Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/3/24 Zak Goldstein 7/3/24

PA Superior Court: Institutional Sexual Assault Statute Does Not Apply to Colleges

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yanovitsky, reversing the defendant’s conviction for institutional sexual assault after concluding that that statute does not apply to colleges and universities.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was a professor at a large state university in Philadelphia. The complainant testified that after class, he dismissed all of the other students, leaving her alone with him in the classroom. He then touched her hair, kissed her forehead, and pressed his penis against her thigh. He also touched her feet and hands, and she said that she did not consent. Her roommate testified that the complainant immediately reported the incident to her and had expressed her concerns about some prior behavior by the same professor. DNA testing revealed the presence of the defendant’s DNA on the complainant’s clothing, but character witnesses testified to the defendant’s good reputation in the community.

The police arrested the defendant, and Philadelphia prosecutors charged him with institutional sexual assault and indecent assault. The jury convicted, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court reversed the institutional sexual assault conviction and affirmed the indecent assault conviction. The Court therefore remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

On appeal, the defendant argued that institutional sexual assault, which is a new offense in Pennsylvania, does not apply to colleges and universities despite the extremely broad language of the statute.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court reversed the institutional sexual assault conviction of primarily because it found that the statute under which he was convicted did not apply to college or university settings.

First, the Court interpreted the statutory language of the institutional sexual assault statute (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2) and concluded that it was intended to protect students in elementary and secondary schools, not those in higher education institutions.

The statute defines “school” to include public or private schools, intermediate units, or area vocational-technical schools. The Court noted that these definitions typically refer to institutions providing education for children and adolescents, not adults in colleges or universities.

The Court looked at dictionary definitions and legal interpretations of the word “school.” Although Merriam-Webster’s definition included colleges and universities, Black’s Law Dictionary and other legal sources suggested that the term “school” in a statute usually refers to institutions for children unless the statute explicitly includes higher education institutions.

The Court also looked at the legislative history and context of the statute. It found that the statute was aimed at protecting younger students from employees and adults in schools. The Governor’s message accompanying amendments to the statute highlighted its focus on protecting children from sexual predators. Additionally, the absence of terms specifically referring to higher education (such as “professor,” “college,” or “university”) in the statute further supported the interpretation that the statute was not meant to cover colleges and universities.

The Court also found that applying the statute to colleges would lead to an absurd result. The Court considered the potential consequences of interpreting the statute to include higher education. It pointed out that if “school” included colleges and universities, any consensual sexual relationship between a college professor and an adult student would be criminalized, which the legislature likely did not intend, especially in cases where the adult student was not even a student of the professor.

Finally, the Superior Court noted that the Commonwealth agreed with the defendant’s argument that the statute did not apply to college or university settings and conceded that his conviction for institutional sexual assault should be vacated.

Therefore, the Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. This case illustrates the fact that although the statute is broad, it does not apply to absolutely everyone in any kind of school setting. Instead, the statute only applies to certain types of schools and to certain employees and other adults in those settings who have “direct contact” as defined by the statute. It does not apply to all employees and all possible types of schools.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/25/24 Zak Goldstein 6/25/24

Speedy Trial Motion Granted in Sexual Assault Case

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire recently won a speedy trial motion to dismiss all charges in a sexual assault case. In Commonwealth v. VK, the client was charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and related charges after the complainant reported that the client had assaulted her years earlier. The complainant did not disclose the alleged abuse for about a decade.

The complainant made a police report, and a detective then obtained an arrest warrant and put the arrest warrant in the system. The detective then did essentially nothing to arrest the client. By then, he had moved to another state. The client was eventually arrested by police in the other state during a random encounter more than two years later and extradited to Philadelphia. Upon his arrival in Philadelphia, he retained Attorney Goldstein. Attorney Goldstein successfully argued for a reasonable bail at preliminary arraignment.

The charges were held for court at the preliminary hearing. Once the case reached the Court of Common Pleas and motions could be filed, Attorney Goldstein immediately filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600(a) of the rules of criminal procedure. In the motion, Attorney Goldstein argued that the charges should be dismissed because the Commonwealth failed to bring the client to trial within 365 days as required by the rule.

Under the rules, the one year deadline for bringing a defendant to trial begins to run on the date on which the complaint is filed. Accordingly, the time during which a defendant has charges filed against them and a complaint pending counts for purposes of the rule unless the Commonwealth exercises due diligence in attempting to locate the defendant but is unable to do so. For example, if a defendant is being held in custody in another state and the other state refuses to extradite the defendant despite the Commonwealth’s attempts to obtain extradition, then the time might not count. Or, if the police conduct records checks and attempt to locate the defendant but are unable to do so despite giving it a good effort, then the time may not count.

Here, the detective who filed the charges testified at a hearing on the motion that he made a couple of phone calls to phone numbers he could not remember when he first filed the charges. He did not call authorities in the other state, he did not have anyone check the addresses in those states, he did not check social media, and he did not ask federal marshals to look for the defendant. Accordingly, Attorney Goldstein argued that the police and prosecutors had failed to exercise due diligence for more than a year from the filing of the complaint.

Ultimately, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judge agreed. The trial judge dismissed all of the charges, and the record can now be expunged. The appellate courts have increasingly enforced the speedy trial rules in Pennsylvania over the last few years. Filing criminal charges against someone is a serious thing, and the Commonwealth is not allowed to just leave cases sitting for years without taking real steps to move the cases forward. Here, the police did nothing to locate and extradite the client despite knowing where he was. This led to pending charges sitting against the client for years. That is exactly what Rule 600 prohibits. Accordingly, the judge dismissed the case.

What is Rule 600?

Rule 600 is Pennsylvania’s speedy trial rule. It applies to felony cases in Philadelphia. Municipal Court misdemeanor cases have a different rule (Rule 1013). Under Rule 600(a), the Commonwealth generally must bring the defendant to trial within 365 days of the filing of the complaint. There are lots of exceptions - defense continuances, continuances due to the court’s schedule, and continuances where the Commonwealth acted with due diligence but could not move forward due to circumstances outside of their control all may not count words the 365 days. But in general, if the case is delayed because the Commonwealth is not ready to proceed without a very good excuse, the time counts against the Commonwealth. Obtaining dismissal under the rule requires filing a written motion in the Court of Common Pleas.

Under Rule 600(b), a defendant in custody because they cannot afford bail may only be held for 180 days before they should be released on nominal bail (usually with house arrest). Again, there are exceptions for defense continuances, but they are more limited. Additionally, the Commonwealth usually responds to a 600(b) speedy trial bail motion by moving to revoke the defendant’s bail. In that case, the trial judge will have to make a determination as to whether the defendant is such a flight risk or danger to the community that bail should be revoked. In less serious cases, the defendant will almost always be released. In more serious cases such as shootings and rapes, this becomes a bigger issue.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed the trial courts to follow the rule and enforce it more reliably over the last few years, and courts have begun to do so. Here, the trial court followed the rule and dismissed the charges.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 6/21/24 Zak Goldstein 6/21/24

PA Supreme Court: Speedy Trial Rule (Rule 600) Runs From Filing of Second Complaint When Commonwealth Acts Diligently

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Womack, holding that the speedy trial rule (Pa.R.Crim.P. 600) runs from the filing of a second related complaint as long as the Commonwealth acted diligently in the prosecution of the case.

The Facts of Womack

On October 6, 2017, Pennsylvania State Trooper Andrew Corl led a search at Tyler and Bobbi Martin's home in Huntingdon County. The search uncovered a large sum of money, drugs, and stolen firearms linked to Marcus Womack. Womack was immediately arrested and charged with nine offenses, including possession with intent to deliver (PWID), conspiracy to commit PWID, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited.

Following his arrest, further investigation revealed Womack's involvement in a larger drug trafficking operation extending to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. This led to a second criminal complaint with additional charges based on new evidence.

The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) took over the case. It conducted a grand jury investigation and ultimately filed the second, more extensive complaint against Womack involving additional charges.

The Rule 600 Motion

Womack eventually moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Commonwealth violated his rights by not bringing him to trial within 365 days as required by Rule 600. Womack argued that the time for speedy trial purposes should start on the date the Commonwealth filed the first complaint. The Commonwealth responded that the time did not begin to run until the filing of the second complaint because the Commonwealth acted with due diligence during the prosecution of the case. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the second complaint was based on new evidence legitimately uncovered during the subsequent investigation. It did not stem from an attempt to violate Rule 600 or Womack’s speedy trial rights.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, opining that the prosecution exercised due diligence in the period between the two complaints. The defendant appealed further, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the appeal. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed, stating that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond the prosecution's control and that the grand jury investigation was a necessary and diligent step. In other words, the police properly arrested Womack when they conducted the initial search. They were not required to wait to bring charges while they investigated further. And once they arrested him, they realized that additional investigation was necessary, so it was not unreasonable for the Commonwealth to later file a second complaint once it uncovered additional evidence of criminal activity. As the Commonwealth never acted with the purpose of delaying trial and investigated the case in a diligent manner, the time ran from the filing of the second complaint, giving the Commonwealth more time to prosecute the defendant.

The key issue in these cases is due diligence. Where the prosecution acts with due diligence, the time runs from the second complaint and the prosecution will have more time to bring the defendant to trial. Where the prosecution acts without due diligence (such as in letting a case get dismissed because it failed to make sure that witnesses showed up for court), the time will run from the first complaint and a speedy trial motion may be successful. In this case, all of the courts involved found that the prosecution acted with due diligence. The prosecution's efforts to investigate further after the first complaint demonstrated due diligence. The grand jury process was crucial to uncovering the full extent of Womack's criminal activities. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the timeline for Rule 600 starts from the filing of the second complaint if it arises from new evidence and the prosecution acts diligently.

These cases are generally fact specific. In this case, the prosecution did not really do anything unfair to intentionally or even negligently cause delays. The first arrest led to a broader investigation that uncovered evidence that supported additional charges, so it was not unreasonable for the Commonwealth to file a second complaint. The Commonwealth acted with due diligence, so it had the benefit of Rule 600’s deadline being calculated from the date the second complaint was filed rather than the first.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 6/10/24 Zak Goldstein 6/10/24

PA Superior Court: Police Justified in Searching Backpack Defendant Abandoned After Fleeing Into Someone Else’s Home

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Coles, reversing the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress a gun. The Court found that the trial court should have found that police properly searched the defendant’s bag after the defendant fled from a lawful police stop, ran into someone else’s house without permission, and abandoned the bag containing the illegal gun.

The Facts of Coles

Two Philadelphia police officers were on patrol in September 2020. They observed the defendant and other individuals smoking what appeared to be marijuana on a street corner. The officers approached the defendant to investigate. The defendant immediately fled into a nearby house. When police saw her, she was carrying a black North Face backpack .

The police followed her into the house. Once they got in the house, they found the backpack abandoned in the kitchen. The officers searched it and found a gun in the bag. They arrested the defendant and confirmed that she did not have a license to carry the firearm in the bag.

The Motion to Suppress

Prosecutors charged the defendant with carrying a concealed firearm without a license in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106 as well as carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. She filed a motion to suppress the gun, arguing that the police did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the backpack. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's decision granting the motion to suppress to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and the Superior Court reversed.

The Court found that the defendant had voluntarily abandoned the backpack when she fled into a property she had no permission to enter. According to Pennsylvania law, an individual who abandons property cannot later contest its search and seizure. The court noted that abandonment is a matter of intent, inferred from actions and circumstances. Here, the defendant’s act of leaving the backpack behind while fleeing from police indicated her intent to abandon it, thereby forfeiting any reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court emphasized that the police did not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search an abandoned item.

Notably, this was not a situation involving “forced abandonment.” If someone flees from the police or abandons property as a direct result of illegal police conduct, then it may still be possible to successfully move to suppress the abandoned property. For example, if the police attempt to stop someone without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the person runs and tosses a gun, it may still be possible to suppress the gun in state court because the gun was only abandoned as a result of the illegal stop. But here, there was no issue of forced abandonment because both the trial court and the Superior Court believed that the police had reasonable suspicion to approach the defendant to investigate the illegal marijuana use. The police officers’s suspicions regarding the marijuana and the defendant’s immediate flight and abandonment of the backpack provided them with the necessary level of suspicion to conduct the search. It is also important to note that although the doctrine of forced abandonment applies in Pennsylvania state court, it generally does not apply in federal court. As a general rule, running away and discarding contraband will not help your case, but in some cases in Pennsylvania, it may still be possible to argue that the initial unlawful police conduct requires suppression of the evidence. Unfortunately, this case does not appear to be one of them.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys