Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/11/22 Zak Goldstein 8/11/22

PA Superior Court: Police May Enter Car Without Search Warrant if Contraband in Plain View

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer — Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. McMahon, holding that the police legally searched the defendant’s car despite not obtaining a search warrant because they entered the car only to obtain contraband which was in plain view. The plain view exception allows the police to conduct a warrantless search where an object of an incriminating nature is viewed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point. The Superior Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating evidence that had been obtained from his car.

Commonwealth v. McMahon

The defendant was stopped by two officers on patrol. The two officers conducted a traffic stop because they knew the defendant did not have a valid driver’s license from prior encounters. One of the officers, Sergeant Harrison Maddox, testified that he smelled marijuana and observed two burnt cigarettes containing marijuana in the cupholder of the car. The officers then detained and searched the defendant, finding one and a half pills that were later determined to be Oxycodone. Sergeant Maddox then searched the defendant’s vehicle and found three bags of marijuana.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. In this case, he sought to suppress the marijuana cigarettes, bags of marijuana, and Oxycodone pills. During the suppression hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress the bags of marijuana recovered but denied suppression of the marijuana cigarettes and Oxycodone pills. The defendant was found guilty of possessing a controlled substance and possessing marijuana after a stipulated non-jury trial.

The defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence under the plain view doctrine because the officers did not have the right of access to items inside the vehicle, and there was also no exigency to justify the seizure. The court denied that motion, and the defendant appealed.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court reviewed the relevant law and precedent regarding the plain view exception and denied the appeal. First, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment provides that individuals cannot be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrant for probable cause is required before an officer may search for or seize evidence. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides additional protections for individuals, providing that probable cause and exigent circumstances must exist in order to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle. There are, however, exceptions that may justify a warrantless search. Some examples include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the automobile exception, the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.

Here, the Superior Court found that the plain view exception applies to a search of a vehicle where the police enter the car to obtain contraband which they can see from outside of the car. In order for the plain view exception to apply: 1) the officer must see the evidence from a lawful vantage point, 2) the object must be of an obviously incriminating nature, and 3) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object.

The trial court had concluded that Sergeant Maddox testified that the object clearly had an incriminating nature, as the cigarettes both looked and smelled like marijuana, so the officer had a lawful right of access to the cigarettes. Sergeant Maddox saw the cigarettes in plain view upon approaching the vehicle, so he seized the cigarettes to prevent the destruction of evidence, and he subsequently arrested the defendant.

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On appeal, the defendant attacked the third prong of the test. Specifically, he argued that the police did not seize the item from a place for which they had obtained lawful access because they did not have the right to physically enter the car without a warrant. The defendant relied on Commonwealth v. Alexander to support his argument, but the Superior Court determined that Alexander did not address the plain view exception to a warrantless search; instead, it addressed the automobile exception. It also did not address exigent circumstances at all. In this case, the Superior Court determined that because the cigarettes were in plain view, the officer had the right to go in the car and retrieve it without getting a warrant regardless of whether exigent circumstances existed. Therefore, the Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s judgment of sentence and the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

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Zak Goldstein 7/27/22 Zak Goldstein 7/27/22

PA Supreme Court: Police Often Must Get Search Warrant to Obtain Homicide-by-DUI Defendant's Blood from Hospital

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, holding that the defendant’s blood was illegally seized for drug testing because the police obtained it from a hospital without getting a search warrant. The Commonwealth had attempted to use various statutes and theories to justify the warrantless seizure, but because no exigent circumstances were present which would justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court ruled that the police violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court therefore suppressed the blood results.

Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams

The defendant drove his car at about two miles per hour over train tracks, where a train collided with his vehicle. The train pushed it for a quarter of a mile before it stopped moving. The defendant and his daughter were transported to a hospital, while his fiancée who had also been in the car was pronounced dead at the scene.

Lieutenant Steven Lutz, the officer in charge, spoke to several individuals who explained that the defendant’s car smelled like burnt marijuana. Lieutenant Lutz told Sergeant Keith Farren to interview the defendant and obtain a legal blood draw. A legal blood draw requires consent or a search warrant from a subject before being seized for testing. Sergeant Farren determined that the defendant was not conscious enough to give consent, as he had been drifting in and out of consciousness. This would often justify a warrantless search under the Supreme Court’s case law, but prior to obtaining the blood, the officer learned that the hospital had already drawn the defendant’s blood.

Sergeant Farren completed paperwork authorizing the defendant’s blood to be tested, and it was revealed that the defendant’s blood contained Delta-9 THC, an ingredient in marijuana. The defendant was arrested and charged with homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, II, or III metabolite, DUI: general impairment, careless driving, careless driving – unintentional death, aggravated assault while DUI, and aggravated assault by vehicle.

The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the blood test results, arguing that the police did not have probable cause that he was driving under the influence, that his blood was seized without a warrant, and that Section 3755, which allows the police to obtain blood from a hospital without a warrant, did not justify the seizure.

Of note, Section 3755 states that if a person who is suspected to be DUI must seek medical treatment, then a physician must take blood samples from the individual and transmit them within 24 hours to the Department of Health or a laboratory for testing. These results then may be released to the individual tested, his attorney, his physician or government officials.

During the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Lutz testified that the defendant’s blood was obtained through a legal blood draw, citing Section 3755. Notably, Sergeant Farren never referenced Section 3755 during his testimony, instead explaining that he attempted to obtain the defendant’s blood through an implied consent form. Both officers acknowledged that they could have obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood but did not do so.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, stating that the blood test results were admissible under the exigent circumstances exception. The defendant’s trial by jury commenced, and the Commonwealth admitted his blood test results. The defendant was found guilty of DUI offenses, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, aggravated assault while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle, and careless driving.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The defendant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence, but this motion was denied. He then appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his first motion to suppress evidence. He argued that the Commonwealth did not comply with Section 3755, that even if the Commonwealth had complied with Section 3755, this compliance alone is insufficient to overcome the warrant requirement, and that there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court concluded that the original finding of exigency was erroneous because there was no urgent need for Sergeant Farren to dispense with obtaining a search warrant for the seizure of the defendant’s blood test results. The Superior Court agreed with this opinion. As the hospital had already preserved the blood evidence, Sergeant Farren had plenty of time to obtain a warrant. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted and remanded for a new trial.

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to address whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow legal precedent in holding that Section 3755 does not independently support implied consent and whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow the legal precedent from Mitchell v. Wisconsin by finding that exigent circumstances did not exist to support a warrantless testing of the defendant’s blood. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and agreed to hear the appeal.

The Supreme Court ultimately decided with the defendant. The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth’s Mitchell argument. In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court found that exigency almost always exists when the police need to obtain blood from an unconscious defendant because the defendant cannot be asked to consent and any controlled substances in the blood quickly begin to dissipate. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argued that exigency was established due to probable cause that the defendant was driving under the influence of marijuana, he had to be transported to the hospital, he was not fully conscious, and he was unable to communicate with Sergeant Farren. The Commonwealth further agued that the police could not have applied for a search warrant as they had other duties to attend to regarding the crash and other emergencies.

The defendant argued that the police officers testified that they could have obtained a search warrant during his trial. The seizure occurred after the blood was drawn, meaning the blood had already been preserved and nothing would dissipate, but testing did not occur until three days later, demonstrating a lack of exigency.

The Supreme Court concluded that there was no exigency because there was very little chance that the blood evidence would be destroyed if the officers took time to obtain a search warrant. The blood evidence had been properly preserved in this case.

The Supreme Court also addressed the Commonwealth’s argument about Section 3755 and concluded that the Commonwealth did not adhere to the requirements of the statute. Sergeant Farren did not comply with Section 3755; specifically, in his paperwork to obtain the defendant’s blood, he invoked 75 Pa.S.C.A. 1547. He also sought the defendant out to obtain consent, which is not necessary when invoking Section 3755, and there was no mention during the trial that any emergency room personnel took the defendant’s blood due to adherence to Section 3755. The Supreme Court also vacated the portion of the Superior Court’s holding that Section 3755 was unconstitutional because it determined that Section 3755 did not legally apply to this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately found that police violated the defendant’s rights and that the blood evidence should be suppressed. It remanded the case for a new trial. Thus, where the hospital has already preserved a suspect’s blood, the police must get a search warrant prior to seizing that blood from the hospital. They may not rely on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

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Zak Goldstein 7/15/22 Zak Goldstein 7/15/22

Pennsylvania Increases Penalties for Multiple Driving Under the Influence Offenses

The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted a new law which significantly increases the penalty for third and subsequent driving under the influence (“DUI”) offenses. The law, which is nicknamed Deana’s Law, provides that a third DUI within ten years will now be a third degree felony instead of a first degree misdemeanor. Further, a defendant who has three or more DUIs within the prior ten years will face a second degree felony should they again get arrested for DUI rather than what would previously have been a felony of the third degree. Previously, a third degree was a misdemeanor rather than a felony.

This change increases the potential maximum sentence for a DUI conviction because a misdemeanor of the first degree is punishable by up to five years in prison, while a third degree felony conviction may result in seven years in prison and a second degree felon may result in up to ten years’ incarceration.

The law also increases the potential mandatory minimums for a defendant who has to serve sentences for multiple DUI offenses at the same time. The law provides that anyone who has two or more prior offenses must serve a DUI sentence consecutively to any other DUI sentence. This means that if a defendant gets arrested for a third and fourth DUI and is sentenced for both cases, the judge cannot run the two sentences concurrently. Instead, the judge must run them consecutively. As a third degree DUI is normally punishable by a mandatory minimum of one to two years’ incarceration in a state prison, this means that a third and fourth DUI would result in a mandatory two to four years’ incarceration rather than the possibility of a concurrent one to two years’ incarceration on each count.

The law also directs the sentencing commission to provide a sentencing enhancement for a refusal of chemical testing under certain situations. Accordingly, the new law substantially increases the potential penalties for picking up multiple DUI cases in a ten year period.

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Zak Goldstein 7/12/22 Zak Goldstein 7/12/22

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein Wins Motion to Suppress Drugs in Possession with the Intent to Deliver Case

Criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a motion to suppress a significant quantity of fentanyl, heroin, and pills in a case in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. In Commonwealth v. B.R., police alleged that they responded to a 911 call for a report of a person screaming. When they arrived on the scene, they did not see a disturbance or hear anyone screaming, but they did observe the defendant’s car double parked in the middle of the road with the engine running. The defendant approached the police, and the police asked him if he knew to whom the car belonged. The defendant responded that it was his car.

The police walked over to the vehicle, and they claimed that they were able to smell marijuana coming from the car. They ran the defendant’s identification and determined that the defendant had a bench warrant from missing court in another case. They therefore placed him under arrest and put him in the back of the patrol car. They also claimed that while they were arresting him, he began cursing at them and saying things about guns and knives being in the car. The police asked if they could search the car, and the defendant purportedly told them that they could search it. The officers then performed a “consent search” and recovered a significant quantity of heroin, fentanyl, and oxycodone pills. The police charged B.R. with Possession with the Intent to Deliver (“PWID”) and related charges.

B.R. retained Attorney Goldstein for his case, and after reviewing the matter, Attorney Goldstein immediately filed a motion to suppress the drugs that were recovered from the car. Attorney Goldstein alleged that the drugs were illegally recovered by the police because the police failed to obtain a search warrant for the car, the consent obtained from B.R. was invalid, and the police had failed to give B.R. his Miranda warnings prior to interrogating him.

The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas held a hearing on the motion to suppress at which the officers testified to many of the above allegations. The Commonwealth based its arguments as to the legality of the search on the officers’ claims that B.R. had in fact consented to a search of the vehicle, leading to the recovery of the drugs. Under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitution, however, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a suspect has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligent consented to a search before the police may conduct such a search. As the police did not obtain a search warrant and there was no real claim that this search was performed out of a concern for officer safety, the Commonwealth attempted to show that B.R. had consented.

The trial court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument. First, following Attorney Goldstein’s cross-examination of the officer, the court found that the officer’s testimony was not credible because it did not make any sense that the defendant would consent to a search of his car when the car contained a large amount of drugs. The officer also struggled to recall details regarding the search or exactly what the defendant had supposedly said when giving consent. Second, the court found that the defendant did not voluntarily give consent to the search. Under Pennsylvania law, the consent to a search must be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. It may not be the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne. A court must look at the totality of the circumstances in determining whether consent was freely given. Here, the police had arrested the defendant, failed to give him Miranda warnings, failed to tell him that he had the right to refuse the search, and failed to comply with their own directives which required them to consult with a supervisor and have the defendant sign a consent to search form prior to conducting the search of the vehicle.

Accordingly, the court found the officers’ testimony not credible and that the defendant had not actually consented. The court granted Attorney Goldstein’s motion to suppress, and the Commonwealth was forced to withdraw the charges. On paper, this case looked difficult – the car smelled like marijuana, the defendant had an arrest warrant, the police recovered a lot of drugs, and the defendant had supposedly consented to the search, thereby eliminating the need for a search warrant. Through cross-examination and the use of the case law on consent searches, which is often helpful to the defense, Attorney Goldstein was able to convince the trial court that the police had violated B.R.’s constitutional rights and win the case.