Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/17/22 Zak Goldstein 5/17/22

PA Superior Court Finds Rule 600 Fully Suspended Due to COVID Emergency Even Where Delay Not Due to COVID Emergency

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Carl, holding that the trial court improperly granted a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss by ignoring the fact that the rule had been suspended due to a locally declared judicial emergency. This case is significant because it limits a defendant’s ability to get his case dismissed on Rule 600 grounds because of judicial orders that were put into place during COVID-19 pandemic. Throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, many judicial districts suspended Rule 600 even though they were still actively hearing criminal cases. Because of Carl, a defendant is precluded from using time if it was expressly written in a local judicial order even if that same judicial district was still hearing criminal cases during the time period in question.

Commonwealth v. Carl

In July 2020, the defendant was charged with simple assault and summary harassment in York County. He had a preliminary hearing in August 2020. The defendant then filed a waiver of arraignment in September 2020. The defendant was then scheduled for a plea date in November 2020, but then the defendant’s case was scheduled for trial date in January 2021. However, after the defendant’s case got continued, York County issued an emergency order that suspended jury trials from November 30, 2020 to February 28, 2021. The defendant’s case was not called for trial until October 2021. At this time, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s speedy trial motion. At the hearing, the defendant argued that 485 days had passed since the filing of the criminal complaint. He conceded that there were 46 days of excludable time in his case. The Commonwealth argued that the time from June 29, 2020 to August 31, 2020 should also be excluded because the York County Court of Common pleas was operating under a Covid-19 related judicial emergency declaration that was issued by the President Judge. As part of this declaration, the President Judge “suspended statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial.” Further, any case that was postponed by the judicial emergency would be considered a court postponement and constitute as excludable time for purposes of Rule 600.

The Commonwealth and the defendant agreed that that the emergency order had not actually contributed to any delay in litigating the defendant’s case. The trial court noted that there was no discernable backlog of pending criminal trials in York County during this period of time. The trial court also produced a list of 15 criminal cases with less Rule 600 urgency than the defendant’s case that the Commonwealth elected to bring to trial before the defendant’s case. Consequently, the trial court did not consider the York County judicial emergency order and also concluded that the Commonwealth had not demonstrated appropriate time management in the defendant’s case. Therefore, the trial court found that the Commonwealth had not acted with due diligence throughout the proceedings to bring the case to trial in compliance with Rule 600 and thus granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Commonwealth then filed an appeal.

What is Rule 600?

Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Criminal Procedure provides that “trial in a court case in which a written criminal complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” In calculating the Rule 600 deadline, the courts do not necessarily count all the time following the filing of the complaint. Instead, the courts will consider periods of delay at any state of the proceedings which were caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence. If there are other periods of delay (i.e. a defendant takes a continuance) then that time shall be excluded from the computation. If enough time passes where the Commonwealth was not diligent in putting up its case against a defendant, then a defense attorney may file a motion to dismiss with prejudice. The appellate courts were very hostile to these motions for a long time, but more recently, they have begun to enforce the rule more consistently.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Opinion

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the lower court’s decision. In making its decision, the Superior Court reviewed the judicial emergency order that was issued by the President Judge in York County. In that order, it specifically stated that “during the emergency…statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial [is suspended.” Therefore, this meant that all Rule 600 computations in criminal cases were to be held in abeyance and defendants could not include this time period in their Rule 600 calculations. As such, the Superior Court found that the defendant’s new adjusted run date was December 2021 and therefore the trial court improperly granted his motion to dismiss. Consequently, the defendant will now have to face trial on the charges against him.

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Criminal Defense Lawyers — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 5/12/22 Zak Goldstein 5/12/22

New Trial Ordered by PA Superior Court for Client Convicted of Sexual Assault

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a new trial for a client who had been convicted of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. In the case of Commonwealth v. G.W., the defendant was convicted following a jury trial on charges of allegedly molesting a girlfriend’s young daughter. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a state prison sentence of thirty - sixty years’ incarceration. This would have been a life sentence for G.W.

Attorney Goldstein represented G.W. on appeal and was able to successfully convince the Pennsylvania Superior Court to overturn the conviction. At trial, the complainant had made a number of inconsistent statements about the details relating to the allegations - each time she was interviewed by the authorities, she had told markedly different stories about the illegal acts involved, where they allegedly took place, whether other people were home, and whether she had told anyone. It was also very clear that there were significant reasons for her to potentially fabricate the story. The jury, however, convicted in part due to highly improper testimony from one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses.

As a general rule, when a juvenile complainant makes an allegation that they have been the victim of some kind of crime in Philadelphia, the complainant is typically interviewed by forensic interviewers at the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance. The interviewers have some level of training on interviewing children regarding sensitive allegations, and the videos are recorded so that they can be reviewed by law enforcement and potentially used at trial. In this case, the Commonwealth called a supervisor from the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance to testify regarding the process that that agency uses for investigating these types of cases and conducting the interviews. The supervisor then confirmed that the complainant had undergone an interview and that the agency had recorded it. The Commonwealth then played the video-taped interview for the jury.

On cross-examination, the criminal defense attorney questioned the supervisor on whether the complainant had made a number of inconsistent statements both during the interview as well as to police officers and other witnesses. The supervisor confirmed that she had. On re-direct, without qualifying the supervisor as an expert witness, the Commonwealth then asked the supervisor if it was normal for children to have trouble giving consistent statements. Obviously taking the prosecutor’s hint, the supervisor immediately testified that this type of thing happens all of the time, that children have trouble remembering such traumatic events, and that as they become more comfortable, the stories often evolve. In other words, the supervisor suggested that the jurors should not concern themselves with the fact that the statements had changed repeatedly because such a thing is normal and perfectly consistently with a child complainant who is telling the truth.

Fortunately, the trial attorney objected to this improper expert testimony. The PCA supervisor had not been qualified as an expert witness to testify about the typical responses of alleged sexual assault victims, and the defense had not been provided with any notice that the Commonwealth would try to offer this type of testimony to explain away the wildly inconsistent statements which the complainant had made. The trial judge allowed the introduction of the testimony over the defense’s objection. Having been re-assured that it did not need to worry about the inconsistent statements, the jury convicted.

G.W. appealed. Attorney Goldstein argued to the Superior Court that the improper admission of this unqualified expert testimony had unfairly prejudiced the jurors against G.W. and that G.W. should receive a new trial. This testimony was not supported by any research, the supervisors qualifications were not provided to the defense, and the defense had not been given any notice that it would need to prepare to try to rebut this type of testimony. Had the defense been given notice, it could have considered retaining its own experts, doing additional research, and the defense could have prepared to cross examine the supervisor to show that this type of conclusion is not reliable. The Superior Court agreed. The Court recognized that testimony regarding the typical response of a sexual assault victim is clearly expert testimony and that such testimony is not necessarily admissible. Even in cases where this type of testimony may be admissible, the defense is entitled to notice and expert reports so that the defense can properly prepare for trial instead of being ambushed with unfair, unproven expert testimony. Accordingly, the Superior Court ordered that G.W. receive a new trial. The thirty to sixty year sentence has been vacated as a result of Attorney Goldstein’s successful arguments on appeal.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers Demetra Mehta and Zak Goldstein

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won new trials on appeal and in PCRA litigation for clients charged with crimes as serious as sexual assault and first degree murder. Pennsylvania criminal appeals are a complicated and highly technical area of the law, and just because a lawyer has defended clients at trial does not mean that they have the level of expertise and knowledge necessary to making winning arguments in the appellate courts. Our lawyers have that critical skill and experience. We offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/30/22 Zak Goldstein 4/30/22

PA Superior Court: Defendants Should Generally Be Allowed to Withdraw Guilty Pleas Before Sentencing

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Garcia, holding that sufficient evidence was presented to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. This decision is significant in multiple ways. First, the Court re-committed to the general rule that a defendant should usually be allowed to withdraw a pre-sentence guilty plea. Second, it also illustrates the importance of creating a thorough record at these types of hearings. In its opinion, the Superior Court highlighted the lack of details in the trial record, but the Court found that the defendant had presented enough evidence to have his guilty plea withdrawn. At the same time, it found the Commonwealth had done a poor job of showing why it would be substantially prejudiced if the defendant’s guilty plea was withdrawn. Because the prosecution did not make an adequate record, there was not enough evidentiary support to deny the defendant’s appeal.

Commonwealth v. Garcia

Easton police were called for a report of a sexual assault in progress. Upon arrival, they met with the complainant, who stated that her ex-boyfriend, the defendant, had climbed the exterior of her apartment building onto her deck and entered the residence through a sliding glass patio door without her consent. Once inside, he proceeded to force her to engage in sexual intercourse without her consent. She also had an active protection from abuse order against the defendant.

The police located the defendant, who was hiding in the bushes outside of her apartment building. The complainant was then taken to the hospital where she underwent a sexual assault examination kit that was sent to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab to be analyzed. The defendant’s DNA came back as being seminal material found on the complainant’s vaginal swab. They also found the defendant’s DNA under the complainant’s fingernails because she had told the police she tried to defend herself while the assault was going on.

Before a trial date was even set, the Commonwealth and the defendant negotiated a guilty plea where the defendant would serve four to eight years’ incarceration followed by two years of reporting probation for the crime of sexual assault. The defendant then entered into the plea, but his sentencing was deferred to determine whether he qualified as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”). Prior to his sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea in which he asserted his innocence. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant offered only a bare and implausible assertion of innocence given his incriminating statements shortly after the assault. The Commonwealth also argued prejudice, citing the difficulty the victim experienced in testifying at the preliminary hearing, her relief at learning of the defendant’s guilty plea, her anxiety at learning that the defendant wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, and the difficulty of finding another sexual assault expert because their expert had conducted the defendant’s SVP evaluation and therefore could no longer testify at trial. The Commonwealth claimed that were no other “local” experts.

The court held a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. At the hearing, the defense moved the preliminary hearing transcript into evidence. The defendant argued that the transcript suggested that he had a viable consent defense. Specifically, he argued that transcript made clear that the he had a previous relationship with the complainant and that she had allowed him inside her residence a week before the alleged assault. The defendant did not testify at this hearing. At the conclusion of arguments, the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant then filed a second pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. This second pre-sentence motion was denied without a hearing. The defendant was subsequently sentenced, and he then filed a timely appeal.

Can a Defendant Withdraw a Guilty Plea Before He is Sentenced?

Yes, a defendant is permitted to withdraw a guilty plea before he is sentenced. However, there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Trial courts have discretion in determining whether a defendant can withdraw his guilty plea, but such discretion is to be administered liberally in favor of the accused. Additionally, any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. A fair and just reason exists where the defendant makes a claim of innocence that is at least plausible. However, trial courts are also supposed to consider the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with the relationship of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence. Finally, trial courts should also consider any ulterior or illicit motive by the defendant for withdrawing his guilty plea.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded his case back to the trial court so that he could have a trial. The Superior Court reviewed the record in this case, which it described as “poorly developed.” Nonetheless, the Superior Court found that the defendant made a prompt motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that the preliminary hearing notes did in fact establish that the complainant allowed the defendant inside her home a week before the alleged assault and that he had a prior relationship with her. According to the Superior Court, these facts established “more than the bare ‘makeweight’ assertion of innocence.”

Additionally, there was no strong evidence presented at the sentencing hearing to undermine the plausibility of the defendant’s consent defense. Further, this guilty plea was not entered on the eve of trial as no trial date had been set. Additionally, the Superior Court was unpersuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that it would be substantially prejudiced by the withdrawal of the defendant’s guilty plea. In part, because the Commonwealth did not develop the record sufficiently enough to show how it would be prejudiced. As such, the Superior Court found that the defendant proffered a timely and plausible basis for withdrawing his guilty plea and therefore he will be able to go to trial on these charges.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 4/15/22 Zak Goldstein 4/15/22

PA Superior Court: Police May Not Enter House Based on Consent From Person Who Clearly Does Not Live in House

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lehnerd, holding that actual or apparent authority must be established before an officer may enter a residence. Evidence obtained from a warrantless search and without permission to enter from a person with actual or apparent authority is illegally obtained and must be suppressed. Where police know that the person giving the consent to enter the house does not actually have authority to grant permission, they may not enter the house without a warrant.

Commonwealth v. Lehnerd

Two Pennsylvania State Police troopers found the defendant’s pickup truck overturned on a highway after responding to a dispatch call about a one-vehicle accident. The driver was not present. One of the troopers searched for registration documents in the truck and found empty beer cans. A neighbor informed the troopers that the driver had asked to borrow their phone to call for a ride and the driver smelled of alcohol. The troopers ran the license plates on the vehicle and determined that the defendant was the owner and found their address. The defendant’s parents then arrived at the scene and informed the troopers that the defendant owned the car, and they had driven the defendant home.

After leaving the scene, the troopers drove to the defendant’s home and knocked on the door. No one came to the door. While the troopers were waiting, the defendant’s parents arrived, and the defendant’s mother told the troopers that she believed the defendant was home. The troopers asked if the defendant’s mother could let them in, and she did so. The troopers entered the defendant’s house and escorted him out to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant was arrested for intoxication based on the tests, and he submitted to a blood alcohol breath test at the local State Police barracks, where it was shown that his blood alcohol level was .163%.

The defendant was charged with DUI General Impairment Incapable of Driving Safely, DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, Abandoning Vehicle on a Highway, and Failure to Activate Hazard Lamps, in addition to three other Vehicle Code offenses. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his house due to the troopers’ warrantless entry into his house and the subsequent illegal seizure.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to suppress on the grounds that the defendant’s mother had apparent authority to give consent for the troopers to enter the defendant’s house. The defendant was convicted of DUI General Impairment Incapable of Driving Safely, DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, Abandoning Vehicle on a Highway, and Failure to Activate Hazard Lamps. The defendant filed a post sentence motion seeking a new trial, which was denied. The defendant filed an appeal, continuing to argue that the evidence from his house was illegally obtained.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s DUI convictions and remanded for a new trial, granting the motion to suppress evidence. The defendant argued that his mother had neither actual nor apparent authority to permit the troopers to enter his home, and the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Although a warrant is typically needed for an officer to enter a home, voluntary consent is an exception to this requirement. An occupant with authority over the premises may consent to an officer’s entry and search. The officer must demonstrate reason to believe that an individual has apparent authority to grant permission for entry.

The Superior Court reviewed relevant cases to make its decision. If an individual is not inside the house to let an officer in and they do not tell the officer that they are a current occupant, the officer cannot legally search the house despite the individual informing the officer they can enter. The fact that the person who gave consent in this case was the defendant’s mother did not constitute apparent authority because the defendant was an adult who clearly lived in a separate residence from his mother. The defendant’s mother was not already inside the house and showed no evidence of occupying the house, such as having a key, when she informed the troopers that they could enter the defendant’s house. In fact, one of the troopers testified that they were aware the defendant’s mother did not live there and was not staying there. Due to the defendant’s mother’s lack of apparent or actual authority to grant permission of entry, the Superior Court remanded for a new trial.