Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/10/20 Zak Goldstein 4/10/20

PA Department of Corrections to Establish Temporary Program to Reprieve Sentences of Incarceration

The Department of Corrections has provided the following information regarding temporary releases from prison for state inmates who are close to completing their sentences:

Harrisburg, PA – Under the authority granted to him by the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Emergency Management Services Code, Governor Tom Wolf today ordered Department of Corrections officials to establish a Temporary Program to Reprieve Sentences of Incarceration to help aid the department in the transfer of qualifying individuals to community corrections facilities or home confinement amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Wolf Administration continues to take every possible action – and asks all Pennsylvanians to do the same – to help stop the spread of COVID-19. These actions, including those in the state corrections system, will save lives, help stop the spread of the virus and avoid overwhelming our already-burdened health care system.

“We can reduce our non-violent prison population and leave fewer inmates at risk for contracting COVID-19 while maintaining public safety with this program,” Gov. Wolf said. “I am pleased to direct the Department of Corrections to begin the process to release vulnerable and non-violent inmates at or nearing their release dates in an organized way that maintain supervision post-release and ensures home and health care plans are in place for all reentrants.”

The Temporary Program to Reprieve Sentences of Incarceration Program only applies to state prison inmates who have been identified as being non-violent and who otherwise would be eligible for release within the next 9 months or who are considered at high risk for complications of coronavirus and are within 12 months of their release.

“Just as everyone in the community is dealing with COVID-19, the state prison system is doing the same,” Corrections Sec. John Wetzel said. “We must reduce our inmate population to be able to manage this virus. Without this temporary program, we are risking the health, and potentially lives, of employees and inmates. We can safely release individuals to the community to reduce their vulnerability and allow the department to successfully manage COVID-19.

“Without any current legislation, we are moving forward with the understanding that future legislation could further advance these efforts.”

As of this morning, there are 11 COVID-19 cases at one prison, SCI Phoenix in Montgomery County, but concern for cases spreading to other facilities is another reason for the expedited release of eligible inmates.

Under the temporary reprieve program, approximately 1,500 to 1,800 inmates would be eligible, although given the reentry challenges of ensuring connection to the health care and behavioral health system, housing and food security, the number will likely be less than the eligible pool.

Vulnerable inmates will include inmates aged 65 or older; anyone with an autoimmune disorder; pregnant inmates; anyone with a serious, chronic medical condition such as heart disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, bone marrow or organ transplantation, severe obesity, kidney disease, liver disease,[and] cancer; or another medical condition that places them at higher risk for complications of coronavirus as defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The releases could begin as early as Tuesday, April 14.

Sec. Wetzel stressed that a thorough reentry component has been developed to ensure inmates will be successful.

“While we need to release inmates to protect them and to allow us space to mitigate the impact of the virus in our system, we also know that we need to prepare inmates for release,” Sec. Wetzel said. “Our reentry plans will include several days of release planning with the inmate, preparing and connecting the inmate to treatment programs in the community, release transportation and a complete medical screening to ensure that we are not releasing sick inmates. We’ll also provide them with an appropriate medication supply and connect them to medical providers in the community.”

While on temporary reprieve, individuals will be monitored similarly to parolees and will be supervised by parole agents. Upon expiration of the order, individuals would be returned to prison to complete any remaining portion of their sentences.

A copy of the governor’s order can be found as a PDF here or on Scribd.

Find the latest information, including a daily dashboard, on the DOC’s COVID-19 efforts here.

Find the latest information on the coronavirus here.

MEDIA CONTACTS: Lyndsay Kensinger, Governor’s Office, RA-GVGOVPRESS@pa.gov
Susan McNaughton, DOC, smcnaughto@pa.gov
Maria Finn, DOC, mfinn@pa.gov

Zak Goldstein 4/7/20 Zak Goldstein 4/7/20

US Supreme Court: Police Have Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Car Where Owner Has Revoked Driver’s License

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Kansas v. Glover, holding that a Kansas deputy sheriff had reasonable suspicion to pull over a car after running the car’s license plate and learning that the registered owner had a revoked driver’s license. This is an absolutely disastrous decision for privacy and civil rights as it almost goes without saying that the mere fact that the car is registered to a particular owner tells the police absolutely nothing about whether or not the owner is actually driving the car or whether the driver of the car has a valid driver’s license. This decision continues a trend of anti-fourth amendment rulings from the United States Supreme Court in the context of automobile stops.

The Facts of Glover

Glover had an unusual set of facts in that instead of actually calling live witnesses for a motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated to a certain set of facts. In this case, the defendant was charged with driving as a habitual violator under a Kansas traffic law. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the stop of his car. At the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to the following facts:

Deputy Mark Mehrer is a certified law enforcement officer employed by the Douglas County Kansas Sheriff’s Office.
On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mehrer was on routine patrol in Douglas County when he observed a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ.
Deputy Mehrer ran Kansas plate 295ATJ through the Kansas Department of Revenue’s file service. The registration came back to a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck.
Kansas Department of Revenue files indicated the truck was registered to Charles Glover Jr. The files also indicated that Mr. Glover had a revoked driver’s license in the State of Kansas.
Deputy Mehrer assumed the registered owner of the truck was also the driver, Charles Glover Jr.
Deputy Mehrer did not observe any traffic infractions, and did not attempt to identify the driver [of] the truck. Based solely on the information that the registered owner of the truck was revoked, Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop.
The driver of the truck was identified as the defendant, Charles Glover Jr.

Obviously, this is not the normal way that a motion to suppress is litigated. Normally, the Commonwealth or Government would be held to the burden of proving that a stop occurred in a constitutional manner. In order to do so, the Government would have to call live witnesses to testify as to what happened, and the credibility and observations of those witnesses would be subject to attack on cross-examination. Here, the parties agreed to the above stipulations, leaving only the narrow legal issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car where the registered owner’s license was suspended and where the officer had not seen anything to suggest that the driver was not in fact the owner.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court reversed again, finding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion without taking any steps to determine who the actual driver was before pulling over the car.

The United States Supreme Court’s Decision

The United States Supreme Court accepted the appeal and reversed again, finding that the sheriff had reasonable suspicion to stop the car despite the fact that the sheriff based his decision solely on the fact that the driver’s license of the registered owner was listed as revoked. The sheriff had obtained no other evidence, did not know who was actually driving the car, and had seen no other traffic violations. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that it was reasonable for the sheriff to assume that Glover was driving the car and make the stop.

This is a terrible decision. Reasonable suspicion typically requires an individualized, reasonable belief based on all of the facts and circumstances that some sort of criminal activity is afoot. Here, the sheriff clearly did not have that because he had not seen who was driving the car and any number of people could have borrowed Glover’s car. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled against the defendant.

Despite this ruling, there are still ways to litigate a motion to suppress in Philadelphia, PA based on similar facts. First, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that reasonable suspicion would not have existed had the officer observed that someone else was driving the car or that the person driving the car could not have been Grover based on age, race, or other physical characteristics. Second, the concurrence noted that reasonable suspicion existed in this case in part due to the nature of the Kansas statute which led to Glover’s license revocation. Glover’s license had been revoked due to repeated violations of Kansas’s traffic laws, which may give rise to an inference that he is the type of person who is likely to continue driving despite having a suspended license. Had the license been revoked solely for one traffic infraction, reasonable suspicion may not have existed. This inference also could have been challenged through the user of statistics regarding the likelihood of driving with this type of suspended license in that jurisdiction. Finally, Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Constitution provide greater privacy protections than the United States Constitution. Therefore, a criminal defense attorney in Pennsylvania should make sure to bring a motion to suppress under both the federal and state constitutions as a Pennsylvania appellate court could (and previously has) find that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not allow this type of stop.

The ultimate mistake here by the criminal defense lawyer was likely not conducting any cross-examination of the sheriff. Had the defense lawyer litigated a normal motion to suppress, he or she may have been able to establish that the sheriff knew or should have known that it was not Glover driving the car or that the officer had credibility issues which would have provided an alternative basis for granting the motion to suppress. Nonetheless, this is a very bad decision for privacy and Fourth Amendment rights.

Facing criminal charges in Philadelphia, PA? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, DUI, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/4/20 Zak Goldstein 4/4/20

PA Superior Court: Police Properly Conducted Inventory Search of Vehicle Where Unlicensed Driver Parked at Gas Pump During Stop

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Peak, holding that police properly conducted an inventory search of a car which had to be towed because the driver had parked at a gas pump and did not have a valid driver’s license.

Zak Goldstein - Criminal Lawyer in Philadelphia

The Facts of Peak

In Peak, the defendant was charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver following a traffic stop. On March 3, 2017, a police officer was on routine patrol in a marked police car. While he was driving, he saw a Buick Sedan out in the intersection that seemed to be confused about whether it was turning left or right. The car had no turn signal and eventually turned left. The officer made a U-turn to conduct a traffic stop. Before he could, the car pulled up to a gas pump at a local convenience store near the intersection. The officer pulled behind the Buick and ordered the driver of the Buick to remain in the car.

The officer approached the defendant and asked for his license and insurance. He immediately smelled an odor of burnt marijuana. Nonetheless, he ran the defendant’s license and learned that the defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended. He then told the defendant to get out of the car and grab any of his belongings. He asked to whom the car belonged, and the defendant replied that it belonged to his sister. The officer told the defendant that he would have to have the car towed, and the defendant did not make any objections to the officer. He also told the defendant that he was not planning on arresting him but would send citations in the mail.

The Inventory Search of the Car

The officer then called a private tow company and began conducting an inventory search of the defendant’s car. He felt that it was necessary to tow the car because it was not in a legal parking spot but was instead parked directly in front of an operable gas pump. This was impeding the business’s ability to sell gas as normal. He felt that it was important to conduct an inventory search to document any valuables in the vehicle and protect the police from any claims concerning missing or damaged property. The defendant did tell the officer that he was trying to get someone to come get the car, and the defendant did begin making phone calls. Nonetheless, the tow truck arrived within ten minutes.

Prior to the tow truck taking the car, the officer conducted the inventory search and found bundles of heroin in the car. He then arrested the defendant, searched him, and found $1,700. Prosecutors charged the defendant with Possession with the Intent to Deliver based on the amount of the heroin.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, found the defendant guilty of PWID, and sentenced him to three to six years’ incarceration followed by a period of probation. The defendant eventually appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Ruling on Appeal

The Superior Court denied the appeal. First, the court found that the defendant did have standing to bring a motion to suppress and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle despite the fact that he did not own it. He had borrowed it with his sister’s permission and had been legally driving it at the time of the stop. Therefore, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car despite the fact that he was not the registered owner. He had also testified that although it was not registered to him, he had purchased it himself with his own money and then put it in his sister’s name.

What is an inventory search?

Nonetheless, court denied the motion because it found that the police properly conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. Under Section 6309.2 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, police officers are directed to immobilize or tow a vehicle when they find that a person has operated that vehicle on a highway or trafficway without a valid driver’s license. When the police have to tow a vehicle, they are permitted to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. An inventory search is permissible when 1) the police have acted lawfully in impounding the vehicle and 2) the police have acted in accordance with a reasonable, standard policy of routinely securing and inventorying the contents of the impounded vehicle.

The critical question when litigating these types of motions is whether or not the police actually had to tow the vehicle. In general, if the police can just leave the vehicle on the street in a lawful parking spot or allow someone else to come get it, then they do not necessarily have the authority to tow it and conduct an inventory search. At the same time, if the vehicle is jeopardizing public safety in some way or has not been parked legally, then the police may have the authority to tow the vehicle. If they have that authority, then they are allowed to first search the car even without a warrant.

The decision to tow the vehicle must be based on public safety; it cannot be motivated by a desire to search the car on a hunch. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Laganella, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that evidence should be suppressed where the police had no reason to tow a car from a lawful parking spot. Here, however, the car was parked blocking a gas pump, preventing customers from getting gas. The owner did not want his pump blocked, and there was no one else there to drive the vehicle away immediately. The fact that someone might have been able to come at some point in the future did not change the analysis. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the police properly towed the vehicle and therefore had the right to conduct an inventory search. Accordingly, the Superior Court denied the criminal appeal.

Facing criminal charges in Philadelphia, PA? We can help.

Criminal Defense Attorneys in Philadelphia

Zak Goldstein 3/31/20 Zak Goldstein 3/31/20

PA Superior Court: Hospital Interrogation May Require Miranda Warnings

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Harper, holding that trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to 1) move to suppress the defendant’s confession for lack of Miranda warnings, 2) object to the introduction of the defendant’s confession at trial based on the corpus delicti doctrine, and 3) object to impermissible lay opinion testimony from the arresting officer that the defendant’s gun shot wound must have been self-inflicted.

The Facts of Harper

In Harper, police officers charged the defendant with persons not to possess firearms (VUFA 6105) and firearms not to be carried without a license (VUFA 6106) after he made incriminating statements to a police officer while in the hospital. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of a local police officer who testified that he and his partner responded to a report of a shooting. They were told to go to the hospital to speak with the defendant. When they arrived, the defendant was in a hospital bed and had received medical treatment for a gunshot wound. The officer saw that the defendant had a gunshot in his knee area.

The officer testified that based on his experience and his observation of the angle and location of the wound, the defendant had a self-inflicted gunshot wound. This would be a problem for the defendant with respect to the gun charges because it would establish that he must have possessed a firearm illegally in order for the wound to have been self-inflicted. The criminal defense attorney failed to object to this opinion testimony from the officer.

Suspicious that the wound had been self-inflicted, the officer began questioning the defendant. The officer told the defendant that he was going to perform a gunshot test on his hands to see if he had recently fired a gun. He was bluffing, but the defendant believed him. He also told the defendant that he was going to check his clothes for residue, as well. The officer then actually administered a fake test by swabbing his hands with a Q-tip and saline. The defendant promptly confessed to shooting himself, thereby establishing the illegal gun possession.

After successfully obtaining this full confession, the police decided that it was then time to administer Miranda warnings. The defendant received his Miranda warnings and then confessed again. The United States Supreme Court has held that this kind of two-step Miranda warning procedure is unconstitutional.

The police never found the gun. There was no evidence at trial that anyone saw the defendant shooting anyone, getting shot at, or possessing a gun. The parties stipulated that he had a felony conviction which made him ineligible to possess a firearm. He did not testify. The court found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to three to six years’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation.

The PCRA Petition

Instead of filing a direct appeal to the Superior Court, the defendant pursued a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition in the Court of Common Pleas. In the Petition, the defendant alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial attorney. Specifically, he alleged that his attorney was ineffective in 1) failing to move to suppress the statement on Miranda grounds, 2) failing to object on corpus delicti grounds, and 3) failing to object to the officers opinion testimony regarding the wound being self-inflicted. The trial court denied the PCRA Petition, and the defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Are Miranda warnings required for hospital interrogations?

First, the defendant alleged that his criminal defense attorney should have moved to suppress his hospital confession on the grounds that police failed to provide him with Miranda warnings prior to questioning him. In general, the police must provide Miranda warnings prior to questioning a suspect when the suspect is in custody AND the police are going to ask questions or make statements reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement. Here, it was clear that the police asked questions which were designed to obtain incriminating information. Therefore, the real issue was whether the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when they questioned him at the hospital given that they had not transported him to the police station, put him in handcuffs, or told him that he was under arrest.

The Superior Court found that he was in custody. A person is in custody when the officer’s show of authority leads the person to believe that he is not free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter. A court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as “the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transported against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat, or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions.”

The Superior Court found that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. First, the officers believed that he was likely guilty and so it is likely that their behavior would have reflected that belief. Second, the officers did not simply ask questions. Instead, they issued commands that the defendant submit to the fake gunshot powder residue test. Third, based on the defendant’s condition and the commands issued by the officers, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave. Therefore, the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, and a motion to suppress his statement would have been successful. The Court found that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress the statement because such a motion would have been granted. The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction as there was no other evidence linking him to possession of a firearm.

What is corpus delicti?

Second, the PCRA Petition also alleged that the trial lawyer was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the statement on corpus delicti grounds. Corpus delicti is a doctrine of criminal law which stands for the proposition that the Commonwealth must show that a crime actually occurred before using a defendant’s statement to convict him at trial. In order to prove corpus delicti, the Commonwealth must show that the evidence is more consistent with a crime than with an accident. This protects a defendant from being convicted based solely on a statement where it is possible that no crime actually occurred. In order for a statement to be admissible, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti by a preponderance of the evidence. In order for the statement to actually be considered by the fact finder, the Commonwealth must prove a crime occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, the Commonwealth failed to establish the unlawful possession of a firearm with any evidence other than the defendant’s statement. It showed only that the defendant had been shot. It did not show, without his statement, that he had actually possessed the gun or that anyone ineligible to do so had possessed the gun. Accordingly, it was just as possible that someone else who could possess a gun lawfully had shot the defendant. Therefore, the Commonwealth failed to establish corpus delicti. Had the defense attorney objected on this basis, the court would have sustained the objection, and the confession would have been inadmissible. Accordingly, the Superior Court found the defense attorney ineffective on this basis and would have reversed the conviction for this reason, as well.

May a police officer testify that a gunshot wound is self-inflicted?

Finally, the defendant alleged that his trial attorney provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the officer’s opinion testimony that the wound was self-inflicted. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701, some opinion testimony from witnesses is admissible where the testimony is a) rationally based on the witness’s perception, b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

The defendant alleged that the officer’s testimony violated part c of the rule in that it was really based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that would require the officer to be qualified as an expert in gunshot wounds. The Commonwealth never sought to tender the officer as such an expert or establish that he really had the qualifications to provide this type of opinion. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the defense attorney was ineffective in failing to object to this improper opinion testimony that the wound was in fact self-inflicted. Given that the Court agreed with the defendant with respect to all three allegations in the PCRA Petition, it reversed his conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial.

If you need a criminal defense attorney in Philadelphia, PA, we can help.