Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/23/18 Zak Goldstein 8/23/18

PA Supreme Court Rejects First Amendment Challenge to Witness Intimidation Conviction Based on Rap Lyrics

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Knox, holding that rap lyrics can support convictions for witness intimidation and terroristic threats even where there is no evidence that the defendants actually sent the video of the rap to the complainants. The court rejected the idea that the First Amendment right to free speech shielded the authors of the lyrics from criminal liability because the song communicated a true threat to the complainants.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Knox

In April 2012, a Pittsburgh police officer initiated a routine traffic stop of a vehicle driven by the defendant. While the officer was questioning the defendant, the co-defendant got into the driver’s seat and then sped away and crashed the vehicle. The police caught up, searched the vehicle, and recovered fifteen bags of heroin, money, and a stolen firearm on the driver’s-side floor of the car. When they arrested the defendant, he gave the police a fake name. A detective eventually arrived on scene, recognized the defendant, and provided the arresting officers with his real name. Based on these facts, the defendant and his co-defendant were subsequently charged with several offenses, including weapons charges.

While the charges were pending, the defendants wrote and recorded a song titled “F—k the Police,” which was put on video with still photos of the defendants displayed in a montage. In the photos, the two looked into the camera and motioned as if firing weapons. The video was uploaded to YouTube and also publicized on Facebook. Prosecutors did not establish who uploaded the video to the internet.

The song’s lyrics expressed hatred towards the Pittsburgh police. The lyrics of “F—k the Police” contain descriptions of killing police informants and police officers. The song specifically mentioned the officers involved in the defendant's case and that the defendants knew when those officers’ shifts end. It suggested that the officers may be attacked in their homes. Further, the lyrics also contained a reference to an individual who previously murdered three Pittsburgh police officers.

The Pittsburgh police discovered this song and then arrested and charged the defendant with terroristic threats and witness intimidation. At the trial, one of the officers testified about the “street slang” for some of the lyrics mentioned in the song. Examples include “cop killa” as a type of bullet that can pierce armored vests; “strapped nasty” means carrying multiple weapons; and “busting heavy” means to shoot many rounds.

One of the officers involved in the defendant's first case testified at trial. He testified that when he heard the song he was “shocked” and it made him “nervous.” He further stated that it was one of the reasons why he left the Pittsburgh police force. A detective involved in the defendant's first case also testified and said he found the song to be very upsetting and that it made him concerned for his safety.

At the conclusion of the trial, it was clear that the song was the sole basis on which the Commonwealth sought convictions for witness intimidation and terroristic threats. The defendant argued that the song was protected speech and that any conviction would violate his First Amendment rights. The trial court rejected the argument and found him guilty of witness intimidation and terroristic threats. He then filed a timely appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur and heard the appeal.

What is the First Amendment?

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. ”

— The First Amendment

First Amendment protections apply broadly to different types of expression including art, poetry, film, and music. The bedrock principle of the First Amendment is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.

However, not all speech is protected. In Schenck v. United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes was famously quoted as saying that the First Amendment does not protect against someone falsely shouting “fire” in a theater and causing a panic. Further, threats of violence fall outside the First Amendment’s protective scope. In response to threats of violence, the United States Supreme Court adopted the “true-threat doctrine.”

What is the “True-Threat Doctrine?”

The “true-threat doctrine” originated from the United States Supreme Court case Watts v. United States. In that case, the defendant was convicted of a federal statute making it a crime to threaten the President. In Watts, the defendant stated that, in essence, he would not report to the draft and “if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” Though the Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional, the Court went on to say that the defendant’s conviction could only be upheld if his words conveyed an actual threat, as opposed to political hyperbole. In Watts, the Court held that, given the circumstances in Watts (it was uttered during a political debate, the audience reacted with laughter, and that it was a conditional threat) that the statement was merely just an expression of political dissent and not a true threat.

In subsequent years, courts across the country have struggled to define the “true-threat doctrine.” Some jurisdictions utilize an objective standard, while other jurisdictions put great emphasis on the speaker’s subjective intent when making a statement. In Knox, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there should be an inquiry into the speaker’s mental state and thus evidentiary weight should be given to contextual circumstances of the utterance.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Affirms Defendant's Conviction

In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convictions for terroristic threats and witness intimidation. Specifically, the justices did not find persuasive the argument that the defendant's song was an “artistic expression of frustration.” The Court rejected the First Amendment argument because of the fact that some of the officers involved in his first case were mentioned by name and the lyrics described in graphic terms how he intended to kill them.

To the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “the lyrics are both threatening and highly personalized to the victims.” Its conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the song references the officers’ shifts. Additionally, because the lyrics were directly related to the defendant's first case (i.e. the one officer confiscating cash from Appellant to which he says that said officer “knockin’ my riches”) was further support that the defendant's song was personalized to the officers. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also did not find persuasive the fact that the song was not directly sent to the officers. The fact that the song was published on YouTube and Facebook, despite no direct evidence that the defendant posted it on these mediums so that the police would see it, was sufficient to convict the defendant of these crimes.

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Zak Goldstein 8/18/18 Zak Goldstein 8/18/18

NJ Supreme Court: Most Expert Testimony Concerning “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” Is Inadmissible

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has decided the case of State v. J.L.G., holding that the prosecution cannot introduce expert testimony regarding “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” (CSAAS) in general and its component behaviors, with the exception of delayed disclosure, at trial. Specifically, the Court found that this evidence, other than delayed disclosure, does not have a sufficiently reliable basis in science to be the subject of expert testimony. This is a truly significant decision that will no doubt affect countless child sex cases.

State v. J.L.G.

In J.L.G., the defendant was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, third-degree aggravated sexual criminal sexual contact, second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and third-degree witness tampering. The complainant in the case was the defendant’s stepdaughter. The complainant testified that the defendant abused her on a daily basis for approximately eighteen months. At one point, the defendant pointed a gun at her and threatened to hurt her, her mother, and her brother if she told anyone about the abuse. Further, the complainant did not tell anyone because she was embarrassed about the abuse.

On one occasion, a friend of the complainant’s mother visited her residence and found the defendant lying on top of the complainant with an erection. The complainant’s mother became aware of this incident and threatened to kill the defendant. However, the complainant, fearful that her mother would do something that would result in her getting arrested, denied any sexual activity was occurring. Eventually, the complainant did tell her mother about the abuse. The complainant then made a statement to the prosecutor’s office and, under the guidance of the detectives, the complainant called defendant. In these conversations, which were recorded, the defendant offered to give the complainant money if she would withdraw the allegations. The complainant also had an audio recording of the last time the defendant abused her which the Court described as “graphic.”

Police arrested the defendant and charged him with the previously mentioned crimes. At trial, the State presented evidence through various witnesses and the recorded phone conversations and interaction with the defendant. Additionally, the State also presented expert testimony. Specifically, the State called a clinical psychologist who testified about CSAAS. The defendant had filed a pre-trial motion to exclude this testimony, but the motion was denied. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant on all charges. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

What is CSAAS?

Dr. Roland Summit is credited for creating CSAAS. In 1983, he published an article which he described the syndrome as “a common denominator of the most frequently observed” behaviors of child sexual abuse victims. In essence, CSAAS testimony is used to explain how a sexually abused child behaves and why a child may not immediately report abuse. According to Dr. Summit, there are several frequently observed behaviors of child abuse victims. These “components” form CSAAS and are: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and retraction. If a child were to exhibit these behaviors, according to Dr. Summit, CSAAS can be used to support the theory that the child was abused.

Notably, neither the American Psychiatric Association nor the American Psychological Association has recognized CSAAS. Further, this syndrome does not appear in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which is the authoritative list of mental disorders. CSAAS has been undermined by a number of scientific studies. Despite this, in 1993, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554 (1993) held that CSAAS had “sufficiently reliable scientific basis” to be presented to a jury. The Court opined that its introduction allowed juries to understand “traits found in children who have been abused” and thus allowed expert testimony of CSAAS to be introduced in criminal trials.

What is Expert Testimony?

To put it simply, expert testimony is testimony about a subject that is beyond the range of knowledge of the average person. Expert testimony is used in a variety of cases. To give an example, experts are frequently called to testify in drug cases. Typically, the Commonwealth would not need an expert if a defendant was charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver and the facts demonstrated that a defendant exchanged drugs for money. However, an expert may be needed if a defendant was not seen engaging in a hand-to-hand transaction, but instead was arrested with a significant amount of narcotics on his person. The average person might not know that particular amount of drugs is enough to establish that the defendant possessed those drugs with the intent to sell them and thus the Commonwealth may need an expert to prove its case.

In New Jersey, Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence governs the admission of expert testimony. In order to introduce expert testimony they must establish: 1) the subject matter of the testimony must be “beyond the ken of the average juror”; 2) the field of inquiry “must be at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable;” and 3) “the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the” testimony. However, this is not the end of the analysis. The trial court then must make a determination as to whether the science underlying the proposed expert testimony has “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” This is known as the Frye standard.

The Frye standard does not require a universal acceptance by the scientific community. Nonetheless, the proponent must show that there is general acceptance of the what the expert is going to testify to. The proponent can do this numerous ways: they can introduce judicial opinions, scientific or legal articles, and expert testimony to establish that the science is generally accepted. Notably, Pennsylvania also uses the Frye standard, whereas federal courts use a different test.

New Jersey Supreme Court Dramatically Restricts Expert Testimony Concerning CSAAS in Criminal Cases

In State v. J.L.G., the Supreme Court of New Jersey dramatically restricted the introduction of CSAAS testimony in criminal trials. First, the Court reiterated that expert testimony can only be introduced when the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. In the instant case, the complainant gave what the court described as “straightforward reasons” as to why the she did not immediately report the defendant’s abuse. Specifically, she did not report because she was embarrassed, the defendant had threatened her if she reported, and she was worried that her mother would incur criminal charges if she were to disclose said abuse. Therefore, CSAAS testimony was not necessary to show why there was a delayed report. The Court went on to say that if the child cannot offer a rational explanation as to why there was a delayed report, then the prosecution can introduce expert testimony to help understand the witness’s behavior. However, this was not applicable in the instant case and thus the trial court erred in allowing CSAAS testimony in the first place.

The Court did not end its analysis there. The Court also addressed whether CSAAS testimony satisfies the Frye standard. To make this determination, the Court conducted a lengthy analysis of CSAAS and studied its origins and subsequent critiques by other experts. The Court found that there is a lack of data supporting CSAAS. The Court further highlighted that it is not in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and that it has not been accepted by the American Psychiatric Association and other notable associations. Further, there is limited scientific and empirical support for the majority of the individual components of CSAAS. As such, the Court found that with the exception of delayed reporting (because there is consistent and long-standing support in scientific literature to support that most child victims of sexual abuse do not immediately report their abuse), there is not enough scientific support to allow experts to testify to the other components of CSAAS.

In the instant case, this was a hollow victory for the defendant. Despite the Court agreeing with the defendant that this evidence should not have been introduced at trial, the Court found that this was a harmless error because the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming. As such, the defendant will not get a new trial and will serve the majority of his 23 year prison term.

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Zak Goldstein 8/16/18 Zak Goldstein 8/16/18

PA Superior Court: Police May Stop and Search You If You’re Bleeding from a Gunshot Wound

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Edwards, holding that Philadelphia Police did not violate the defendant’s rights when they stopped and searched him because he was walking down the street while bleeding from a gunshot wound. The Superior Court relied on the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement in finding that police did not violate the defendant's rights when they stopped him even though they did not see him personally engaged in criminal activity.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Edwards

In Edwards, Philadelphia Police Officers were on routine patrol at around 1 am in the Kensington area. One of the officers noticed a black male, the defendant, limping in the bike lane on the west side of the street. He was walking towards the police car. As he got closer to the car, one of the officers noticed that he had blood coming down the left side of his leg. After noticing the blood, the officer attempted to get the defendant’s attention, but he ignored the officer and kept limping at a fast pace. The defendant ignored the officers as they backed up their car and tried to talk to him.

Eventually, police exited the patrol car and told the defendant to stop multiple times. The defendant initially did not stop, but he eventually turned and faced the officers. However, he continued to back away from them even after being told they were only interested in bringing him to the hospital for his leg injury. He told the officer he had been shot by a Hispanic male around the corner and that the officers should go look for the male.

The officers moved closer to the defendant, and the defendant then reached for his right jacket pocket while backing away. Based on this movement, the officers believed that the defendant was trying to hide something in his right jacket pocket. The officers also testified that the area was a high crime area known for drug sales, stabbings, shootings, and robberies. Therefore, the officers frisked the defendant, felt a hard object that they knew to be a gun in the right pocket, and then removed the gun from the defendant’s jacket. Police arrested the defendant and charged him with various VUFA charges, including possessing a concealed firearm without a license, possessing a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia, and felon in possession of a firearm.

The Motion to Suppress the Gun

After prosecutors charged the defendant with various gun charges, the defendant’s defense attorney filed a motion to suppress the gun. The motion to suppress alleged that police did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop and search the defendant because they did not see him engaged in any criminal activity and he did not ask for their help. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding both that police actually had probable cause to arrest him and that the police were justified in their actions due to the community caretaker doctrine. After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, the defendant proceeded by way of bench trial. The trial judge found him guilty and sentenced him to state prison after it was revealed at sentencing that he had shot himself. The trial judge also made negative comments at sentencing about the fact that although defense counsel highlighted the defendant's extensive family support, the defendant's mother was present but did not speak on his behalf.

The Criminal Appeal

Following sentencing, the defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant challenged both the denial of the Motion to Suppress as well as the trial court’s sentence. Unfortunately for the defendant, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling both with respects to the Motion to Suppress and the sentencing issue. The Superior Court relied heavily on the community caretaker doctrine as explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Livingstone.

What is the community caretaker exception?

In general, the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions require the police to get a search warrant before stopping and searching someone. However, there are many exceptions to this general rule. For example, police do not have to obtain a search warrant in order to stop someone on the street and conduct a frisk when they have reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. Police also may conduct a full search of a pedestrian when they have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime. In addition to these exceptions for investigatory stops, the Supreme Court has also created the community caretaker doctrine or community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement.

The community caretaker doctrine anticipates the possibility that police may be motivated by a desire to render aid or assistance rather than the investigation of criminal activity. Appellate courts have reasoned that police do not just investigate and prosecute crime – they also provide first aid, intervene in crises, and maintain the peace. Accordingly, police do not always need to get a warrant in order to take action when they believe that someone is in need of assistance.

In order for this exception to apply, the police must be able to point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance. When police can do that, they may be justified in conducting a stop or search without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that criminal activity is afoot. The police action must also be independent of the investigation of criminal activity, meaning it cannot be a pretext for conducting a search without the necessary level of suspicion. Finally, the level of intrusion must be commensurate with the perceived need for assistance. Thus, in Livingstone, the Supreme Court summarized the rule as follows:

“To summarize, in order for a seizure to be justified under the public servant exception to the warrant requirement under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that assistance was needed; the police action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence, and based on a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the action taken by police must be tailored to rendering assistance or mitigating the peril.”

The Superior Court's Decision

Here, the Superior Court found that the police acted reasonably and pursuant to the community caretaking doctrine. They saw the defendant limping, with a bloody leg, at 1:20 am in a dangerous area. They approached and offered medical assistance. The court found that they would have been neglecting their duties had they not done so. Further, the officer identified specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen was in need of assistance. The court also found that they were not looking for criminal evidence, meaning their actions were independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence. They were planning on taking the defendant to the hospital. They only frisked the defendant because he bladed his body away from the officer and placed his hand in his pocket as if he were trying to conceal something. Finally, the level of intrusion was commensurate with the need for assistance. The police had merely stopped to offer aid. Only after the defendant acted strangely by backing away, turning his body, and reaching in his pocket, did the police conduct any kind of search. The court found that that search was a legitimate safety frisk and upheld the decision of the trial court.

The Superior Court also rejected the defendant’s sentencing challenge. Here, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him when the trial judge pointed out that the defendant’s mother was present for sentencing but did not speak on his behalf. After the trial judge made that remark, the defense attorney asked to have the mother speak, but the trial judge refused to permit her to speak. The defense ordinarily must file a post-sentence motion explaining any challenges to a sentence in order to be able to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence, but here, the Superior Court found that the issue was not waived for appeal because the defendant’s attorney had attempted to call the mother as a witness but been prevented from doing so. The Superior Court reached the merits of the issue, but affirmed the sentence because the judge considered a number of factors and did not base the sentence only on the mother’s failure to testify at sentencing. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

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Zak Goldstein 8/10/18 Zak Goldstein 8/10/18

PA Superior Court: Trial Court Properly Granted Commonwealth's Tender Years Motion

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Strafford. This decision clarifies 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5985, which governs when a child-victim's out-of-court statement may be introduced by the prosecution under the Tender Years Hearsay Exception and when a child-victim may testify via closed-circuit television instead of in open court.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Strafford

In Strafford, prosecutors alleged that the defendant sexually abused the complainant, who was eight years old, between June 2013 and December 2014. According to the complainant, the defendant would frequently stay over at the complainant’s home. During these overnight visits, the defendant would regularly touch the complainant’s genitals and perform oral sex on him. In December 2014, the complainant disclosed to his older brother and his mother that the defendant was molesting him. Upon hearing this, the mother called the police. Police arranged for the complainant to provide a video-recorded statement to a child forensic interviewer.

Prosecutors charged the defendant with Indecent Assault of a Person less than 13 years of age, Corruption of a Minor, and Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Child. On March 18, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a petition to admit out-of-court statements under the Tender Years Hearsay Exception and a Motion to Allow a Child Witness to Testify Under Pennsylvania Uniform Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act. The trial court granted both of these motions.

Following a jury trial, the court convicted the defendant of the above-mentioned charges. The court sentenced him to six to twelve years' incarceration followed by five years probation. The defendant will also have to register as a sex offender upon his release. Because the defendant was found guilty of enumerated Tier III offenses, he will be required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police for life. On November 18, 2016, he filed a timely appeal.

What is the Tender Years Hearsay Exception?

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5985.1 provides the Tender Years Hearsay Exception which was at issue in this appeal. The Tender Years Hearsay Exception to the rule against hearsay applies to children who are twelve years or younger at the time of the statement. It permits prosecutors to introduce some previously recorded statements from these children which would ordinarily be hearsay. However, this does not mean that all statements made by children twelve or younger qualify for this exception. Specifically, it only applies to certain offenses (i.e. cases involving sexual assault). Additionally, the statement that is to be introduced must be relevant and have sufficient indicia of reliability.

A court will make a determination as to whether or not the statement has the sufficient reliability. To make this determination, the court will look at the time, circumstances, content of the statement, the statement’s spontaneity, the declarant’s mental state, consistency in repetition, and lack of motive to fabricate. The main consideration for a trial court is to determine whether the statement is reliable. In making the determination, the trial court is granted significant leeway in admitting this statement. A trial court’s decision will only be overturned on appeal if the defendant is able to show that the trial court abused its discretion. Typically, this is very difficult standard to show and thus the trial court will likely not be overturned if it allows said statement to be introduced. If the trial court concludes that the statement is relevant, reliable, and the child is going to testify at trial, then the prosecution may introduce the prior out-of-court statement pursuant to this exception to the hearsay rule.

Note: Since the Superior Court decided this case, the rule has been changed. Tender Years now applies to children who were 16 years old or younger at the time of the statement.

Children Testifying by Contemporaneous Alternative Method

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5985 allows for juvenile victims to testify via a closed circuit television in a criminal case. When this occurs, the prosecutor, judge, defense attorney, and other enumerated individuals may be allowed to be in the same room as the child witness. However, the defendant is specifically not allowed to be in the room. The defendant (and the jury) is able to watch and listen to the child’s testimony via closed circuit television, but the child witness will note able to see the defendant during his or her testimony. The defense attorney is still allowed to cross-examine the child.

However, before this can occur, the trial court must make a determination that if the child were to testify in the defendant’s presence, the child would suffer serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child’s ability to reasonably communicate. In making this determination, the trial court may observe or question the child inside or outside the courtroom; or hear testimony from a parent, custodian, or any other person that has dealt with the child “in a medical or therapeutic setting.”

Superior Court Holds that Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Child to Testify via Closed-Circuit Television and Admitting Out-of-Court Statement

In Strafford, the Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the child to testify via closed-circuit television and admitting the out-of-court statement. In terms of allowing the complainant to testify via closed-circuit, the Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the child would have suffered serious emotional distress had he testified.

In support of this conclusion, the Superior Court referenced the trial court’s opinion which stated that subsequent to the complainant’s disclosure, he would frequently have nightmares, wet the bed, and sleep with his parents. According to this mother, all of this was atypical of the complainant’s usual behavior. Additionally, when complainant was told he would need to testify, he would get moody and uncomfortable. Complainant also threatened to “run out of the room” if he saw the defendant. He also told his mother he did not want to see him. The complainant also had difficulty in school following this incident according to his mother. Based on these facts, the Superior Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the complainant to testify via closed-circuit television.

Additionally, the Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Commonwealth’s Tender Years Motion to admit the complainant’s out-of-court statements. The Superior Court reasoned that the complainant made a spontaneous statement to his brother about being molested by the defendant. Additionally, there was nothing on the record to suggest that complainant had a motive to fabricate these allegations. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the complainant’s out-of-court statements to be introduced.