PA Superior Court: Four or More Years Older Means a Full Four Years under Statutory Sexual Assault Statute

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

What does four or more years older mean in a statututory sexual assault case? 

The Superior Court has just decided the cases of Commonwealth v. Price. In Price, the court held that the defendants had not been properly convicted of Statutory Sexual Assault because they were less than four years older than the 16-year-old complainant in the case. The court held that the term “four or more years older” as used in the Statutory Sexual Assault (Statutory Rape) statute requires just that; that a defendant be four years or more older than the complainant. Here, because both defendants were actually a few hours less than four years older than the complainant, the trial court erred in finding them guilty of Statutory Rape.

The facts of Commonwealth v. Price 

The facts of Price are relatively straightforward. The defendants were twin brothers who were charged with Statutory Sexual Assault for having sexual intercourse with the complainant. The complainant was born on a certain date in May 1998, at 8:16 am. The brothers were identical twins who were born on the same day and month in 1994 at 7 pm. This means that they were just a few hours less than four years older than the complainant. Both brothers admitted to having sex with the complainant when she was 14 and they were 18. Accordingly, they were charged with Statutory Sexual Assault.

Statutory Sexual Assault in Pennsylvania 

Pennsylvania’s Statutory Sexual Assault statute creates a number of different offenses. For purposes of this appeal, the defendants were charged with the Felony of the second degree section of the statute. That section makes it illegal for a person to have sexual intercourse with a complainant to whom the person is not married if the complainant is under the age of 16 years AND the defendant is four years older but less than eight years older than the complainant. This means that the case depended on whether the defendants were four years older or less than four years older than the complainant. If they were four or more years older than the complainant, then they would be guilty of Statutory Sexual Assault even if the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse. If they were less than four years older, then they could not be convicted of Statutory Rape.

The trial court found that because they were born on the same day, they were four years older than the complainant. The court reasoned that for purposes of defining a year, the measurements should not be reduced below days to hours. The court found that a person becomes a certain age on their birthday, so the defendants became four years or more older than the complainant when the day began. Accordingly, the trial court convicted both brothers of Statutory Sexual Assault. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court recognized that the issue in the case was how to define a year for purposes of the statute. It was not disputed that the defendants were three years, 364 days, and approximately ten hours older than the complainant. The Superior Court reversed. It noted that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and that any ambiguity in a statute must be construed in favor of a criminal defendant pursuant to the Rule of Lenity.

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code does not define the meaning of the term “four years older.” However, the court noted that the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals and a previous panel of the Superior Court had interpreted four years to mean 1,461 days and that the defendants had been born 1,461 days before the complainant. Thus, if the period of time is counted in days, the defendants would be guilty. If it were counted in smaller increments like hours, minutes, or seconds, then the defendants would be innocent. Because the crimes code does not provide a method by which to measure years, the court accepted the defendants’ argument that they had to be a full 1,461 days older than the complainant. Because a day is 24 hours, they were not a full 1,461 days older than the complainant. They were 14 hours short of a full day from the age of the complainant.

The court concluded that the statute could reasonably be interpreted either way. Given the ambiguity in the statute, the court was required to give the benefit of the doubt to the defendants. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions.

Facing Criminal Chargs? We Can Help. 

Criminal Lawyer Demetra Mehta

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of cases in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client who is facing criminal charges or who may be under investigation by law enforcement. We can also provide advice to anyone who is considering the merits of filing an appeal or Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today. 

PA Legislature Revises SORNA in Attempt to Fix Unconstitutional Megan's Law Provisions

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted HB 631, amending Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute which governs who must register as a sex offender under Megan’s Law, the type of information that must be provided, how often that information must be provided, and for how long an offender must register. HB 631 is the legislature’s response to recent appellate decisions finding various provisions of SORNA unconstitutional. However, HB 631 fails to address many of the issues that led to SORNA being found unconstitutional in the first place, and many of its provisions remain subject to litigation when applied to offenders who were convicted of crimes for acts which were committed prior to December 20, 2012.

Recent Changes in SORNA

Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law registration scheme has gone through a number of significant changes in the last few years. For example, in 2012, the original SORNA law took effect. SORNA made Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration scheme more punitive by imposing registration requirements on juveniles, increasing the number of offenses which require registration upon conviction, and retroactively increasing the length of the registration period for many people who had already been convicted.

For example, SORNA made M2 Indecent Assault a Tier I Sex Offense requiring 15 years of registration upon conviction. M2 Indecent Assault did not previously require Megan’s Law registration for a first offense. Various provisions in SORNA also attempted to retroactively require registration for people who had already been convicted of Indecent Assault even if they had been convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment.

Since the enactment of the law, Pennsylvania appellate courts have found many of these provisions unconstitutional. For example, courts quickly concluded that requiring people to register as adults for life following juvenile delinquency adjudications was irrational and unconstitutional. More recently, in Commonwealth v. Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that retroactively requiring people to register under SORNA for longer periods of time, for offenses that did not require registration at the time that they were committed, and under more onerous conditions, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The ex post facto clause prohibits the Government from imposing criminal penalties for actions which were not illegal at the time that they were taken. It also prevents the Government from retroactively increasing the punishment for a given crime.   

The Pennsylvania Superior Court quickly followed suit in Commonwealth v. Butler, holding that because Megan’s Law registration can be considered criminal punishment, Pennsylvania’s Sexually Violent Predator classification process violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. The SVP procedure violates a defendant's jury trial rights because it allows a judge, instead of a jury, to find that a defendant should be required to register as a Sexually Violent Predator for life. It also allows the judge to make this finding under a clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction.

The Effect of Muniz and Butler on Pre-2012 Offenders

An important side effect of the Supreme Court’s Muniz decision is that it arguably eliminated the registration requirement completely for anyone who had been convicted of a sex crime for conduct which occurred prior to December 20, 2012. This is because the SORNA statute explicitly repealed the prior Megan’s Law scheme that was in effect at the time. Thus, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that SORNA could not be applied retroactively to people who had been convicted of crimes for conduct which took place prior to the December 20, 2012 enactment, the Court left no alternative registration scheme in place for these offenders. With SORNA unconstitutional for those people and Megan’s Law repealed, even lifetime offenders (such as those convicted of rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) who properly had to register prior to December 20, 2012, would arguably be eligible for removal from the State Police registry. The legislature responded quickly in an attempt to aovid this outcome. 

The Legislature’s Response to Muniz and Butler

Concerned that many people would no longer have to register at all, the Pennsylvania Legislature responded by amending the SORNA statute in the hopes of “re-capturing” pre-December 20, 2012 offenders. The act amends SORNA “to address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Butler (2017 WL3882445).” It is debatable, however, whether the amendments are constitutional. It is also questionable whether they address the problems identified in Muniz and Butler.

Changes for Post-2012 Registrants

For the most part, the amendments made very few changes to SORNA as applied to offenders who committed the acts for which they must register after December 20, 2012. For example, SORNA no longer requires registration for one offense. A conviction for the interference with custody of children where the defendant is the child’s parent, guardian, or lawful custodian no longer requires registration.

The amendments also created a mechanism by which even Tier III lifetime registrants and Sexually Violent Predators may petition the court for removal from Megan’s Law. Now, a registrant who avoids conviction for any offenses punishable by more than a year for twenty-five years following his or her release from custody may petition to have the registration requirement lifted. A petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is not a threat to others. It is unclear how many petitioners will receive relief under this provision, and it is important to note that even if the Petitioner meets this heavy burden, the court is not required to actually grant the removal petition.

Finally, the new amendments relax the in-person registration requirement for some registrants. An offender who must register more than once a year may register in-person once and by phone for the other registration requirements that year if the offender is compliant with all of the requirements for the first three years of registration and does not get convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year.

Although these changes are relatively minor, they do provide some relief to Tier III and SVP offenders who would otherwise have to register for life with no hope of ever obtaining removal from Megan’s List. It is likely that the legislature included this provision so that the Commonwealth's lawyers could argue that the statute is now less punitive and therefore does not violate the ex post facto clause.

Changes for Pre-2012 Registrants

With respect to registrants who committed the crimes for which they were convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment, the changes primarily seek to decrease the requirements to what they would have been under the old Megan’s Law Scheme. For example, the period of time for which the offender must register has been reduced to what it would have been under the pre-SORNA Megan’s Law. Thus, offenders must either register for ten years or for life, whereas new offenders could have to register for 15 years, 25 years, or for life. 

The information that offenders must provide to the State Police continues to be roughly the same. A registrant still must inform the State Police of where they live, work, and go to school. They must all inform the State Police if any of those things change, and the State Police will continue to post that information on the internet and to provide that information to local police departments. The amendments also make it a crime to fail to comply with these requirements, and they make it even more difficult on “transient” offenders who do not have a fixed address.   

The most surprising part of the new bill is that the amendments do not change the procedure by which an offender may be classified as a Sexually Violent Predator. An offender may still be found to be a Sexually Violent Predator by the sentencing judge under the clear and convincing evidence standard, and the requirements for Sexually Violent Predators are still essentially the same with the exception that they may petition for removal from the list after 25 years. It is entirely unclear how this re-enactment of the same unconstitutional sentencing scheme will survive appellate review.  

SORNA Litigation

The appellate courts have not yet addressed whether the new amendments to SORNA are constitutional. It is likely that there will be numerous challenges both to the legislature’s attempt to retroactively apply the statute to pre-SORNA offenders given that SORNA repealed their original registration requirement and to the continuation of the same procedures for making the Sexually Violent Predator determination. Although appellate decisions may eventually bring relief to thousands of people, the ongoing litigation leaves many people uncertain as to their registration requirements. If you are currently subject to registration requirements, it is important that you continue to register with the State Police as required until the State Police or a court inform you that you no longer have to register. If you believe that you should no longer have to register, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney about the possibility of petitioning the state police or the trial court for removal from Megan’s Law. It is also likely that other issues will arise as attorneys have more time to review the changes in the new bill. 

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help. 

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal, post-conviction relief act petition, or Megan's Law removal petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court: It Is Always Ineffective Assistance of Counsel to Go to Trial Without an Interpreter for a Client Who Doesn’t Speak English

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Diaz. The Court found that it is always ineffective assistance of counsel where a defense attorney fails to object to the court proceeding to trial without an interpreter for a defendant who does not speak English. The Court reversed the decision of the trial court, which had denied the defendant’s Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition, and awarded the defendant a new trial.

In Diaz, Bucks County prosecutors charged the defendant with Rape of a Child, Rape of a Person Less Than 13 Years of Age, Statutory Sexual Assault, Corruption of Minors, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and Criminal Conspiracy. Prosecutors alleged that the defendant molested his step-daughter for four years. Prosecutors further alleged that the girl’s mother knew of the molestation and cooperated with it.

The defendant retained two private attorneys, and the representation lasted for approximately eight months. During that period, the attorneys appear to have done nothing. One of them met with the defendant for less than an hour, and the other attorney never met with him at all. The defense attorneys apparently assumed that the other attorney was working on the case and handling the trial preparation, but in fact, no one was working on it.

On the day of trial, the attorney who had never met with the defendant finally met with him fifteen minutes before the trial court called the case. That attorney was surprised to realize that his client did not really speak or understand English. The attorney informed the Court that he would need an interpreter, but there was no interpreter available that day. This was likely because the attorneys had not notified the court in advance that an interpreter would be needed. The attorney, likely not wanting to show how unprepared he was, then told the judge that the defendant would only need the interpreter for when he actually testified and that they could start the trial without the interpreter. The trial judge initially said that the court would only proceed through jury selection without the interpreter, but ultimately, the court began receiving testimony that day.

The defendant received the services of an interpreter for the rest of the trial. The jury ultimately convicted him of all charges. When the defendant returned to court for sentencing and a hearing on whether he should be designated a Sexually Violent Predator, the trial court noted that the defendant had an interpreter present because he did not understand the proceedings well enough to participate in them without an interpreter. He received a sentence of 20-40 years in state prison.

The defendant appealed to the Superior Court on the grounds that he had not received the interpreter on the first day of the trial. The Superior Court denied the appeal. It found that because the attorney failed to object to proceeding to trial without an interpreter, the defendant had waived the claim and could not raise it on appeal.  

Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition 

The defendant next filed a Post-Conviciton Relief Act Petition (“PCRA”). In the PCRA Petition, the defendant raised a number of claims relating to ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition to other errors, the defendant alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that his attorneys failed to object when the court began the trial without an interpreter present. The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately agreed with the defendant. It reversed his conviction and awarded him a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed.

Appealing the Denial of a PCRA Petition 

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA’s court decision awarding the defendant a new trial. There was some dispute as to exactly how much English the defendant could understand, but the Superior Court ultimately found that there was enough evidence on the record for the PCRA court to properly find that the defendant could not speak sufficient English to proceed to trial without an interpreter. Further, the Court noted that it must apply a very deferential standard of review to the appeal of a PCRA. The Court recognized that it may not make its own findings of fact Instead, the Superior Court must defer to the trial court’s findings unless the trial court abused its discretion by making findings with no support in the evidentiary record.

In general, a PCRA Petitioner must show three things in order to win a new trial or sentencing: 1) counsel was ineffective, 2) there was no reasonably strategic basis for counsel’s decision, and 3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s ineffective representation. Prejudice is often difficult to show. The defendant must be able to show that had he received effective representation, the outcome may have been different. Thus, even in many cases where a petitioner can show that the attorney did something horribly ineffective, the trial courts and appellate courts will not award a new trial because the courts will find that the defendant would have been convicted anyway.

Presumed Prejudice in PCRA Litigation 

There are a handful of situations in which the error is so fundamental that prejudice is presumed and a petitioner does not have to show that the outcome would have been different. In these cases, the petitioner must show only that the attorney was ineffective and that there was no reasonable, strategic basis for the decision or omission. This makes the burden of winning a new trial or sentencing much easier to meet. This is because there are some “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a parituclar case is unjustified.”

For example, prejudice is presumed when there is an actual or constructive denial of counsel, the state interferes with counsel’s assistance, or counsel had an actual conflict of interest. In addition, prejudice is presumed where trial counsel’s ineffectiveness causes a defendant to be physically absent from his own trial without cause or consent. In Commonwealth v. Tolbert, the Superior Court reversed a conviction where trial counsel admittedly and erroneously told the defendant he did not have to be present for a court date and the court then proceeded through jury selection without the defendant.

The Superior Court relied heavily on the Tolbert case in finding that a defendant who cannot understand the proceedings due a language barrier is essentially not present at his own or her own trial. The defendant’s ability to use an interpreter encompasses numerous fundamental rights. The Court noted that the failure to understand the proceedings may deny him his right to confront witnesses, his right to consult with his attorney, or his right to really be present at his own trial. Accordingly, because the defendant could not understand the first day of proceedings, the defendant was essentially not present for his trial. Therefore, prejudice could be presumed from the defense attorney’s failure to object. The Superior Court reversed the conviction and awarded the defendant a new trial.

This may seem like the obvious answer – that a defendant has the right to an interpreter and to understand what is happening in court, but the impact of awarding a new trial in a case like this is significant. These types of sexual assault trials are lengthy, expensive, and very emotionally difficult for everyone involved. The complainant and other witnesses must testify again, the defendant must face trial and sentencing again, and the odds of winning for the prosecution likely go down as time goes by, memories fade, and witnesses become unavailable. Therefore, the appellate courts will often do anything they can to affirm convictions in these cases. This particular case was decided by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court. Although two judges voted in favor of the defendant receiving a new trial, one of the judges wrote a 46-page dissent arguing that the defendant should have to show actual prejudice under these circumstances. Fortunately, the majority judges were not convinced by the dissent. It is now clear that a court may not proceed to trial without providing a non-English speaking defendant with an interpreter. 

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Conviction? Our Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers Can Help. 

Philadelphia PCRA Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges, are under investigation, or are considering an appeal of a criminal conviction, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully represented clients in PCRA Petitions and direct appeals to the Superior Court. We offer a free, 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to anyone who is considering appealing a wrongful conviction or filing a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with one of our award-winning defense attorneys today.  

PA Superior Court: Trial Court May Hear from Variety of Witnesses in Deciding Whether Child Complainant May Testify Via Closed Circuit TV

Commonwealth v. Tyrrell

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, rejecting the defendant’s challenge to his convictions for Rape of a Child and related charges. In this appeal, the Superior Court rejected the defendant’s arguments that 1) the trial court improperly permitted the complainant to testify via closed circuit television and 2) the trial court should have excluded the testimony of the minor complainant because the testimony was tainted.

The Criminal Charges

In Tyrrell, the defendant was charged with rape of a child, rape of a child resulting in serious bodily injury, indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor, and corruption of minors for molesting S.B., his then 8-year-old daughter. The offenses allegedly occurred on April 2, 2014, and the defendant gave a statement confessing to the crimes on August 24, 2014. The defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession, opposed the Commonwealth’s motion to introduce the testimony of the complainant via closed circuit television, and also challenged the admissibility of the complainant’s testimony by arguing that the testimony had been tainted through the suggestions of others. The trial court rejected all three arguments, and the defendant was convicted. The court sentenced him to 50-100 years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation, and he appealed.

Pennsylvania's Tender Years Act – When May A Child Witness Testify Via Closed Circuit Television?

On appeal, the Superior Court also rejected the arguments. With respect to the closed circuit television issue, the defendant argued that the complainant should have been required to testify in open court in front of the jury. However, the Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a “Tender Years Act” which permits children who are 12 years old or younger to testify via closed circuit television under certain circumstances. When the prosecution moves that a child witness be permitted to testify via closed circuit television, the court must hold a hearing to determine, based on the evidence presented to it, whether requiring the child to testify in an open forum in the presence and full view of the jury and defendant will result in the child victim or child witness suffering serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child victim or material witness’s ability to reasonably communicate.

The statute further provides: “in making this determination, the court may do all of the following:

1) Observe and question the child victim or child material witness, either inside or outside the courtroom.

2) Hear testimony of a parent or custodian or any other person, such as a person who has dealt with the child victim or child material witness in a medical or therapeutic setting.”

The statute makes it clear that the court must hold a hearing and either hear from the child or from a witness who can testify as to the emotional state of the child. If the court is satisfied that the child cannot testify without suffering from substantial emotional distress which will impair the child’s ability to communicate, then the court may permit the child to testify in a different room. Only the attorneys for the parties, the judge, the court reporter, an advocate for the child, and persons necessary to operate the recording equipment may be present in the room in which the child testifies. The defendant, the jury, the public, and any other court staff may not be present in the room.

Here, the defendant challenged the trial court’s determination that the complainant could testify via closed circuit television. In a pre-trial hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of a licensed professional counselor. The counselor testified that in her expert opinion, she believed it would be traumatic for the complainant to testify in open court in front of her father and others. She believed that it would be traumatic because of how hard it was for the complainant to disclose the sexual assault and because many children still feel loyalty to their parents even after they report having been sexually assaulted.

The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of a caseworker for the county’s Children and Youth Services (called DHS in Philadelphia). The caseworker testified that the complainant suffered because the allegations against the defendant broke up her family. She had been placed in foster care, and she had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and PTSD. She had also told the caseworker how scared she was and that she was dreading the court date. The caseworker felt that the complainant was not ready to stand in a public courtroom and testify.

Based on this testimony, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to permit the child to testify from a different location, and the Superior Court approved of the trial court’s decision. The Superior Court reasoned that there is no specific requirement as to who or what kind of witness must testify in order to make the showing necessary under the Tender Years Act. The Tender Years Act does not require a current counselor, a medical doctor, or even a parent to testify in making the necessary showing. Instead, the plain language of the Act permits the Court to evaluate the child witness for itself and for the Court to hear from any adult witness who has the relevant knowledge of the effect that testifying would have on the child. The child does not necessarily have to testify, and the child’s current counselor or doctor does not have to testify. The Superior Court therefore held that the trial court properly permitted the complainant to testify via closed circuit television.

Tainted Testimony Is Not Admissible in Child Abuse Cases  

The Superior Court also rejected the argument that the complainant’s testimony should have been excluded due to taint. In every case, witnesses must be competent to testify. Competency requires:

1. the ability to communicate,

2. the mental capacity to observe the occurrence itself and the capability of remembering what it is that the witness is called to testify about, and

3. 3) a consciousness of the duty to tell the truth.

In prior decisions, PA appellate courts have recognized that child witnesses are particularly susceptible to the world of make-believe and of suggestions, and taint has been described as “the implantation of false memories or distortion of actual memories through improper and suggestive interview techniques.” Therefore, where there is evidence that the testimony of a child witness has been tainted, it may be possible to exclude the testimony of the witness because the witness does not have the capability of remembering what it is the witness is called to testify about.

A defendant may move prior to trial to exclude the testimony of a tainted witness. When the defendant makes such a motion, the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence of taint and the burden of proving that the witness was tainted by clear and convincing evidence. This means that a defendant must be able to show that the witness’s testimony stems from repetitive, suggestive, or coercive interview techniques either on the part of an interested party such as the other parent or on the part of investigators.

Here, the Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the testimony of the complainant had been tainted. The first disclosure of the sexual assault took place in the victim’s journal which she later provided to a counselor. She also did not initially disclose the sexual assault to investigators during the forensic interviews. The court found that the defendant failed to show that anyone had suggested to the complainant that she make the allegations or that any of the questioning was inappropriate. The witnesses testified that they did not use leading questions or in any way coerce the witness into making the allegations, and both the trial court and Superior Court accepted that testimony. In this case, the Court found that the record simply did not support the defendant’s arguments that the complainant should have been required to testify in open court or that the complainant’s testimony was tainted by the investigators.

Challenging Tainted Testimony and Tender Years Act Motions in Sexual Assault Cases

Although the defendant did not win in this particular case, the Superior Court’s opinion explores two significant issues which often arise in sexual assault cases involving children. First, it is important to fight against any attempts on the part of the Commonwealth to take shortcuts and protect its witnesses from open cross-examination. The Confrontation clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions give criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them. These clauses have been interpreted as providing defendants the right to have their attorneys cross-examine adverse witnesses in open court with the idea that cross-examination is the best method for determining whether or not witnesses are telling the truth. When the Commonwealth can shield its witnesses from appearing in open court, it makes it easier for the witnesses to fabricate stories because it is easier to lie when you do not have to face the person that you are lying about. Therefore, it is important to challenge the Commonwealth’s motions in these types of cases and fight for open cross-examination. Second, it is critically important that the defense attorney fully investigate these cases and be extremely familiar with the discovery and contents of the forensic interviews that prosecutors typically rely upon. If it can be shown through the Commonwealth’s evidence or through the testimony of defense witnesses that the complainant has been coached and had his or her testimony tainted through the suggestions or coercion of others, then it may be possible to have the testimony excluded.

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