Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
Recent Case Results - Motion to Suppress and Speedy Trial Motions Granted
Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
The Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys of Goldstein Mehta LLC continue to obtain outstanding results both in and out of the court room. Our defense lawyers have fought for successful outcomes in cases involving a wide variety of charges including robbery, burglary, assault, probation violations and probation detainers, and gun charges. Some of our recent success stories include:
Commonwealth v. G. – Motion to Suppress Confession for Lack of Miranda Warnings Granted in Shooting Case
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
In Commonwealth v. G., Attorney Goldstein successfully moved for the suppression of an incriminating statement in a case in which the defendant was charged with gun charges including Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”) Sections 6108, 6106, and 6105 as well as conspiracy, tampering with evidence, and recklessly endangering another person. The Commonwealth alleged that G. accompanied his co-defendants to a location where a shooting broke out. After the complainants returned fire and shot one of the co-defendants, G. allegedly took the gun and hid it. When G. went to visit his friend at the hospital, police arrested him and began interrogating him, resulting in a confession which implicated G. in hiding the gun.
Attorney Goldstein moved to suppress the statement and the firearm due to violations of the Miranda rule. Pennsylvania and federal law both require the police to read suspects their Miranda warnings prior to interrogating them. Prior to asking any questions which could lead to incriminating answers, police must advise a suspect who has been arrested and taken into custody that the suspect has:
The right to remain silent,
The right to an attorney and that the attorney will be paid for by the government if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, and
That anything the suspect says can be used against them in court.
Shortly before trial, prosecutors admitted that detectives had actually interrogated G. twice. First, they interrogated him immediately upon his arrival at the police station when they had not yet provided him with Miranda warnings at that time. After obtaining a confession, police quickly provided G. with Miranda warnings, questioned him again, and obtained a signed statement.
Attorney Goldstein successfully moved to have both statements suppressed due to detective’s failure to provide Miranda warnings prior to the first interrogation. Under federal law, police may not intentionally fail to provide Miranda warnings in order to obtain a confession, then provide warnings, and quickly re-interrogate the defendant after providing the warnings. Instead, federal courts have applied a sort of “good faith exception” when evaluating whether prosecutors may use a second, Mirandized statement which is substantially similar to a prior un-Mirandized statement. Where police make a mistake in failing to provide Miranda warnings or where the circumstances change enough so that the second statement is not directly related to the first, the statement may become admissible. The Commonwealth attempted to justify the failure to warn by arguing that it had been inadvertent and that there was a break in the chain between the first and second interrogations due to the passage of time.
Here, Attorney Goldstein successfully argued that the police intentionally failed to provide Miranda warnings during the first statement. Additionally, there was no break in the chain between the two interrogations. The second interrogation happened almost immediately, took place in the same location, and involved the same police detective. The trial court agreed and granted the Motion to Suppress, ruling that both statements could not be used at trial. Once the statements were excluded, the Commonwealth agreed that it would not appeal the court’s ruling if G. accepted a plea deal for a misdemeanor charge and probation. The successful Motion to Suppress helped G. avoid a felony gun conviction and years in state prison.
Commonwealth v. A. – Robbery, Burglary, and Assault Charges Dismissed for Speedy Trial Violation.
In Commonwealth v. A., Attorney Goldstein successfully moved to have all charges against the client dismissed due to the prosecution’s violation of Pennsylvania Speedy Trial Rules, specifiically Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A). A. and a co-defendant were charged with dressing up as police officers and forcing their way into a massage parlor. Once inside, the defendants allegedly demanded money from the employees. The employees called the police, and the defendants were arrested inside the massage parlor. The Commonwealth immediately brought charges for robbery, burglary, assault, and other related charges.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, the Commonwealth brought the charges without completing its investigation. At the first trial listing, the Commonwealth was not prepared to proceed because it had improperly failed to turn over critical witness statements and evidence in advance of trial. The trial court marked the continuance as a Commonwealth continuance request, and by the time the second jury trial listing arrived, the defendant had been awaiting trial for two years.
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A) requires that all criminal defendants be brought to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal Complaint. There are exceptions for things like court continuances and circumstances outside of the prosecution’s control, but in order to qualify for an exception, the Commonwealth must show that its prosecutors acted with due diligence in prosecuting the case. In this case, Attorney Goldstein successfully argued that the judge at the first trial listing had already found that the prosecution acted without due diligence in failing to provide witness statements and other discovery materials in advance of the first trial date. Because the Commonwealth never asked the first judge to reconsider the ruling in writing, Rule 600 barred the Commonwealth from asking the new trial judge to reconsider the first judge’s ruling without some showing of obvious error on the part of the first judge. The court agreed and dismissed all of the charges in this extremely serious case.
Commonwealth v. M. – Car Theft Charges Dismissed at Preliminary Hearing
In Commonwealth v. M., the client was charged with multiple counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Unauthorized Use of an Automobile, and Theft from a Motor Vehicle. Prosecutors alleged that in one case, M. stole the complainant’s car and drove it around for a night before leaving it abandoned on a nearby street. Further, numerous valuable items were missing from the car, leading to additional allegations that M. had stolen the items.
In a second case which had been joined for the preliminary hearing, prosecutors alleged that M. broke into a parked car, stole valuable items, and transported those items to his house. When prosecutors executed a search warrant on M.'s house, they found M. and another gentleman in the living room along with the stolen items. Neither man was closer to the items, said anything incriminating, or attempted to flee, and the other man's hospital ID had actually been found by police in the stolen car in the first case.
In both cases, the prosecution attempted to rely entirely on hearsay at the preliminary hearing under the Superior Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Ricker. The prosecution sought to have a police detective, who had no personal knowledge of who took the car or took items from the other car, testify that a witness who failed to appear for court saw M. driving the car on the night in question.
Attorney Goldstein’s repeated objections to this hearsay testimony led to it being excluded from evidence at the preliminary hearing, and without the hearsay, the evidence was completely insufficient for the preliminary hearing judge to hold M. for court. This was particularly true in light of the fact that the other gentleman's hospital wristband was found by police in the stolen car. Accordingly, the court dismissed all charges against M. This case shows that even with the trend of judges permitting more and more hearsay at preliminary hearings, there are still limits. This is especially true in Philadelphia where judges tend to require that witnesses have some level of personal knowledge before they will hold a case for court.
Probation Detainers Lifted – In the last six weeks, our Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys have successfully moved to have probation detainers lifted for three separate clients who were on probation and subsequently arrested on new charges. This includes the lifting of a probation detainer for a client who was on probation for a gun charge and who was arrested on a new case of Possession with the Intent to Deliver.
State v. D. – Prosecution Agrees to Dismiss All Charges in New Jersey Prison Contraband Case
In State v. D., the client was charged with third degree indictable offenses in New Jersey for allegedly smuggling drugs into the prison during a visit with a friend. The prosecution obtained both video of the incident and phone calls which it claimed implicated D. in the offense. After convincing the Assistant Prosecutor that even if real, the phone calls would not be admissible against D. due to violations of New Jersey wiretap and recording laws, the prosecution agreed to dismiss all charges. D. will avoid a felony conviction and jail time.
Commonwealth v. K. – All Charges Dismissed in Third Strike Carjacking (Robbery of a Motor Vehicle) Case.
K. was charged with stealing his ex-girlfriend’s car by snatching the keys out of her hand and driving off in the car. Although this allegation would only have been Robbery as a felony of the second degree, the case became a third strike and a carjacking because of the fact that K. allegedly took a car. Carjacking (Robbery of a Motor Vehicle) is considered a crime of violence under Pennsylvania law for purposes of the three strikes rule. Due to prior convictions, K. would have faced a mandatory 25-50 years in prison if convicted of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle because carjacking is a “strike” case. Fortunately, our criminal defense attorneys were able to have all charges dismissed at the preliminary hearing level.
Commonwealth v. J. – Our criminal defense lawyers were able to successfully negotiate a misdemeanor offer of probation for a client who was initially charged with F1 Strangulation, Robbery, and Aggravated Assault. First, we were able to have the strangulation charge dismissed at the preliminary hearing and the other felonies graded as felonies of the second degree. Once the felonies were no longer F1 strike offenses, the Commonwealth’s offer substantially improved, and we were eventually able to negotiate a misdemeanor probationary offer for the client, thereby avoiding jail time and a felony conviction.
Criminal Defense Attorney Demetra P. Mehta, Esq.
Commonwealth v. A. – All charges against A. were dismissed after our defense lawyers negotiated for A. to participate in the domestic violence diversionary program. After A. completed community service, counseling, and paid a small fine, the Commonwealth withdrew Simple Assault, Terroristic Threats, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person charges against A.
Commonwealth v. R. - The client was arrested and charged with Robbery, Assault, and related charges while on probation for a serious offense. Because there was clear video of the incident occurring, the client was hoping to obtain a plea deal for the shortest possible sentence. The client's previous attorney had been unable to negotiate for anything less than a 1-2 year state prison sentence. After retaining Goldstein Mehta LLC, our defense lawyers were able to negotiate a sentence of 11.5 - 23 months with work release eligibility and no additional jail time on the direct probation violation.
Charged with a crime? Speak with a Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Today
Goldstein Mehta LLC Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges or are interested in appealing a conviction, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully resolved countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.
Doctor May Not Provide Opinion That Child Was Sexually Assaulted Without Physical Evidence of Abuse
Expert Opinions in Sexual Assault Cases
In Commonwealth v. Maconeghy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just held that a child sexual abuse evaluator may not testify to his opinion that a child was sexually assaulted where the opinion is based solely on the evaluator’s apparent acceptance of the child’s reporting and description of the abuse.
In Maconeghy, the defendant’s sixteen year old stepdaughter reported that she had been raped and otherwise sexually abused on multiple occasions by the defendant when she was eleven years old. Based on her statement, the defendant was arrested and charged with various sex offenses, including rape by forcible compulsion and rape of a child. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of both the complainant and a pediatrician who evaluated the complainant to determine whether she suffered from sexual abuse.
The Testimony at Trial
After the complainant testified to the abuse, the Commonwealth called the pediatrician to testify to the results of his interview and examination of the complainant. He testified that he had conducted a physical exam of the complainant, and that the physical exam did not reveal any evidence of abuse. In his opinion, however, a physical examination was unlikely to detect evidence of the abuse outside of the first seventy-two hours following an occurrence of a sexual assault.
On cross-examination, the defense attorney repeatedly asked the doctor to concede that there was no physical or medical evidence of abuse. The doctor refused to concede this point, replying that based on the history provided by the complainant, it was clear that she had been sexually abused. Further, on questioning from the prosecution, the doctor testified that he strongly believed that the child had been victimized.
The Appeal
Based on this testimony, the defendant was convicted. Shortly thereafter, the defendant appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the sexual assault convictions, finding that although the defense had opened the door to some of the doctor’s personal opinion by questioning him on cross-examination, the prosecution had pushed it too far on re-direct examination.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now upheld the Superior Court’s decision to reverse the conviction. The Court held that an expert witness may not express an opinion that a particular complainant was the victim of a sexual assault based upon witness accounts couched as history, at least in the absence of evidence of physical abuse. The Court recognized that such opinion testimony from an expert witness usurps the function of the jury. In other words, it is the jury’s job to determine whether or not the crime was committed. The doctor cannot testify that the crime was committed without intruding on that key function of the jury.
Instead, the doctor may testify only to the medical findings of the examination – that is, whether there was evidence of physical abuse and whether evidence of physical abuse would always be present following an allegation of sexual assault. The Court held that it is extremely important to limit the purported medical testimony because of the potential power and persuasiveness of testimony “by those clothed with the mantle of professional expertise,” meaning it will be very difficult for a jury to disregard the testimony of a respected medical doctor.
Accordingly, the Court upheld the decision of the Superior Court, and the defendant will receive a new trial. The Court declined to rule on whether a doctor would be permitted to testify to this type of opinion in a case with actual physical evidence of abuse. Thus, that remains an open question.
The Impact of the Court's Decision in Child Rape and Sexual Assault Cases
The Court’s decision in Maconeghy is extremely important because it is very common for the prosecution to call these types of expert witnesses in rape and sexual assault cases. This is particularly true in cases involving allegations of child abuse and sexual assault on children. In many cases, complainants wait years after the alleged incident to make any reports to the authorities, and therefore, the case will often come down to the word of the complainant versus the word of the defendant.
By calling respected medical doctors to testify to their opinion that the complainant is telling the truth, the Commonwealth is often able to improperly shroud the testimony of the complainant in a shield of authority and credibility because of the impressive credentials and respectability of the medical doctor. The real question in these cases is whether the jury should believe the complainant’s testimony, but permitting doctors to testify that they believe the complainant makes it much harder for the jury to keep an open mind and reject false testimony. Therefore, this opinion will make it possible for many defendants to have a fair trial by limiting the improper influence of a medical doctor who has no specialized training in determining whether or not a complainant is lying.
Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges or allegations of sexual assault, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully represented thousands of clients. We offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client who is facing criminal charges or who may be under investigation for a crime. We are experienced and understanding professionals who are well versed in recent case law and who will fight to use the law to your benefit. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with one of our defense attorneys today.
Read the Opinion:
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/25655768.pdf?cb=1
PA Superior Court: Child Porn Convictions Arising Out of Same Case Do Not Trigger Lifetime Megan’s Law Registration
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Leonard. In Leonard, the Court found that the trial court erred when it required the defendant to register as a Tier III, lifetime Megan’s Law offender after the defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of distribution of child pornography, possession of child pornography, and criminal use of a communication facility. Because distribution of child pornography, which was the most serious charge in terms of SORNA registration, is only a Tier II offense, the trial court should have required the defendant to register as a Tier II offender for 25 years.
In Leonard, the defendant pleaded guilty to various counts of distributing and possessing child pornography as well as criminal use of a communications facility (“CUCF”). At sentencing, the defense attorney argued that the defendant should be treated as a Tier II sex offender because all of the convictions arose from the same criminal episode and the defendant was convicted of all offenses on the same date. The court ruled that defendant would be sentenced as a Tier III, lifetime offender under the SORNA provision which finds that if the defendant “has two or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses,” the defendant becomes a Tier III offender and must register for life. The court did allow the defendant to preserve the issue for appeal.
The defendant was sentenced and filed a notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case of A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, holding that the previously mentioned language dealing with multiple convictions requires separate convictions. Thus, in A.S. (and the companion case of Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison), the Supreme Court held that a defendant who had been convicted of multiple counts of Tier I possession of child pornography at the same time must only register for fifteen years as a Tier I offender.
In Leonard, the Superior Court held that the same rule applies for when multiple Tier II and Tier I offenses are combined as part of the same case and are part of an ongoing course of conduct. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for re-sentencing with an order that the trial court require the defendant to register only as a Tier II offender. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the defendant improperly challenged his registration by filing a notice of appeal directly to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The prosecution argued that the defendant should have challenged his registration classification by filing suit against the Pennsylvania State Police in the Commonwealth Court as the Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction over lawsuits against state agencies. The Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that because the defendant was still in the process of serving his sentence and had filed a timely direct appeal, the Superior Court could review the issue of whether the trial court had imposed a legal sentence. Accordingly, the Superior Court remanded the case so that the trial court could re-sentence the defendant as a Tier II offender.
AWARD-WINNING Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys
Philadelphia Sex Crimes Defense Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges or believe you may have been improperly required to register under Megan’s Law, we can help. We offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client who is under investigation or facing active criminal charges. We also offer a $100 Megan's Law consultation if you believe that you may be improperly classified under SORNA. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with one of our award-winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers.
PA Superior Court Rejects Good Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule in Birchfield Cases
Commonwealth v. Carper
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Carper. In Carper, the Court held that prosecutors may not introduce illegally obtained blood test results in Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) cases despite the fact that the police relied on then-settled law which permitted warrantless blood testing of DUI suspects. The Superior Court specifically rejected the application of the “good faith exception” and held that the evidence remains inadmissible despite the fact that the police officers may have acted in good faith and not realized that they were violating the law.
Carper involved a relatively straight-forward DUI case. A Pennsylvania State Police Trooper pulled Carper over in October 2014 for an expired inspection sticker. During the ensuing stop, the Trooper began to suspect Carper of driving under the influence of a controlled substance. The Trooper arrested Carper, transported him to the hospital, and informed him that if he did not consent to a blood draw, he would face increased criminal penalties. Carper agreed to the blood draw, and the blood draw showed the presence of a controlled substance.
Motion to Suppress
Carper moved to suppress the evidence under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Notably, Carper did not move to suppress the blood results under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The trial court held a suppression hearing, and the Commonwealth introduced evidence in an attempt to show that it complied with both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Following the hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, and then Carper filed a post-suppression hearing brief in which he also argued that the blood results should be suppressed under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Likewise, the Commonwealth filed a brief in which it argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution did not bar the introduction of the blood results into evidence.
Birchfield v. North Dakota made it illegal for states to impose criminal penalties on DUI suspects who refuse a warrantless blood draw. Thus, the trial court granted the Motion to suppress, agreeing with the defense that the police illegally coerced the defendant into consenting to the blood draw by informing the defendant that he would face more severe criminal penalties if he refused chemical testing.
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
The Commonwealth appealed. In its appeal, the Commonwealth argued for the application of the good faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule. In the federal system, prosecutors may still use unlawfully seized evidence if police acted in good faith when they obtained the evidence. For example, courts have found that officers acted in good faith where they arrested a defendant on what they believed to be a valid warrant despite the fact that the warrant had actually been lifted. Likewise, federal courts have held that police act in good faith when they rely on existing case law when conducting a search even if later case law subsequently changes the legality of the search. Thus, the Commonwealth asked the Superior Court to find that the good faith exception applies in Birchfield cases because police relied on well-established case law. The Commonwealth also argued that the defendant failed to properly preserve his state law challenge to the blood draw because defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence only under the United States Constitution prior to the hearing and never mentioned the state law claim until the defense filed its post-hearing brief.
The Superior Court rejected both of the Commonwealth’s arguments. First, the Court recognized that Pennsylvania appellate courts have repeatedly found that there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania. Thus, while the good faith exception may apply in federal court, it does not apply in Pennsylvania state courts. The only issue is whether officers violated the law; it does not save the Commonwealth’s case that the officers relied on the law at the time. Second, the Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that Carper waived the state law claims by failing to mention them in the initial motion. This would have led to the motion being denied because under the federal law claims, the good faith exception would have applied. Nonetheless, the Court rejected this argument as well, finding that the Commonwealth had not been prejudiced because the Commonwealth extensively briefed the state law issues and presented testimony relating to the issue of coercion at the suppression hearing. Further, the defense preserved the issue by filing the post-hearing brief and allowing the trial court to rule on it. Therefore, the Court rejected both of the Commonwealth’s appellate issues.
Following Carper, it is clear that the good faith exception does not apply in Birchfield DUI cases. States may not penalize DUI suspects for refusing to submit to blood testing without a search warrant. Although prosecutors continuously ask the appellate courts to adopt a good faith exception in Pennsylvania, the courts have fortunately refused to do so thus far.
Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys
If you are facing DUI charges or fighting any other criminal case, we can help. Our award-winning criminal defense attorneys have successfully represented thousands of clients in all types of criminal cases. Don't just assume you have to plead guilty and are going to lose your license. Call 267-225-2545 for a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session with one of our Philadelphia DUI Defense Attorneys and Criminal Lawyers.