Is Mace a Deadly Weapon Under the Aggravated Assault Statute?

Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon in Pennsylvania

An issue that frequently comes up in Aggravated Assault prosecutions is whether or not the defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of an assault that resulted in bodily injury. In cases where the defendant is charged with attempting to cause or knowingly or intentionally causing bodily injury, the Commonwealth may seek a conviction for Aggravated Assault as a felony of the second degree instead of Simple Assault if the Commonwealth can also show that the defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense.

Bodily injury is defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain," and a deadly weapon is defined as "any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." In cases involving a knife or a gun, it is relatively simple for the Commonwealth to show that a deadly weapon was involved for purposes of the Aggravated Assault (F2) statute because those weapons are clearly identified in the statute. There may be other potential defenses, but it will likely not be a defense that the weapon involved was not deadly.

what is a deadly weapon in pennsylvania? 

However, when the defendant is alleged to have used some sort of non-traditional weapon, the issue becomes much more complicated because any object can become a deadly weapon depending on how it is used. Under the statute, if the object is used or intended to be used in a manner calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, then the object could qualify as a deadly weapon even if it is not something that would normally be thought of as a weapon. Accordingly, appellate courts have found that even such seemingly harmless objects as eggs can be deadly weapons if the eggs are thrown at moving cars. In that scenario, an egg could be a deadly weapon because the manner in which the egg was used could lead to a car accident which could produce or serious bodily injury. 

IS MACE A DEADLY WEAPON? 

Recently, in Commonwealth v. Chambers, the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that mace (pepper spray) could qualify as a deadly weapon under the statute depending on how it is used. In Chambers, the defendant was convicted for Aggravated Assault. The trial court found that Chambers had engaged in a fight with the complainant, and during the fight, a co-conspirator sprayed the complainant with pepper spray. Chambers and a number of other people continued to punch and kick the complainant, leaving the complainant with a concussion, lacerations which required stitches, a burnt retina in his eye, and some broken bones. The trial court found Chambers guilty of Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon on the theories of co-conspirator and accomplice liability because one of Chambers co-defendants used the mace. Chambers appealed, arguing that the mace did not constitute a deadly weapon because it is "an instrument which is not inherently a deadly weapon" and because the Commonwealth did not present any evidence regarding the chemical composition of the mace. 

The Superior Court rejected Chambers argument. The court accepted the trial court's conclusion that even if the mace was not inherently a deadly weapon, it became a deadly weapon because of the manner in which it was used against the complainant. Although mace may not cause permanent injuries on its own, the mace in Chambers was used to incapacitate the complainant so that the group could continue to beat him and cause more serious injuries. Therefore, the mace was used in a manner which made it more likely that the complainant would suffer death or serious bodily injury because he could not defend himself from the ongoing assault. 

Therefore, depending on the circumstances, an item like mace may or may not be a deadly weapon for purposes of the Aggravated Assault statute. If the defendant simply sprays mace in the complainant's eyes and the complainant does not suffer serious bodily injury and there is no further assault, then the mace may not be a deadly weapon. If the mace is used to incapacitate the complainant so that the complainant can be injured, then the mace may qualify as a deadly weapon. 

WHAT IS serious bodily injury?

In cases involving "serious bodily injury," the defendant will typically be charged with Aggravated Assault as a felony of the first degree, and whether or not the defendant used a deadly weapon will not be as relevant. However, it could still be relevant at sentencing because there are sentencing enhancements when a deadly weapon is used or possessed during the comission of an offense. Serious bodily injury is defined by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as "bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Therefore, serious bodily injury is typically going to involve things like broken bones, brain damage, organ failure, shootings, and stabbings. In other words, serious bodily injury involves permanent or at least lasting damage. 

HOW OUR PHILADELPHIA ASSAULT LAWYERS CAN HELP

Regardless of whether the defendant is charged with Aggravated Assault as a felony of the first or second degree, Aggravated Assault is an extremely serious charge. Our Philadelphia assault lawyers have successfully defended many clients charged with all types of assault. The most important thing to do if you are facing assault charges is to act quickly. Do not delay and allow valuable evidence and witnesses to be lost. Video surveillance may often start to be deleted in as little as 24 hours. If you are charged with any type of assault in Philadelphia or the surrounding counties, call the Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC at 267-225-2545 for a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session.  

Philadelphia Assault Lawyers

Supreme Court Update – Clear Evidence of Racial Bias on Part of Jurors May Now Lead to Reversal

In a decision announced earlier this week, the United States Supreme Court opened a hole in state and federal jury deliberation secrecy laws for defendants who can show through clear evidence that the defendant was denied a fair trial due to racial bias against the defendant’s race on the part of one or more jurors. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that when clear evidence emerges following a jury verdict that racial bias played a part in jury deliberations, the trial judge must make an exception to ordinary jury secrecy rules and determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. Although this will often be a difficult showing to make, the Court’s decision provides a defendant with the potential for relief when it can be shown that the jury’s decision to convict was based in part on the race of the defendant.

In previous decisions, the overwhelming majority of state and federal appellate courts had reached the opposite conclusion and prohibited defendants from attacking jury verdicts based on after-discovered evidence of racism on the part of the jurors. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently reached the opposite conclusion in the case of Commonwealth v. Steele. Steele arose in the context of a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. In Steele, the Petitioner alleged that his due process rights and right to a fair and impartial jury were violated by the racial prejudice of one of the jurors. After Steele was convicted of murder, he learned from one of the jurors that other jurors had commented on his race early in the trial and also made fun of his defense attorney. Jurors had also made various racist remarks during deliberations and suggested that he should hang. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the PCRA Petition, noting that Pennsylvania has a “no impeachment” rule with respect to jury deliberations. The Steele court noted:  

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, … a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions in reaching a decision upon the verdict or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, and a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror about any of these subjects may not be received.

The only exception to the “no impeachment” rule is for cases in which there is evidence that some outside force influenced juror deliberations. For example, allegations of bribery or threats could be used to attack a jury verdict. Accordingly, prior to Pena-Rodriguez, a Pennsylvania jury verdict could not be challenged based on even overt racism on the part of the jurors.

Pena-Rodriguez appears to completely overrule Pennsylvania’s “no impeachment” rule as set forth in Steele. In Pena-Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted by a jury of harassment and unlawful sexual contact. After the trial, two jurors told the defendant’s lawyer that during deliberations, one of the jurors had expressed anti-Hispanic bias towards the defendant his alibi witness. Both of these jurors signed affidavits, and Pena-Rodriguez' criminal defense attorneys moved for a new trial. The trial court, however, denied the motion for a new trial because Colorado had a similar “no impeachment” rule.

Following a number of appeals through the Colorado state appellate system which upheld the trial court’s ruling, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court ruled that “where a juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and nay resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for the court to conduct a hearing into whether the defendant received a fair trial.

The Court ruled:

Before the no-impeachment bar can be set aside to allow further judicial inquiry, there must be a threshold showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict. Whether the threshold showing has been satisfied is committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court in light of all the circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered evidence.

Given the Supreme Court’s broad ruling, it is clear that Pennsylvania’s “no impeachment” rule with respect to juror deliberations is now unconstitutional in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The practical effect of this decision for most defendants may be limited because it is fairly uncommon for defense counsel to have much of an opportunity to speak with jurors following trial or for jurors to come forward with this type of information. However, it does open the door for challenges to jury verdicts in cases where there is clear evidence that racism played a role in the deliberations. Further, this case illustrates the importance of comprehensive voir dire or questioning of the jurors during jury selection in the hopes that biased jurors may be kept off the jury.   

As always, if you are facing criminal charges, it is critical that you hire a criminal defense attorney who focuses his or her practice on criminal law and stays on top of new developments in the law. If you are facing criminal charges in Pennsylvania or New Jersey, call 267-225-2545 for a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session with one of our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers.

NOT GUILTY – Attorney Mehta Obtains Full Acquittal in “Second Strike” Aggravated Assault (F1) Trial

The Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC continue to obtain outstanding results in the court room. This week, in the case of Commonwealth v. B. F., criminal defense attorney Demetra Mehta obtained a full acquittal for B. F. in a case involving first degree felony Aggravated Assault charges. After deliberating for less than a day, the jury came back with a resounding Not Guilty verdict for B. F. 

B. F. was arrested and charged with Aggravated Assault for allegedly striking a neighbor in the head with a stick and attempting to “sic” his pit bull on the neighbor. The neighbor ultimately needed thirteen stitches in his forehead due to the injury caused by the stick. After the police were called and found the neighbor with visible injuries, they arrested B.F. and charged him with Aggravated Assault. Although Aggravated Assault is always one of the most serious charge a defendant can face under Pennsylvania law, this case was particularly serious because the Aggravated Assault charge was a “second strike” with a mandatory minimum sentence of 10-20 years in state prison. Firmly convinced of her client’s innocence, Attorney Mehta advised B. F. to reject a plea offer for substantially less jail time and demand a jury trial.       

Through relentless cross examination of the complainant and calling her client to the stand to testify, Attorney Mehta was able to show that B. F. had actually acted in self-defense when he struck the complainant. The jury ultimately concluded that the complainant was the one who initiated the fight by assaulting B. F. with a six foot long cast iron pipe and quickly found B. F. not guilty of all charges. Thanks to the aggressive advocacy of Demetra Mehta, Esq., B. F. walked out of the court room a free man. 

Other Recent Success Stories:

Commonwealth v. D. – Possession with the Intent to Deliver (“PWID”) and Firearms charges dismissed at preliminary hearing. 

Commonwealth v. K. – firearms charges dismissed at preliminary hearing and bail reduced substantially for remaining charges. 

Commonwealth v. P. – Defendant was charged with a felony for attempting to purchase a firearm and failing to disclose a juvenile record on the background check form. After the defendant’s prior counsel attempted to convince him to accept a plea deal which included jail time and a felony conviction, the defendant made the right decision and hired Goldstein Mehta LLC. Attorney Goldstein negotiated a plea to misdemeanor charges and probation, meaning that P. will avoid a felony conviction and serve no jail time. 

Commonwealth v. A. – Felony theft charges (stolen car) dismissed at preliminary hearing. 

Commonwealth v. J. – Felony robbery charges dismissed prior to trial.  

PA Superior Court Limits Application of Possession of Weapon on School Grounds Statute

Possession of a Weapon on School Grounds

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently issued an opinion which significantly expands the defenses available in a prosecution under the Possession of Weapon on School Property statute. In Commonwealth v. Goslin, the full Superior Court reversed the initial three-judge panel decision which upheld Goslin's conviction for possessing a pocket knife on school grounds. The court ruled that the lower courts and panel erred in interpreting the defenses available under the statute when the trial court concluded that the weapon must be possessed for a lawful purpose related to a school activity. Therefore, Goslin is entitled to a new trial. 

Defenses to Possession of Weapon on School Property Charges

The Possession of Weapon on School Property statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 912, makes it a misdemeanor of the first degree to possess "a weapon in the buildings of, on the grounds of, or in any conveyance providing transportation to or from any elementary or secondary publicly-funded educational institution, any elementary or secondary private school licensed by the Department of Education or any elementary or secondary parochial school." However, the statute also provides two defenses to the charge. First, it is a defense where the weapon was possessed and used in conjunction with a lawful supervised school activity or course. Second, it is a defense where the weapon "is possessed for other lawful purpose."  

The facts in Goslin were fairly straight forward and a little bit humorous. Goslin's son was suspended from school for three days for bringing a knife to school. Goslin and his wife then attended a meeting at school to discuss the discipline. Goslin arrived at the meeting directly from working at his job as a carpenter. When he arrived, he had a knife of his own in his pocket which he used both at work and also to sharpen pencils, whittle sticks with his sons, and “open tuna cans when [his] wife forgets to pack [him] a tuna can opener.”

At some point during the meeting, Goslin removed the knife from his pocket, put it on the table, and asked to know whether he would be arrested as well. Of course, Goslin was arrested, and he was later convicted of Possession of Weapon on School Property after the trial court found that the lawful purposes for which Goslin normally possessed the knife were not related to school activities.  

Initially, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court upheld the trial judge's reasoning that the statue requires the weapon possession to be related to school activities and affirmed the conviction. Goslin's attorneys petitioned the full Superior Court or en banc review, and the court agreed to review the case. The full Superior Court interpreted the statute differently and reversed the conviction. The court concluded:

Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the “other lawful purpose” language does not restrict the defense provided in Section 912(c). Instead, the phrase does just the opposite: it expands the defense to include any additional or different lawful reason not otherwise mentioned in the first clause of Section 912(c), regardless of whether it is school-related. To conclude otherwise, would make “possessed for other lawful purpose” redundant with “possessed and used in association with a lawful supervised school activity or course.”

The Superior Court's holding in Goslin is very broad. It means that if the defense can produce evidence of a lawful purpose for which the weapon was possessed, the prosecution likely should not be able to obtain a conviction under the statute. As always, we do not advocate testing the limits of these statutes. If you bring a knife to a school, you will probably still be arrested and forced to deal with the expense and risk of a criminal prosecution. But this decision clearly establishes that if there was a lawful purpose for possessing the weapon, then the Commonwealth may not prevail in a prosecution under this statute.