Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/27/22 Zak Goldstein 7/27/22

PA Supreme Court: Police Often Must Get Search Warrant to Obtain Homicide-by-DUI Defendant's Blood from Hospital

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, holding that the defendant’s blood was illegally seized for drug testing because the police obtained it from a hospital without getting a search warrant. The Commonwealth had attempted to use various statutes and theories to justify the warrantless seizure, but because no exigent circumstances were present which would justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court ruled that the police violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court therefore suppressed the blood results.

Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams

The defendant drove his car at about two miles per hour over train tracks, where a train collided with his vehicle. The train pushed it for a quarter of a mile before it stopped moving. The defendant and his daughter were transported to a hospital, while his fiancée who had also been in the car was pronounced dead at the scene.

Lieutenant Steven Lutz, the officer in charge, spoke to several individuals who explained that the defendant’s car smelled like burnt marijuana. Lieutenant Lutz told Sergeant Keith Farren to interview the defendant and obtain a legal blood draw. A legal blood draw requires consent or a search warrant from a subject before being seized for testing. Sergeant Farren determined that the defendant was not conscious enough to give consent, as he had been drifting in and out of consciousness. This would often justify a warrantless search under the Supreme Court’s case law, but prior to obtaining the blood, the officer learned that the hospital had already drawn the defendant’s blood.

Sergeant Farren completed paperwork authorizing the defendant’s blood to be tested, and it was revealed that the defendant’s blood contained Delta-9 THC, an ingredient in marijuana. The defendant was arrested and charged with homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, II, or III metabolite, DUI: general impairment, careless driving, careless driving – unintentional death, aggravated assault while DUI, and aggravated assault by vehicle.

The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the blood test results, arguing that the police did not have probable cause that he was driving under the influence, that his blood was seized without a warrant, and that Section 3755, which allows the police to obtain blood from a hospital without a warrant, did not justify the seizure.

Of note, Section 3755 states that if a person who is suspected to be DUI must seek medical treatment, then a physician must take blood samples from the individual and transmit them within 24 hours to the Department of Health or a laboratory for testing. These results then may be released to the individual tested, his attorney, his physician or government officials.

During the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Lutz testified that the defendant’s blood was obtained through a legal blood draw, citing Section 3755. Notably, Sergeant Farren never referenced Section 3755 during his testimony, instead explaining that he attempted to obtain the defendant’s blood through an implied consent form. Both officers acknowledged that they could have obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood but did not do so.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, stating that the blood test results were admissible under the exigent circumstances exception. The defendant’s trial by jury commenced, and the Commonwealth admitted his blood test results. The defendant was found guilty of DUI offenses, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, aggravated assault while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle, and careless driving.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The defendant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence, but this motion was denied. He then appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his first motion to suppress evidence. He argued that the Commonwealth did not comply with Section 3755, that even if the Commonwealth had complied with Section 3755, this compliance alone is insufficient to overcome the warrant requirement, and that there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court concluded that the original finding of exigency was erroneous because there was no urgent need for Sergeant Farren to dispense with obtaining a search warrant for the seizure of the defendant’s blood test results. The Superior Court agreed with this opinion. As the hospital had already preserved the blood evidence, Sergeant Farren had plenty of time to obtain a warrant. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted and remanded for a new trial.

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to address whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow legal precedent in holding that Section 3755 does not independently support implied consent and whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow the legal precedent from Mitchell v. Wisconsin by finding that exigent circumstances did not exist to support a warrantless testing of the defendant’s blood. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and agreed to hear the appeal.

The Supreme Court ultimately decided with the defendant. The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth’s Mitchell argument. In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court found that exigency almost always exists when the police need to obtain blood from an unconscious defendant because the defendant cannot be asked to consent and any controlled substances in the blood quickly begin to dissipate. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argued that exigency was established due to probable cause that the defendant was driving under the influence of marijuana, he had to be transported to the hospital, he was not fully conscious, and he was unable to communicate with Sergeant Farren. The Commonwealth further agued that the police could not have applied for a search warrant as they had other duties to attend to regarding the crash and other emergencies.

The defendant argued that the police officers testified that they could have obtained a search warrant during his trial. The seizure occurred after the blood was drawn, meaning the blood had already been preserved and nothing would dissipate, but testing did not occur until three days later, demonstrating a lack of exigency.

The Supreme Court concluded that there was no exigency because there was very little chance that the blood evidence would be destroyed if the officers took time to obtain a search warrant. The blood evidence had been properly preserved in this case.

The Supreme Court also addressed the Commonwealth’s argument about Section 3755 and concluded that the Commonwealth did not adhere to the requirements of the statute. Sergeant Farren did not comply with Section 3755; specifically, in his paperwork to obtain the defendant’s blood, he invoked 75 Pa.S.C.A. 1547. He also sought the defendant out to obtain consent, which is not necessary when invoking Section 3755, and there was no mention during the trial that any emergency room personnel took the defendant’s blood due to adherence to Section 3755. The Supreme Court also vacated the portion of the Superior Court’s holding that Section 3755 was unconstitutional because it determined that Section 3755 did not legally apply to this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately found that police violated the defendant’s rights and that the blood evidence should be suppressed. It remanded the case for a new trial. Thus, where the hospital has already preserved a suspect’s blood, the police must get a search warrant prior to seizing that blood from the hospital. They may not rely on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

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Zak Goldstein 7/15/22 Zak Goldstein 7/15/22

Pennsylvania Increases Penalties for Multiple Driving Under the Influence Offenses

The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted a new law which significantly increases the penalty for third and subsequent driving under the influence (“DUI”) offenses. The law, which is nicknamed Deana’s Law, provides that a third DUI within ten years will now be a third degree felony instead of a first degree misdemeanor. Further, a defendant who has three or more DUIs within the prior ten years will face a second degree felony should they again get arrested for DUI rather than what would previously have been a felony of the third degree. Previously, a third degree was a misdemeanor rather than a felony.

This change increases the potential maximum sentence for a DUI conviction because a misdemeanor of the first degree is punishable by up to five years in prison, while a third degree felony conviction may result in seven years in prison and a second degree felon may result in up to ten years’ incarceration.

The law also increases the potential mandatory minimums for a defendant who has to serve sentences for multiple DUI offenses at the same time. The law provides that anyone who has two or more prior offenses must serve a DUI sentence consecutively to any other DUI sentence. This means that if a defendant gets arrested for a third and fourth DUI and is sentenced for both cases, the judge cannot run the two sentences concurrently. Instead, the judge must run them consecutively. As a third degree DUI is normally punishable by a mandatory minimum of one to two years’ incarceration in a state prison, this means that a third and fourth DUI would result in a mandatory two to four years’ incarceration rather than the possibility of a concurrent one to two years’ incarceration on each count.

The law also directs the sentencing commission to provide a sentencing enhancement for a refusal of chemical testing under certain situations. Accordingly, the new law substantially increases the potential penalties for picking up multiple DUI cases in a ten year period.

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Zak Goldstein 4/15/22 Zak Goldstein 4/15/22

PA Superior Court: Police May Not Enter House Based on Consent From Person Who Clearly Does Not Live in House

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lehnerd, holding that actual or apparent authority must be established before an officer may enter a residence. Evidence obtained from a warrantless search and without permission to enter from a person with actual or apparent authority is illegally obtained and must be suppressed. Where police know that the person giving the consent to enter the house does not actually have authority to grant permission, they may not enter the house without a warrant.

Commonwealth v. Lehnerd

Two Pennsylvania State Police troopers found the defendant’s pickup truck overturned on a highway after responding to a dispatch call about a one-vehicle accident. The driver was not present. One of the troopers searched for registration documents in the truck and found empty beer cans. A neighbor informed the troopers that the driver had asked to borrow their phone to call for a ride and the driver smelled of alcohol. The troopers ran the license plates on the vehicle and determined that the defendant was the owner and found their address. The defendant’s parents then arrived at the scene and informed the troopers that the defendant owned the car, and they had driven the defendant home.

After leaving the scene, the troopers drove to the defendant’s home and knocked on the door. No one came to the door. While the troopers were waiting, the defendant’s parents arrived, and the defendant’s mother told the troopers that she believed the defendant was home. The troopers asked if the defendant’s mother could let them in, and she did so. The troopers entered the defendant’s house and escorted him out to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant was arrested for intoxication based on the tests, and he submitted to a blood alcohol breath test at the local State Police barracks, where it was shown that his blood alcohol level was .163%.

The defendant was charged with DUI General Impairment Incapable of Driving Safely, DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, Abandoning Vehicle on a Highway, and Failure to Activate Hazard Lamps, in addition to three other Vehicle Code offenses. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his house due to the troopers’ warrantless entry into his house and the subsequent illegal seizure.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to suppress on the grounds that the defendant’s mother had apparent authority to give consent for the troopers to enter the defendant’s house. The defendant was convicted of DUI General Impairment Incapable of Driving Safely, DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, Abandoning Vehicle on a Highway, and Failure to Activate Hazard Lamps. The defendant filed a post sentence motion seeking a new trial, which was denied. The defendant filed an appeal, continuing to argue that the evidence from his house was illegally obtained.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s DUI convictions and remanded for a new trial, granting the motion to suppress evidence. The defendant argued that his mother had neither actual nor apparent authority to permit the troopers to enter his home, and the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Although a warrant is typically needed for an officer to enter a home, voluntary consent is an exception to this requirement. An occupant with authority over the premises may consent to an officer’s entry and search. The officer must demonstrate reason to believe that an individual has apparent authority to grant permission for entry.

The Superior Court reviewed relevant cases to make its decision. If an individual is not inside the house to let an officer in and they do not tell the officer that they are a current occupant, the officer cannot legally search the house despite the individual informing the officer they can enter. The fact that the person who gave consent in this case was the defendant’s mother did not constitute apparent authority because the defendant was an adult who clearly lived in a separate residence from his mother. The defendant’s mother was not already inside the house and showed no evidence of occupying the house, such as having a key, when she informed the troopers that they could enter the defendant’s house. In fact, one of the troopers testified that they were aware the defendant’s mother did not live there and was not staying there. Due to the defendant’s mother’s lack of apparent or actual authority to grant permission of entry, the Superior Court remanded for a new trial.

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Zak Goldstein 4/3/22 Zak Goldstein 4/3/22

PA Superior Court: Phone Call About Possible Drunk Driving Did Not Justify Warrantless Search of Suspect's Home

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Edgin, holding that police officers illegally entered a defendant’s home under the guise of exigent circumstances. The officer’s based the warrantless search on the fact that bystanders had reported that the defendant may have been driving drunk prior to arriving home. It seems obvious that the officers should have obtained a search warrant prior to breaking into his home, and fortunately, the Superior Court agreed.

Commonwealth v. Edgin

A police officer in Centre County was dispatched to investigate a call about a possible intoxicated driver. Multiple 911 calls came in to dispatch concerning the driver. One of the 911 callers reported observing the individual driving a truck that was swerving in and out of its designated lane. The caller followed the truck and then observed the defendant exiting the vehicle and entering a residence through a garage door. When an officer arrived on scene, he observed a truck that matched the description given by the callers. This truck had some damage to it. Specifically, it had dents and scrapes, and it was missing a mirror. There was also a piece of wood shoved between the rim and the tire.

The officers attempted to make contact with the defendant. They went to the door of the house and announced themselves as officers. They knocked loudly on the front door and the rear sliding door multiple times with no response. The officers would later testify that they were concerned about the man’s well being and inquired about making entry into the residence. Additionally, although it is unclear from the opinion, one of the officers believed that the individual may have been diabetic, and this officer had prior experience with diabetic emergencies. Claiming a this prior experience and a purported belief that the individual may have needed medical assistance due to the damage on the truck, the officers decided to break into the house without a search warrant.

While inside the residence, the officers again announced themselves loudly and searched the house for the driver. They then came across the defendant asleep in a bedroom on the second floor of the residence. The officer testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and had to shake the male several times to wake up him. The officers then called for an ambulance. The defendant was taken back to the back of an ambulance where one of the 911 callers identified him as the driver. Additionally, the defendant was then advised of his Miranda rights, and he was subsequently interrogated. The defendant denied driving and that his truck was ever downtown. Police also took the defendant to the hospital for a blood draw.

Police arrested the defendant and charged him with DUI. The defendant then filed a motion to suppress, arguing that all evidence recovered from the defendant’s home and any evidence that resulted from the entry into his home should be suppressed because the officers entered his home without a warrant. At the motion to suppress hearing, the above facts were placed into the record. The trial court concluded that the there were exigent circumstances that justified the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home. Specifically, the trial court focused on the fact that the defendant was a known diabetic and that there were multiple 911 calls concerning this incident. Further, one of the 911 callers specifically witnessed the defendant exiting his truck and entering his residence. According the trial court, there were valid exigent circumstances present to justify the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home.

After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant proceeded by way of a non-jury trial. He was subsequently found guilty and he then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the officers entered his house without a warrant and that there were not valid exigent circumstances that allowed them to circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

When do exigent circumstances allow the police to enter a home without a warrant?

Police generally may not enter a home without a search warrant or exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are basically an emergency. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a court should consider a number of factors. Those factors include:

1) the gravity of the offense;

2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;

3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause;

4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered;

5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended;

6) whether the entry was peaceable;

7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night;

8) whether this involves a hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 9) whether evidence is likely to be destroyed without a warrant; and

9) whether there is a anger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.

These factors are to be balanced against one another in determining whether a warrantless intrusion was justified. Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court. In making its decision the Superior Court analyzed the above-mentioned factors. First, the trial court found that because DUI is a misdemeanor offense, this severely weakened the officers’ right to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant was armed, the defendant would have escaped if he had not been apprehended, or any injuries or property damage. Further, the Superior Court rejected the argument that the dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s bloodstream constituted a “per se exigency” that permitted the officers to enter his home without a warrant.

Finally, the Superior Court also rejected the argument that the officers could enter the defendant’s house under the guise that they needed to provide medical assistance to him. The Superior Court noted that the defendant was able to drive himself home and then enter his home without assistance. The Superior Court specifically rejected the argument that a high degree of intoxication can create a medical emergency that allows the officers to enter a home without a warrant. As such, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the officers had a legitimate reason to enter his home to provide medical assistance. Therefore, the Superior Court held that there were no real exigencies that permitted the officers to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Consequently, his conviction will be vacated and the defendant will receive a new trial. The Commonwealth will also not be able to use the evidence it obtained from the illegal entry of the defendant’s residence at this trial.