PA Superior Court Finds Birchfield Not Retroactive in PCRA Litigation

Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Olson, holding that the new rule relating to DUI blood testing cases announced by the United States Supreme Court in Birchfield v. North Dakota may not be raised to challenge a DUI conviction in collateral litigation. This means that defendants who have been convicted of DUI based on evidence obtained via a now-illegal warrantless, coercive blood draw may not challenge their convictions by filing a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition in Pennsylvania state court.

Commonwealth v. Olson

In Olson, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of Driving Under the Influence in September 8, 2015. Because the defendant had numerous prior convictions for DUI, he was sentenced to 18 months to 5 years in state prison. He did not file an appeal to the Superior Court.

Instead, on August 17, 2016, he filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition challenging the legality of his sentence. The defendant argued two issues: first, that the mandatory minimum sentence that he received for his criminal conviction was rendered unconstitutional by the Birchfield decision. Second, he argued that Birchfield created a new substantive rule which courts must apply retroactively where the defendant timely files a PCRA Petition.

What is Birchfield? 

By way of background, Birchfield was an extremely important, recent United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that states may not impose criminal penalties on DUI suspects who refuse to consent to blood testing if the police have not obtained a warrant. This had the effect of radically changing Pennsylvania’s DUI laws because Pennsylvania had statutes on the books which imposed additional penalties on a DUI defendant in cases where the prosecution could prove that the defendant both was driving under the influence and that the defendant refused blood testing. Accordingly, Pennsylvania appellate courts have now found many sections of Pennsylvania’s DUI statute unconstitutional. Birchfield was decided between when the defendant in this case was sentenced and when the defendant filed the PCRA Petition, meaning the defendant sought to apply Birchfield to his case even though his case was already over by the time Birchfield was decided.

PCRA Petitions 

PCRA Petitions are initially filed in the trial court in which the defendant was convicted. If a trial court denies a PCRA Petition, the court’s decision can be appealed to the Superior Court. Here, the defendant filed his PCRA Petition in the trial court, and the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petition was not timely filed and that the rule in Birchfield did not apply retroactively to cases which were no longer on direct appeal. The defendant appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Is Birchfield Retroactive? 

The Superior Court found that Birchfield does not apply retroactively to closed cases. It cited previous case law for the proposition that “a new rule of law does not automatically render final, pre-existing sentences illegal.” Instead, an old rule applies in PCRA litigation, also known as collateral review, if 1) the rule is substantive or 2) the rule is a ‘watershed rule of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Substantive rules decriminalize conduct or prohibit punishment against a class of persons. Rules that regulate only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability are procedural.

The Court first found that the rule in Birchfield requiring a warrant before criminal penalties for refusing a blood draw could be imposed is procedural. The court reasoned that it does not alter the range of conduct or the class of persons punished by the law – DUI is still a crime, and blood tests are still permissible. Instead, it regulates only the manner of determining the degree of a defendant’s culpability.

Accordingly, as the law stands now, Birchfield challenges cannot be raised by filing a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. However, additional appellate litigation may take place, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court could review this decision and reach a different conclusion. It is important to note that Birchfield continues to apply in pending DUI cases. States may not punish defendants who refuse to submit to warrantless blood tests for refusing to submit to the test.

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PA Courts Adopt Public Servant Exception to Warrant Requirement

The Public Servant Exception to the Warrant Requirement

Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. - Criminal Defense Attorney

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Livingstone, holding that although Pennsylvania has a community caretaker and public safety exception to the warrant requirement, police officers must be able to provide specific and articulable facts for why a person may be in need of assistance prior to conducting an investigative detention. In other words, police officers may stop a person if they believe the person is in distress or that there is an emergency situation, but the police must be able to provide specific reasons for why they believe an emergency situation exists, they may not conduct a stop as a pretext to investigate criminal activity, and the stop may only as intrusive as the circumstances require. 

Commonwealth v. Livingstone

In Livingstone, a Pennsylvania State Trooper in Erie County saw the defendant’s vehicle pulled over on the shoulder of the highway. The engine was running, but the hazard lights were not activated. The Trooper activated his emergency lights, and with his passenger side window down, pulled alongside the stopped vehicle. The Trooper then began to ask the defendant some questions, and he eventually reached the conclusion that she was under the influence of a controlled substance. Accordingly, he arrested the defendant and charged her with DUI.

Motion to Suppress

The defendant subsequently filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that she was stopped without reasonable suspicion or probable cause when the Trooper pulled up next to her and activated his emergency lights. The trial court denied the motion and found that after the Trooper saw the vehicle on the side of the interstate, the Trooper had a duty to determine if the defendant was in need of help. The trial court also found that the Trooper engaged only in a “mere encounter,” meaning he did not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause. With the motion to suppress denied, the court found the defendant guilty of DUI and sentenced her to a period of house arrest.

The defendant appealed. After the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review. On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that the case presented two distinct issues: first, was the defendant seized when the Trooper pulled up next to her with his emergency lights on, and second, if the defendant was seized, was the Trooper justified in stopping her.

The Court found that the first issue was relatively simple; the defendant was seized when a marked State Police vehicle pulled up next to her, rolled the window down, and activated its overhead lights. The Court emphasized both that official driver’s license materials provided by PennDOT instruct motorists that they should not leave when a police officer activates his or her emergency lights and that Pennsylvania law makes it a felony to flee from a police officer after the officer signals for the motorist to stop. Because no reasonable person would feel free to leave when a State Police Trooper activates his or her emergency lights, the defendant was seized when the Trooper pulled up next to her and activated the lights.

Second, the Court found that the Trooper did not have the legal authority to make the stop because the Trooper lacked sufficient information to determine that the defendant was in need of assistance. Once a court determines that police have seized someone for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the prosecution generally must show that the police had either reasonable suspicion or probable cause depending on how extensive the stop was. In order to support a Terry stop (“an investigate detention”), the police must have reasonable suspicion. In order to arrest someone, the police must have probable cause to make an arrest.

Here, the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of the stop because he had no indication that criminal activity was afoot or that a crime had occurred solely from the fact that the defendant had pulled over. However, the Court recognized a “community caretaking doctrine” or public safety exception. The community caretaking doctrine applies in three circumstances. First, there is an emergency aid exception. Second, there is an automobile impoundment/inventory exception, and third, there is a public safety exception. For any of these exceptions to apply, the officer must be acting out of a motivation to render aid or assistance rather than an attempt to investigate criminal activity.

The Public Safety Exception (Public Servant Exception)

Prior to this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never specifically addressed the public safety exception. The Court recognized that the police do not exist solely to investigate and prevent criminal activity. Instead, they are also charged with ensuring the safety and welfare of the Commonwealth’s citizens. At the same time, the Fourth Amendment requires that police officers not conduct warrantless searches without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Therefore, the Court sought to employ a test for when police can conduct a seizure of this nature that would both allow the police to help members of the public and protect the privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

Can The Police Conduct A Stop If They Think Someone Needs Help? 

The Court held that in order for the public servant exception (public safety exception) to apply, the Commonwealth must be able to satisfy three requirements. First, police officers must be able to point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance. Further, the Court found that the Trooper in this case could not do so because there were too many reasons why the defendant could have pulled over on the side of the road. The Court noted that the defendant could have needed to look at a map, answer or make a telephone call, send a text message, change an address in a navigation system, clean up a spill, or retrieve something from her purse or the glove compartment. Pulling over to the side of the road to do these types of things should be encouraged.

Second, in order for the exception to apply, the police caretaking action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence. This does not mean that an officer must completely ignore the nature of his or her role in law enforcement, but it does mean that the courts must meticulously consider the facts and carefully apply the exception in a manner that mitigates the risk of abuse and ensures that police do not use the exception as a pretext for obtaining evidence without a warrant.

Third, the level of the intrusion must be commensurate with the perceived need for assistance. This requires the suppression court to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the seizure, including but not necessarily limited to, the degree of authority or force displayed, the lengthy of the seizure, and the availability of alternative means of assistance.

Here, the Court found that the Trooper did not have any reason to believe that the defendant needed assistance. He had not received a report that a motorist needed help, he did not observe anything that indicated there was a problem with her vehicle, the weather was fine, and the defendant did not have her hazard lights on. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered that the blood test and other evidence seized as a result of the illegal stop be suppressed.

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PA Superior Court Rejects Good Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule in Birchfield Cases

Commonwealth v. Carper

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Carper. In Carper, the Court held that prosecutors may not introduce illegally obtained blood test results in Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) cases despite the fact that the police relied on then-settled law which permitted warrantless blood testing of DUI suspects. The Superior Court specifically rejected the application of the “good faith exception” and held that the evidence remains inadmissible despite the fact that the police officers may have acted in good faith and not realized that they were violating the law. 

Carper involved a relatively straight-forward DUI case. A Pennsylvania State Police Trooper pulled Carper over in October 2014 for an expired inspection sticker. During the ensuing stop, the Trooper began to suspect Carper of driving under the influence of a controlled substance. The Trooper arrested Carper, transported him to the hospital, and informed him that if he did not consent to a blood draw, he would face increased criminal penalties. Carper agreed to the blood draw, and the blood draw showed the presence of a controlled substance.

Motion to Suppress

Carper moved to suppress the evidence under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Notably, Carper did not move to suppress the blood results under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The trial court held a suppression hearing, and the Commonwealth introduced evidence in an attempt to show that it complied with both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Following the hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, and then Carper filed a post-suppression hearing brief in which he also argued that the blood results should be suppressed under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Likewise, the Commonwealth filed a brief in which it argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution did not bar the introduction of the blood results into evidence. 

Birchfield v. North Dakota made it illegal for states to impose criminal penalties on DUI suspects who refuse a warrantless blood draw. Thus, the trial court granted the Motion to suppress, agreeing with the defense that the police illegally coerced the defendant into consenting to the blood draw by informing the defendant that he would face more severe criminal penalties if he refused chemical testing. 

The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

The Commonwealth appealed. In its appeal, the Commonwealth argued for the application of the good faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule. In the federal system, prosecutors may still use unlawfully seized evidence if police acted in good faith when they obtained the evidence. For example, courts have found that officers acted in good faith where they arrested a defendant on what they believed to be a valid warrant despite the fact that the warrant had actually been lifted. Likewise, federal courts have held that police act in good faith when they rely on existing case law when conducting a search even if later case law subsequently changes the legality of the search. Thus, the Commonwealth asked the Superior Court to find that the good faith exception applies in Birchfield cases because police relied on well-established case law. The Commonwealth also argued that the defendant failed to properly preserve his state law challenge to the blood draw because defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence only under the United States Constitution prior to the hearing and never mentioned the state law claim until the defense filed its post-hearing brief.     

The Superior Court rejected both of the Commonwealth’s arguments. First, the Court recognized that Pennsylvania appellate courts have repeatedly found that there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania. Thus, while the good faith exception may apply in federal court, it does not apply in Pennsylvania state courts. The only issue is whether officers violated the law; it does not save the Commonwealth’s case that the officers relied on the law at the time. Second, the Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that Carper waived the state law claims by failing to mention them in the initial motion. This would have led to the motion being denied because under the federal law claims, the good faith exception would have applied. Nonetheless, the Court rejected this argument as well, finding that the Commonwealth had not been prejudiced because the Commonwealth extensively briefed the state law issues and presented testimony relating to the issue of coercion at the suppression hearing. Further, the defense preserved the issue by filing the post-hearing brief and allowing the trial court to rule on it. Therefore, the Court rejected both of the Commonwealth’s appellate issues.  

Following Carper, it is clear that the good faith exception does not apply in Birchfield DUI cases. States may not penalize DUI suspects for refusing to submit to blood testing without a search warrant. Although prosecutors continuously ask the appellate courts to adopt a good faith exception in Pennsylvania, the courts have fortunately refused to do so thus far.  

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PA Superior Court Upholds Homicide by Vehicle Conviction for Failure to Come to a Complete Stop at Busy Intersection

Commonwealth v. Moyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Moyer, upholding the defendant’s conviction and state prison sentence for Homicide By Vehicle, Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”), and Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). On appeal, Moyer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against her as well as the admissibility of the blood results for the DUI charge under Birchfield v. North Dakota. Unfortunately for Moyer, the Superior Court held both that the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of homicide by vehicle and that the Birchfield claim that police should have obtained a warrant prior to the blood draw was waived for failure to raise the issue prior to or during trial.

"Rolling Stops" and Homicide by Vehicle 

In Moyer, the record showed that the defendant approached a stop sign at an intersection which she had driven through on many prior occasions. The defendant failed to come to a complete stop at the intersection. She characterized the stop as a “rolling stop,” but the trial court found that she had traveled through the intersection at around twelve miles per hour and had not attempted to activate her brakes prior to the ensuing collision. As she went through the intersection, a box truck crashed into her car, crossed the double yellow line, and then crashed into a tow truck, killing the driver of the box truck. The evidence produced at trial also suggested that it would be difficult to see traffic coming from the side due to the presence of a building at the edge of the intersection.

Criminal Charges for Car Accidents

Moyer was arrested and charged with Homicide by Vehicle, REAP, Homicide by Vehicle while DUI, DUI, and various summary offenses relating to reckless driving. The jury convicted her of homicide by vehicle and REAP, but it acquitted her of Homicide by Vehicle while DUI because the levels of marijuana and Xanax in her system were extremely low and unlikely to cause actual impairment or inability to drive. The trial court found her guilty of DUI and the summary traffic offenses. Notably, there is no right to a jury trial for a first-offense DUI charge or for summary traffic offenses. Therefore, the jury decided whether to convict on the more serious judges, and the trial judge made the ruling on the DUI and summaries.

The Criminal Appeal

Moyer raised two issues on appeal. First, she challenged the use of the blood results against her because police had warned her that she would face more severe criminal penalties if she refused to consent to chemical testing in violation of Birchfield v. North Dakota. In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court held that states many not criminalize the refusal to submit to warrantless blood testing even where police have probable cause to believe that the driver was driving under the influence. However, Birchfield, was decided after the defendant was convicted in the trial court. Although she sought a new trial by filing post-sentence motions prior to taking the appeal, the trial court denied the post-sentence motions.

The Superior Court upheld the trial court’s decision, agreeing that Birchfield is not retroactive and that the defendant should have known the case was on appeal in the United States Supreme Court and raised the issue prior to trial in order to preserve it for appeal. Pennsylvania’s appellate waiver doctrine is extremely demanding. If claims are not properly preserved by filing motions or objections at the trial level, those claims may be waived forever.

Second, Moyer argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict on Homicide by Vehicle because she had done nothing more than roll through the intersection. Homicide by Vehicle is defined in the Motor Vehicle Code. Section 3732 of the Motor Vehicle Code defines Homicide by Vehicle as:

Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic exception section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.

Thus, in order to convict a defendant of Homicide by Vehicle, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant’s traffic violation caused a death and that the defendant acted either recklessly or with gross negligence. Pennsylvania law defines criminal recklessness as follows:

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.

The statute may also be satisfied by a showing of gross negligence. Gross negligence is more than ordinary civil negligence. Instead, it requires that the defendant’s conduct “evidenced a conscious disregard of the substantial and unjustified risk that he would be involved in a traffic accident causing death.” Accordingly, appellate courts have equated gross negligence with recklessness.

The Superior Court rejected Moyer’s argument that she had not acted recklessly. Although the small amounts of marijuana and Xanax in her system had likely not caused the accident, the Court found that her failure to stop at the intersection as required by Pennsylvania’s traffic laws was reckless enough to support a conviction for Homicide by Vehicle. First, the Court found that traveling at twelve miles per hour is different than simply failing to come to a complete stop and “rolling” through an intersection. Second, the Court noted that the stop sign preceded a busy intersection and that a building obscured the view of one lane of the cross traffic. Third, the Court considered the fact that the evidence showed Moyer had failed to brake prior to the collision. Finally, the Court recognized that Moyer was familiar with the intersection and had driven through it numerous times. Therefore, she should have known the risks of driving through it without stopping. Although the decedent failed to wear a seatbelt and was driving with his passenger door open, the Court still found that it was Moyer’s reckless conduct that caused his death. Therefore, the Court upheld the convictions against Moyer.

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Defense Attorneys Demetra Mehta and Zak Goldstein

Homicide by Vehicle charges are extremely serious, and there are often defenses to these charges. In general, it is not enough for the Commonwealth merely to show that there was a car accident and someone died. Instead, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant acted with more than just negligence; that is that the defendant acted recklessly, which is more difficult to show. Here, the evidence showed that the defendant was traveling twelve miles per hour into a busy intersection without stopping, which apparently satisfied the standard. In many cases, it may be possible to challenge Homicide by Vehicle charges both by attacking the prosecution’s proof as it relates to the defendant’s mens rea and by challenging whether the defendant’s actions actually caused the death of the victim. If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of cases. Call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session.

Read the Case: Commonwealth v. Moyer