Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 2/14/23 Zak Goldstein 2/14/23

Not Guilty: Full Acquittal for Man Accused of Threatening Off Duty Police Officer

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently obtained a full acquittal on charges of terroristic threats and harassment for a client who had been charged with threatening an off-duty police officer. In the case of Commonwealth v. KO, the officer claimed that he was walking his dog in a park in Northeast Philadelphia when KO’s dog ran up to the officer’s dog while not on a leash. KO came over to get his dog, and the officer told him to put the dog on a leash. KO did so, but the officer claimed that KO said he would shoot the officer and his dog because the officer suggested that he might let his dog off the leash to bite KO’s dog.

The officer testified that not only did KO threaten to shoot him and his dog once, but he actually made the comment multiple times and put his hand in his jacket as if he had a gun before putting the dog on a leash and walking off. The officer got KO’s license plate number when KO left the park, and he later reported the incident to a detective. The detectives filed charges of terroristic threats and harassment against KO.

KO retained Attorney Goldstein, and Attorney Goldstein obtained a full acquittal at the subsequent Philadelphia Municipal Court trial. At trial, Attorney Goldstein cross-examined the officer on the fact that he never actually saw a gun and that both men were just yelling at each other during the stressful situation of getting the dog back on the leash. Attorney Goldstein then called character witnesses as well as KO to testify that KO had only said something to the officer because the officer had threatened him first and in fact had a gun, whereas KO did not.

The Municipal Court Judge promptly found KO not guilty of all charges, and the charges can now be expunged. As KO holds a professional license and a job that requires a background check, the ability to obtain a full acquittal and an expungement was critical for him. He was able to do both.

Ultimately, the terroristic threats statute appears to be very broad on its face. It covers far more than terrorism and applies to anything that appears to be a threat. The statute provides:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to:
(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another;
(2) cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation; or
(3) otherwise cause serious public inconvenience, or cause terror or serious public inconvenience with reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.

Terroristic threats is a misdemeanor of the first degree which carries up to five years in prison and can result in a permanent disability from possessing a firearm under federal law. At the same time, the statute requires not just a threat but the actual intent to terrorize. In numerous cases, the appellate courts in Pennsylvania have held that threatening words said during a transitory moment of anger as part of an argument do not qualify as a terroristic threat under the law. Accordingly, even if KO had said what the officer alleged, the judge properly applied the law in acquitting KO.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. Our experienced and understanding Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys have successfully defended clients and obtained new trials after conviction in cases involving charges as serious as Aggravated Assault, Rape, Murder, and Fraud. We have also won criminal appeals and post-conviction relief in state and federal court. At the same time, our extensive experience in the Philadelphia criminal justice system and skills in the courtroom often allow us to obtain outcomes like this one even in relatively less serious cases in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. We offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/9/23 Zak Goldstein 1/9/23

PA Supreme Court: Multiple Third-Degree Murder Convictions at the Same Time Require Life Without Parole

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Coleman, holding that a criminal defendant who kills three people during the same incident and is then convicted of third degree murder for each killing is subject to the mandatory life without parole sentencing enhancement that applies for multiple convictions for third degree murder. Many statutes that impose enhanced sentences for subsequent offenses require that the offenses take place at different times, but the Supreme Court has held that killing more than one person and then getting convicted of life without parole requires a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(a).

The facts of Commonwealth v. Coleman

Police observed the defendant make an illegal left turn in a white Hyundai. They approached the vehicle when it stopped at a gas station. The defendant did not have a driver’s license, and when additional officers arrived as backup, the defendant fled in the vehicle. This led to a high-speed chase. The defendant eventually crashed the Hyundai into two vehicles at an intersection. The force of the impact caused the vehicle to explode into flames, killing all three occupants of one of the vehicles instantly. Prosecutors charged the defendant with three counts of murder.

At trial, the defendant was convicted of three counts murder in the third degree, amongst other charges. Before sentencing the Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to proceed under Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code. The trial court declined to apply the sentencing enhancement and instead imposed consecutive terms of 20 to 40 years of incarceration for each of the defendant’s third-degree murder convictions. The defendant was ultimately sentenced to an aggregate term of 70 to 140 years of incarceration.

The Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the statute requires life imprisonment even where a defendant commits multiple counts of third degree murder at the same time but did not have any prior convictions for murder.

Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code, entitled “Life imprisonment for homicide,” provides:

(a) Mandatory life imprisonment.--Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9712 (relating to sentences for offenses committed with firearms), 9713 (relating to sentences for offenses committed on public transportation) or 9714 (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses), any person convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.

The trial court wrote an opinion in which it argued thatSection 9715(a) was a recidivist sentencing statute and that the defendant was not a recidivist because, while he had been convicted of three counts of criminal homicide, he had never “previously” committed criminal homicide.

Both parties appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Commonwealth. The Court found that the defendant should have been sentenced to life without parole. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s third-degree murder conviction at Count 1 of the Criminal Information constituted a prior conviction for purposes of applying Section 9715(a) when sentencing him for his convictions of third-degree murder at Counts 2 and 3 of the Criminal Information. The Superior Court therefore remanded the case for the trial court to sentence the defendant to life without parole.

The defendant filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to resolve the following issue:

Should the mandatory sentencing provision of 9715(a) apply to a case where the offenses and the deaths were simultaneous?

The Defendant argued that Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code should not be construed to apply to a case such as this one, where a single course of conduct caused multiple, instantaneous, simultaneous deaths and the convictions at issue were, at most, minutes apart. The term “previous” in the code is meant to refer to a prior conviction outside the current matter. The Commonwealth focused on principles of statutory construction and Section 9715(a)’s use of the phrase “previously been convicted at any time.” They further argued that the phrase should be interpreted literally, meaning that there is no previous conviction too remote, nor too recent, to be exempt from the rule.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court decided with the Commonwealth. The Court ruled that § 9715 of the applies under these circumstances. § 9715(a) provides that any person convicted of third-degree murder in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder must receive an enhanced sentence. The statute does not define any of the terms in this operative phrase. Giving the most pertinent terms their plain and ordinary meaning, the term “at any time,” the General Assembly made clear that there is no limitation relative to a person’s previous conviction that would preclude application of the sentencing enhancement insofar as it concerns § 9715(a). Thus, § to Section 9715(a), so long as a person convicted of third-degree murder has previously been convicted of murder at any point in time, the sentencing enhancement applies to that person.

The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling to vacate defendant’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with § 9715.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 12/20/22 Zak Goldstein 12/20/22

PA Supreme Court: Judges Should Not Use Hypotheticals to Define Reasonable Doubt for Jury

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Drummond, holding that trial judges should not use hypothetical situations like making the decision to have surgery or purchase a house when describing reasonable doubt for a jury. This is an important decision because these hypotheticals often reduce the standard below what it should be; many people go through with purchasing a house or having a surgery even when they are not certain that it is the right thing to do. By avoiding the hypotheticals, judges can better ensure that juries probably understand how high of a standard beyond a reasonable doubt is.

The Facts of Drummond

Police arrested the defendant and a co-defendant for the murder of two people. At the conclusion of trial, the judge provided the jury with instructions as is normal in a criminal case. The controversy in this case centered on the judge’s definition of reasonable doubt. In this case, the judge used the hypothetical of making the decision to have surgery and equated making that decision as no longer having reasonable doubt. The trial attorney did not object to the judge’s hypothetical. The defendant was convicted, and his direct appeals were denied.

The defendant eventually filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. In the PCRA Petition, the defendant alleged that his trial attorney provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the court’s instruction on reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the PCRA, and the defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The Superior Court Ruling

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the PCRA Petition. That court concluded that an imperfect jury instruction does not trigger automatic reversal in collateral proceedings like PCRA litigation. The court also did not have a significant problem with the analogy, and it noted that other portions of the instruction aligned closely with the suggested reasonable doubt instruction in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruction Manual. The Superior Court concluded because the instruction never relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of proof or removed the presumption of innocence, it was not reasonably likely that the jury applied a diminished reasonable doubt standard. The defendant then filed for allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the case.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited its review to one issue: “[w]as trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt?”

The standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim comes from the United States Supreme Court case Strickland v. Washington. Pennsylvania has adapted that standard and required a PCRA petition tis how that: (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) that no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error.

In assessing whether there is arguable merit, the Court first analyzed whether the jury instruction did not meet basic constitutional requirements as set in Boyde v. California, “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenge in a way that violates the Constitution.”

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have ever construed the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution as flatly prohibiting hypotheticals or analogies. The Court, however, found that the jurors were told not to consider reasonable doubt objectively and dispassionately but instead in an emotional and personal way. This instruction therefore arguably violated due process because it allowed the jury to interpret the relevant burden in a way that was a “degree of proof below” proof beyond a reasonable doubt, thus meeting the arguable merit prong.

The Court therefore rejected the hypothetical and strongly suggest that it should not be used by trial courts. At the same time, however, the Court found that the trial court properly denied the PCRA petition because at the time of the decision, there was no opinion from a Pennsylvania appellate court in which a jury verdict had been invalidated due to the use of similar hypotheticals. Instead, the Superior Court had actually affirmed under these circumstances. Therefore, counsel could not have been under an obligation to predict that the law would change and to raise an objection. The Court therefore denied the appeal.

As the Court found that counsel acted reasonably, it did not reach the prejudice portion of the test. A PCRA petitioner must meet all three prongs of the test in order to show the ineffective assistance of counsel. If the petitioner cannot show even one element, then the petitioner will lose. This petitioner lost, but the case remains important because these hypotheticals may often contribute to a conviction by improperly lowering the Commonwealth’s burden.

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Zak Goldstein 12/11/22 Zak Goldstein 12/11/22

PA Superior Court: Prosecution May Cross Examine Defendant on Prior Arrests if Defendant Opens the Door

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Bullock, holding that where the defendant testifies in an unprompted manner that they’ve never been arrested before, the prosecution may then introduce evidence of prior arrests as impeachment evidence. Although there is a general rule that a defendant may not be cross examined on prior criminal convictions, that rule gives way to false testimony by the defendant which makes the prior convictions admissible impeachment evidence.

The Facts of Bullock

In 2018, the defendant’s children found the defendant passed out on the porch of their home. The children called the police. The police came to the scene, and they found the defendant stumbling, going in and out of consciousness, and smelling of PCP. The police arrested the defendant.

The children were placed with their grandparents. They then disclosed that the defendant, their mother, had allegedly been abusing them. The Commonwealth charged her with aggravated assault, strangulation, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child.

The Criminal Trial

The defendant proceeded by way of bench trial. The trial court found her guilty of the endangering the welfare of a child counts, but it acquitted her of everything else. The court sentenced her to time served to 23 months’ incarceration followed by a year of probation. She filed timely post-sentence motions. The court denied those motions, and she appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The Issue on Appeal

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for public drunkenness. Her defense attorney objected to admission of that evidence, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the evidence to be admitted.

Pennsylvania has a statute which generally prohibits the Commonwealth from cross-examining the defendant themselves about prior convictions, even where the defendant testifies. The statute provides:

§ 5918. Examination of defendant as to other offenses
No person charged with any crime and called as a witness in his own behalf, shall be asked, or if asked, shall be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed, or been charged with, or been convicted of any offense other than the one wherewith he shall then be charged, or tending to show that he has been of bad character or reputation . . .

The statute, however, has exceptions that allow the Commonwealth to do so when:

(1) he shall have at such trial, personally or by counsel, asked questions of the witness for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good reputation or character, or has given evidence tending to prove his own good character or reputation; or
(2) he shall have testified at such trial against a co-defendant, charged with the same offense.

Here, the defense attorney asked the defendant if she used PCP or alcohol on the day in question, and she denied that she had consumed either. Later, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if she had ever used drugs or alcohol, and she denied that, as well. Obviously, that was untrue as the defendant had a conviction for public drunkenness. The prosecution then the evidence of that conviction.

Additionally, while testifying on direct examination, the defendant testified that she felt terrible that day, was not really sure what happened, and that she had never been arrested before. That was not true, however, as she had the prior conviction.

Following the denial of her post-sentence motions, she appealed the conviction to the Superior Court and challenged the trial court’s decision to allow the prior conviction into evidence.

The Superior Court’s Ruling on Appeal

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the conviction. The Court ruled that the trial court should not have allowed the prosecutor to ask if she ever used drugs or had ever used alcohol. She had not denied ever using them on direct examination; she had only denied using them that day. She had, however, suggested that she had never been arrested before. This was not true, and that statement did not come in response to the Commonwealth’s questioning but rather the questioning of her own attorney. Therefore, the Commonwealth properly impeached her with evidence of her prior conviction in response to her insistence that she had never been arrested before. The Superior Court therefore denied the appeal.

It is possible, however, that a subsequent lawyer could challenge trial counsel’s performance in a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition as trial counsel should not have asked a question which opened the door to a prior conviction. Thus, the issue may be one of ineffective assistance of counsel rather than error by the trial court. Either way, the Court ruled that the conviction will stand.

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