Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/10/22 Zak Goldstein 10/10/22

PA Supreme Court: Trial Court May Dismiss Prosecution for Incompetent Defendant Where Defendant Unlikely to Regain Competency

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Humphrey, holding that Section 7403(e) of the MHPA authorizes a trial court to dismiss the charges of an individual deemed incompetent in any instance that the court finds it would be unjust to resume the prosecution due to the passage of time and its effect on criminal proceedings. Notably, the Supreme Court overruled prior precedent that an individual must regain competency before a trial court may dismiss charges due to the unreasonable nature of this condition and the plain language of the statutory text.

Commonwealth v. Humphrey

While serving a state sentence, the defendant allegedly threw a bag of urine on a corrections officer. A few months later, the defendant allegedly spat on a corrections officer. The Commonwealth charged the defendant with two counts of aggravated harassment by prisoner. Preliminary hearings occurred, and the charges were bound over for trial.

Defense counsel requested a psychiatric evaluation and competency examination of the defendant, and the trial court entered an order for these evaluations. Dr. Scott Scotilla evaluated the defendant and prepared a report. In the report, the defendant displayed paranoid and delusional behavior and frequently spoke about irrelevant topics, such as conspiracy theories, and did not answer Dr. Scotilla’s questions. Dr. Scotilla reviewed Department of Corrections Mental Health Contact Notes, which showed that the defendant had engaged in similar behavior previously. The defendant’s most recent diagnosis indicated he had antisocial personality disorder and mild intellectual disability. Dr. Scotilla concluded that the defendant should be evaluated at another psychiatric center which could more effectively evaluate the defendant and provide restoration of competency services if necessary, though Dr. Scotilla did not mention in his report if the defendant’s competency could be restored or if treatment options within the Department of Corrections could address his competency issues.

The defendant’s attorney filed a petition in the trial court claiming that the defendant could not understand the nature of the proceedings against him and that his mental illness prevented him from being criminally responsible for his offenses. During the hearing on this matter, the Commonwealth agreed that the defendant was not competent to proceed to trial at the time, and the trial court entered an order for the defendant to be admitted into involuntary treatment before the case would be reevaluated. The Department of Human Services ordered the defendant to be transferred to a hospital, but the hospital informed the Commonwealth that the defendant could not be admitted because he was a state inmate serving a sentence.

The defendant eventually filed a motion to dismiss his charges because the Commonwealth was unable to find him necessary competency restoration services, emphasizing the fact that two years had already passed since his offenses occurred and that he would likely not regain competency. The Commonwealth responded, arguing that the defendant did not present sufficient evidence that he would not regain competency to stand trial and requested that the defendant be reexamined for competency. The Commonwealth provided an assessment by Dr. Cynthia Wright of the DOC, where Dr. Wright opined that the defendant’s aggressive behavior was not due to mental illness, but instead due to a desire to receive special privileges. She opined that his diagnoses were antisocial personality disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and adjustment disorder with depressed mood. Notably, the defendant did not cooperate with Dr. Wright’s evaluation, so she based her report on the defendant’s progress notes, treatment plans, medication summaries, diagnosis summaries, and physicians’ notes.

The court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. All three witnesses agreed that the DOC does not provide competency restoration services to inmates serving state sentences, but the DOC can provide some mental health treatment. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the criminal charges, referencing the Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. McGargle and Section 7403(e), specifically the sentence that explains that a dismissal may occur if it would be unjust for the prosecution to resume based on the passage of time. The trial court noted that the defendant would only become eligible for competency restoration services in the next 2.5 to 13.5 years due to his current sentence and that even if he were paroled after 2.5 years, it is unlikely he would be able to recall the events of his offenses due to the passage of time and the severity of his incompetence.

The Commonwealth filed an appeal, raising the issues of whether the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s charges violated Section 7403, whether the evidence was insufficient that the defendant would be prejudiced by resuming criminal proceedings, and whether the trial court erred in dismissing the charges instead of ordering another competency evaluation. The Superior Court agreed that the trial court erroneously interpreted Section 7403(e), stating that relevant case law demonstrated that Section 7403(e) does not authorize dismissal of charges when a defendant would likely not regain competency. The Superior Court did not address the other two issues raised.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for allowance of appeal to address whether the Superior Court erred in reversing the dismissal of charges, where the defendant claimed that Section 7403(e) does authorize dismissal of charges when the resumption of prosecution would be unjust, evidence did establish that the defendant’s incompetence and the passage of time rendered the resumption of prosecution unjust, and competency evaluation was unnecessary since the trial court had concluded that sufficient time had passed for the prosecution to be rendered unjust.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reviewed the MHPA, beginning with Section 7402(a), which states that when an individual who is charged with a crime is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, he will be deemed incompetent to be tried, convicted, or sentenced for as long as the incapacity exists. Additionally, according to Section 7403(f), the stay of the prosecution may not last longer than 10 years in this case. The Supreme Court concluded that both the defendant’s and the Commonwealth’s interpretations of Section 7403(e) were reasonable. However, the Supreme Court determined that the consequences of the Commonwealth’s interpretation were not reasonable.

Under the Commonwealth’s interpretation, the trial court would not possess authority to dismiss criminal charges against an incompetent defendant under any circumstances. Section 7403(e) also does not state at any point that dismissal of charges is based on the defendant’s resumption of competency, which was part of the Commonwealth’s interpretation.

The Supreme Court also acknowledged that if ambiguity exists in a statute, the language should be interpreted in a way that is favorable to the defendant. The Supreme Court disagreed with the initial decision of the Superior Court, which presumed that the Legislature intended for the consequences of the statute to be unreasonable.

The Supreme Court reviewed relevant cases Hazur and McGargle, neither of which properly addressed whether a trial court may dismiss charges of an individual deemed incompetent for the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court determined that Section 7403(e) does grant trial courts the authority to dismiss criminal charges in any instance where it would be unjust to resume prosecution, whether or not the defendant has regained competency. The Supreme Court remanded the remaining issues to an intermediate appellate court. Therefore, the Superior Court vacated judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/27/22 Zak Goldstein 7/27/22

PA Supreme Court: Police Often Must Get Search Warrant to Obtain Homicide-by-DUI Defendant's Blood from Hospital

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, holding that the defendant’s blood was illegally seized for drug testing because the police obtained it from a hospital without getting a search warrant. The Commonwealth had attempted to use various statutes and theories to justify the warrantless seizure, but because no exigent circumstances were present which would justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court ruled that the police violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court therefore suppressed the blood results.

Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams

The defendant drove his car at about two miles per hour over train tracks, where a train collided with his vehicle. The train pushed it for a quarter of a mile before it stopped moving. The defendant and his daughter were transported to a hospital, while his fiancée who had also been in the car was pronounced dead at the scene.

Lieutenant Steven Lutz, the officer in charge, spoke to several individuals who explained that the defendant’s car smelled like burnt marijuana. Lieutenant Lutz told Sergeant Keith Farren to interview the defendant and obtain a legal blood draw. A legal blood draw requires consent or a search warrant from a subject before being seized for testing. Sergeant Farren determined that the defendant was not conscious enough to give consent, as he had been drifting in and out of consciousness. This would often justify a warrantless search under the Supreme Court’s case law, but prior to obtaining the blood, the officer learned that the hospital had already drawn the defendant’s blood.

Sergeant Farren completed paperwork authorizing the defendant’s blood to be tested, and it was revealed that the defendant’s blood contained Delta-9 THC, an ingredient in marijuana. The defendant was arrested and charged with homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, II, or III metabolite, DUI: general impairment, careless driving, careless driving – unintentional death, aggravated assault while DUI, and aggravated assault by vehicle.

The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the blood test results, arguing that the police did not have probable cause that he was driving under the influence, that his blood was seized without a warrant, and that Section 3755, which allows the police to obtain blood from a hospital without a warrant, did not justify the seizure.

Of note, Section 3755 states that if a person who is suspected to be DUI must seek medical treatment, then a physician must take blood samples from the individual and transmit them within 24 hours to the Department of Health or a laboratory for testing. These results then may be released to the individual tested, his attorney, his physician or government officials.

During the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Lutz testified that the defendant’s blood was obtained through a legal blood draw, citing Section 3755. Notably, Sergeant Farren never referenced Section 3755 during his testimony, instead explaining that he attempted to obtain the defendant’s blood through an implied consent form. Both officers acknowledged that they could have obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood but did not do so.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, stating that the blood test results were admissible under the exigent circumstances exception. The defendant’s trial by jury commenced, and the Commonwealth admitted his blood test results. The defendant was found guilty of DUI offenses, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, aggravated assault while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle, and careless driving.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The defendant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence, but this motion was denied. He then appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his first motion to suppress evidence. He argued that the Commonwealth did not comply with Section 3755, that even if the Commonwealth had complied with Section 3755, this compliance alone is insufficient to overcome the warrant requirement, and that there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court concluded that the original finding of exigency was erroneous because there was no urgent need for Sergeant Farren to dispense with obtaining a search warrant for the seizure of the defendant’s blood test results. The Superior Court agreed with this opinion. As the hospital had already preserved the blood evidence, Sergeant Farren had plenty of time to obtain a warrant. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted and remanded for a new trial.

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to address whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow legal precedent in holding that Section 3755 does not independently support implied consent and whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow the legal precedent from Mitchell v. Wisconsin by finding that exigent circumstances did not exist to support a warrantless testing of the defendant’s blood. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and agreed to hear the appeal.

The Supreme Court ultimately decided with the defendant. The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth’s Mitchell argument. In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court found that exigency almost always exists when the police need to obtain blood from an unconscious defendant because the defendant cannot be asked to consent and any controlled substances in the blood quickly begin to dissipate. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argued that exigency was established due to probable cause that the defendant was driving under the influence of marijuana, he had to be transported to the hospital, he was not fully conscious, and he was unable to communicate with Sergeant Farren. The Commonwealth further agued that the police could not have applied for a search warrant as they had other duties to attend to regarding the crash and other emergencies.

The defendant argued that the police officers testified that they could have obtained a search warrant during his trial. The seizure occurred after the blood was drawn, meaning the blood had already been preserved and nothing would dissipate, but testing did not occur until three days later, demonstrating a lack of exigency.

The Supreme Court concluded that there was no exigency because there was very little chance that the blood evidence would be destroyed if the officers took time to obtain a search warrant. The blood evidence had been properly preserved in this case.

The Supreme Court also addressed the Commonwealth’s argument about Section 3755 and concluded that the Commonwealth did not adhere to the requirements of the statute. Sergeant Farren did not comply with Section 3755; specifically, in his paperwork to obtain the defendant’s blood, he invoked 75 Pa.S.C.A. 1547. He also sought the defendant out to obtain consent, which is not necessary when invoking Section 3755, and there was no mention during the trial that any emergency room personnel took the defendant’s blood due to adherence to Section 3755. The Supreme Court also vacated the portion of the Superior Court’s holding that Section 3755 was unconstitutional because it determined that Section 3755 did not legally apply to this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately found that police violated the defendant’s rights and that the blood evidence should be suppressed. It remanded the case for a new trial. Thus, where the hospital has already preserved a suspect’s blood, the police must get a search warrant prior to seizing that blood from the hospital. They may not rely on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

Zak Goldstein 4/6/22 Zak Goldstein 4/6/22

Not Guilty - Attorney Goldstein Wins Aggravated Assault (F1) Bench Trial

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire recently won a full acquittal for his client in the case of Commonwealth v. L.S. In that case, L.S. was charged with Aggravated Assault (F1), Burglary (F1), and a slew of other serious charges. Prosecutors alleged that L.S. had gone along with some other family members to a family friend’s house to fight her after the friend’s boyfriend had disrespected one of those family members. Once there, the group supposedly entered the house and began beating up the friend and her boyfriend, using knives as well as kitchen appliances to injure them and send them to the hospital. Based on some questionable identifications, police arrested L.S. and her mother and charged them with countless first-degree felonies.

Fortunately, L.S. retained Attorney Goldstein for trial. She elected to have a bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, meaning that she decided to allow a judge to decide whether she was guilty or not guilty instead of a jury. In Philadelphia, bench trials sometimes have advantages in that it is possible to get to trial faster, the judges are generally fair, and the penalties are sometimes much lower in the event of a conviction on some or all charges because a bench trial takes significantly less time than a jury trial.

At trial, the Commonwealth called numerous witnesses to testify to the alleged assault and that L.S. had been present for it. Attorney Goldstein, however, had carefully reviewed the discovery and transcripts from the preliminary hearing and realized that many of the witnesses had not been totally sure that L.S. was in fact one of the people involved. The police had showed photo arrays to each potential witness, and although they testified that they thought L.S. looked like one of the people who went to the house, they were not 100% sure. Of course, their stories changed when they came to court for trial. By the time of trial, they had decided that they had no doubt at all that L.S. was one of the assailants.

Attorney Goldstein cross-examined the witnesses using their statements to police and from prior hearings and was able to show that it was very questionable whether L.S. had even been there. Through this cross-examination and the presentation of character witnesses, Attorney Goldstein was able to convince the trial judge that the Commonwealth could not prove its case. The judge found L.S. and her co-defendant not guilty of all charges. L.S. will continue to have no record, and all charges will be expunged.

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Zak Goldstein 4/1/22 Zak Goldstein 4/1/22

Attorney Goldstein Wins New Trial in Superior Court Appeal of First Degree Murder Case

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. V.G., reversing that defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and the accompanying mandatory sentence of life without parole. In this case, the evidence introduced at trial showed that the defendant attended a house party. During the party, he was assaulted and robbed by a larger man. He pulled a gun and fired it, shooting and killing the man who had robbed him and shooting and injuring the friend of that man who was rapidly approaching him as if he too might have had a gun. The defendant testified at trial to the above facts and that he had acted in self-defense. Despite his testimony, the trial judge announced that he did not believe the defendant and refused to provide him with the jury instructions for self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life without parole.

V.G. retained Attorney Goldstein and filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, Attorney Goldstein argued that the trial court had unfairly deprived V.G. of his entire defense by refusing to instruct the jury on the defenses of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The standard for whether a jury instruction relating to a defense should be provided to the jury is solely whether there is some evidence in the record that would support the instruction. In this case, the defendant had specifically testified to his actions and that he took them in self-defense, so there was at least some evidence in the record to support both defenses. The trial judge had erred in simply choosing not to believe the defendant, whereas the question of whether he was telling the truth should have gone to the jury.

The Superior Court agreed. It reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. V.G., who would have had to serve a life sentence for first degree murder, will now receive a new trial.