Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 9/12/20 Zak Goldstein 9/12/20

PA Superior Court: You Can't Suppress an Assault Even If Police Entered Your House Illegally

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Schneider, holding that a defendant cannot suppress testimony regarding his assault on officers even if he can prove that the police illegally entered his home prior to the assault taking place inside the home. Although the physical contraband that police found as a result of the illegal search should have been suppressed, the court ruled that the police could still testify regarding the defendant’s physical actions despite the illegal entry.

Commonwealth v. Schneider

A Crisis Unit worker spoke with a local police officer and expressed an interest in having the officer accompany him to conduct a mental welfare check on the defendant. The worker wanted the officer to accompany him for the check out of safety concerns. According to the Crisis Unit worker, the defendant said that he believed that he was Jesus Christ, Thor, and Jim Carrey. It is worth noting, that at the time of the request, there were no allegations that the defendant was armed; was in danger of harming himself or others; was malnourished or lacked utilities. The police officer and the Crisis Unit Officer arrived at the defendant’s home, and the police officer knocked on the defendant’s door. The defendant answered and at first, the interaction was fine. However, the defendant then told the officer to take off his “peashooter” because guns kill people. The defendant then tried to close his door, but the officer placed his foot in the doorway to prevent the defendant from closing it, and the officer then went into the defendant’s home.

The officer then had the defendant sit in a chair. The defendant began to chant incoherent things, and his eyes blinked rapidly. Then, unprovoked, the defendant struck the officer. Eventually, the officer and the defendant began to struggle. The officer called for backup, and the police tasered and pepper sprayed the defendant. After several minutes, the police put the defendant in handcuffs and then escorted him into a police vehicle. After the police arrested the defendant and removed him from his home, an officer re-entered the house and saw marijuana and a pipe in plain view. Prosecutors charged the defendant with aggravated assault, simple assault, resisting arrest, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Prior to his trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the drugs, paraphernalia, and the officers’ testimony about his alleged actions when the police entered his home. The defendant argued that the police had illegally entered his house without a warrant, and therefore all of the evidence against him was the fruit of unconstitutional action by the police and should be suppressed. At the suppression hearing, the officers testified to the above assertions. Additionally, the officer testified that he believed the defendant was a threat to himself and others.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court stated that because the officer reasonably believed that the defendant needed mental health assistance, the warrantless entry of his home was justified under the Community Caretaking Doctrine. The defendant then proceeded to a jury trial where he was convicted of the above charges and sentenced to five years’ probation. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. The defendant raised several issues on appeal, but for purposes of this blog only the issue of whether his motion to suppress was wrongly decided will be addressed.

What is the Community Caretaking Doctrine?

The Community Caretaking Doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. This doctrine permits a warrantless entry into someone’s home if the purpose of the officer’s entry was to render aid or assistance, rather than the investigation of criminal activity. In order for a seizure to be justified under this exception, the officer must be able to point to specific, objective, and articulable facts which would reasonably suggest to an experience officer that assistance was needed. Additionally, the police action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence. Finally, the action taken by police must be tailored to rendering assistance or mitigating the peril. Once assistance has been provided or the peril mitigated, then further police action will be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and ordered that he receive a new trial. The Superior Court found that prior to entering the defendant’s home, there was not sufficient evidence for the officer to reasonably believe that the defendant required immediate assistance. The defendant’s odd behavior was not enough to justify a warrantless entry into his home. Further, the Superior Court emphasized that none of the defendant’s actions were threatening, combative, or violent prior to the officer entering his home. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant had a weapon, was malnourished, and did not look like he was hurt or intended to hurt anyone. In other words, there was no evidence to suggest that the defendant needed any form of assistance.

The Superior Court opined that the officer entered the defendant’s home to conduct additional investigation of the defendant’s mental health. This is not constitutionally permissible. According to the Superior Court, an officer cannot enter an individual’s home without a warrant to investigate if that person needs assistance. At the same time, however, the Superior Court ruled that the assault could not be suppressed. In other words, the physical evidence and contraband was suppressed because the officers should not have been in the home. But the assault on the officers itself could not be suppressed regardless of the fact that the police entered the home illegally. Nonetheless, the testimony regarding the contraband could have contributed to the jury convicting the defendant of the assault-related charges, and so the defendant will receive a new trial on all of the charges without the suppressed evidence.

This opinion is good and bad for privacy rights; it is good in that the court continued to enforce limits on the ability of police to enter a private home without a warrant, but it is bad in that the court still allowed prosecutors to proceed on resisting arrest and assault charges that stemmed from the officers’ decision to illegally invade the defendant’s home without a search warrant or arrest warrant.

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Zak Goldstein 8/13/20 Zak Goldstein 8/13/20

PA Supreme Court: Commonwealth Bears Burden of Disproving Claim of Self-Defense in Gun Case

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lineman, reaffirming its decision in Commonwealth v. Torres. The Supreme Court again held that if a criminal defendant properly raises the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth has the burden of disproving that claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, it is not adequate for the fact-finder to merely disbelieve the defendant’s evidence of self-defense. The Commonwealth must produce actual evidence to counter a defendant’s self-defense claim. The Lineman decision is significant because it applies the logic of Torres to a possessory offense rather than just a crime of violence.

Commonwealth v. Lineman

A Philadelphia Police officer was on routine patrol when he received a radio call indicating that a male was screaming for assistance. The officer arrived on scene and observed the defendant and another male struggling on the ground. The defendant was lying on the ground with the other male on top of him. The officer ordered the male to get off the defendant. As the defendant began to stand he heard the sound of metal scraping the ground. The officer then looked at the defendant’s hand and saw that he was holding an Uzi. According to the officer, the defendant appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance and was bleeding. The defendant was subsequently arrested for Violation of the Uniform Firearm Act § 6105 (“VUFA 6105”), Persons Prohibited from Possessing a Firearm.

The defendant elected to proceed by way of bench trial. At his trial, he testified in his own defense. Specifically, he testified that he and the other male had been drinking. Eventually, the other male became violent towards him and hit him in the face with the gun, which broke the defendant’s nose. The two then began to wrestle for the gun. The officer arrived while they were wrestling and this is what caused the fight to end. During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the defendant was entitled to an acquittal because he raised the issue of self-defense and the Commonwealth did not present any evidence to rebut this claim as required by the case of Commonwealth v. Torres.

The trial court disagreed. The trial court stated that because this was a possessory offense, he could not raise a self-defense argument. The trial court did state that the defendant could raise a duress defense, but because he did not believe the defendant’s story it was not applicable to him. As such, he found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to three to seven years’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. In its decision, the Superior Court found that because the defendant was still in possession of the firearm after the police officer broke up the fight, this was sufficient to convict him of the charge of VUFA 6105. Undeterred, the defendant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Which side has to prove self-defense in Pennsylvania?

Commonwealth v. Torres is a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that was decided in 2001. The basic facts of the case were that the police arrived at a house in Philadelphia, PA after they received a radio call. When the police arrived on scene, they met with the complainant who said that the defendant had hit him in the head with a wrench. The defendant was about a half block away from the scene when the police arrived. While investigating the scene, the police were unable to locate a wrench. The defendant was then subsequently arrested and charged with simple assault.

The complainant never appeared to court. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth still elected to prosecute the case against the defendant by calling the police officers who arrived on scene. The officers testified that the complainant said the defendant hit him with a wrench. In response, the defendant testified on his own behalf and stated that he was acting in self-defense. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court stated he disbelieved the defendant and found him guilty. The defendant then filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court which affirmed his conviction. He then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which agreed to hear the case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and vacated the defendant’s conviction. The Court stated that when a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove that claim beyond a reasonable doubt. According to the Court, the Commonwealth must produce some evidence to dispute this claim. Further, the Court specifically stated that it is not sufficient for the trial court to not believe the defendant. Therefore, because there was no evidence on the record to contradict the defendant’s claim that he was acting in self-defense, the defendant’s conviction could not stand and thus was vacated. It is important to note that the defendant in Torres was not charged with a possessory offense (i.e. possessing a gun).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a slip opinion decision vacating the defendant’s conviction. In its opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically cited Commonwealth v. Torres as the reason why it was reversing the lower courts’ decisions. The Court did not provide any additional justification for its decision. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the Court has now expanded Torres to include possessory offenses as well. As a matter of common sense, this decision makes sense. If someone is in danger and uses a weapon to protect themselves in self-defense, they should also be able to avoid a conviction for the possession of said weapon. Regardless of the logic of the decision, this decision is obviously favorable to the defendant because his conviction is now vacated, and he will be released from prison.

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Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

Zak Goldstein 7/14/20 Zak Goldstein 7/14/20

PA Superior Court: Acquittal on Underlying Reckless Endangerment Charge Does Not Prevent Conviction for Drug Delivery Resulting in Death

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Burton, holding that a defendant may be convicted of Drug Delivery Resulting in Death (“DRDD”) despite being acquitted on the charge of Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”) in the same trial. This decision is not surprising given that it has long been the rule that with few exceptions, inconsistent verdicts do not usually warrant a new trial. As many criminal defense attorneys can tell you, inexplicable verdicts are not uncommon in jury trials. Because the judge cannot question the jury regarding its motivation, the reasons for these verdicts are usually unknown. Sometimes they are reached out of leniency, while it is also possible that the jury just may not understand the law. Here, the defendant’s acquittal on the REAP charge did not require an acquittal on the related drug delivery resulting in death charge.

Commonwealth v. Burton

On January 29, 2016, police officers responded to a call for an unresponsive person in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, the officers were too late. When they arrived, the unresponsive person unfortunately had died. The officers found a syringe on the floor near her body. They also found three blue wax bags from the scene which contained fentanyl. The officers also recovered the decedent’s cell phone and prescription pill bottles.

Between 7:00 p.m. and midnight on January 28, 2016, the decedent exchanged text messages with an individual named “Rachel” in her phone. It was later determined that “Rachel” was the defendant. According to a detective who reviewed the text messages and testified at the defendant’s trial, the conversation between the defendant and the decedent was indicative of arranging a drug transaction. The police also recovered surveillance footage that showed the defendant walking near the decedent’s building while talking on his phone. The video footage also showed the defendant entering and leaving the decedent’s house.

On June 22, 2016, the defendant was arrested and charged with DRDD, REAP, criminal use of a communication facility, and possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the subscriber information relating to his cell phone which was denied by the trial court. Following a two-day trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of DDRD, criminal use of a criminal facility, and PWID. Notably, the jury acquitted the defendant on the REAP charge. On October 31, 2018, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate term of 13 to 35 years in a state correctional institution. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that he could not have been convicted of DDRD because he was acquitted on the charge of REAP.

What is Drug Delivery Resulting in Death in PA?

The crime of DDRD is governed by 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2506. The statute provides:

A person commits a felony of the first degree if the person intentionally administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, sells or distributes any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64),1known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and another person dies as a result of using the substance.

The crime of DRDD is unique because unlike most crimes, it has two separate mental states that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant. First, the defendant must have intentionally sold the contraband. Next, the death of the decedent must be the reckless result of the actions of the defendant. Further, the penalty for DRDD can be quite severe. If a defendant is convicted of DDRD, they can face a maximum sentence of forty years. Although DRDD is not usually charged in Philadelphia state court, it is a very common charge in the surrounding counties (i.e. Bucks County) and is particularly serious when charged in federal court. Therefore, if you are charged with DDRD it is imperative that you have a highly skilled attorney representing you.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that he could not be convicted of DRDD because he was acquitted on the charge of REAP. Unfortunately, these confusing and inconsistent jury verdicts are fairly common, and appellate courts are extremely reluctant to apply an acquittal on one charge to prevent a conviction on another except under extremely limited circumstances. Here, the Superior Court expressly rejected the argument that REAP is a lesser included offense of DDRD. The Superior Court found that the recklessness mental state is satisfied by the delivery of a drug whose dangers are widely known. Fentanyl is widely known to be extremely dangerous and frequently results in overdoses. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction for DRDD will stand, and he will be forced to serve his sentence.

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Zak Goldstein 6/8/20 Zak Goldstein 6/8/20

PA Superior Court: Trial Judge Improperly Usurped Role of Jury By Deciding Gradation of Witness Intimidation Charge

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Raymond, holding that the trier of fact must make a specific finding of how the defendant “intimidated” a witness before the trial court can impose an enhanced felony gradation for the charge at sentencing. The Superior Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the court could decide the gradation itself in the absence of a specific ruling from the jury.

Commonwealth v. Raymond

Philadelphia police charged the defendant with intimidation of a witness, retaliation against a witness, and possession of an instrument of a crime (“PIC”) based on his interactions with the complainant. Prior to the initiation of this case, the complainant had cooperated with law enforcement officials who charged the defendant’s friend with first degree murder. At the preliminary hearing for the murder case, the complainant testified that the defendant’s friend murdered the victim in that case.

The defendant and the complainant knew each other because they had lived in the same neighborhood for years. As the complainant had agreed to testify against the defendant’s friend at his murder trial, the complainant was placed in a witness protection program and relocated to another neighborhood approximately ten to fifteen minutes away. The complainant testified that he was concerned for his safety in his former neighborhood and no longer kept in contact with friends there because he had been labeled a snitch.

Shortly before the murder trial, the complainant was outside with his wife and his daughter at his residence when the defendant approached in his vehicle. After the defendant exited the vehicle and greeted the complainant’s family, the complainant’s wife and daughter went inside the residence. While the two men were alone, the defendant told the complainant that “I know where you was at. I would have done reach out and touched you, but I wanted to give you an opportunity to make shit right.” The complainant interpreted the defendant’s statement as an effort to convince him not to testify at the murder trial. The complainant then subsequently asked the defendant to leave. The defendant then said that “I’ve been up to the prison to see [defendant’s friend]. I know everything. And you got to make this shit right.”

The complainant then went inside his residence. He watched from his window as the defendant went back to his car, grabbed a black firearm, and tucked it under his shirt. The defendant then said “what are you gonna do?” while he placed his hand on his gun. After the complainant shut his door, he heard the defendant say “I know where you’re at.” The defendant then drove away.

After the defendant drove away, he called the complainant’s cell phone and stated “I shouldn’t have came. I don’t want you to feel threatened.” The defendant then stated that he did not want to be involved as the matter was between the complainant and his friend. As a result of this incident, the complainant relocated his family again to an unspecified address, which required his daughter to change schools. The complainant testified against the defendant’s friend, and that person was convicted of murder.

After the murder trial, the complainant testified about two incidents that occurred that made him feel he was being retaliated against for his testifying against defendant’s friend. First, he saw two men in a van parked outside of his home. One of the men was the defendant’s friend from his old neighborhood. Additionally, the complainant also found a dead bird on his doorstep. This was symbolic because the defendant’s nickname was tweet. The defendant, however, was in custody during both of these incidents.

The defendant went to trial with a jury. The above testimony was presented and he was convicted of all charges with the exception of PIC. It should be noted that there was not a specific finding by the jury as to how the defendant “intimidated” the complainant. This is important because intimidation has various subsections which trigger different gradations - it can range from a misdemeanor carrying only a few years in prison to a felony for which someone can get twenty years.

After his conviction, he filed a motion for extraordinary relief arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support either of his convictions. Regarding the witness intimidation charge, the defendant was originally charged under §4952(a)(1) which, as shown below, does not fit the facts that the Commonwealth alleged. The defendant also argued that there was no evidence to show that he made a specific threat or used violence to retaliate against the complainant for testifying at his friend’s preliminary hearing and thus there was insufficient evidence to convict him of that charge. The trial court agreed that there was insufficient evidence to convict him for the retaliation against a witness charge, however it denied the defendant’s motions on the intimidation of a witness charge. At his sentencing, the defendant was sentenced to six to twelve years’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied. He then filed a timely appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

What is an Intimidation of a Witness Charge in Pennsylvania?

The charge of intimidation of a witness is governed by 18 Pa C.S.A. § 4952. The statute provides that a person can be guilty of intimidating a witness:

if with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent, or interfere with the administration of justice he intimidates or attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to” do any of the following:

Refrain from informing or reporting to any law enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge concerning any information, document or thing relating to the commission of a crime.
Give any false or misleading information or testimony relating to the commission of any crime to any law enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge.
Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing relating to the commission of a crime from any law enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge.
Give any false or misleading information or testimony or refrain from giving any testimony, information, document or thing, relating to the commission of a crime, to an attorney representing a criminal defendant.
Elude, evade or ignore any request to appear or legal process summoning him to appear to testify or supply evidence.
Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been legally summoned.

The penalty for being found guilty of intimidating a witness can be very severe. 18 Pa C.S.A. § 4952 (b)(1) lists how the charge of witness intimidation may be graded:

The offense is a felony of the degree indicated in paragraphs (2) through (4) if:
The actor employs force, violence or deception, or threatens to employ force or violence, upon the witness or victim or, with the requisite intent or knowledge upon any other person.
The actor offers any pecuniary or other benefit to the witness or victim or, with the requisite intent or knowledge, to any other person.
The actor's conduct is in furtherance of a conspiracy to intimidate a witness or victim.
The actor accepts, agrees or solicits another to accept any pecuniary or other benefit to intimidate a witness or victim.
The actor has suffered any prior conviction for any violation of this section or any predecessor law hereto, or has been convicted, under any Federal statute or statute of any other state, of an act which would be a violation of this section if committed in this State.
The offense is a felony of the first degree if a felony of the first degree or murder in the first or second degree was charged in the case in which the actor sought to influence or intimidate a witness or victim as specified in this subsection.
The offense is a felony of the second degree if a felony of the second degree is the most serious offense charged in the case in which the actor sought to influence or intimidate a witness or victim as specified in this subsection.
The offense is a felony of the third degree in any other case in which the actor sought to influence or intimidate a witness or victim as specified in this subsection.
Otherwise the offense is a misdemeanor of the second degree.

The statute requires the Commonwealth to prove specific things in order to obtain an enhanced sentence. If the Commonwealth wants the witness intimidation charge to be graded as a felony of the first degree, it is not sufficient to show that the underlying case was also listed as felony of the first degree or a murder, but they must also show that the defendant “intimidated” the witness in one of the enumerated ways listed in 18 Pa C.S.A. § 4952 (b)(1)(i)-(iv). In the instant case, the defendant argued that because the jury did not specifically find which way the defendant “intimidated” the witness, he was entitled to the least severe grading which is a misdemeanor of the second degree.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court agreed with the defendant that his conviction should have been graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree. The reason is because the jury did not make a specific finding as to how the defendant “intimidated” the complainant. Per 18 Pa C.S.A. § 4952 (b)(1), a criminal defendant can only receive an enhanced grading if the trier of fact finds that the defendant “intimidated” a witness through one of those enumerated points. Because the jury did not make a specific finding of how the defendant “intimidated” the complainant, his conviction could not be upgraded to the higher grading. Therefore, the trial court should have found that it was a misdemeanor and sentenced him to a maximum of two years’ incarceration.

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