Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Superior Court Rejects Castle Doctrine Defense Where Victim Did Nothing More Than Bang on Defendant’s Front Door
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Cannavo, holding that a defendant is not entitled to raise the Castle Doctrine defense solely because he subjectively believed that the victim was trying to enter his house. Instead, prior to instructing a jury on Pennsylvania’s castle doctrine defense, the court must find that there is evidence of record from which the defendant could have objectively, reasonably believed that someone was trying to enter his or her house without permission.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Cannavo
In Cannavo, the defendant was staying at a carriage house near West Chester University on Halloween in 2015. That night, the victim and his friends went out into West Chester wearing Halloween costumes. The victim and his friends were intoxicated. At 1:17 a.m., the victim and his friends attempted to enter a party around the carriage house, but were denied entry. After being denied entry to the party, the victim proceeded to bang on the defendant’s door. The defendant had a closed-circuit television system that permitted him to see the area outside his door. It is unclear how many times the victim banged on the defendant’s door, but there was no evidence presented at trial that the victim actually attempted to enter the defendant’s house beyond knocking on the door. The defendant, however, testified that he believed that the victim was attempting to break into his house, but there was nothing to support the defendant’s belief beyond the victim’s knocking on the door.
After the victim knocked on the door, the defendant fired a .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol through the door without opening it. The bullet went through the door and struck the victim in his small intestine and colon. The police later discovered that, because of the defendant’s prior criminal record, he was not allowed to possess the gun. Fortuntaely, the victim survived. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, simple assault, and persons not to possess a firearm.
At trial, the defendant raised a claim of self-defense. Prior to the court’s instructions to the jury, the defendant requested a charge directing the jury to consider the castle doctrine, which would inform the jury of a presumption of a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary for the defendant to defend himself based on the victim’s unauthorized entry into the defendant’s home. The trial court denied his request for this jury instruction. The jury then convicted the defendant of the above crimes, and the trial court subsequently convicted him, following a bench trial, of persons not to possess a firearm in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 6105.
The trial court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate term of 25-50 years’ incarceration. The defendant filed post-sentence motions for reconsideration which were denied. He then filed a timely appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant raised two issues on appeal. For purposes of this article, only the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the castle-doctrine presumption.
What is the Castle Doctrine?
The Castle Doctrine is a basic tenet of American law. The ideological foundation for the castle doctrine is the belief that a person’s home is his castle and that one should not be required to retreat from his sanctum. The doctrine is of ancient origins and even the Bible references it. Ironically, even though this doctrine has existed for thousands of years, it was only codified into Pennsylvania law in 2011.
The Castle Doctrine defense, when available, is a legal rule that permits a defendant to lawfully use deadly force against another individual. The burden is on the defense to establish the factual support for the Castle Doctrine defense. To assert the Castle Doctrine defense, a defendant must establish that the victim is in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcefully entered and is present within a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. Further, a defendant must establish that he took his actions because he believed that his actions were necessary to protect against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, or rape. However, the unauthorized entry or attempted entry into the residence raises a presumption that the actions were in fact necessary to protect against death or serious bodily injury, thereby making it easier for the defendant to prove that he or she acted in self-defense. It is important to note that just because a defendant raises the Castle Doctrine defense does not mean that they are entitled to an acquittal. Rather, the burden switches to the Commonwealth to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant is not entitled to the Castle Doctrine defense (i.e. the defendant did not credibly believe that he was in danger of death, serious bodily injury, etc.).
There are limits to the Castle Doctrine, however. A defendant is not entitled to this defense if: the person against whom the force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner or lessee; the person sought to be removed is a child or grandchild or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of the person against whom the protective force is used; the actor is engaged in a criminal activity or is using the dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle to further a criminal activity; or the person against whom the force is used is a peace officer acting in the performance of his official duties and the actor using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a peace officer. Taking all of this into consideration, a trial court must decide, based on the facts presented at trial, whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant the Castle Doctrine jury instruction. Whether the jury receives such a instruction is incredibly important because if the jury does not receve the instruction from the court, the jury will not likely find a defendant not guilty due to this defense.
Cannavo Was Not Entitled to the Castle Doctrine Defense
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial to include the Castle Doctrine jury instruction. In Cannavo, the Superior Court ruled that it is not enough for the defendant to subjectively believe that the victim was trying to enter his home. Instead, there must also be factual support for a defendant’s belief that the victim was attempting to enter his or her home. The Superior Court found that there was simply no evidence that the victim was trying to enter the defendant’s home and that the defendant’s subjective belief was not sufficient to receive the jury instruction. Further, assuming that the victim was actually trying to enter his home, the defendant was not entitled to raise this defense because he illegally possessed a firearm and was not justified in doing so. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defense’s motion for the relevant jury instruction. This defendant will not receive a new trial.
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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Possession with the Intent to Deliver, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court: Shooting Someone in the Calf Is Not Automatically Attempted Murder
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Predmore, finding that the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of attempted murder where the evidence showed only that the defendant shot the victim in the calf twice and missed with a third shot. Predmore is an excellent case which re-affirms the proposition that the serious charge of Attempted Murder requires the specific intent to kill. The Commonwealth may not prove Attempted Murder simply by showing that the defendant shot someone.
The Facts of Predmore
In Predmore, the complainant drove past his ex-girlfriend’s house and noticed the defendant’s vehicle. He stopped near the rear of the vehicle. The defendant left the house and walked into the parking lot. The defendant and the complainant then began to argue. The complainant’s ex-girlfriend broke up the argument, but the defendant then retrieved a gun from his car. He subsequently shot at the complainant three times, missing with one shot but striking him in the back of the calves twice. The defendant then left in his car, and the complainant went to the hospital. The defendant told the police that he had acted in self-defense. The Commonwealth charged the defendant with Attempted Murder, Aggravated Assault, Simple Assault, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person.
The defendant was held for court at a preliminary hearing. His defense attorney filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (called a motion to quash in Philadelphia), asking the Common Pleas Judge to dismiss the Attempted Murder charge. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the Attempted Murder charge. The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
The Superior Court Appeal
The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing the Attempted Murder charge and that the dismissal of the charge substantially handicapped the prosecution. An en banc panel of the Superior Court ultimately upheld the trial court’s ruling. The court began by noting that Attempted Murder requires the specific intent to commit a homicide. Thus, criminal attempt to murder is defined by reading Pennsylvania’s attempt statute with the first-degree murder statute. A conviction for Attempted Murder requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and took a substantial step towards that goal. The mens rea element of Attempted Murder is the specific intent to kill, which is the same mens rea as first degree murder. The defendant must also have more than just the requisite mens rea. The defendant must also take a substantial step towards committing the intended killing. There is no such thing as attempted third degree murder under Pennsylvania law.
Here, the Commonwealth argued that the defendant attempted to kill the complainant by shooting at him repeatedly. However, the Superior Court rejected this argument. It agreed that the defendant had taken a substantial step towards the commission of a killing as shooting someone could lead to death, but it rejected the idea that the defendant had acted with the intent to kill. Attempted Murder requires more than just an action that could result in death – it requires an actual attempt to kill. Thus, had the defendant shot at the complainant’s head, or had the defendant said something that indicated that he wanted to kill the complainant, the Commonwealth may have presented sufficient evidence. The Commonwealth’s evidence failed to meet its burden, however, because the Commonwealth showed only that the defendant shot at the complainant’s legs from close range.
Notably, the Court’s opinion rejected the idea that the trial court should have just assumed the existence of the mens rea element from the defendant’s act of merely shooting a gun. In many preliminary hearings, magistrates tend to relieve the Commonwealth of its burden of actually showing that the defendant acted with a certain level of intent. Because the standard for holding a defendant for court at a preliminary hearing is less than the standard for obtaining a conviction at a trial, courts often assume that if something could have happened, the defendant may have intended for it to happen, and therefore actual evidence of mens rea is unnecessary.
The Superior Court explicitly rejected that argument here. The specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of a victim’s body. However, the legs were not a vital part of the defendant’s body. Further, there was no evidence that the defendant had shot at a vital part and missed because the defendant was only a few feet away from the complainant. There was also no verbal statement from the defendant that suggested an intent to kill or evidence of motive to kill. Therefore, there was no evidence of the requisite mens rea, and the Court upheld the dismissal of the Attempted Murder charge. A shooting is not automatically an Attempted Murder.
FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES? WE CAN HELP.
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court: Police Reasonably Conducted Warrantless Search of Defendant's Home After Defendant Fired Assault Rifle in Back Yard and Acted Crazy
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. C.*, holding that police properly conducted a protective, warrantless sweep of the defendant’s home following corroborated reports that he had fired an assault rifle multiple times in the home. The Superior Court found that the police conduct in this case involved the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless entry into a home.
The Facts of C.
In August 2015, Philadelphia Police responded to a radio call indicating that multiple gun shots had been fired in the back yard of a residence in a high-crime area. The police peered into the back yard while perched upon a wall and saw a white male, the defendant, and numerous shell casings on the ground. They did not see a gun, but they secured the defendant and asked him if anyone was inside the house. He gave them inconsistent answers, so they performed a “protective sweep” of the home to make sure that no one had been injured. They found and seized an assault rifle on the second floor.
The police arrested the defendant, and the District Attorney’s Office charged him with a Violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA Sec. 6106), possessing instruments of crime, and recklessly endangering another person. The VUFA charge was ultimately dismissed because VUFA 6106 requires either that a gun be concealed or located in a car and that the defendant not have a license. There is an exception to the VUFA 6106 statute which provides that a defendant may conceal a gun in his or her home. Here, the evidence showed that the defendant lived in the house, so VUFA 6106 was not an appropriate charge.
Following the dismissal of the VUFA 6106 charge, the defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the gun, which would help his case with respect to the possessing instruments of crime and recklessly endangering another person charges. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. It concluded that police searched the home solely because they wanted to find the gun; not because they were looking for injured people in the house. The court therefore found that police should have obtained a warrant prior to entering the house.
The Superior Court Appeal
The Commonwealth appealed the suppression of the gun to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court reversed. The Superior Court noted that in general, police may not search a house without a warrant. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general requirement. Although the warrantless entry and search of a home is presumptively unreasonable and illegal, there is an exigent circumstances requirement which may justify such a search. Exigent circumstances exist where the police reasonably believe that someone within a residence is in need of immediate aid. There are a number of factors which courts typically look at when determining whether exigent circumstances exist:
The gravity of the offense,
Whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed,
Whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause,
Whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered,
Whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended
Whether the entry was peaceable, and
The time of the entry (entry at night is disfavored).
These factors apply in the typical case, but in this case, the real inquiry was whether the police reasonably believed someone inside the residence was in need of immediate assistance.
The Emergency Aid Exception and the Superior Court’s Decision
The Superior Court ultimately concluded that police acted reasonably in entering the house. They did not need ironclad proof of a likely, serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception. Instead, they could err on the side of caution in this case given all of the circumstances. Here, the evidence showed that the defendant fired the gun multiple times in a neighborhood known for gun violence. The initial report suggested that he fired the gun in his back yard, but he also could have fired it in the home. When a witness flagged down the police, she told the police to be careful and described the defendant as acting crazy. Police corroborated the witness statement when they saw spent shells in the defendant’s backyard and by speaking with the defendant, who gave them inconsistent answers about whether anyone was inside. These inconsistent answers in particular suggested that maybe the defendant had a victim in the house who needed help. Therefore, under these circumstances, it was reasonably for police to confirm that he had not injured anyone by searching the house.
Ultimately, this case will likely be the subject of additional appeals as it conflicts with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Wilmer. For now, however, the case illustrates one of the rare circumstances in which police need not obtain a warrant prior to entering a residence. If police reasonably believe that someone inside may be in need of urgent assistance, then they may enter a house without a search warrant.
FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES? WE CAN HELP.
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
*The case name has been changed to an initial as the defendant’s case was ultimately dismissed following its remand to the trial court.
PA Supreme Court: "I'm done talking" invokes right to remain silent
The Right to Remain Silent
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lukach, holding that the defendant unambiguously asserted his right to remain silent by telling police that he was done talking and had nothing else to talk about. This decision is significant because it makes it easier for a defendant to invoke the right to remain silent during a police interrogation. Specifically, prosecutors will be less successful when they argue that the defendant was “ambiguous” when asserting their right to remain silent.
Commonwealth v. Lukach
On August 6, 2015 at approximately 5:00 AM, a Pottsville Police Officer received a call from another officer requesting his presence at the scene of a homicide. Upon arrival, the officer observed blood on the roadway and was informed by other officers that they found the body of the victim lying in the street. During their preliminary investigation, officers became aware that the defendant and a Mr. Thomas had been involved in a prior crime at the victim’s house. They quickly became persons of interest in the homicide investigation. Other Pottsville Officers reported seeing the defendant and Mr. Thomas walking together on the day on which the victim’s body was found, and police later encountered both individuals at 12th Street and Market Street, which is in close proximity to where they found the decedent’s body.
During a discussion with an officer, the defendant stated he was in the area to see what was happening. He further stated that he had been with Mr. Thomas for the entire previous evening and had previously visited an A-Plus store at approximately 5:00 AM. The officers then went to the A-Plus store and determined that the defendant had not been at the A-Plus store at that time. Later that day, an officer went to his house, advised his mother of the homicide, and stated that he wished to speak to the defendant. The defendant was not home, but his mother consented to a search of the property. During the search of the property, officers recovered box cutters and work gloves, both of which were similar to items found at the crime scene.
The next day, police detained the defendant based on two non-related warrants. After arresting him, they put him in an interrogation room. A detective officer turned on an audio and visual recorder, read the defendant his Miranda rights, and began to interview the defendant regarding the homicide of the victim. Prior to incriminating himself, the defendant told the officer: “Yeah. I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” The police officer then immediately replied, “You don’t have to say anything, I told you that you could stop.” The officer, however, continued to ask the defendant questions and talk to him. At some point, the officer left the room for approximately eight minutes. Another officer then entered the room, asked for the defendant’s shoes, and the defendant turned them over. The original officer then re-entered the room and discussed with the defendant the types of evidence that could be found on shoes. The defendant continued to deny involvement in the homicide.
Later, the defendant foolishly asked the officer if he could ask him a quick question off camera. After their off-the-record conversation, the officer turned the camera back on, re-advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and the defendant asked to speak with someone from the Schuylkill County District Attorney’s Office in regards to whether he could receive a deal in exchange for his cooperation. An Assistant District Attorney arrived shortly thereafter. The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and he subsequently confessed to participating in the victim’s murder.
As part of his confession, the defendant told the police that he used one of the victim’s credit cards to access an ATM and then placed it in a storm drain. Officers subsequently recovered the credit card, a pair of sunglasses, a t-shirt and a hat in a storm drain. Based on the confession and the recovery of the credit card, officers were able to retrieve video which showed the defendant accessing an ATM around the time of the homicide. They arrested him and charged him with murder and related criminal charges.
The Motion to Suppress the Statement for a Miranda Violation
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any statements made to the police after he stated “yeah. I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” The motion further requested that the defendant’s shoes and any other evidence recovered as a result of those statements, including the items found in the storm drain and the ATM video, also be suppressed because they were all recovered in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court agreed with the defense. It found that the confession was coerced because the continuing interrogation was “meant to pressure the defendant into relinquishing his right and the statements he thereafter made were the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.”
The Superior Court Appeal
The Commonwealth then filed an interlocutory appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the suppression order. The Superior Court found that the officer violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights as he failed to scrupulously honor the defendant’s request to remain silent, and the defendant’s subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights before speaking to the Assistant District Attorney did not cure that violation or render his confession voluntary. The Superior Court also agreed that the physical evidence that was obtained as a result of Appellee’s confession was illegally obtained and affirmed the suppression’s court order. The Commonwealth then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Court granted allocatur.
When do the Police Have to Give You Your Miranda Warnings?
The police do not always have to provide a suspect or arrestee with Miranda warnings. Instead, police are required to provide Miranda warnings only if they want to use the results of a custodial interrogation in court. Thus, whether Miranda warnings are required depends on two factors – 1) you must be in custody, typically meaning under arrest, and 2) the police must ask questions which are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating statements. If police fail to provide Miranda warnings prior to conducting a custodial interrogation, they usually may not use the statements made during the interrogation in court. Police do not, however, have to provide Miranda warnings if they are not going to question you. Generally, a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes when the defendant is deprived of his physical freedom in a significant way, or when the defendant reasonably believes that his or her freedom of action is restricted by the interrogation. In addition to providing Miranda warnings, police must also honor a defendant’s invocation of his or her rights. This means that if you ask to speak with a lawyer or tell the police that you wish to remain silent, then they cannot continue to question you without first taking a substantial break. Instead, the interrogation must cease immediately. If the police continue questioning after an invocation of the right to remain silent or consult with an attorney and obtain statements because of this questioning, the trial court should bar the Commonwealth from using the statements at trial because this evidence was illegally obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
This rule seems simple, but it can become complicated when it is not totally clear whether a defendant actually seek to exercise his or her rights. Various appellate courts have held that the invocation of the right to remain silent or speak with a lawyer must be unambiguous. Obviously, most suspects, when questioned by the police, do not say “I am invoking my Fifth Amendment Rights against self-incrimination.” Rather, they say something that is similar to what the defendant said in his case. As such, suppression courts must then decide whether this was an unambiguous invocation of one’s right to remain silent. If the invocation of the right to remain silent was ambiguous, then the police may continue to question the suspect.
What is an Unambiguous Invocation of Your Right to Remain Silent?
Appellate courts have held that when an individual is given his Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease. The problem, as mentioned above, is that a defendant typically does not speak in legalese and will attempt to invoke their right to remain silent in ways that are not always the most articulate. Over the years, most appellate have acknowledged this problem, so courts do not always require a suspect to explicitly reference the Fifth Amendment or the right to remain silent. However, the courts do require that a defendant’s request be “unambiguous.” Ironically, the decisions on this issue are quite ambiguous. Nonetheless, the courts will employ an objective inquiry into determining whether the defendant’s request to remain silent was “unambiguous.”
One issue that frequently arises, as in the case here, is whether the invocation was prefaced by some qualifying phrase. In Lukach, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions that addressed this issue. In these jurisdictions, the courts found that when a defendant prefaced his “invocation” by a phrase such as “I don’t know” or “I don’t know [about x crime],” then the defendant was not invoking his right to remain silent. As such, if you are being interrogated for a crime, you should try to be as clear as possible when you invoke your right to remain silent.
The Defendant’s Invocation Was Unambiguous
Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and affirmed the order granting the suppression of the defendant’s statement. The Court found that the defendant unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights when he stated “I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” Therefore, the Court held that the defendant’s statements were properly suppressed. The Court also affirmed the suppression of the physical evidence, finding that police had coerced the statement. This part of the Court’s decision is a little bit unusual because the law typically does not require suppression of the derivative evidence of a Miranda violation, meaning that if you confess and tell the police where to find other evidence, the confession may be suppressed, but the other evidence usually will not. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted an appeal in a different case to evaluate whether the derivative evidence should also be suppressed. It is possible the justices are leaning in favor of changing that rule to require the suppression of the derivative evidence given the decision to suppress the physical evidence in this case
Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.