Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/21/18 Zak Goldstein 7/21/18

PA Supreme Court: Quality of Evidence Should Be Considered When Evaluating Whether After-Discovered Evidence is Cumulative or Corroborative

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Small, holding that the quality of evidence is relevant in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial based on the after-discovered evidence prong of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (hereinafter “PCRA”). In general, after-discovered evidence may help a defendant get a new trial after a conviction, but the evidence may not be cumulative or corroborative of the type of evidence that was already presented at the original trial. In Small, the Court held that stronger evidence in support of a proposition for which there was some evidence introduced at trial may require a court to grant a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Small

On March 7, 2011, the decedent was killed after he suffered a contact gunshot wound to the left side of his head after he left a local club in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. No one saw the actual shooting, but a number of witnesses saw the defendant with the decedent moments before the shooting. The Commonwealth alleged that the defendant shot the victim because of his loyalty to a Mr. Espada. Specifically, the Commonwealth alleged that the defendant, who grew up with Espada, killed the decedent because the decedent had previously assaulted Ms. Tyson, the mother of Espada’s children.

The Commonwealth presented multiple witnesses to support this theory. Because no one actually witnessed the shooting, the Commonwealth relied primarily on circumstantial evidence at trial. For example, the Commonwealth called Ms. Tyson to testify about the decedent’s assault of her. Mr. Williams, the defendant's sister’s boyfriend, testified that he saw the defendant and Espada with the decedent moments before his demise. Although he did not see the defendant shoot the decedent, he did see the defendant standing over the decedent’s body before he fled the scene. The Commonwealth also called Mr. Evans to testify that he and a Mr. Gibson pursued the person whom they believed to be the shooter immediately after the shooting. They stopped their pursuit after someone fired two gunshots in their direction.

The Commonwealth also called Mr. Knight, who was one of the defendant's friends. He testified at trial that he saw the defendant approach the decedent and put his arm around him. He also saw the defendant running towards the river immediately following the shooting and, later on in the night, make statements such as “we did what we had to do” and “if it came down to it, pin it on my boy [Espada].” The Commonwealth also called police as witnesses. Specifically, the officers testified that they were able to track footprints in the snow that lead from the crime scene, to the riverfront, and then back to the defendant's apartment complex. Additionally, they called a forensic pathologist who testified that the decedent died as a result of a “contact gunshot wound” and that the gun that killed the decedent had to be pressed into the left side of his face. In addition to this circumstantial evidence, the Commonwealth also presented the testimony of two inmates who were former cellmates with the defendant. Supposedly, the defendant admitted to both of these cellmates that he killed the decedent.

At trial, the defense did not call any witnesses. Instead, they relied on the Commonwealth’s witnesses to establish the theory that Espada was the shooter. On cross examination, the defense was able to ascertain that Ms. Tyson had just given birth to one of Espada’s children only two weeks prior to the decedent assaulting her. Additionally, they were able to ascertain that Espada was more upset about this assault than the defendant and thus had a stronger incentive to kill the decedent. Espada was also in close proximity to the decedent prior to his murder.

Further, the defense was able to show that Espada shot at Mr. Gibson and Mr. Evans immediately after the shooting. They also were able to show that Espada had confessed, on at least two occasions, to the murder of the decedent. The defense was able to elicit this through the testimony of the defendant's sister. She testified that Mr. Espada confessed to his then-girlfriend that he had killed the decedent. Finally, in regards to the two jailhouse informants, they were able to impeach them to show that they received favorable treatment in their own pending cases in return for their testimony against the defendant.

After-Discovered Evidence

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and firearms not to be carried without a license. The trial judge sentenced him to life in prison as required by law. The defendant then filed several appeals which were ultimately denied. He then filed a timely PCRA petition. The PCRA petition sought a new trial on after-discovered evidence grounds. The defendant attached as an exhibit a notarized statement from Ms. Tyson. In this statement, Ms. Tyson stated that she withheld from the police and the jury that Espada admitted to her that he, not the defendant, shot the decedent. She also provided details about Espada's appearance and demeanor after the shooting which suggested that he could have been the shooter.

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on May 12, 2015. At this hearing, Ms. Tyson testified that within twenty-four hours of the murder, Espada called her and confessed to the murder. Ms. Tyson also spoke with Espada in person and described him as a “hot mess” and that “he cut his hair and he just looked like he was up all night crying and stuff and he was like shaken up.” According to Ms. Tyson, Espada killed the decedent because of his prior assault on Ms. Tyson. Ms. Tyson testified that she did not tell the police this because her children were in foster care and she was receiving threats on Facebook. She also stated that the police threatened her and that the reason she came forward was because she wanted to remove the stress she bore from withholding this information. On January 19, 2016, the PCRA court granted a new trial based on the defendant's after-discovered evidence claim. The court stated that Ms. Tyson’s testimony satisfied all four factors (as discussed later) which a petitioner must meet in order to obtain a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. However, the PCRA court did not specifically address the credibility of Ms. Tyson; meaning it made no finding as to whether or not it found her testimony to be truthful.

The Commonwealth appealed. The Superior Court reversed the PCRA court. It held that Ms. Tyson’s testimony was merely corroborative and cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. The Superior Court further held that this testimony “goes to the very heart of the defense’s theory at trial” and faulted the PCRA court for accepting Ms. Tyson’s testimony “with no apparent corroboration.” It is important to remember that there was already testimony introduced at trial that Espada admitted to committing the murder. The defendant then filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

What is The After-Discovered Evidence Prong of the PCRA Statute?

The law on after-discovered evidence has been around for almost two centuries. Pennsylvania courts will allow a defendant to receive a new trial if they present evidence that meets four requirements: 1) the evidence could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; 2) the evidence is not merely corroborative or cumulative; 3) the evidence will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and 4) the evidence would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. This is a conjunctive test and a petitioner must satisfy each of these elements by the preponderance of the evidence standard. Additionally, there are timing issues. For example, a petitioner cannot file a PCRA petition while an appeal is pending, and the petition must be filed within one year of the petitioner's sentence becoming final or within sixty days of the discovery of the evidence if the petitioner is outside of that initial one year window. Further, the petition must still be serving the sentence in order to file a PCRA Petition. As shown by the elements, a petitioner can have an uphill battle in satisfying all four elements. The reason why it can be difficult to succeed on this motion is that the courts have articulated a public policy that seeks to limit continued litigation.

What is Merely Corroborative and Cumulative Evidence?

The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and ruled that the evidence was not necessarily corroborative or cumulative because it may have been evidence of a higher quality than the similar evidence which had been introduced at trial. However, because the trial judge did not specifically find that he or she believed the testimony, the Court remanded the case for a credibility determination.

In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that in its After-Discovered Evidence jurisprudence the Court never precisely defined what is “merely corroborative or cumulative” evidence. Accordingly, the Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. Specifically, the Court analyzed decisions from both New York and Georgia. In those states, the appellate courts analyzed the grade or the character of the evidence that was newly discovered. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found these positions persuasive and adopted them. Specifically, the Court held that “[i]f the new evidence is of a different and ‘higher’ grade or character, though upon the same point, or of the same grade or character on a different point, it is not ‘merely’ corroborative or cumulative, and may support the grant of a new trial based on after-discovered evidence.”

When applying this new rule to the instant case, the Supreme Court held that Ms. Tyson’s testimony, though technically cumulative, was a much higher grade and character, if believed, than what was presented at trial. Ms. Tyson was the mother of Espada’s children and thus her testimony would arguably be much more persuasive than what was presented at trial. Additionally, she would be able to testify about his physical appearance in the immediate after hours of this shooting, which could also be more persuasive than what was presented at trial.

Unfortunately for the defendant, despite this favorable ruling, he is not guaranteed a new trial. As stated above, the PCRA court did not make a clear credibility determination of Ms. Tyson in its opinion, which is necessary to rule on an after-discovered evidence petition. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose not to grant the defendant's petition. Instead, it remanded the case for the PCRA court to make the credibility determination.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today

Zak Goldstein 7/20/18 Zak Goldstein 7/20/18

PA Supreme Court: Participants in a Multi-Person Fight Are Not Automatically in a Conspiracy Together

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Explains Conspiracy and Accomplice Liability and Reverses an Aggravated Assault Conviction

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

We previously wrote about the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Chambers. There, the Superior Court found that mace could constitute a deadly weapon where the use of the mace rendered the complainant vulnerable to and unable to defend himself from additional assaults from other people. This week, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction in Chambers, finding that the Commonwealth failed to prove either the existence of a conspiracy or accomplice liability beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court reversed the defendant’s convictions for Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”).

The Facts of Chambers

In Chambers, the defendant was charged with Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and related charges as a result of his participation in a street fight into which additional persons entered. The incident began when the complainant drove to an apartment complex in Philadelphia. Once the complainant arrived, he saw Chambers standing next to a Jeep which was blocking entrance to the driveway. The complainant beeped at the Jeep and asked Chambers and the Jeep’s occupants why they were blocking the driveway. He asked them to move. When they did not answer, the complainant continued to yell at them. Chambers did not say anything, but he gave the complainant a nasty look.

The complainant eventually drove up on the curb in order to drive by the Jeep and park. As he drove by, some kind of words were exchanged with Chambers. The complainant parked his car, approached Chambers, and asked Chambers why they were blocking the driveway. The verbal argument escalated into a fist fight, with Chambers throwing the first punch. The complainant defended himself. Once the incident became physical, other people jumped in and helped Chambers. A female approached the complainant from behind, tore his glasses from his face, and began scraping and scratching his cheek and forehead. The complainant continued to throw punches to defend himself, but he could not see what was going on. Chambers climbed on his back, pinned him down, and began punching him repeatedly. While Chambers was doing that, a woman sprayed mace in the complainant’s face. The witnesses did not identify any weapons other than the mace as being used during the fight.

Philadelphia Police eventually arrived on the scene and saw Chambers punching the complainant in the face. As the officer arrived, he heard some of the females in the group yelling at Chambers to stop. The officer grabbed Chambers, pulled him off of the complainant, and put him in his handcuffs. The complainant attempted to leave, but the officer grabbed him and also put him in cuffs. Chambers repeatedly yelled that he was going to kill the complainant in front of the officer. The officer observed that the complainant had a large cut on his face, and the complainant told the officer that someone cut him with a knife. The officer, however, searched everyone at the scene and did not find a knife. Additionally, witnesses testified that no one used a knife. There were also defense witnesses who testified that the complainant was much bigger than Chambers and had in fact instigated the fight. This defense witness also testified that he did not see a knife, but he heard Chambers yelling that the complainant had a knife and asking for others to find the knife.

Police transported the complainant to the hospital and decided not to charge him with any crimes. The complainant suffered broken ribs, a burned retina, a concussion, and a laceration above his eye which required stitches. Police decided to charge Chambers with aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, possessing instruments of crime, terroristic threats, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person.

Chambers proceeded by way of bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and the trial judge found him guilty of conspiracy and Aggravated Assault as a felony of the second degree. The trial judge’s decision to grade the Aggravated Assault as a second degree felony ultimately turned out to be critical to the appeal because Aggravated Assault as a second degree felony is very different from first degree felony Aggravated Assault.

F1 Aggravated Assault requires the causation or the attempt to cause serious bodily injury. F2 Aggravated Assault, however, involves causing or attempting to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon. Recognizing that Chambers himself had not used any kind of weapon against the complainant, the Commonwealth argued that Chambers had at a minimum attempted to cause serious bodily injury. The trial court found that Chambers did not cause serious bodily injury but had instead cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon under a theory of conspiracy liability because of the female who entered the fight and sprayed the complainant with mace. Thus, in the initial appeal, the Superior Court upheld the decision of the trial court, finding that the mace could be a deadly weapon under the right circumstances.

The Supreme Court Appeal

Following the Superior Court’s decision, Chambers appealed again to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not have to hear every appeal and instead chooses the cases which it wishes to review. In this case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed to review the case. This time, Chambers’s defense attorneys argued that the Superior Court erred in finding that he was on the hook for the F2 Aggravated Assault of the unknown female with the mace because Chambers had not used a deadly weapon himself and had not instructed or encouraged anyone else to join the fight or use a weapon.

The Supreme Court agreed. It recognized that because Chambers had not used the mace himself, the convictions could only be sustained if Chambers had engaged in a conspiracy to commit Aggravated Assault or had acted as an accomplice.

What is a Criminal Conspiracy?

First, the Court rejected the idea that Chambers had acted as part of a conspiracy to assault the complainant. Conspiracy is defined by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as follows:

(a) Definition of conspiracy. - A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a).

Thus, in order to prove a conspiracy, the Commonwealth must show an agreement to commit a crime, shared criminal intent between the conspiracy members, and an overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Once the Commonwealth proves these three things, a defendant may be convicted of both conspiracy as a separate crime and the underlying offense or offenses that the conspirators planned to commit.

The difficulty for the Commonwealth in proving conspiracy is that unless it has obtained the testimony of a cooperating witness or has engaged in a wiretap, it is difficult to prove the existence of a prior agreement. This is particularly true when a fight breaks out and a bunch of people jump into the fight. The mere fact that people help each other during a fight, even when those people know each other or are friends, does not mean that they made a prior agreement to commit a crime. Of course, even a quick signal to start a fight such as a nod to the other person could be evidence of a conspiracy. But here, there was no evidence of that. Chambers exchanged words with the complainant and then engaged in a one on one fight. There was simply no evidence whatsoever that Chambers encouraged other people to jump in or use mace. Accordingly, the Court found that the Commonwealth failed to prove a conspiracy and therefore any liability for the underlying offenses beyond the Simple Assault, REAP, and Terroristic Threats that Chambers committed himself.

What is Accomplice Liability?

Second, the Supreme Court also rejected the Superior Court’s reasoning that Chambers acted as an accomplice. Pennsylvania law provides the following definition for accomplice liability:

(c) Accomplice defined.—A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he:

(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or

(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or

(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

(d) Culpability of accomplice.—When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 306.

The Supreme Court rejected the accomplice liability for two reasons. First, the Commonwealth had never before suggested that Chambers acted as an accomplice. It did not allege that he was an accomplice in the Bills of Information which it submitted prior to trial, and it never argued at trial that Chambers was an accomplice of the woman with the mace. Second, there was simply no evidence in the record whatsoever that Chambers had encouraged anyone else to do anything. He did not tell anyone else to join the fight and he did not ask anyone to use mace on the complainant. He did not even make any non-verbal signals towards the others who joined the fight. He simply had not done anything to solicit another person to commit a crime, and he had not aided or agreed or attempted to aid a person in committing a crime. Although he did hold the complainant down, the Court viewed it as clear that he held the complainant down for the purposes of punching the complainant himself. He did not hold the complainant down so that other people could mace him.

This is an excellent case because conspiracy is one of the most over-charged offenses in Pennsylvania. In virtually every case in which more than one defendant is charged with a crime, the Commonwealth will tack on a conspiracy charge even when there is little or no evidence that the defendants agreed in advance to commit a crime. This is particularly true in cases involving fights among large groups of people. It is a fundamental to criminal law that people should be responsible for their own actions and not the actions of others. Thus, a person should not be on the hook for someone else’s decision to jump into a fight and use a weapon if that first person had nothing to do with that decision and was engaged in a “fair” one on one fight.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Zak Goldstein 7/17/18 Zak Goldstein 7/17/18

When is Simple Assault a misdemeanor of the third degree in Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Hodges, holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving at sentencing that a “mutual combat” Simple Assault should be graded as a misdemeanor of the third degree instead of a misdemeanor of the second degree. This is an important decision because it makes it easier for the Commonwealth to obtain the conviction for the higher-graded Simple Assault, and that charge cannot be expunged or sealed.

What is the gradation of Simple Assault in PA?

Under Pennsylvania law, there are two types of Simple Assault. The most common variety of Simple Assault is a misdemeanor of the second degree. It simply involves knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury to another person. For example, punching someone in the face one time is usually going to be a Simple Assault unless very severe injuries occur. A misdemeanor of the second degree is punishable by up to two years in prison and a $5,000 fine. Simple Assault (M2) also cannot be expunged or sealed pursuant to a limited access order. Therefore, a conviction for Simple Assault as an M2 will stay on your record for life unless you obtain a pardon from the Governor.

Alternatively, Simply Assault can also be a misdemeanor of the third degree. The statute provides that when the Simple Assault was part of a mutual combat, then the court should instead grade Simple Assault as an M3. An M3 is punishable by up to one year in prison and a $2,000 fine. More importantly, Simple Assault (M3) is subject to Pennsylvania’s new limited access order law. This means that if you are convicted of Simple Assault (M3), you may petition the court to seal the conviction after ten years if you remain arrest-free during that period. Although this is not quite the same as an expungement, it drastically reduces the likelihood that potential employers are going to find out about the prior conviction. Law enforcement agencies and state licensing authorities will still have access to it, but the general public will not. Additionally, it is not possible to receive a state prison system for an M3, whereas an M2 could result in a state prison sentence because of the potential two year maximum.

Who has to prove whether the Simple Assault is an M3 or an M2?

The issue in Hodges is whether the Commonwealth or the defendant bears the burden of proving the degree of the Simple Assault. In Hodges, the defendant was convicted of Simple Assault by a jury. He appealed, arguing in the Superior Court that the trial court gave him an illegal sentence when it sentenced him on Simple Assault as a misdemeanor of the second degree because the Commonwealth never proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he had not engaged in a fight by mutual consent.

The Superior Court rejected this argument. It found that the issue of whether the charge should be graded as an M2 or an M3 is a sentencing issue which must be determined by the trial judge. Where the factfinder concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed a Simple Assault, the default gradation is the misdemeanor of the second degree. However, the defendant may then introduce additional evidence or make argument at sentencing that the judge should reduce the gradation of the charge to the third-degree misdemeanor based on the mutual consent section. In Hodges, the defendant never made that argument at sentencing, and therefore, the claim was waived. Had the defendant made this argument at sentencing, it is possible that the court would have reduced the gradation of the charge. Unfortunately, his defense attorney did not.

Notably, the VUFA 6106 gun charge statute which prohibits carrying a concealed firearm without a license has a similar gradation scheme. By default, a violation of VUFA 6106 is a felony of the third degree. However, the appellate courts have held in prior cases that the defendant may ask the court to find that a VUFA 6106 conviction should be graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree if the defendant can show that he or she was otherwise eligible to obtain a concealed carry permit and was not facing any other charges at the same time. Thus, the Superior Court has held that it is the defendant's burden in these types of cases to show that the defendant is eligible for a reduction in gradation. It is extremely important that defense counsel be aware of this burden as it may be too late to make the argument on appeal as it was for Hodges.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges in PA or NJ, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in assault cases and against all types of criminal charges. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/24/18 Zak Goldstein 6/24/18

SCOTUS: Defendant May Waive Double Jeopardy by Moving to Sever Felon in Possession of Firearm Charge

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Currier v. Virginia, holding that a defendant may waive double jeopardy protections by consenting to the severance of criminal charges and moving for separate trials on different charges. Specifically, the defendant may waive his or her double jeopardy rights by moving to sever a felon in possession of a firearm charge from the other charges in a criminal case.

The Facts of Currier v. Virginia

In Currier, prosecutors charged the defendant with burglary, grand larceny, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Virginia. Coincidentally, the defendant was not eligible to possess a gun because he had prior convictions for burglary and grand larceny. Because the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, prosecutors would have been allowed to introduce his prior convictions for burglary and grand larceny in his trial as the existence of those prior convictions is an element of the statute. This would have been detrimental to his case because the jury would have heard both that he had prior convictions in general and that he had prior convictions for the exact same thing with which he was charged.

Accordingly, the defendant and the Government agreed to sever the charges and hold two separate trials. As discussed in the Court’s opinion, there is no universal way to handle this issue and each jurisdiction is different. In Virginia, a defendant can have two trials: one for the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and a second trial for the other charges. In this case, Petitioner elected to have two trials. This is not the normal procedure in Philadelphia. In Philadelphia, the prosecutors will ordinarily proceed against the defendant on the non-felon in possession charges first. If the prosecution obtains a conviction on all of the charges other than the felon in possession charge, then the defense will typically allow the trial judge to make the decision on the remaining gun charge. If the jury acquits on all of the other charges, then the prosecution will usually move to nolle prosse the remaining gun charge. In some cases, the prosecution does still insist that the jury hear the felon in possession case after it has ruled on the other charges. However, Philadelphia does not typically conduct two separate trials in these types of cases.

The first trial, for the charges of grand larceny and burglary, went very well for the defendant. He was acquitted of both charges. When he appeared for his second trial, his defense attorneys moved to dismiss the gun charge. They argued that it would violate his constitutional right against Double Jeopardy. In the alternative, he asked that the prosecution not be allowed to introduce any evidence pertaining to the grand larceny and burglary charges because he was acquitted of those charges. The trial court denied the defense's request, and the jury found him guilty of the gun charge. The court sentenced him to a lengthy period of incarceration. He appealed through the Virginia state appellate system, and both the Virginia Court of Appeals and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his double jeopardy motion. He appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed to hear the case.

What is Double Jeopardy?

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits a defendant from being tried twice for the same crime after he or she has been acquitted or convicted of the crime. These situations can become more complicated than one would expect, but a simple example of double jeopardy is this: Imagine a defendant is charged with robbing a bank. The defendant goes to trial, and the jury acquits him of robbing the bank. The same jurisdiction cannot then re-try him again for robbing the bank, even if prosecutors later uncover more evidence that would have likely led to a different verdict.

It is important to note that under the federal constitution and subsequent case law, this protection only applies to the particular jurisdiction that tried the defendant. In other words, just because a defendant is acquitted of a crime at the federal level does not mean that the state government cannot prosecute for the crime too. However, the rules governing this depend on the jurisdiction. Pennsylvania offers much broader Double Jeopardy protections in comparison to other states. Thus, if a defendant is acquitted in federal court, Pennsylvania prosecutors cannot then bring charges. The reverse, however, is not true - if a defendant is acquitted in Pennsylvania court, the federal government can still bring charges. Click here to learn more about double jeopardy in general.

The Double Jeopardy Clause also has a collateral estoppel component to it. What this means is that the government cannot re-litigate a fact that was decided in a defendant’s favor. To give a basic example of this, let’s assume that a defendant punched a person in the face and took their phone. This is technically a robbery, but it is also a simple assault. Let’s also assume that at trial, the government chooses only to proceed on the robbery charge and the defendant is found not guilty. The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the government from re-arresting the defendant for simple assault because he was already found not guilty of an essential fact of the case (i.e. punching the complainant) in the robbery trial.

This idea of collateral estoppel, as discussed in Currier, is not a universally accepted idea by legal jurists and remains controversial. However, as the justices noted in their opinion, collateral estoppel was not the issue in this case, though it is a little confusing (as discussed below). The issue in Currier, according to the justices, was whether a defendant can waive his Double Jeopardy protections by seeking a severance of the charges filed against him.

The Court Holds that a Defendant Can Waive His Double Jeopardy Protections When He Agrees to Severance of the Charges

In Currier, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may waive his Double Jeopardy protections when he elects to have two trials. In making its decision, the Court looked at its prior decisions that addressed the issue. In its research, the Court concluded that when a defendant elects to have two trials, he is no longer entitled to Double Jeopardy protections. The Court stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to protect against government oppression, not from the consequences of a defendant’s voluntary choice.

The defendant, of course, argued that he had no real choice. If he had not elected to sever his cases, than the jury would have heard that he had prior convictions for the same offenses, and he would not have received a fair trial. However, the Supreme Court noted that though he was entitled to have separate trials under Virginia law, it was not a constitutional right to have separate trials. Thus, he was not forced to give up one constitutional right to secure another. Additionally, the Court held that because the defendant consented to the severance of the cases, the prosecution could still introduce evidence relating to the charges for which he had already been acquitted.

This decision will likely prove confusing and frustrating for criminal defendants because even though the defendant was found not guilty of the burglary and the grand larceny charges, the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence for those crimes in his second trial. The Court made clear that its decision was based on the text of the Fifth Amendment and therefore held that the Double Jeopardy Clause only prohibits re-litigating offenses, not issues or evidence. Consequently, the Court held that the normal rules of evidence apply and thus a trial court must decide whether to allow the introduction of evidence and facts from the prior trial.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Defense Attorneys Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

If you are facing criminal charges in state or federal court, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of criminal cases in trial and appellate courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. If you are under investigation or have been arrested, we offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session free of charge. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.