Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 11/18/22 Zak Goldstein 11/18/22

PA Superior Court: Juvenile May Not Be Prosecuted for Corruption of Minors

Zak Goldstein Criminal Lawyer — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court has decided the case of In re: J.C., holding that a juvenile court does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate a juvenile defendant delinquent for the offense of corruption of minors. The corruption of minors statute plainly applies only to someone who is over 18 years of age, and so a juvenile defendant may not be charged in juvenile court with a violation of this statute.

The facts of In re: J.C.

A police officer in Monroe County obtained an arrest warrant for J.C., alleging that J.C. had sexually assaulted a female classmate while the two were riding on a school bus. The school district deleted surveillance video of the incident during a software update, but the complainant reported the incident to school officials. The officials then questioned J.C., and J.C. admitted that he had done it. The Commonwealth then charged him in juvenile court with aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and open lewdness.

J.C. filed a motion to suppress the statement, arguing that school officials were required to give him Miranda warnings before questioning him. J.C. also moved to dismiss the case due to the school district’s destruction of the video evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and J.C. eventually entered into an admission (juvenile guilty plea) to the charge of corruption of minors. The court accepted the admission, and the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosse the remaining charges. The court adjudicated J.C. delinquent. J.C. filed timely post-dispositional motions. The court denied the motions, and J.C. appealed. On appeal, J.C. argued both that the court should have granted his motions and that certain portions of his sentence were unconstitutional or illegal.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

J.C. did not actually argue that the admission was illegal because corruption of minors could not apply to him, a minor. The Superior Court, however, has the authority to review cases for jurisdiction sua sponte, and in this case, the Court, on its own, recognized that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept the admission.

Corruption of minors is defined as follows:

(1) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor in violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i)

The Court recognized that the statute, by its plain language, seeks to prevent prohibited actions between minors and individuals 18 years or older, otherwise defined as an adult. Here, J.C. was clearly not an adult – he was a minor at the time of the incident. Therefore, he could not be prosecuted for corruption of minors because the statute applies only to someone who is older than 18. There were other offenses he could have been prosecuted for, as he originally was, but it was illegal for the court to accept an admission to a charge which does not apply to juveniles. The court lost jurisdiction when the Commonwealth withdrew the properly filed charges and charged J.C. only with a charge that applies to adults.

Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the disposition and remanded the case back to the juvenile court for further proceedings. It did not rule on whether the Commonwealth could reinstate the original charges. This ruling benefits J.C. in that it vacates his adjudication, but ultimately, it could make things worse for him as the Commonwealth may seek to proceed on the original, more serious sex offenses. Nonetheless, it is clear that a juvenile court may not hear a prosecution against a juvenile defendant for corruption of minors as that statute applies only to adults.

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Zak Goldstein 5/19/22 Zak Goldstein 5/19/22

PA Superior Court: Internet Search for Criminal Defense Lawyer May Not Be Used Against You at Trial

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lang, holding that the trial court properly granted the defendant a new trial where the previous judge, who had been removed from the bench, allowed the Commonwealth to admit evidence that the defendant searched for a criminal defense attorney online before he was charged with any crimes. The result here seems obvious based on the constitutional right to a lawyer in both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, but somehow the original judge had allowed this internet search into evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lang

The defendant, a priest, allegedly sexually abused the complainant when he was a minor at a church in Munhall, Pennsylvania. Specifically, the complainant alleged that the defendant took a naked picture of him and threatened to show the complainant’s friends this picture. The defendant also forced the complainant to masturbate him. The complainant did not report the abuse until 17 years after the alleged abuse occurred. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with attempted aggravated indecent assault, three counts of indecent assault, indecent exposure, corruption of minors, sexual abuse of children, and unlawful contact with a minor.

The defendant elected to proceed by way of a bench trial. At the trial, the Commonwealth called the complainant to the stand, and he testified to the above allegations. Additionally, the Commonwealth also admitted into evidence a Pennsylvania Attorney General report that disclosed the results of an investigation into clergy abuse in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This report named several priests who were accused of misconduct, but the defendant was not one of them. However, the Commonwealth also introduced evidence of the defendant’s internet searches where he was searching for “top Pittsburgh criminal attorneys” one day after the release of this report. The defendant also testified at his trial. He specifically denied ever sexually abusing the complainant and claimed he did not even know him. The trial court was not persuaded by the defendant’s testimony and found him guilty of one count of unlawful contact with a minor, indecent exposure, corruption of minors, and three counts of indecent assault.

After his trial, but before his sentencing, the defendant’s case was assigned to a new judge. The defendant was sentenced to a term of 9 months’ to 2 years’ incarceration, followed by 5 years’ probation. The defendant filed a timely post-sentence motion arguing that he was entitled to a new trial based on the erroneous admission of his internet searches under the theory of consciousness of guilt. The post-trial court found that the defendant’s constitutional right to due process was violated by the introduction of the internet search evidence “being presented and being material to the outcome of the case” and that the prejudicial impact of that evidence “outweighed any probative value.” The post-trial then granted the defendant a new trial. The Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the post-trial court’s order granting the defendant a new trial. The issue before the Superior Court was whether a prosecutor could use a defendant’s search of an attorney in its criminal case against said defendant. Prior to this decision, Pennsylvania Appellate courts had never addressed this issue, and this was an issue of first impression. In making its decision, the Superior Court reviewed prior decisions that were tangentially related to this issue in Pennsylvania and in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the Superior Court analyzed cases where the prosecutor made comments about a defendant’s acquisition of counsel prior to being charged with a crime. In its analysis, the Superior Court found that that appellate courts would overturn convictions when prosecutors would make comments about a defendant’s acquisition of counsel prior to being arrested.

The Superior Court found these decisions persuasive and held that when a prosecutor comments on a defendant’s search for an attorney before charges are filed, the commentary implicates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As such, the Superior Court held that the post-trial court properly determined the admission of the defendant’s internet searches for criminal defense attorneys, before he was charged or implicated in any offenses, violated his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial. Further, the introduction of this evidence was not harmless and was prejudicial to the defendant. As such, the defendant will get a new trial and the Commonwealth will not be able to use his internet searches for an attorney in its case against him.

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Zak Goldstein 5/12/22 Zak Goldstein 5/12/22

New Trial Ordered by PA Superior Court for Client Convicted of Sexual Assault

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a new trial for a client who had been convicted of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. In the case of Commonwealth v. G.W., the defendant was convicted following a jury trial on charges of allegedly molesting a girlfriend’s young daughter. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a state prison sentence of thirty - sixty years’ incarceration. This would have been a life sentence for G.W.

Attorney Goldstein represented G.W. on appeal and was able to successfully convince the Pennsylvania Superior Court to overturn the conviction. At trial, the complainant had made a number of inconsistent statements about the details relating to the allegations - each time she was interviewed by the authorities, she had told markedly different stories about the illegal acts involved, where they allegedly took place, whether other people were home, and whether she had told anyone. It was also very clear that there were significant reasons for her to potentially fabricate the story. The jury, however, convicted in part due to highly improper testimony from one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses.

As a general rule, when a juvenile complainant makes an allegation that they have been the victim of some kind of crime in Philadelphia, the complainant is typically interviewed by forensic interviewers at the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance. The interviewers have some level of training on interviewing children regarding sensitive allegations, and the videos are recorded so that they can be reviewed by law enforcement and potentially used at trial. In this case, the Commonwealth called a supervisor from the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance to testify regarding the process that that agency uses for investigating these types of cases and conducting the interviews. The supervisor then confirmed that the complainant had undergone an interview and that the agency had recorded it. The Commonwealth then played the video-taped interview for the jury.

On cross-examination, the criminal defense attorney questioned the supervisor on whether the complainant had made a number of inconsistent statements both during the interview as well as to police officers and other witnesses. The supervisor confirmed that she had. On re-direct, without qualifying the supervisor as an expert witness, the Commonwealth then asked the supervisor if it was normal for children to have trouble giving consistent statements. Obviously taking the prosecutor’s hint, the supervisor immediately testified that this type of thing happens all of the time, that children have trouble remembering such traumatic events, and that as they become more comfortable, the stories often evolve. In other words, the supervisor suggested that the jurors should not concern themselves with the fact that the statements had changed repeatedly because such a thing is normal and perfectly consistently with a child complainant who is telling the truth.

Fortunately, the trial attorney objected to this improper expert testimony. The PCA supervisor had not been qualified as an expert witness to testify about the typical responses of alleged sexual assault victims, and the defense had not been provided with any notice that the Commonwealth would try to offer this type of testimony to explain away the wildly inconsistent statements which the complainant had made. The trial judge allowed the introduction of the testimony over the defense’s objection. Having been re-assured that it did not need to worry about the inconsistent statements, the jury convicted.

G.W. appealed. Attorney Goldstein argued to the Superior Court that the improper admission of this unqualified expert testimony had unfairly prejudiced the jurors against G.W. and that G.W. should receive a new trial. This testimony was not supported by any research, the supervisors qualifications were not provided to the defense, and the defense had not been given any notice that it would need to prepare to try to rebut this type of testimony. Had the defense been given notice, it could have considered retaining its own experts, doing additional research, and the defense could have prepared to cross examine the supervisor to show that this type of conclusion is not reliable. The Superior Court agreed. The Court recognized that testimony regarding the typical response of a sexual assault victim is clearly expert testimony and that such testimony is not necessarily admissible. Even in cases where this type of testimony may be admissible, the defense is entitled to notice and expert reports so that the defense can properly prepare for trial instead of being ambushed with unfair, unproven expert testimony. Accordingly, the Superior Court ordered that G.W. receive a new trial. The thirty to sixty year sentence has been vacated as a result of Attorney Goldstein’s successful arguments on appeal.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won new trials on appeal and in PCRA litigation for clients charged with crimes as serious as sexual assault and first degree murder. Pennsylvania criminal appeals are a complicated and highly technical area of the law, and just because a lawyer has defended clients at trial does not mean that they have the level of expertise and knowledge necessary to making winning arguments in the appellate courts. Our lawyers have that critical skill and experience. We offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/30/22 Zak Goldstein 4/30/22

PA Superior Court: Defendants Should Generally Be Allowed to Withdraw Guilty Pleas Before Sentencing

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Garcia, holding that sufficient evidence was presented to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. This decision is significant in multiple ways. First, the Court re-committed to the general rule that a defendant should usually be allowed to withdraw a pre-sentence guilty plea. Second, it also illustrates the importance of creating a thorough record at these types of hearings. In its opinion, the Superior Court highlighted the lack of details in the trial record, but the Court found that the defendant had presented enough evidence to have his guilty plea withdrawn. At the same time, it found the Commonwealth had done a poor job of showing why it would be substantially prejudiced if the defendant’s guilty plea was withdrawn. Because the prosecution did not make an adequate record, there was not enough evidentiary support to deny the defendant’s appeal.

Commonwealth v. Garcia

Easton police were called for a report of a sexual assault in progress. Upon arrival, they met with the complainant, who stated that her ex-boyfriend, the defendant, had climbed the exterior of her apartment building onto her deck and entered the residence through a sliding glass patio door without her consent. Once inside, he proceeded to force her to engage in sexual intercourse without her consent. She also had an active protection from abuse order against the defendant.

The police located the defendant, who was hiding in the bushes outside of her apartment building. The complainant was then taken to the hospital where she underwent a sexual assault examination kit that was sent to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab to be analyzed. The defendant’s DNA came back as being seminal material found on the complainant’s vaginal swab. They also found the defendant’s DNA under the complainant’s fingernails because she had told the police she tried to defend herself while the assault was going on.

Before a trial date was even set, the Commonwealth and the defendant negotiated a guilty plea where the defendant would serve four to eight years’ incarceration followed by two years of reporting probation for the crime of sexual assault. The defendant then entered into the plea, but his sentencing was deferred to determine whether he qualified as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”). Prior to his sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea in which he asserted his innocence. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant offered only a bare and implausible assertion of innocence given his incriminating statements shortly after the assault. The Commonwealth also argued prejudice, citing the difficulty the victim experienced in testifying at the preliminary hearing, her relief at learning of the defendant’s guilty plea, her anxiety at learning that the defendant wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, and the difficulty of finding another sexual assault expert because their expert had conducted the defendant’s SVP evaluation and therefore could no longer testify at trial. The Commonwealth claimed that were no other “local” experts.

The court held a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. At the hearing, the defense moved the preliminary hearing transcript into evidence. The defendant argued that the transcript suggested that he had a viable consent defense. Specifically, he argued that transcript made clear that the he had a previous relationship with the complainant and that she had allowed him inside her residence a week before the alleged assault. The defendant did not testify at this hearing. At the conclusion of arguments, the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant then filed a second pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. This second pre-sentence motion was denied without a hearing. The defendant was subsequently sentenced, and he then filed a timely appeal.

Can a Defendant Withdraw a Guilty Plea Before He is Sentenced?

Yes, a defendant is permitted to withdraw a guilty plea before he is sentenced. However, there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Trial courts have discretion in determining whether a defendant can withdraw his guilty plea, but such discretion is to be administered liberally in favor of the accused. Additionally, any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. A fair and just reason exists where the defendant makes a claim of innocence that is at least plausible. However, trial courts are also supposed to consider the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with the relationship of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence. Finally, trial courts should also consider any ulterior or illicit motive by the defendant for withdrawing his guilty plea.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded his case back to the trial court so that he could have a trial. The Superior Court reviewed the record in this case, which it described as “poorly developed.” Nonetheless, the Superior Court found that the defendant made a prompt motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that the preliminary hearing notes did in fact establish that the complainant allowed the defendant inside her home a week before the alleged assault and that he had a prior relationship with her. According to the Superior Court, these facts established “more than the bare ‘makeweight’ assertion of innocence.”

Additionally, there was no strong evidence presented at the sentencing hearing to undermine the plausibility of the defendant’s consent defense. Further, this guilty plea was not entered on the eve of trial as no trial date had been set. Additionally, the Superior Court was unpersuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that it would be substantially prejudiced by the withdrawal of the defendant’s guilty plea. In part, because the Commonwealth did not develop the record sufficiently enough to show how it would be prejudiced. As such, the Superior Court found that the defendant proffered a timely and plausible basis for withdrawing his guilty plea and therefore he will be able to go to trial on these charges.