PA Supreme Court Agrees Police May Not Search Cell Phone Without Warrant

Zak Goldstein - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney

Warrantless Searches of Cell Phones in Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Fulton, agreeing with the United States Supreme Court that law enforcement officers generally may not search a cell phone incident to a defendant’s arrest without first obtaining a search warrant. The Court further concluded that the introduction of the evidence obtained from the illegal search of the defendant’s phone in this homicide case did not amount to harmless error. Therefore, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial.  

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Fulton

On June 15, 2010, Philadelphia police received a call from Michael Toll reporting that he had been shot. Police responded to the call and found Toll in a vehicle on the sidewalk with gunshot wounds on the right side of his body. Toll told the police that Jeff shot him, and he gave them a description of Jeff. Police took Toll to the hospital and searched the car. They recovered a cell phone, and the cell phone showed that Toll had exchanged phone calls with someone listed in the phone as Jeff. Police determined that the number for Jeff was linked to a prepaid phone with no subscriber information.

Toll eventually died from his wounds. On the morning that he died, police received a call concerning drug activity and a man with a gun at a specific address. Police responded to the call and found several individuals in and around a 2002 green Mercury Marquis. The police saw a gun, a gun holster, and cell phones in the vehicle. They arrested the four men who were nearby. One of those men was Fulton, the defendant in this case. Police took a cell phone from Fulton incident to his arrest and obtained a search warrant for the vehicle but not the phone.

The Search of the Phone

The phones were given to Homicide Detectives who were investigating Toll’s death. The detectives opened the phones, turned them on, and examined them in order to determine the phone number associated with each phone. One of the phones turned out to have the same number as the phone number for Jeff that was in the decedent’s phone. Homicide detectives did not obtain a warrant prior to going through the phones. Further, detectives began answering incoming calls to the phone that had been linked to Jeff.

One person called and eventually told detectives that the phone number belonged to Fulton and that she regularly purchased heroin from him. Armed with this information, detectives interrogated Fulton, and Fulton promptly incriminated himself in the shooting. Police obtained a search warrant for Fulton’s residence and found ammunition which was the same as that used in the fatal shooting. Police also interviewed some of the other men who they had arrested along with Fulton and obtained statements from them which implicated Fulton in the murder. Accordingly, police charged Fulton with murder.

The Motion to Suppress

Prior to trial, Fulton moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search and use of the cell phone. The trial court denied the motion, but the trial court made its decision prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California holding that police must obtain a warrant prior to searching a cell phone. Fulton went to trial and was eventually convicted of third-degree murder and sentenced to 15-30 years of incarceration. Fulton appealed to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court denied the appeal.

By the time of the Superior Court’s decision, the United States Supreme Court had held that police may not search a phone without a warrant. The Superior Court recognized that police should have obtained a search warrant for the phone, but it held that the intrusion into the phone was minimal because police did not review personal data or social media located on the phone. Therefore, the Superior Court held that Riley did not apply. It also found that to the extent that the police violated Fulton’s rights, the introduction of the illegal evidence amounted to harmless error which would not justify overturning the third-degree murder conviction.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

Fulton filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately overturned the defendant’s conviction. The Court concluded that there was really no dispute. Riley’s holding could not be clearer: in order to access any information on a cell phone, police must first obtain a warrant. The Supreme Court did not create an exception for what police or courts may deem a minimally invasive search of a cell phone. The Court specifically rejected a case-by-case test for searches of phones. Instead, it held that police simply must get a warrant or they cannot use the results of the search of a cell phone in court. Any search of a cell phone requires a warrant.

The Court concluded that homicide detectives conducted three separate searches of the phone without a warrant. First, they searched the phone by powering it on. Second, they searched the phone by going into it and obtaining its phone number. Third, they searched the phone by monitoring incoming calls and text messages.

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Having concluded that the police violated Fulton’s rights by searching the phone without a warrant, the Court next found that the constitutional violation did not amount to harmless error. The Court ruled that all of the evidence that was found due to the searches of the phone must be suppressed. This included the existence of the woman who identified Fulton as a drug dealer, her statement, and the evidence that the phone number was the same number as that for Jeff. Given the extensive use of this evidence against the defendant at trial and the fact that much of the evidence was contradicted and inconsistent, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the conviction could stand under the harmless error doctrine. Accordingly, the Court vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial for Fulton without the illegally seized evidence. 

Anonymous Tip Cannot Provide Reasonable Suspicion for Police Stop

Can the the police stop someone based on an anonymous 911 call? 

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mackey, once again holding that an anonymous tip of criminal activity, no matter how serious, does not provide police officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop, arrest, or search a suspect. This is true even when the tip is for a person with a gun on a SEPTA bus. Although this has long been settled law, trial courts routinely attempt to disregard this rule in cases involving guns and drugs.

Commonwealth v. Mackey

In Mackey, Philadelphia Police Officers received an anonymous radio call for a person with a gun on a specific SEPTA bus. The radio call further described the person as “a black male wearing a white T-shirt and a flowered hat.” The officer who received the tip responded immediately, stopped the bus, and boarded the bus. Upon boarding the bus, which contained 50 to 60 passengers, the officer saw the defendant on the bus wearing a pink and green flowered hat and a shirt that was white on the back and black on the front. The officer testified that the hat was extremely distinctive in that it was a bucket hat patterned with pink and green flowers.

As soon as the officer saw the defendant and realized that the defendant matched the description from the anonymous radio call, the officer pulled his gun, pointed it at the defendant, and ordered him to raise his hands. The defendant sat up straight while the other passengers ducked for cover. The officer then handcuffed the defendant and removed him from the bus. He testified that as the defendant was being escorted from the bus, he waddled in a strange way, suggesting that he might have been walking that way to keep a gun from falling out of his loose-fitting pants. Once they were off the bus, the officer frisked the defendant and found a gun. He arrested the defendant and charged him with various gun charges.

Motion to Suppress the Firearm

The defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that under well-established case law, the police did not have the right to stop him and frisk him based on a totally anonymous radio call. At the evidentiary hearing for the motion to suppress, the officer was unable to provide any additional information about the radio call relating to who called it in. The officer also could not provide any specific reason for why he believed the call to be trustworthy prior to stopping and searching the defendant.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth and the court relied on the fact that the tip contained a great deal of detail and that the defendant waddled in a strange way while exiting the bus. The Commonwealth also stressed that the defendant sat up very straight while everyone else on the bus ducked for cover. The court denied the motion, found the defendant guilty following a bench trial, and sentenced him to 2 to 5 years in state prison followed by three years of probation.   

Mackey's Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court

The defendant immediately appealed, and on appeal, the Superior Court reversed the conviction and the denial of the motion to suppress. The Superior Court heavily emphasized the difficulty in these cases. On one hand, police are fully expected to respond to a 911 call for a person with a gun, and the failure to do so could have disastrous consequences. At the same time, an anonymous radio call simply provides the police with no way to determine whether the call is genuine and reliable. If such a call provides the police with the basis for stopping and searching a suspect, then there are few protections for anyone as the police would be able to stop a person based on a prank phone call or even where another police officer has anonymously called 911 in order to provide the basis for the stop.

The Superior Court recognized that a long line of cases, including Commonwealth v. Jackson and Commonwealth v. Hawkins, have repeatedly held that the police may not conduct a stop based on anonymous information. The Commonwealth has repeatedly asked the courts to find a public safety or firearms exception to the warrant requirement in these cases because of the risk created by firearms, and the courts have unanimously rejected such an exception as unconstitutional. This case was no different. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. Finally, the Court found that the defendant was immediately seized when the officer entered the bus and pointed a gun at him. Because the officer only found the gun and noticed the waddling after stopping the bus, boarding it, and pointing a gun at the defendant, the waddling and strange behavior could not be used to provide reasonable suspicion because it happened after the illegal seizure. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, vacated the firearms convictions, and remanded the case for a new trial without the suppressed guns.    

Cases like Mackey are extremely important because they protect citizens from unconstitutional police searches even in cases involving charges as serious as illegal gun possession charges. They also prevent Pennsylvania citizens from being harassed and searched based on unreliable or even knowingly false information by requiring the police to show some evidence of reliability in the information before acting on it. At the same time, the officer’s hands were not totally tied. The officer likely would have been justified in getting on the bus and asking Mackey if he could ask him a few questions. If Mackey then acted nervously, walked strangely, or the officer observed a gun shaped bulge, the officer then may have been able to conduct the frisk lawfully. Instead, the officer immediately pointed a gun at the defendant without any basis for believing the tip, and this is particularly problematic given the fact that it is legal to carry a gun with a permit in Pennsylvania.

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PA Supreme Court: Police May Not Search Car Parked in Driveway Without Warrant

Can The Police Search My Car Without A Warrant If It's In My Driveway?

Criminal Defense Attorney Demetra Mehta, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Loughnane, holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to a car parked in a residential driveway. This decision provides a commonsense limitation on the ability of the police to search private property in Pennsylvania and follows a recent trend of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seeking to increase privacy protections for the Commonwealth's citizens. 

Commonwealth v. Loughnane

In Loughnane, the defendant was charged with accidents involving death or serious injury. On July 24, 2012, a large dark-colored truck struck and killed the victim while she was outside of her apartment that she shared with her boyfriend in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Her boyfriend witnessed the accident. When the boyfriend reported the accident to the police, he told them that the truck which hit the decedent was a large, dark-colored truck that had a distinctive sound.  

A few weeks later, the boyfriend's father drove through a residential neighborhood and saw a truck that matched the description provided by his son parked in a residential driveway. He called his son, and his son came to this residence and identified the truck as the one he saw on July 24. The boyfriend then called the police. Later that day, police detectives went to the house, ran the truck's license plate, and determined that the truck belonged to the defendant. Detectives then unsuccessfully attempted to contact the defendant.  

After failing to reach the defendant, police sought guidance from the local prosecutors. Apparently, at some point during the investigation, the lead detective learned that the keys to the truck were inside the automobile. Believing that it was about to rain and potential forensic evidence could be lost, the police decided to take action without obtaining a search warrant. They towed the truck to the Wilkes-Barre police garage. Four days later, they obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. The search did not result in the discovery of any evidence. However, they brought the boyfriend back to the police station to make a second identification of the truck. They also turned the truck on and revved the engine, and the boyfriend confirmed that the engine sounded the same as the engine on the truck that hit the decedent. 

The defendant was arrested and charged with Accidents involving death or serious bodily injury (hit and run). The defense filed pre-trial Motions to Suppress. At the Motion to Suppress hearing, the defendant's defense lawyer successfully moved to suppress the boyfriend's police station identification of the vehicle. The suppression court granted the motion because the truck was taken from the defendant's private property and there were no exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless taking of the truck. The Commonwealth then filed an interlocutory appeal. The Superior Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered that the Commonwealth be allowed to use the results of the warrantless seizure. In its opinion, the Superior Court inexplicably ruled that a private driveway does not provide any reasonable expectation of privacy becasue it is not part of the curtilage of a home. This ruling was contradicted by dozens of cases in Pennsylvania, the federal courts, and other states.  Therefore, the defendant then asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review the Superior Court's decision, and the Supreme Court agreed. 

Limits to the Automobile Exception

On appeal, the defendant asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to decide whether the automobile exception applies to automobiles parked in driveways of private residences. The defendant argued that the automobile exception does not apply to vehicles in private residential driveways. As a preliminary matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court corrected the Superior Court and held that a driveway is constitutionally protected curtilage. This was crucial because in order to have a valid constitutional claim, one must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the person, place, or thing that the government searched or seized.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then addressed whether the automobile exception applies to cars parked in a residential driveway. In making its determination, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed federal and other state cases that addressed the automobile exception.

In its analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlighted the fact that in cases that upheld the automobile exception, a deciding factor was that the automobile was in a public space. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s justification for the automobile exception (the inherent mobility of motor vehicles and that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle as compared to an individual’s home or office).

However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not end its analysis there. It also reviewed federal circuit court and other states’ decisions that found the automobile exception inapplicable. In those cases, the courts consistently held that the automobile exception did not apply when the car was parked in a residential driveway. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to say that “[because] none of the justifications for the automobile exception apply to vehicles parked in a residential driveway, there is no reason for the exception to apply.” Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the rationale of these courts and held that the automobile exception does not apply to automobiles that are parked in residential driveways. If the Commonwealth searches or seizes an individual’s car without a warrant, the limited automobile exception applies and there must be both probable cause and exigent circumstances.   

Motions to Suppress

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Trials can be won and lost with a motion to suppress. If you are facing criminal charges, you need a defense attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to defend your case. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

PA Courts Adopt Public Servant Exception to Warrant Requirement

The Public Servant Exception to the Warrant Requirement

Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. - Criminal Defense Attorney

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Livingstone, holding that although Pennsylvania has a community caretaker and public safety exception to the warrant requirement, police officers must be able to provide specific and articulable facts for why a person may be in need of assistance prior to conducting an investigative detention. In other words, police officers may stop a person if they believe the person is in distress or that there is an emergency situation, but the police must be able to provide specific reasons for why they believe an emergency situation exists, they may not conduct a stop as a pretext to investigate criminal activity, and the stop may only as intrusive as the circumstances require. 

Commonwealth v. Livingstone

In Livingstone, a Pennsylvania State Trooper in Erie County saw the defendant’s vehicle pulled over on the shoulder of the highway. The engine was running, but the hazard lights were not activated. The Trooper activated his emergency lights, and with his passenger side window down, pulled alongside the stopped vehicle. The Trooper then began to ask the defendant some questions, and he eventually reached the conclusion that she was under the influence of a controlled substance. Accordingly, he arrested the defendant and charged her with DUI.

Motion to Suppress

The defendant subsequently filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that she was stopped without reasonable suspicion or probable cause when the Trooper pulled up next to her and activated his emergency lights. The trial court denied the motion and found that after the Trooper saw the vehicle on the side of the interstate, the Trooper had a duty to determine if the defendant was in need of help. The trial court also found that the Trooper engaged only in a “mere encounter,” meaning he did not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause. With the motion to suppress denied, the court found the defendant guilty of DUI and sentenced her to a period of house arrest.

The defendant appealed. After the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review. On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that the case presented two distinct issues: first, was the defendant seized when the Trooper pulled up next to her with his emergency lights on, and second, if the defendant was seized, was the Trooper justified in stopping her.

The Court found that the first issue was relatively simple; the defendant was seized when a marked State Police vehicle pulled up next to her, rolled the window down, and activated its overhead lights. The Court emphasized both that official driver’s license materials provided by PennDOT instruct motorists that they should not leave when a police officer activates his or her emergency lights and that Pennsylvania law makes it a felony to flee from a police officer after the officer signals for the motorist to stop. Because no reasonable person would feel free to leave when a State Police Trooper activates his or her emergency lights, the defendant was seized when the Trooper pulled up next to her and activated the lights.

Second, the Court found that the Trooper did not have the legal authority to make the stop because the Trooper lacked sufficient information to determine that the defendant was in need of assistance. Once a court determines that police have seized someone for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the prosecution generally must show that the police had either reasonable suspicion or probable cause depending on how extensive the stop was. In order to support a Terry stop (“an investigate detention”), the police must have reasonable suspicion. In order to arrest someone, the police must have probable cause to make an arrest.

Here, the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of the stop because he had no indication that criminal activity was afoot or that a crime had occurred solely from the fact that the defendant had pulled over. However, the Court recognized a “community caretaking doctrine” or public safety exception. The community caretaking doctrine applies in three circumstances. First, there is an emergency aid exception. Second, there is an automobile impoundment/inventory exception, and third, there is a public safety exception. For any of these exceptions to apply, the officer must be acting out of a motivation to render aid or assistance rather than an attempt to investigate criminal activity.

The Public Safety Exception (Public Servant Exception)

Prior to this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never specifically addressed the public safety exception. The Court recognized that the police do not exist solely to investigate and prevent criminal activity. Instead, they are also charged with ensuring the safety and welfare of the Commonwealth’s citizens. At the same time, the Fourth Amendment requires that police officers not conduct warrantless searches without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Therefore, the Court sought to employ a test for when police can conduct a seizure of this nature that would both allow the police to help members of the public and protect the privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

Can The Police Conduct A Stop If They Think Someone Needs Help? 

The Court held that in order for the public servant exception (public safety exception) to apply, the Commonwealth must be able to satisfy three requirements. First, police officers must be able to point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance. Further, the Court found that the Trooper in this case could not do so because there were too many reasons why the defendant could have pulled over on the side of the road. The Court noted that the defendant could have needed to look at a map, answer or make a telephone call, send a text message, change an address in a navigation system, clean up a spill, or retrieve something from her purse or the glove compartment. Pulling over to the side of the road to do these types of things should be encouraged.

Second, in order for the exception to apply, the police caretaking action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence. This does not mean that an officer must completely ignore the nature of his or her role in law enforcement, but it does mean that the courts must meticulously consider the facts and carefully apply the exception in a manner that mitigates the risk of abuse and ensures that police do not use the exception as a pretext for obtaining evidence without a warrant.

Third, the level of the intrusion must be commensurate with the perceived need for assistance. This requires the suppression court to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the seizure, including but not necessarily limited to, the degree of authority or force displayed, the lengthy of the seizure, and the availability of alternative means of assistance.

Here, the Court found that the Trooper did not have any reason to believe that the defendant needed assistance. He had not received a report that a motorist needed help, he did not observe anything that indicated there was a problem with her vehicle, the weather was fine, and the defendant did not have her hazard lights on. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered that the blood test and other evidence seized as a result of the illegal stop be suppressed.

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