Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Superior Court Decides Automatic Gunshot Detector May Contribute to Finding of Reasonable Suspicion
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein
The Pennsylvania Superior Court just announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Raglin, holding that “Shot Spotter” gunshot detection technology coupled with additional factors may provide sufficient reasonable suspicion for police to make a Terry stop. The Superior Court made its decision without any evidence as to whether this Shot Spotter system is reliable or not, including whether a gun was even fired on the day in question. This decision could have significant consequences for individuals who live in urban locations where city officials are more likely to employ this unproven technology.
Commonwealth v. Raglin
On February 27, 2015, a police officer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was working at his desk when he received a notification from Shot Spotter that a gunshot occurred in “zone 5.” Shot Spotter is a system of censors that is supposedly sensitive enough to distinguish between gun shots and fireworks. Additionally, the police claim Shot Spotter is accurate enough to pinpoint the location of the shot within 25 yards, although the Commonwealth did not present any conclusive evidence to this effect at the motions hearing in this case.
After receiving the gunshot detection notification, the operator dispatched multiple police officers to the location. Pittsburgh Police Sergeant Baker was one of the first officers on scene. When he arrived, he observed two black males in the street who were close to the location of the shot. One of these males was the defendant. When these two individuals saw the officer, they both separated and left the area in separate automobiles. Sergeant Baker followed both vehicles for a period of time, but eventually lost track of the vehicle not operated by the defendant. The vehicle operated by the defendant was observed making several turns and eventually pulled over on Thomas Boulevard.
The Superior Court then offers conflicting accounts of what happened next, but supposedly just as Sergeant Baker activated his lights, the defendant got out of his car. Immediately after this, the defendant began to walk towards Sergeant Baker. Sergeant Baker ordered the defendant to place his hands on the trunk where he conducted a pat-down search. Another officer arrived shortly thereafter and noticed a handgun on the center console of the defendant’s vehicle in plain view. Narcotics were also recovered, although it is unclear from where they were recovered. The defendant then admitted that he had an active arrest warrant and a gun and “was trying to get away.” At this point, the defendant was officially placed under arrest.
Prosecutors charged the defendant with various offenses including: Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Knowing and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance, Receiving Stolen Property, and various Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (including persons not to possess a firearm and carrying a firearm without a license), and driving with a suspended license. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun and drugs, arguing that the police lacked the reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessary to stop his vehicle and detain him.
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and subsequently found him guilty of all charges in a waiver trial. The court sentenced the defendant to 4-8 years incarceration, followed by a one year of probation. He appealed to the Superior Court, again arguing that police simply did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary for the stop.
What Is the Difference Between Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause?
As discussed above, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence in his case. Typically, a motion to suppress is a motion that asks a court to exclude evidence against a defendant because it was obtained when police did something illegal such as making a stop without “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion.” Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are similar, but distinct legal concepts. Probable cause is mentioned in both the United States Constitution (the Fourth Amendment) and the Pennsylvania Constitution (Article I, Section 8). In order for the government to arrest you, there must be probable cause that you committed a crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined probable cause as “the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”
Reasonable suspicion is a different and lesser standard. Unlike probable cause, reasonable suspicion is not mentioned in either the U.S. or Pennsylvania constitutions. Despite its absence, courts have allowed police officers and other government officials to stop people on reasonable suspicion after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. Reasonable suspicion is not as rigorous of a standard as probable cause. A person cannot be arrested or have their home searched based on reasonable suspicion. However, police may detain an individual for an investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion as “a less stringent standard than probable cause and depends on the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances.” A police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect that criminality is afoot. The issue in the defendant’s case is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first place.
Does a Shot Spotter Provide Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause?
The defendant’s case is unique in that he did not become a person of interest until the police received a shot-spotter notification that a gun had been fired. When the police first saw the defendant, he was not committing any crimes or visibly carrying a gun. They merely saw him outside and, allegedly, within 25 yards of where a shot had occurred. Pennsylvania law is very clear that being in a high-crime area, does not qualify as reasonable suspicion to stop someone. This obviously makes sense because if this were the law, the police could stop anyone simply because they lived in a bad neighborhood. However, if someone runs from the police in a high crime area, that is often sufficiently suspicious for the police to stop that person.
In the defendant’s case, he was in a high crime area, but he did not run. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that walking away from the police after seeing them in a high crime area is not sufficient for the police to stop a person on the basis of reasonable suspicion. In the defendant’s case, he did leave the area after he saw Sergeant Baker. However, once Sergeant Baker initiated a stop, the defendant complied and proceeded to walk towards Sergeant Baker. The defendant also followed his order by placing his hands on his trunk.
What is most significant about the Superior Court’s opinion is what was not in the record. Specifically, there was nothing in the Superior Court’s decision about how reliable this Shot-Spotter technology is. In fact, the Superior Court wrote in its opinion that it was “not prudent” to consider the reliability of this program. Further, there was nothing on record that the police recovered a bullet casing, despite the Shot-Spotter stating that a gun had just been discharged. The Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence as to whether police even looked for a shell casing or tested the defendant for gunshot residue.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court Finds That the Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion
Despite the above-stated omissions, the Superior Court held that Sergeant Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. The Superior Court provided four reasons why Sergeant Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. First, the Shot Spotter itself provides some level of suspicion even though there was nothing in the record to indicate how accurate the technology is; second, the defendant was close to the area where a shot occurred; third, the defendant’s strange act of jumping out of his vehicle just as Sergeant Baker activated his lights; and finally because this all occurred in a high crime area.
Ultimately, it appears that the Superior Court put a heavy emphasis on the Shot-Spotter technology. In one of their footnotes, they described Shot Spotter as providing “strong evidence that a crime has likely occurred,” yet they stated that they did not find it “prudent” to know how accurate this technology is. It will be interesting to see if the defendant appeals this decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Currently, “Shot-Spotter” is in use in Philadelphia, but that could change, and it is in heavy use in Camden, NJ.
Motions to Suppress
Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys
Criminal cases can be won and lost with a motion to suppress. If you are facing criminal charges, you need an attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to litigate these motions, even when the law has yet to be determined. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.
The Collective Knowledge Doctrine in PA
Commonwealth v. Yong
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yong, holding that an investigating officer’s knowledge of facts sufficient to establish probable cause may be imputed to a second officer who arrests the suspect when the officers are working as a team. This is true even when the arresting officer has no individual knowledge of the facts giving rise to probable cause.
In Yong, Philadelphia Police Officers conducted a narcotics investigation targeting the 2300 block of North Fairhill Street in Philadelphia. Police Officer Joseph McCook (the "eyes" of the operation) and his partner conducted surveillance on September 21, 22nd, and 23rd of 2011. While conducting the surveillance, they observed Yong make a number of exchanges of United States currency for small objects which they believed to be drug transactions in which Yong was the seller. Based on the alleged drug activity observed during the three-day surveillance, Officer McCook obtained a search warrant for a property that was involved in these transactions. The officers returned to execute the search warrant later in the day on the 23rd. The warrant team included Police Officer Gerald Gibson. Officer Gibson had not been present for any of the surveillance and had no knowledge of Yong or Yong’s alleged involvement in any drug sales.
Relying on the search warrant, police entered the house located at 3202 North Fairhill Street. Officer McCook, who had witnessed the alleged drug sales, was towards the rear of the group. When the officers entered the house, Yong was standing in the living room. Officer Gibson, who had never seen Yong before, grabbed Yong, patted him down, and found a .38 caliber revolver in Yong’s waistband. The search of the property also led to the recovery of drug paraphernalia, including new and unused packaging.
Possession with the Intent to Deliver and Gun Charges
The Commonwealth charged Yong with Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Criminal Conspiracy, and various gun charges including firearms not to be carried without a license and persons not to possess a firearm. Yong’s defense attorney moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that Officer McCook’s probable cause could not be imputed to Officer Gibson because Officer Gibson was not part of the prior narcotics surveillances. This was important because Pennsylvania appellate courts have long held that even where officers have a search warrant for a home, the officers need specific probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search the occupants of the home unless the occupants are identified or described in the search warrant. Because Officer Gibson did not know anything about Yong and Yong was not identified as a person to be searched by the search warrant, the defense argued that Officer Gibson had violated Yong’s rights by patting him down without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The defense argument relied on the fact that Officer McCook had not specifically directed Officer Gibson to search or arrest Yong because Pennsylvania courts have also held that an officer who does not have probable cause may conduct a search or make an arrest when specifically directed to do so by an officer who does have probable cause.
The Criminal Appeal
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court found that Officer McCook’s knowledge and probable cause could be imputed to Officer Gibson, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately agreed. The Court recognized the bad incentives that the decision could create for police officers in that it encourages officers who are working together to take a chance and conduct a search or make an arrest and hope that one of the other officers will later turn out to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The Court attempted to limit this incentive and its holding by limiting the application of the decision to the narrow facts of this case.
What is the Collective Knowledge Doctrine?
The Court held that the officer who does not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause may conduct the search or seizure only where that officer is specifically working as part of the same team and is near the officer who made the original observations. The Court rationalized its holding by suggesting that Yong’s arrest was inevitable. Officer McCook had observed Yong engaged in drug sales, so even if Officer Gibson had not arrested Yong, Officer McCook would have arrested Yong once he got into the house and saw him. This is an extension of the existing inevitable discovery doctrine. However, the Court was clear that it is not sufficient for officers to be part of the same police force or to be independently investigating the same criminal conduct. The officers must actually be working together and nearby, and one of the officers must have the requisite level of suspicion. In that limited situation, an officer does not violate a suspect’s rights by conducting a search or arrest. Although this opinion does create bad incentives for police officers to gamble on a potentially illegal search, it is relatively limited as it probably does not represent a substantial expansion of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
Facing Drug or Gun Charges? We Can Help
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers
The Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC will fight for your rights at trial or on appeal. Our attorneys have successfully defended thousands of cases in Philadelphia and the surrounding counties, and we can help with all types of state and federal charges in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a top-rated defense attorney today.
Anonymous Tip Cannot Provide Reasonable Suspicion for Police Stop
Can the the police stop someone based on an anonymous 911 call?
Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mackey, once again holding that an anonymous tip of criminal activity, no matter how serious, does not provide police officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop, arrest, or search a suspect. This is true even when the tip is for a person with a gun on a SEPTA bus. Although this has long been settled law, trial courts routinely attempt to disregard this rule in cases involving guns and drugs.
Commonwealth v. Mackey
In Mackey, Philadelphia Police Officers received an anonymous radio call for a person with a gun on a specific SEPTA bus. The radio call further described the person as “a black male wearing a white T-shirt and a flowered hat.” The officer who received the tip responded immediately, stopped the bus, and boarded the bus. Upon boarding the bus, which contained 50 to 60 passengers, the officer saw the defendant on the bus wearing a pink and green flowered hat and a shirt that was white on the back and black on the front. The officer testified that the hat was extremely distinctive in that it was a bucket hat patterned with pink and green flowers.
As soon as the officer saw the defendant and realized that the defendant matched the description from the anonymous radio call, the officer pulled his gun, pointed it at the defendant, and ordered him to raise his hands. The defendant sat up straight while the other passengers ducked for cover. The officer then handcuffed the defendant and removed him from the bus. He testified that as the defendant was being escorted from the bus, he waddled in a strange way, suggesting that he might have been walking that way to keep a gun from falling out of his loose-fitting pants. Once they were off the bus, the officer frisked the defendant and found a gun. He arrested the defendant and charged him with various gun charges.
Motion to Suppress the Firearm
The defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that under well-established case law, the police did not have the right to stop him and frisk him based on a totally anonymous radio call. At the evidentiary hearing for the motion to suppress, the officer was unable to provide any additional information about the radio call relating to who called it in. The officer also could not provide any specific reason for why he believed the call to be trustworthy prior to stopping and searching the defendant.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth and the court relied on the fact that the tip contained a great deal of detail and that the defendant waddled in a strange way while exiting the bus. The Commonwealth also stressed that the defendant sat up very straight while everyone else on the bus ducked for cover. The court denied the motion, found the defendant guilty following a bench trial, and sentenced him to 2 to 5 years in state prison followed by three years of probation.
Mackey's Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court
The defendant immediately appealed, and on appeal, the Superior Court reversed the conviction and the denial of the motion to suppress. The Superior Court heavily emphasized the difficulty in these cases. On one hand, police are fully expected to respond to a 911 call for a person with a gun, and the failure to do so could have disastrous consequences. At the same time, an anonymous radio call simply provides the police with no way to determine whether the call is genuine and reliable. If such a call provides the police with the basis for stopping and searching a suspect, then there are few protections for anyone as the police would be able to stop a person based on a prank phone call or even where another police officer has anonymously called 911 in order to provide the basis for the stop.
The Superior Court recognized that a long line of cases, including Commonwealth v. Jackson and Commonwealth v. Hawkins, have repeatedly held that the police may not conduct a stop based on anonymous information. The Commonwealth has repeatedly asked the courts to find a public safety or firearms exception to the warrant requirement in these cases because of the risk created by firearms, and the courts have unanimously rejected such an exception as unconstitutional. This case was no different. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. Finally, the Court found that the defendant was immediately seized when the officer entered the bus and pointed a gun at him. Because the officer only found the gun and noticed the waddling after stopping the bus, boarding it, and pointing a gun at the defendant, the waddling and strange behavior could not be used to provide reasonable suspicion because it happened after the illegal seizure. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, vacated the firearms convictions, and remanded the case for a new trial without the suppressed guns.
Cases like Mackey are extremely important because they protect citizens from unconstitutional police searches even in cases involving charges as serious as illegal gun possession charges. They also prevent Pennsylvania citizens from being harassed and searched based on unreliable or even knowingly false information by requiring the police to show some evidence of reliability in the information before acting on it. At the same time, the officer’s hands were not totally tied. The officer likely would have been justified in getting on the bus and asking Mackey if he could ask him a few questions. If Mackey then acted nervously, walked strangely, or the officer observed a gun shaped bulge, the officer then may have been able to conduct the frisk lawfully. Instead, the officer immediately pointed a gun at the defendant without any basis for believing the tip, and this is particularly problematic given the fact that it is legal to carry a gun with a permit in Pennsylvania.
OUR PHILADELPHIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS CAN HELP YOU WITH WEAPONS AND FIREARMS OFFENSES
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
If you are charged with the illegal possession of a gun or other weapons offense, you need an experienced criminal defense attorney to evaluate your case, investigate for potential defenses, and provide you with all of the options. We have won countless cases involving firearms and other weapons offenses at the prelminary hearing, motion to suppress, and trial court levels. Call 267-225-2545 now for a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session.
Speedy Trial Motion Granted in Prescription Fraud Case, Not Guilty Verdict in Domestic Assault Case, and Other Recent Case Results
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
Our Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys have continued to obtain successful results in the courtroom. In the last two months, our defense attorneys have obtained acquittals and dismissals at trial and in preliminary hearings in criminal cases and successfully defended Protection from Abuse (PFA) Petitions. Some of our notable recent results include:
Commonwealth v. T.T. – Speedy Trial Motion Granted in Prescription Fraud Case Due to Delay in Arresting Defendant.
The client was arrested and charged with Forgery, Identity Theft, Possession With the Intent to Deliver, and related charges for allegedly forging Oxycodone and Percocet prescriptions and attempting to have them filled at local pharmacies. The magistrate judge initially set bail at $100,000, and the client’s family immediately hired Goldstein Mehta LLC. Attorney Goldstein moved for a bail reduction at the first listing of the preliminary hearing, and the Municipal Court judge promptly reduced bail to $25,000. Attorney Goldstein then renewed the bail motion in the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Common Pleas reduced bail even further, allowing the client to be released for a bail payment of $670.
Attorney Goldstein then defended the client at the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, an Agent for the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office testified that she had obtained records indicating that the defendant had attempted to fill forged prescriptions in various names on multiple occasions. However, the Agent had not actually viewed the defendant filling any prescriptions herself. Accordingly, the Municipal Court Judge held the case under advisement to determine whether the agent had sufficient personal knowledge of the allegations or whether the case should be dismissed because the Commonwealth’s entire case at the preliminary hearing was hearsay.
In addition to moving to dismiss the case due to the excessive hearsay, Attorney Goldstein also moved to dismiss the case for a violation of the client’s right to a speedy trial under Rule 600. Rule 600 requires that the Commonwealth bring a defendant to trial within 365 days from the filing of the criminal complaint. However, Rule 600 has a number of exceptions and is often not strictly enforced in cases where the Commonwealth can show that it was not the prosecution’s fault that trial was delayed. Here, the Agents conducted their investigation and filed the criminal complaint in 2014. When they first filed the complaint, they attempted to arrest the defendant, but he was not home. The police then failed to exercise due diligence in trying to find the defendant and bring him to trial, and he was not actually arrested until 2017. Accordingly, Attorney Goldstein moved to dismiss the case due to this pre-arrest delay. When police fail to arrest a defendant within 365 days from the filing of the Complaint, Rule 600 and the case of Commonwealth v. Webb require that the case be dismissed unless the Commonwealth can show that the police executed due diligence in trying to find the defendant and execute the arrest warrant. Here, there was no evidence that the police had diligently attempted to serve the warrant. Therefore, the Municipal Court judge dismissed the case with prejudice at the preliminary hearing for the speedy trial violation, meaning the Commonwealth cannot re-file the charges.
Commonwealth v. A.W. - Motion for Reconsideration of Probation Violation Sentence Granted
The client was found in technical violation of probation for theft and drug possession while represented by a different attorney. The probation judge sentenced A.W. to 11.5 - 23 months in custody. A.W. retained Goldstein Mehta LLC, and our attorneys immediately filed a motion to reconsider the sentence within ten days as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. The client's back judge scheduled a hearing on the Motion to Reconsider, and prior to the hearing, we were able to work with the client's family to locate a drug treatment faciity which she could attend if released. Once our attorneys presented the probation judge with the treatment option, the judge reconsidered the sentence and granted immediate parole to treatment. Our defense attorneys were able to help the client avoid a lengthy jail sentence.
PFA Litigation – Protection from Abuse Petition Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
Attorney Goldstein successfully moved to have a protection from abuse Petition dismissed at trial for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff alleged that she had had a sexual relationship with the defendant and that the defendant subsequently threatened her at a party. The PFA Act allows a plaintiff who claims that they were the victim of abuse to obtain an emergency ex parte protection from abuse order which prohibits the defendant from having any contact with the plaintiff. This order can be extremely problematic for a defendant as it can damage the defendant’s reputation, require the defendant to relinquish legally owned firearms, and can even require the defendant to be evicted from a shared residence. Although the initial order may be granted on an emergency basis without a hearing, the defendant has the right to a trial on whether the allegations are true and a final order is necessary. At the trial, the plaintiff must show that the PFA Court has jurisdiction, that abuse occurred, and that a restraining order is necessary to prevent abuse from occurring.
Here, Attorney Goldstein was able to have the Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although the initial Petition alleged that the defendant and plaintiff had a consensual relationship, the defendant testified on cross-examination that the relationship had not been consensual. Knowing that the Superior Court has repeatedly held that PFA jurisdiction only exists in cases involving domestic partners, meaning household members, family members, and people in consensual, dating relationships, Attorney Goldstein immediately moved for dismissal of the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Family Court judge agreed and dismissed the Petition, thereby vacating the restraining order.
Commonwealth v. R.B. – Client was charged with various gun charges, including Violation of the Uniform Firearms Act Sec. 6106, 6108, and 6105. Our criminal defense lawyers successfully moved for the case to be dismissed after the Commonwealth was repeatedly not ready to proceed for the preliminary hearing.
Commonwealth v. R.T. – Unsworn Falsification Case Dismissed at Municipal Court Trial
The client was charged with Unsworn Falsification to Authorities for allegedly lying to police about being robbed in order to cover up a drug deal gone wrong. The police alleged that the defendant had not been robbed and had instead made up a story about being robbed at gunpoint in order to try to get money back which was stolen in a drug deal. The client retained Attorney Goldstein, who promptly requested all of the discovery in the case, including documents from Cherry Hill. The Commonwealth never successfully obtained the police reports from the other jurisdiction for two trial listings, so Attorney Goldstein moved to dismiss the charges. The Philadelphia Municipal Court judge dismissed the case for lack of prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Z.B. – Detainer Lifted and Client Sentenced to Time Served on Section 17 Detainer.
The client had previously pleaded no contest as part of a Section 17 pre-trial diversionary program to knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance in Montgomery County. After getting arrested again for the same charge in a different jurisdiction, the probation officer took the client into custody and lodged a probation detainer. The client retained Goldstein Mehta LLC, and our defense attorneys immediately filed a Motion to Lift the Detainer, arguing that Section 17 probation does not give the sentencing judge the authority to lodge a probation detainer. Instead, the judge must schedule a hearing and either continue the probation or impose a judgment of sentence. In this case, the judge had not scheduled the probation violation hearing for months. After receiving the motion and recognizing that the law was unsettled as to whether Section 17 probation gives the authority to lodge a probation detainer, the judge moved the probation violation hearing up by two months. The client then stipulated to the probation violation in exchange for a sentence of roughly time served and was released shortly thereafter. By filing a creative motion on the client’s behalf, our defense lawyers were able to save the client months in jail.
Commonwealth v. J.B. – Probation Detainer Lifted, Full Acquittal Obtained in Domestic Assault Case
The client was charged with Simple Assault, Terroristic Threats, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, and other related charges in the Philadelphia Municipal Court for allegedly assaulting his girlfriend. The client was on probation for similar charges, so the probation officer took the client into custody and lodged a probation detainer. If the client had done nothing, he would have had to stay in jail until the new case was resolved. Fortunately, the client retained Goldstein Mehta LLC, and our defense lawyers promptly filed a Motion to Lift the Probation Detainer with the client’s back judge. By putting together a thorough mitigation packet showing the defendant’s exemplary work record, successful compliance with probation other than the new charges, and extensive family and community support, our lawyers were able to have the client’s probation detainer lifted so that he could fight the case from out of jail.
We were then able to obtain a full acquittal for the client at trial. By cross-examining the complaining witness on the inconsistencies between her testimony at trial and the statement she had given to police and showing that she had a motive to fabricate the allegations, our attorneys were able to convince the Municipal Court judge that the complainant should not be believed. This was particularly true in light of the complainant’s lack of visible injuries and the fantastical nature of her allegations. Accordingly, our defense attorneys successfully had the client’s probation detainer lifted and obtained a full acquittal at trial.
Commonwealth v. V.F. – Possession with the Intent to Deliver Charges Dismissed at Preliminary Hearing
V.F. was charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver and Possession of a Small Amount of Marijuana. Philadelphia narcotics officers alleged that they observed the client receive money from another person in exchange for small objects, which is the typical testimony that officers provide to describe what they believe to be a drug transaction. When officers stopped the man who handed the money to the defendant, the man had marijuana in his possession. Officers then arrested the defendant and found money, but they did not find any matching marijuana. Attorney Goldstein argued that the felony PWID charge should be dismissed because there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had sold the marijuana. Instead, police simply could not say what the defendant had allegedly given to the man who had marijuana on him. Accordingly, the preliminary hearing judge dismissed the felony charge and remanded the case for a trial on the misdemeanor marijuana charge.
Commonwealth v. T.C. – PWID Charges Withdrawn at Trial after Seizure Analysis Showed Marijuana Fake.
AWARD-WINNING PHILADELPHIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients at the trial level on appeal. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to anyone who is under investigation or facing criminal charges. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.