Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Supreme Court: Once Emergency Ends, Police Must Leave Private Residence or Get a Warrant
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Wilmer, holding that if the police enter a residence to respond to an emergency, once the emergency ends, the police are no longer permitted to remain in one’s house absent a warrant or the existence of some other exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Commonwealth v. Wilmer
On October 27, 2013, while on foot patrol in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State Troopers observed a number of people on the roof of a sorority house. One of these people appeared to be visibly intoxicated and unsteadily stumbling around on the roof. The troopers feared that this individual would fall off of the roof and injure himself, and so they approached the sorority and requested permission to enter. However, their request was denied. One of the troopers then attempted to kick the door open, but the kick failed. The people inside laughed at the trooper’s inability to kick the door open.
The same trooper then kicked through a window that was next to the door and then reached in and unlocked the door. While inside, the troopers called EMS and campus police to the scene. Unfortunately, the troopers’ efforts were for naught, and the individual they were attempting to save fell off of the roof. The troopers then began to leave the house. As the troopers exited the house, one of the troopers saw a bag of marijuana and a marijuana grinder on a coffee table, which he seized and took to his patrol vehicle. No one present at the sorority house claimed ownership of either the marijuana or the grinder.
This same trooper then re-entered the sorority house without a warrant. He claimed that his purpose for re-entering the house was to get information about the broken window and an air conditioning unit that was damaged by the troopers during this incident. The trooper knocked on a closed bedroom door. The trooper then spoke to the occupants of the room, which contained the defendant. The defendant raised her hand when the trooper asked if any of the occupants of the room lived in the house. The trooper then observed a glass marijuana bong and a pipe sitting in plain view next to her. The defendant admitted that the items belonged to her, and she was subsequently charged with one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.
The Motion to Suppress
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, challenging the legality of the troopers’ initial entry and their subsequent re-entry into the home after the man fell off fo the roof. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The judge ruled that there were exigent circumstances that justified the entry, i.e. the intoxicated individual standing on the roof, and that the trooper’s re-entry “was justified by the exigent circumstances that gave rise to the original entry.” The defendant was found guilty and ordered to pay court costs and a $50 fine.
The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court held that the initial entry was lawful given that the troopers were attempting to aid someone in danger. In regards to the one trooper’s re-entry, the Superior Court held that “when police are properly authorized to enter a dwelling under the exigent circumstances doctrine, they are also authorized to return to complete the necessary paperwork required by the emergency situation that allowed them to enter the building in the first place.” The defendant then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Court accepted the case.
What is the Community Caretaking Exception to the Fourth Amendment?
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ”
Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable subject only to specified exceptions. Over the years, the Supreme Court has created a number of specific exceptions that allow the police to search and seize one’s property without a warrant. One of these exceptions is the community caretaking exception. There are three exceptions that embody the “community caretaking exception.” These include: the public servant exception, the automotive impound/inventory exception, and the emergency aid exception. The emergency aid exception was the exception at issue in this case.
The emergency aid exception allows the police to enter one’s property or conduct some warrantless search to assist a person that the officer reasonably believes is in jeopardy. It is important to remember that just because an officer’s initial intrusion may be justified under the emergency aid exception, or for that matter any exception, it does not follow that the police are given unlimited and unfettered access to the property.
In Mincey v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. However, the Court noted, that the “warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Other legal scholars have addressed this issue. Professor Wayne LaFave addressed this issue in his treatise on search and seizure law. He wrote that a police officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance to provide that assistance. Further, he wrote, that once it is determined that the suspicion which led to the entry is without substance, the officers must depart rather than explore the premises further.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the troopers’ re-entry was not justified under the emergency aid exception. The Court opined that the troopers’ initial entry into the residence was permissible to assist the visibly intoxicated young man stumbling around on the roof. However, once he fell, the troopers’ authority for a warrantless entry in the house ceased, and thus the troopers were required to leave the premises immediately. Further, the Court expressly rejected the Superior Court’s reasoning that the troopers’ re-entry into the home to obtain information to complete police paperwork was part of “one continuous episode” which permitted the re-entry without a warrant. Consequently, because the trooper did not observe the glass marijuana bong and the pipe in the house from a lawful vantage point, the suppression court erred in denying the defendant’s motion. The Court vacated the defendant’s sentence, and she will receive a new trial.
Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.
Criminal Defense Attorneys Demetra Mehta and Zak Goldstein
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Unnecessary 23-minute Extension of Traffic Stop Requires Suppression of Gun and Marijuana
Zak Goldstein - Criminal Lawyer
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has decided the case of United States v. Clark, holding that police violated Clark’s rights by questioning him and the driver of the car he was in for 23 minutes about subjects unrelated to the initial purpose of a traffic stop. The Third Circuit held that the trial court properly granted Clark’s motion to suppress a gun and marijuana found in the car because police impermissibly extended the stop for longer than was necessary to investigate the motor vehicle code violations that led to the stop.
The Facts of Clark
Clark is an excellent example of how police body camera footage dramatically changes the analysis of routine police searches and seizures. In Clark, police in New Jersey stopped a minivan because the driver was using his cell phone while driving, did not have his headlights on, and had an obstructed view. The police asked to see the paperwork for the vehicle. The driver handed over his license and insurance card, but he could not find the van’s registration. He said the van belonged to his mother, and he offered to call his mother and ask her if she knew where to find the registration. The officer told the driver that the stop was for the three traffic violations and asked whether his license was suspended. The driver said it was not. The officer then asked if the van belonged to the driver’s mother, and the driver confirmed that it did.
After speaking with the driver, the officer returned to his police car to run the paperwork. He confirmed that the driver’s license was valid, that the driver had a criminal record for drug charges, there were no outstanding arrest warrants for the driver, and the car was registered to a woman with the same last name and address as the driver. The officer then went back to the van and asked the driver about his criminal record. He asked whether the driver had been arrested, for what he had been arrested, and when was the last time he had been arrested. The driver confirmed he had been arrested for drug charges, most recently in 2006. The officer continued questioning the driver as to such things as where he was coming from, whether he and any warrants, and again how many times he had been arrested.
After questioning the driver for a few minutes, mostly about his criminal record, the officer asked the driver to step out of the vehicle. The driver did so, and the officer then began asking him about Clark, the passenger. After asking a few questions about Clark, the officer walked over to the passenger’s side of the van and asked similar questions of Clark. The officer then returned to the driver and accused him of lying. He then said he smelled marijuana coming from the passenger’s side and asked Clark to get out of the car. Clark complied. The officers told him to turn around for a pat-down, and Clark then told the officers that he had a gun. The officers searched Clark and recovered a gun and a small amount of marijuana.
Body camera footage showed that police had questioned the two men for about 23 minutes. Had the footage not been recorded, officers likely would have been able to describe the questioning as a “brief encounter,” and Clark would have had much more difficulty establishing what happened that led to the search.
The Motion to Suppress
After police arrested Clark, the United States Attorney’s Office adopted the case. A federal grand jury indicted Clark for possession of a weapon as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the gun and the marijuana, arguing that police had impermissibly prolonged the stop beyond its original purpose without the necessary reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The District Court granted the motion to suppress, finding that police had no real basis for extensively questioning the driver about his criminal history and that the officer had no reasonable suspicion to investigate other criminal matters beyond the traffic violations.
The Federal Appeal
After the District Court granted the motion to suppress, the United States appealed to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision on appeal. The Court noted that even when a stop may be lawful at its inception, as the parties agreed in this case, a stop may become illegal as it progresses. In Rodriguez v. United States, the United States Supreme Court recently held that an initially-valid traffic stop may become unlawful when it lasts longer than is necessary for police to complete the mission of the stop. The authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the mission are or reasonably should have been completed. In order to prolong a stop beyond that point, a police officer must have acquired additional reasonable suspicion or probable cause during the investigation to justify additional investigation and a lengthening of the stop.
When police pull a suspect over for a traffic stop, the mission of the stop is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and address related safety concerns. This could include deciding whether to issue a ticket, checking the driver’s license and for any outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the vehicle’s registration and insurance. These tasks are all part of ensuring roadway safety. Police may also take steps that are reasonably related to officer safety. However, not all investigation during a traffic stop qualifies as part of the traffic stop’s mission. For example, extensive questioning of the occupants of a vehicle, as occurred here, requires independent reasonable suspicion beyond the observation of a motor vehicle code violation.
Here, the extensive questioning of the driver regarding his criminal record and where he was coming from had nothing to do with the purpose of the stop. The questions were entirely unrelated to whether he had a driver’s license, insurance, and registration, and they had nothing to do with whether he was lawfully in possession of the car. The driver was cooperative with the officers, he provided proof of insurance and a valid driver’s license, he did not have any outstanding arrest warrants, and the police were able to confirm that the car belonged to the driver’s mother. Accordingly, the police had no basis for believing that the driver should not have been driving the car. Once police confirmed that all of the paperwork for the car was valid, they were required to either issue a ticket or let the car go. They had no authority to then turn to Clark, the passenger, and question him. By doing so, they unconstitutionally extended the length of the stop. Therefore, the District Court properly granted the motion to suppress the gun and the marijuana. This is a great case for individual privacy rights as the Third Circuit has now held that even a relatively short 23-minute stop can violate a defendant’s rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.
Facing criminal charges? We can help.
If you are facing criminal charges or are under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
Full Acquittal: Attorney Goldstein Wins Not Guilty Verdict in Attempted Murder/Carjacking Case
Criminal Defense Attorneys Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta
The Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys of Goldstein Mehta LLC have continued to find success on behalf of their clients in the courtroom, winning jury trials and motions to suppress in serious cases. Outside of the courtroom, we are also a source of insightful legal analysis on criminal defense issues in the news. Recently, our defense attorneys have won criminal cases involving charges ranging from Attempted Murder to DUI and Possession with the Intent to Deliver. Some of our recent wins include:
Commonwealth v. R. R. – Jury Acquits Client of Attempted Murder, Carjacking, and Related Charges
R.R. was charged with Attempted Murder, Robbery of a Motor Vehicle (carjacking), Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Conspiracy, and related gun charges. Prosecutors alleged that R.R. and a friend robbed the complainant after a drug deal, taking his cell phone, car keys, and a small amount of money. R.R. then shot the complainant twice when the complainant tried to demand that R.R. return the car keys. The complainant, however, initially denied to police at the scene that he knew who shot him. He was then briefly interviewed by detectives at the hospital, and he again reiterated that he did not know the person who shot him.
A few days later, after police allegedly received an anonymous tip that R.R. was the shooter in this incident, Philadelphia detectives re-interviewed the complainant. This time, he told them that R.R., a long-time friend, was the person who shot him and stole his car. A second witness also allegedly came forward a few days later and claimed to have been smoking marijuana with the complainant just before the shooting and that she was still present at the scene when R.R. shot the complainant. She called 911 right at the time of the shooting, but when police arrived at the scene, she refused to give a statement. She also did not claim that R.R. was involved in the shooting for a week or two. When she did finally give a statement, she said that she saw R.R. in the area right before the shooting, but she did not see the shooting itself. At trial, of course, she changed her story and testified that she personally saw R.R. shoot the complainant. In addition to the witness statements, police obtained cell phone records that showed that R.R. and the complainant had exchanged a number of text messages and phone calls directly before the shooting. Police also recovered the complainant’s car a few days later and held it for fingerprints and DNA .
Based on these later statements of the complainant and the eyewitness in which they claimed that R.R. was the shooter, police arrested R.R. and charged him with Attempted Murder and related charges. R.R. rejected the Commonwealth’s plea offer and decided to proceed by way of a jury trial. At trial, Attorney Goldstein was able to successfully argue to the jury that the witnesses had fabricated their statements. Attorney Goldstein highlighted the fact that the complainant gave two separate statements right after the shooting in which he did not tell police that R.R. shot him. He also impeached the eyewitness on the fact that she did not come forward for weeks and was on probation for theft at the time that she made the statement. He also confronted her with her original statement in which she never said that she actually saw the shooting itself. Finally, Attorney Goldstein called the police department’s own DNA analyst as a witness to testify that the steering wheel and gear shift of the complainant’s car had been tested for DNA and they had been unable to match the DNA to R.R.
In closing, Attorney Goldstein argued that the Commonwealth had simply failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The DNA did not match R.R., there was no other physical evidence linking him to the crime, and both the complainant and eyewitness had failed to either implicate R.R. or come forward after the shooting. Both have given multiple contradictory statements, and even the assigned detective had given testimony that was impeached through his own police reports. The jury deliberated for approximately two hours before acquitting R.R. of all charges. R.R., who had been held pending the trial, was released from custody.
Commonwealth v. A.R. – Motion to Suppress Granted in DUI Case
Police arrested and charged A.R. with driving under the influence of marijuana and Xanax. The arresting officer claimed that he saw A.R. driving through Philadelphia with a defective center brake light, which is a violation of the motor vehicle code. Based on the defective brake light, the officer activated his lights and sirens and attempted to pull A.R. over. The officer claimed that A.R. refused to pull over for numerous blocks and seemed like he was trying to flee from the officer. Further, after A.R. did eventually pull over, the officer approached the car and immediately noticed the strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. The officer further testified that A.R. had slurred speech, slow movements, was uncooperative, and admitted to smoking marijuana.
On paper, the case looked very difficult. Fortunately, A.R. retained Attorney Goldstein. Attorney Goldstein litigated a motion to suppress the statement regarding smoking marijuana and the blood test which showed the presence of marijuana and Xanax in A.R.’s blood. At the hearing on the motion, the officer testified that A.R. refused to pull over and immediately blurted out that he had been smoking weed, but the officer’s report directly contradicted his testimony. In his report, the officer specified the exact location at which he claimed he initially saw A.R. operating the car with the broken brake light and the location at which A.R. eventually pulled over. Although the officer testified that A.R. attempted to flee when the officer activated his lights and sirens, Attorney Goldstein was able to use a map of the area to show that in reality, A.R. had pulled over within two or three blocks at most of first coming into contact with the police officer. Given that A.R. actually pulled over within two or three blocks, the testimony that A.R. refused to pull over simply did not make any sense.
Further, the officer eventually admitted that he had not even waited for A.R. to roll down the window but had instead immediately opened the car door himself. Attorney Goldstein argued at the motion to suppress hearing that the Philadelphia Municipal Court judge should reject the officer’s testimony as not credible because of the obvious contradiction provided by the map and find that the officer engaged in an illegal search of the car when he opened the car door himself without giving A.R. the opportunity to roll the window down. Attorney Goldstein also called the police officer who conducted the blood draw at the police station an hour or two after the arrest to testify that he had not recorded any observations of intoxication or odor of marijuana on the report that this second officer created when he came into contact with A.R.
The Municipal Court judge agreed with Attorney Goldstein and granted the motion to suppress. Without the critical blood evidence and incriminating statement, prosecutors had no choice but to withdraw all charges.
Commonwealth v. K.H. – Judge Acquits Client of Drug Charges Following Bench Trial
Police charged K.H. with Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Knowing and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance, Conspiracy, and Possessing an Instrument of Crime. Prosecutors alleged that K.H. and another man sold drugs in Kensington. Philadelphia narcotics officers claimed that they set up surveillance from a vehicle parked down the block and began watching as the alleged buyers approached. The officer claimed that the buyers would each hand money to K.H.’s co-defendant, who was standing on the sidewalk, and then K.H., who was standing in an alley, would hand small items consistent with narcotics packaging to the alleged buyers. As the alleged buyers exited the block, back up officers would arrive and take them into custody. Police successfully stopped four of the five alleged buyers and found that they had drugs on them. Concluding that K.H. and the co-defendant must have been selling drugs, police then moved in to search the alley, the abandoned house nearby, and to arrest the defendants.
Police arrested K.H. and found that he had $40 on him. They arrested the co-defendant, who tried to run. They also found drugs which matched those found on the alleged buyers in the alley, and they found a shotgun in a nearby abandoned house which the surveillance officer claimed that he had seen K.H. briefly enter and exit. K.H. was arrested after walking in and out of a different house on the corner of the block. Officers claimed that they entered and searched both the abandoned house and the house which K.H. had walked out of right before being arrested.
K.H. immediately retained Goldstein Mehta LLC for his defense. At the preliminary hearing, recognizing that the case would become significantly less serious if K.H. were not facing gun charges, our criminal defense attorneys focused on getting the Possessing Instrument of Crime charge which stemmed from the discovery of the shotgun in the abandoned house dismissed. Attorney Goldstein extensively cross-examined the police witnesses on whether they had ever seen K.H. in possession of the gun, whether the gun was out in the open in the abandoned house, and whether police had attempted to obtain fingerprints or DNA from the shotgun. Because the shotgun was hidden, police never saw K.H. in possession of it, and police had not bothered to conduct any forensic testing on the gun, Attorney Goldstein was successfully able to move for the dismissal of the gun charge. Attorney Goldstein also cross-examined the main police officer on the location from which he was supposedly watching the drug sales, which would become extremely important at trial.
K.H. then elected to proceed to a bench trial in which the trial judge, instead of a jury, makes the decision as to guilt. At the bench trial, the narcotics officers testified to roughly the same story that they had provided at the preliminary hearing. They claimed that K.H. provided small objects, which later turned out to be drugs, to five alleged buyers. They also claimed that they were successfully able to stop and arrest four of those five buyers and recover the drugs which K.H. had allegedly sold.
On cross-examination, however, Attorney Goldstein was able to use photographs of the crime scene to establish that the officer would not have been able to see into the alley to see who was actually making the drug sales from the location in which he said he was parked at the preliminary hearing. Attorney Goldstein also successfully established that the officer had searched the corner property on the street without a search warrant. Although the officer tried to claim that he could legally search the property without a warrant because the property was abandoned, Attorney Goldstein used photographs of the house and K.H.’s lease for the property to show that the property was not abandoned and police had entered the house without a warrant. Finally, Attorney Goldstein introduced character evidence which showed the judge that K.H. had never been arrested before and had an excellent reputation in the community for being a peaceful, law-abiding citizen. After recognizing that K.H. had no prior record, had not been found in actual possession of any drugs, and that the abandoned house was not actually abandoned, the trial judge found that she had reasonable doubt as to whether K.H. was actually the person in the alley. The judge found K.H. Not Guilty of all charges despite the fact that police claimed to have seen him selling drugs to five separate people.
Attorney Goldstein Quoted in Philly.com Articles on Indecent Assault and Impact of #MeToo Movement on Criminal Defense Strategies
In addition to winning cases in the courtroom, our attorneys are often asked for analysis of criminal defense issues by the media. For example, Attorney Goldstein was recently quoted in two separate articles in the Philadelphia Inquirer.
In one article, Attorney Goldstein was asked to provide insight on how attorneys are responding to the #MeToo Movement in sexual assault cases. You can read the article here.
In the other article, Attorney Goldstein was asked to comment on the potential charges a person could face for groping a stranger in public and whether the victim would face charges if he or she responded by punching the groper. You can read the article here.
Facing criminal charges? We can help.
If you are under investigation or facing criminal charges in Pennsylvania or New Jersey, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients in state and federal courts throughout PA and NJ. We are experienced and understanding defense attorneys with the skill and ability to help you with your case, and we are not afraid to take a case to trial. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a criminal defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court: Violation of Philadelphia Police Directives Does Not Require Suppression of Drugs
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. McCleary, holding that suppression of the evidence is not required when Philadelphia Police Officers violate their own police department’s directives. In McCleary, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that drugs recovered by the police officers may be admissible at trial even though police did not follow department protocol related to obtaining consent to a search of a private home.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. McCleary
In McCleary, Philadelphia police officers responded to a radio call for a burglary in progress at a certain address. When they arrived at that address, they walked into the eventual-defendant’s house through an open door. In the living room, they found the defendant speaking with two other police officers. The arriving officers relieved the two who had already arrived and tried to figure out what was going on.
The defendant told the police officers that a woman who was present on the scene had tried to break into his home and that he had a valid Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order against her. The woman responded that she lived there, had the right to be present in the home, and that she had belongings in the second-floor bedroom which would prove that she lived there. The officers did not take any steps to verify if the defendant in fact had a valid PFA.
Instead, the officers asked the defendant if they could see if the woman had belongings in the second-floor bedroom. The defendant twice told them that they could. The officers then walked upstairs to the bedroom. In the bedroom, they found in plain view a scale, a sandwich bag with marijuana, a box of unused drug packaging, eleven bags of crack cocaine, and clear plastic Ziploc bags. The defendant told the officers that the drugs belonged to him. The officers arrested him and charged him with Possession with the Intent to Deliver.
Motion to Suppress the Drugs
The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress his statements and the drugs. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress and ultimately granted the motion to suppress. The trial judge found that police violated with Philadelphia Police Department Directive 5.7, Sections 12 through 16, which address the procedure by which Philadelphia Police Officers are expected to obtain valid consent to search a home. The court found that the officers violated their own police directives by failing to obtain signed consent, failing to inform the defendant of his right to refuse consent, failing to consult with a supervisor, and failing to verify the defendant’s valid PFA and arrest the woman who was alleged violating it. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and ruled that the evidence would be inadmissible at trial, thereby essentially excluding the Commonwealth’s entire case.
The Commonwealth’s Appeal
The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court. In the appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Philadelphia Police Directives do not have the force of law. The Commonwealth argued that because police are not required by law or the constitution to follow them, the remedy for a violation of the directives should not be suppression of the evidence.
The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth’s arguments. It found that exclusion of the evidence via a successful Motion to Suppress is only required where the Government has violated a person’s right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure as provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Exclusion is not automatically warranted simply because the police failed to comply with a Rule of Criminal Procedure or the police department’s directives or regulations. Instead, suppression is only required when the police violate the constitution or certain statutes.
When can police search a home without a warrant?
The Superior Court held that the question was not whether police violated their directives; instead, the question which the trial court should have addressed was whether the police obtained constitutionally valid consent to search the property. Although law enforcement officers must ordinary obtain a search warrant prior to searching a home, there are some exceptions to this rule. One of the main exceptions to the warrant requirement is consent. If you tell the police that they can search your house, then they do not have to get a warrant prior to doing so.
How will a court decide if police voluntarily obtained consent to search a home?
In evaluating consent, previous appellate decisions have suggested that courts consider the following factors:
the presence or absence of police excesses;
whether there was physical contact;
whether police directed the citizen’s movements;
police demeanor and manner of expression;
the location and time of the interdiction;
the content of the questions and statements
the existence and character of the initial investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness;
the degree to which the transition between the traffic stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can be viewed as seamless, thus suggesting to a citizen that his movements may remain subject to police restraint; and
whether there was an express admonition to the effect that the citizen-subject is free to depart, which is a potent, objective factor.
Here, the Court evaluated the factors and found that there was nothing coercive about the police request to see the rest of the home. Certainly, they should have followed their directives, but their failure to do so did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that the drugs may be admissible in the prosecution for Possession with the Intent to Deliver.
Notably, one of the three judges on this panel dissented, arguing that the trial court had in fact found that the police officers simply were not credible on the issue of whether they truly obtained consent. The trial court simply considered the violation of the directives as part of analyzing whether the police were telling the truth. This is important because once the defense files a motion to suppress in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth must produce sufficient evidence to show that it is more likely than not that the police complied with the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions during the search and/or interrogation. If the trial judge finds that the police are not credible, then the judge may grant the motion to suppress for that reason even if what the police claim they did was legal. Thus, on remand, the defense may still argue that the judge found that the police were not credible and that the judge should clarify his or her opinion. However, it is clear that as a matter of law, a violation of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Directives does not automatically result in suppression of the evidence.
Facing criminal charges? We can help.
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients at the trial and appellate level in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We know the law and the defenses that will work in your case, and we recognize the types of defenses and arguments that are going to withstand appellate scrutiny. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.