PA Supreme Court: Parole Agents May Frisk You Even If You Are Not On Parole

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mathis, holding that a parole agent may detain and frisk a non-parolee visitor to the parolee’s home while performing a routine home inspection if the parole agent acts on reasonable suspicion that the visitor is engaged in criminal activity and armed.

Commonwealth v. Mathis - Can a Parole Agent Search Someone Who Is Not On Parole During a Routine Home Visit? 

In Mathis, parole agents conducted a routine check of a parolee’s home which was located in a high crime area in Dauphin County. When they arrived, they immediately recognized the strong odor of marijuana throughout the home. As they walked through the house, they observed the defendant, Mathis, receiving a hair cut from the parolee who they were there to check up on. The parolee identified the parole agents to the defendant, and the agents then questioned the parolee as to why the house smelled like marijuana. The agents also found an ashtray full of marijuana roaches in the front room, but they did not see anyone smoking marijuana. 

While one of the agents questioned the parolee, the other agent monitored Mathis. Mathis repeatedly got up from his chair and walked to the kitchen, apparently checking text messages on his cell phone. The parole agents asked him to stop using the cell phone while they were there because he seemed nervous. They asked him to leave until they finished speaking with the parolee. Mathis began to leave, and as he gathered his belongings, one of the agents noticed that he picked up his jacket as if holding it up to his body like a football or a baby. Mathis appeared to try to put his body in between the agents and the jacket, and he continued to hold it in a strange manner. The agents also noticed a bulge coming from the jacket which was roughly the size and shape of a gun. 

The agents became concerned for their safety, so they asked Mathis if they could pat him down. He refused, but one of the agents reached out and touched the jacket. The agent immediately felt what he believed to be a firearm. They then handcuffed Mathis, patted him down, recovered a bag of marijuana from between his feet, and recovered a handgun from the jacket. Because Mathis was prohibited from possessing a firearm due to his prior criminal record, the agents called the police. The police arrived, recovered the gun, and charged Mathis with gun charges, marijuana charges, and possessing drug paraphernalia.

Motion to Suppress

Mathis filed a pretrial motion to suppress the gun, arguing that the parole agents had no right to search him because he was not on parole. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, found him guilty of drug possession and gun possession, and sentenced him to thirty-two to sixty-four month’s imprisonment. Mathis appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the decision of the Superior Court. The Court concluded that parole agents may conduct a Terry frisk under these circumstances for their own safety. Although parole agents may not act as police officers with respect to non-offenders or private citizens, they do have the right to protect themselves.

Parole agents are required to supervise offenders in part by conducting routine, unannounced home visits, thus risking exposure to a variety of potentially dangerous unknowns. Interactions with non-offenders are often going to occur during home visits, and parole agents have an obligation to make sure that the parolee is not living or associating with people who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses.

Parole agents are also legally classified as “peace officers,” giving them the power to make a lawful arrest upon reasonable suspicion of a felony and the authority to use deadly force to protect themselves and carry firearms. Because a parole agent has the authority to use deadly force for the protection of himself or herself and others, the agent has the authority to prevent the need for deadly force in the first place by conducting a Terry frisk when necessary.

Finally, the Court noted that the purpose of the Terry frisk is not to conduct an investigation or find evidence; instead, it is merely to check for deadly weapons so that the officer can do his or her job without fear of bodily injury. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that a parole agent may conduct a frisk for weapons so long as the agent has reasonable suspicion to do so. Reasonable suspicion requires “specific and articulable facts” that criminal activity is afoot, and the authority to frisk also requires that the officer or agent have reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous. 

There Are Still Limits On Probation and Parole Searches

Unfortunately, the Mathis Court's decision serves to eliminate important privacy rights for anyone who associates with someone who is on state parole. If someone has the bad luck to be present at a parolee's residence when agents show up to conduct an unannounced search, that person will now be at risk of being searched by parole agents despite the fact that they are not even on parole. This is particuclarly true for anyone who lives with someone who is on state parole; that person will now have substantailly reduced privacy rights just by virtue of who they live with. However, some protections remain in that the parole agents are still required to have reasonable suspicion and cannot conduct a search for general investigatory purposes. Therefore, motions to suppress will likely still be brought in many of these cases.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

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If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers have successfully defended thousands of cases. We offer a free, 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attoreny today. 

PA Superior Court Continues to Struggle With Meaning Of "Stop"

Motions to Suppress in Gun and Drug Cases

The first line of defense to criminal charges like gun possession or drug possession is often the Motion to Suppress. If the police stopped or searched you or your belongings without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, it may be possible to have the evidence suppressed. Once the evidence is suppressed, the Commonwealth would not be able to proceed to trial in a case involving a possessory offense, and the case could be thrown out. In cases involving illegal stops or searches of pedestrians, the first thing that the defense must typically show is that the police actually stopped or “seized” the defendant under either Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

What makes a stop a stop? 

As recently as three months ago, in the case of Commonwealth v. Morrison, the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that when a police officer says stop, that means stop. Thus, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and the encounter rises to the legal level of a Terry stop. In the case of Commonwealth v. Newsome, a different panel of the Superior Court has reached a different conclusion. In Newsome, the Superior Court held that the mere use of the word “stop” does not necessarily transform a police encounter into a Terry stop requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Instead, whether police conduct rises to the level of a stop depends on the totality of the circumstances and the specific facts of each case. 

Commonwealth v. Newsome

In Newsome, the defendant was arrested in Philadelphia and charged with various Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”). The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, and the court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, a Philadelphia Police Lieutenant testified that he received an anonymous radio call that a group of males were outside on the 2000 block of Croskey Street passing around a gun. The officer drove to the scene. When he arrived, he saw a group of men huddled together. Two of the men left the group and walked to the other side of the street.

The defendant was one of the two men who crossed the street and began to walk southbound down Croskey street. The officer exited his marked patrol car and asked the defendant to “come here” so he could talk to him, but the defendant refused and continued walking. The officer began to radio for backup to stop the defendant when he observed the defendant reach into his waistband, remove an object that looked like a gun, and place it in a nearby flowerpot. Although the defendant discarded the gun in view of the officer, the gun could be suppressed if the defense could show that the defendant discarded the gun only in response to some sort of unlawful illegal police activity or seizure. 

A different police officer recovered the firearm, and the police arrested the defendant. On cross examination, the officer testified that he approached the defendant and the other men because he believed that they may have been violating Philadelphia’s 10:30 pm curfew. He also testified that he had not seen the defendant with any bulges or weapons on his person and that the defendant did not make any suspicious movements prior to putting the gun in the flowerpot. 

The trial court found the officer’s testimony credible, but it granted the Motion to Suppress. The trial court concluded that by saying stop and asking the defendant to come talk to him, the officer had stopped the defendant and legally seized him. Thus, the officer was required to have reasonable suspicion in order to make a stop, and the officer did not have that level of suspicion because he did not observe the defendant doing anything suspicious. Further, it is well-settled in Pennsylvania that an anonymous radio call cannot provide the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and even accepting the radio call as true, the radio call did not identify the defendant as the person with the gun.

The Superior Court’s Decision On Appeal

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision and concluded that the officer had not legally stopped the defendant. Instead, the officer had attempted to have a mere encounter with the defendant, and a mere encounter need not be supported by any articulable level of suspicion. In determining whether the officer conducted a stop, the court noted that it must evaluate all of the circumstances “evidencing a show of authority or exercise of force, including the demeanor of the police officer, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements.” Courts must also consider the number of officers present, whether the officer accuses the citizen of criminal activity, the officer’s demeanor and voice, the location and timing of the interaction, the visible presence of weapons on the officer, and the questions asked. Where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave due to the behavior of the officer, the encounter rises to the level of a stop and requires at least reasonable suspicion. 

Here, the Superior Court found that the officer had not stopped the defendant and reversed the decision of the trial court. The Superior Court found that it was only a mere encounter because the officer simply exited the vehicle and asked the defendant to come here so he could talk to him. Although he was in full uniform and in a marked car, he did not engage the lights and sirens, display his weapon, or tell the defendant that he was not free to leave. He also did not block the defendant from moving in any particular direction. He did admit asking the defendant to stop two or three times, but he did not threaten any consequences for non-compliance or use an authoritative tone. Further, the defendant clearly felt no compulsion to stop because he continued walking away. Only after the defendant discarded the gun did the police arrest the defendant. Therefore, the defendant was not seized and officers were not required to have any level of suspicion.

THE EVIDENTIARY CONSEQUENCES OF AN ILLEGAL STOP

Motions to Suppress guns can be difficult to win, but police are required to follow the law. Although judges may be reluctant to suppress illegal firearms and large amounts of drugs, it remains the law that police must have reasonable suspicion or probable cause prior to making a stop or conducting a search. When the police stop or search someone illegally, the Fourth Amendment requires that the evidence be suppressed, meaning that it may not be used at trial. However, it is critical that the defense establish that the police conducted a stop or a search in order to win a Motion to Suppress. Clearly, the Superior Court’s decision in Newsome conflicts with recent precedent in which the Court held that the use of the word stop transforms an encounter into a Terry stop. Therefore, the question of whether a defendant is stopped for purposes of the Fourth Amendment remains highly fact specific. In many cases, a successful motion to suppress will require skillful cross examination by the defense in order to establish that based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave. This is particularly true in cases involving “Forced Abandonment” in which a defendant who has been illegally seized discards a gun or drugs prior to being physically restrained by the police. 

AWARD-WINNING PHILADELPHIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS

Goldstein Mehta LLC: Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended clients against gun charges, drug charges, and other possession of contraband cases in preliminary hearings, pre-trial motions to suppress, and at trial. Call 267-225-2545 for a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session with one of our award-winning defense attorneys. 

Read the Opinion: Commonwealth v. Newsome

After-Discovered Evidence Motion | PCRAs and Appeals

Can I use new evidence to overturn a criminal conviction?

If the defense learns of new evidence after the defendant has been convicted but while the defendant is still serving a sentence, it may be possible to obtain a new trial by filing a post-sentence motion or PCRA Petition. For example, if new witnesses come forward or relevant video footage is uncovered, it may be possible to use that evidence to obtain a new trial. In general, Pennsylvania law provides a number of different ways to attack a criminal conviction or guilty plea. The normal appeals process involves filing post-sentence motions and if they are denied, an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. If that is not successful, the defendant may be able to challenge a conviction by filing a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition.

After-Discovered Evidence Motions

Philadelphia Criminal Appeals Lawyer Demetra Mehta, Esq.

In addition to the normal appeals and PCRA process, there are also special motions which may be filed when the defense learns of new evidence or witnesses which would have made a difference and possibly led to a different outcome at trial. There are two types of after-discovered evidence motions, and the standard which must be met differs slightly depending on whether the case is still on appeal or whether the direct appeals have been exhausted.

Post-Sentence Motion for a New Trial

First, if the defendant has been found guilty but the case is still in the trial court for sentencing or post-sentence motions or it is still in the Superior Court for a direct appeal, the defense attorney must file a post-sentence motion with the court promptly upon the discovery of the new evidence. In order to obtain a hearing, the defendant must plead four things under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720:

1. That the evidence was not available at trial to the defense despite the exercise of due diligence. This means that the defense must have taken reasonable steps to investigate the case and find the evidence. If the defense attorney did not conduct any investigation of any kind and should have interviewed a helpful witness who was mentioned in the discovery, then the motion will fail this prong.
   

2. The evidence is not cumulative. This means that if the defense already presented four alibi witnesses and would have presented a fifth alibi witness to testify to the same thing, the defense may fail this prong because the evidence would have been cumulative.
   

3. The evidence may not be used solely for impeachment. Thus, the fact that the defendant learns that a witness had a conviction for crimen falsi would likely not warrant a new trial. Instead, the evidence must be substantive – meaning a new witness who would testify to an alibi, or a new scientific method for testing DNA or fingerprints and corresponding results that would show that the defendant could not have committed the crime.
   

4. That the evidence would have resulted in a different verdict. This is often the hardest prong as witnesses who wait years to come forward may have credibility problems, and ultimately, the trial judge must rule on whether the witness would have made a difference at trial.

If the defense is able to plead all four of these things relating to the new evidence or new witness, then the trial court should hold a hearing on the after-discovered evidence motion, make findings of fact, and determine whether the defendant should receive a new trial. At the evidentiary hearing, the Court will typically hear testimony from the new witness or view the new evidence and also hear from the defense attorneys and possibly the defendant as to what steps were taken to locate the new evidence prior to trial.

After the Court holds an evidentiary hearing, the Court will then rule on each of these four factors. If the Court denies the motion, it may be appealed. However, the trial court has a great deal of discretion in evaluating these motions as the trial judge will view the testimony from the new witness and make a determination as to whether the witness is credible and would have made a difference, and these findings are difficult to overturn on appeal. Finally, it is important to note that an after-discovered evidence motion must be filed promptly.

Post-Conviction Relief Act Petitions (“PCRAs”) Based On New Evidence

Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

If direct appeals have been exhausted and the defendant is still serving a sentence, the defendant may file a Post-Conviction Relief Act petition seeking a new trial based on new evidence. Ordinarily, a PCRA Petition must be filed within one year from the date of sentencing (or the date on which the appellate courts uphold the conviction if appeals were taken). However, there is an after-discovered evidence to the one-year time limit which allows a defendant to file a new PCRA Petition based on after-discovered evidence within sixty days of learning of the evidence even if the Petition is filed more than one year from the date on which the sentence became final.

A PCRA Petition based on after-discovered evidence is very similar to the aforementioned Post-Sentence Motion. However, it differs slightly in that it must be filed within sixty days if the defendant is outside of the one year deadline for a PCRA. It also requires the defendant to show he or she did not know the fact(s) upon which he or she based her petition; and (2) they could not have learned those fact(s) earlier by the exercise of due diligence.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The defendant could also take two different approaches in filing the PCRA. First, the defendant could attempt to meet the same standards as explained above and try to show that although the investigation was reasonably diligent, the evidence could not be uncovered. Alternatively, the defendant could attempt to introduce the new evidence through a PCRA challenge based on ineffectiveness of counsel by arguing that the defense attorney was ineffective and should have uncovered the evidence but did not adequately investigate the case. For example, if there was an alibi witness that was known to the defense in a Robbery case, but the defense took no steps to locate that person, then the PCRA Petition could allege that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. However, this may not satisfy the previously mentioned sixty day extension because the defendant likely knew about the alibi witness. Whether the extension would apply depends on the facts of the individual case, making it important to consult with an attorney if you believe that new evidence could make a difference for you.

Commonwealth v. Shiloh

The recent case of Commonwealth v. Shiloh provides an example of after-discovered evidence in the PCRA context. In Shiloh, the defendant was convicted of selling drugs in part based on the testimony of a co-defendant, her sister. Specifically, she was convicted of multiple counts of delivery of a controlled substance, criminal use of a communication facility, conspiracy, and endangering the welfare of children, in connection with her participation in a drug operation. Her sister testified against her at trial, she was convicted, and she received 14-30 years of incarceration at sentencing.

Ms. Shiloh exhausted of all of her appeals and ordinary PCRAs, and she eventually filed a PCRA outside of the one year deadline for filing a PCRA. In the new PCRA, she alleged that her sister, who had testified against her, had prepared an affidavit admitting that she had received benefits from the prosecution in exchange for her testimony. Her sister also admitted to lying about receiving this consideration from the prosecution at trial. Shiloh included the notes of testimony from her sister’s sentencing in which the Commonwealth confirmed the existence of the agreement and asked for a reduced sentence due to the cooperation.

The trial court dismissed the PCRA Petition as untimely, and Shiloh appealed to the Superior Court. On appeal, Shiloh argued that the new evidence would constitute after-discovered evidence and that she could not have learned of it prior to trial. Whether or not Shiloh was entitled to the benefit of the previously discussed sixty day time limit for filing an after-discovered evidence PCRA came down to whether the “public record presumption” applied to her. As a general rule, PCRA Petitioners who are not in custody are expected to exercise due diligence in investigating their cases, meaning that if there are facts contained in public records such as the guilty plea colloquy of a co-defendant, then the facts will not constitute after-discovered evidence.

The public record presumption, however, does not apply to an incarcerated, pro se petitioner. The petitioner must still show that they exercised due diligence in conducting an investigation, but the presumption will not apply because pro se prisoners do not have access to the same resources and records as someone who is represented by counsel or someone who is not incarcerated. Because Shiloh was in custody for the duration of her appeals and PCRAs, the Superior Court reversed the finding of the trial court that she should have known about the guilty plea colloquy sooner and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on when exactly Shiloh discovered or should have learned that her sister had cooperated against her and received benefits for so doing.

On remand, if Shiloh can show that she had no way of knowing about the cooperation and that the cooperation would have made a difference at trial, then she could be entitled to a new trial. Thus, after-discovered evidence motions can be extremely important because they could lead to the defendant receiving a new trial. 

Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys  

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. and Demetra Mehta, Esq.

if you are facing criminal charges or considering an appeal, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have won countless pre-trial motions, bench trials, and jury trials, and we have also successfully resolved many cases through negotiations which resulted in excellent outcomes for our clients. We can also help you evaluate the likelihood of success in filing a PCRA Petition or direct appeal to the Superior Court. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client, so call 267-225-2545 to speak with one of our experienced and understanding defense attorneys today. 

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PA Superior Court Finds Suspicionless Boat Searches Unconstitutional

On August 21, 2017, the Pennsylvania Superior decided the case of Commonwealth v. Karash, holding that the government cannot stop a boat without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. This was a case of first impression in Pennsylvania that will affect the thousands of people who utilize Pennsylvania’s waterways each year.

Commonwealth v. Karash

In Karash, the defendant was charged with not having the required safety equipment on his boat. On May 23, 2016, Mr. Karash was fishing on his boat when he was stopped by a waterways conservation officer. The officer did not see Mr. Karash do anything illegal prior to boarding his boat. Regardless, the officer boarded Mr. Karash’s boat to conduct a license check of those who were fishing. After this check was completed, and the occupants were cleared, the officer then performed a safety inspection. During this inspection, the officer determined that Mr. Karash did not have sufficient flotation devices and issued him a citation.

Mr. Karash contested his citation at a hearing. Mr. Karash litigated a Motion to Suppress where he argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to board his vessel in violation of his rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The magisterial district court denied his motion because 30 PA C.S. § 901 (a)(10) allows a waterways conservation officer to board a boat to make sure it is in compliance with the administrative aspects of the Fish and Boat Code (i.e. licensing requirements). It is important to note that this particular provision does not require an officer to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a government official to board one’s boat. After the hearing, Mr. Karash was found guilty of not having the required number of life vests and fined $75.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION?

Typically, a motion to suppress is a motion that asks a court to exclude evidence against a defendant because it was obtained when police acted without “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion.” Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are similar, but distinct legal concepts.  Probable cause is mentioned in both the United States Constitution (the Fourth Amendment) and the Pennsylvania Constitution (Article I, Section 8). In order for the government to arrest you, there must be probable cause that you committed a crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined “probable cause” as “the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 203 (Pa. 2009).

“Reasonable suspicion” is different. Unlike “Probable cause,” reasonable suspicion is not mentioned in either the U.S. or Pennsylvania constitutions. Despite this, courts have allowed police officers and other government officials to stop people on “reasonable suspicion” after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. To be clear, “reasonable suspicion” is not as rigorous a standard as “probable cause.” Additionally, a person cannot be arrested or have their home searched based on “reasonable suspicion.” However, an individual can be detained for an “investigatory detention” based on “reasonable suspicion.”  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court defines “reasonable suspicion” as “a less stringent standard than probable cause…and depends on the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances…a police officer must be able to point to ‘specific and articulable facts’ leading him to suspect that criminality is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2010).   

Typically, the government needs either “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” to detain someone. There are exceptions when the government can make a suspicionless stop of you (i.e. point-of-entry searches at public schools for weapons and DUI checkpoints). In determining whether a suspicionless check will be upheld, Pennsylvania courts employ a “balancing test…wherein the intrusion on the individual of a particular law enforcement practice is balanced against the government’s promotion of legitimate interests.” Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d  1177, 1167 (Pa. 1992). Thus, the issue for the Karash Court was whether suspicionless checks for boats are constitutional.

As stated above, this was a case of first impression. Thus, the Karash Court looked for guidance from other jurisdictions to see how they ruled on this issue. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez. In its decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal government could conduct suspicionless "Customs checks" on vessels with close proximity to the open sea because of the complexity of the documentation required by federal law and the governmental interest in preventing smuggling. Thus, in Villamonte-Marquez, the United States Supreme Court upheld the warrantless and suspicionless search of a ship that resulted in finding thousands of pounds of marijuana.  

Can the Police Search a Boat Without Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause? 

Despite the ruling in Villamonte-Marquez, the Pennsylvania Superior Court declined to follow its holding. In Karash, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held, understandably, that ensuring recreational boater safety on Pennsylvania’s waters is a legitimate government interest. Nonetheless, the Karash Court also held that government had not demonstrated that it was unable to achieve its goal of recreational boater safety by a means other than suspicionless searches. 

The Karash Court analogized the Commonwealth’s waterways to its roads. Specifically, the Court focused on DUI Checkpoints. Pennsylvania allows DUI Checkpoints, but there are extremely strict limitations that the appellate have imposed on police departments in setting up these highly intrusive checkpoints. Police do not have “unfettered discretion” and along with other guidelines (i.e. prior notice, momentary stoppage of drivers, checkpoints placed on roads where DUI’s are more likely, etc.), courts have imposed rules to reduce the intrusiveness of the checkpoints so that they may comply with the Pennsylvania Constitution.  Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1037 (PA 1987).

The Karash Court held that the Commonwealth has not employed these same safeguards on its waterways. As such, the Karash Court held that Mr. Karash’s constitutional rights were violated when the waterways conservation officer boarded his boat without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Thus, Mr. Karash’s conviction was overturned. 

Motions to Suppress

Goldstein Mehta LLC Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

Trials can be won and lost with a motion to suppress. If you are facing criminal charges, you need an attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to litigate these motions even when the law has yet to be conclusively established. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.