Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/25/24 Zak Goldstein 5/25/24

PA Superior Court: Statements Made to Constables May Be Suppressed for Lack of Miranda Warnings

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Seeney, holding that statements made to constables during a custodial interrogation may not be admissible in court unless the constable first gave Miranda warnings.

The Facts of Seeney

In Seeney, the defendant was charged with attempting to possess a firearm as a prohibited person in violation of § 6105 and two counts of making a false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(g)(4). The police arrested the defendant, and he was held in custody at the Bucks County Correctional Center.

The defendant was scheduled for his preliminary hearing in 2022. In the suburban counties, preliminary hearings take place at the office of a Magisterial District Justice. Sheriffs transport prisoners to preliminary hearings in Philadelphia and for other hearings in the Court of Common Pleas in the counties, but magistrates use constables for prisoner transportation. In this case, a constable transported the defendant to the magistrate’s office for his preliminary hearing. The constable had no real involvement in the case and did not particularly care about it, but in making conversation with the defendant, he asked the defendant what he was charged with. The defendant then told the constable that he had tried to buy a gun despite being prohibited from doing so.

The constable did not give the defendant Miranda warnings during this conversation and likely would not have told anyone what the defendant said. Unfortunately for the defendant, a police detective happened to overhear it. The detective then called the constable the next day and asked the constable to give a formal statement about what the defendant said to him, and the constable would have then been a witness for the Commonwealth at trial.

The Motion to Suppress

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the incriminating statement made to the constable because the constable never gave him Miranda warnings. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that the constable was not required to provide Miranda warnings because 1) he did not actually interrogate the defendant and 2) he was not a law enforcement officer like a police officer or detective. The Superior Court rejected both arguments. First, it found that the constable’s questioning was clearly an interrogation. By asking the defendant about his court appearance, the constable asked questions which were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The constable’s purpose in asking the questions - that he was just making conversation - did not matter. Instead, the test is whether the questions themselves were likely to elicit an incriminating response. Second, the court found that it was irrelevant that the constable was not actually a police officer or sworn law enforcement officer. Constables provide transportation to court for the magistrate. In order to do so, they physically restrict a prisoner’s movements both by locking them in their transport vehicle and in holding cells, and by guarding them while armed with a firearm. This creates a custodial setting no different than being transported by a sworn police officer, and the constables do this on behalf of the government. Accordingly, the fact that the constable was not actually a police officer was irrelevant - it was still a custodial interrogation conducted by a state actor.

When do the police have to give Miranda warnings?

The police only have to give a defendant Miranda warnings when they are going to conduct a custodial interrogation. If the police fail to give Miranda warnings, then any statement obtained may not be used against the defendant. The failure to give Miranda warnings does not automatically result in the dismissal of a case. Instead, it would only result in the suppression of a statement if the police took a statement. Accordingly, if the police do not want to take a statement or do not care if the resulting statement is going to be admissible, then they do not have to give Miranda warnings.

Here, the defendant was obviously in custody - he was being held at the Bucks jail and transported by an armed constable, and the constable asked him questions which were likely to result in incriminating admissions. The constable worked on behalf of the government, so this amounted to a custodial interrogation which required Miranda warnings. The Superior Court therefore upheld the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress the confession.

The ruling here seems pretty obvious, so it is somewhat surprising the prosecution appealed. The case provides a good illustration of when Miranda warnings are required, however.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/22/24 Zak Goldstein 5/22/24

Attorney Goldstein Argues Before PA Supreme Court in Harrisburg

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire recently argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Harrisburg, PA. In the case of Commonwealth v. Muhammad, the Court granted review on the following question:

Was the evidence insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, where the jury made a specific factual finding that Petitioner did not possess a firearm in response to a special interrogatory to which all parties and the trial court had agreed?

In Muhammad, the police arrested the defendant after finding a gun in the center console of a car to which multiple people had access. Prosecutors charged him with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 and carrying a concealed firearm in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106. The case law holds that a felon in possession charge under § 6105 must be bifurcated from other charges and heard after the other charges have been decided. § 6105 must be bifurcated because in order to prove a violation of § 6105, the Commonwealth must introduce evidence of the defendant’s criminal record. This evidence obviously makes it very difficult for the jury to remain impartial. Once the jurors have heard that the defendant has a felony conviction, they are much more likely to convict. Therefore, trial courts throughout the state will usually conduct the trial without telling the jury about the § 6105 charge first, and then once the jury has reached a verdict on the other charges, hold a mini-trial just on the § 6105 charge at which the Commonwealth will tell the jury about the defendant’s criminal record and then ask the jury to make a decision on that case. This procedure avoids the issue of the jury becoming prejudiced against the defendant after learning that they have a record.

In this case, however, the trial court decided to use a placeholder interrogatory on the possession of a firearm. The parties agreed that instead of completely bifurcating the offense, the jury would receive an instruction on the definition of actual and constructive possession and then be asked whether the defendant possessed a firearm. If the jury answered yes, then the judge would find the defendant guilty of § 6105. If the jury answered no, then the judge would find the defendant not guilty. All parties agreed to this unusual procedure. The judge accurately instructed the jury on the definition of possession, and the jury answered “no” to an interrogatory on whether the defendant possessed and controlled a firearm. The case took a bizarre turn, however, when the jury then convicted the defendant of carrying a concealed firearm without a license.

Carrying a firearm without a license in violation of § 6106 requires possessing the firearm – so the interrogatory answer and the verdict are impossible to reconcile. If the defendant did not possess a firearm, then he could not have carried one for § 6106, and the evidence was therefore insufficient. The trial court and Superior Court, however, both found that the inconsistency was acceptable because Pennsylvania law allows for inconsistent verdicts in most situations.

Attorney Goldstein sought review in the state Supreme Court because this situation is different. The jury’s response to the interrogatory was not a verdict. Instead, it was a specific factual finding – that the defendant did not possess a gun – which negated an element of the offense for which he was convicted. Therefore, the lower courts should have entered a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient.

The Supreme Court granted review on whether inconsistent interrogatories should be treated differently from inconsistent verdicts, and Attorney Goldstein argued the case in Harrisburg last week. The Court will now likely make a decision within the next few months, and this could be a particularly important decision as trial courts have increasingly relied on interrogatories in the last few years since the United States Supreme Court found in Alleyne and Apprendi that any elements which could increase a maximum penalty or impose a mandatory minimum must be submitted to the jury.

The audio from the argument is available through the Court on Youtube here: https://www.youtube.com/live/NLbu2tIk_S4?si=gpNc7d5o1MYhQnsL&t=15566

Video of the 5/14/24 argument is available here: https://pcntv.com/pennsylvania-politics-and-policy/pa-courts/pa-supreme-court/

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Attorney Goldstein in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Zak Goldstein 2/19/24 Zak Goldstein 2/19/24

PA Superior Court Explains When Ineffective Assistance Claims May Be Raised on Direct Appeal

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Watson, dismissing the defendant’s appeal because the defendant improperly tried to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims prematurely through post-sentence motions and on appeal rather than by filing a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. The Superior Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be reviewed in post-sentence motions rather than in a PCRA petition.

The Facts of Watson

The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court after he was convicted by a jury of rape and other related sex crimes. The conviction stemmed from the alleged sexual abuse of the defendant’s stepdaughter. She said that the abuse started when she was eleven and ended when she was seventeen. Prior to sentencing, the defendant retained new counsel, and trial counsel withdrew his appearance. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 27-60 years in prison and found the defendant to be a sexually violent predator.

The defendant’s new attorney filed a post-sentence motion and eventually an amended post-sentence motion. The motion raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which usually need to be deferred until after a direct appeal has concluded. The amended post-sentence motion concluded with the statement, “[Defendant] has been advised that in raising ineffectiveness now, he waives the right to raising [sic] issues of merit on direct appeal.”

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion. At the hearing, the Court did not really address whether it was appropriate to hear ineffective assistance claims in the post-sentence motions rather than defer any such claims until after the direct appeal had concluded. Instead, new counsel immediately called the defendant to the stand and asked the following preliminary questions:

[Defense Counsel]: [Defendant], before we go any further, I’ve advised you that in your [amended] post[-]sentence motion that you’re raising ineffectiveness of counsel, correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: And I’ve advised you that raising it in your [amended] post[-]sentence motion means that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania will not, you’re not going to be raising questions of merit. Do you remember that?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And I’ve advised you that you have to make a choice of doing one or the other and you chose to raise ineffectiveness of counsel, correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And nobody’s forced you. You’re making this decision voluntarily, correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.

The trial court denied the amended post-sentence motion, and the defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. All of the issues that the defendant raised in the Superior Court related to the allegations that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which he had asserted in his post-sentence motions. The Superior Court began by addressing whether it was appropriate for the Court to deal with claims relating to the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal instead of in a PCRA petition. The Court also addressed the related claim of whether it was proper for the trial court to hear the ineffective assistance claims in a post-sentence motion rather than a PCRA.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court provided a helpful summary of when PCRA/ineffective assistance of counsel claims should normally be raised. In general, PCRA claims such as claims that the lawyer provided the ineffective assistance of counsel should not be raised until PCRA proceedings, and a PCRA petition must be filed either after the direct appeal has concluded or instead of a direct appeal. Trial courts usually should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness in post-sentence motions, and therefore, those claims should not ordinarily be raised on direct appeal. There are exceptions to this rule, however. A defendant may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim right away in the following scenarios:

(1) an extraordinary case where the trial court, in its discretion, determines that a claim of ineffectiveness is both meritorious and apparent from the record so that immediate consideration and relief is warranted; or

(2) when the defendant raises multiple, and comprehensive, ineffectiveness claims, which the court, and for good cause shown, determines that post-verdict review is warranted, and the defendant waives his right to PCRA review; or

(3) if the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review, the trial courts must address claims challenging trial counsel’s performance.

The first exception is for claims that are so strong and so obviously likely to be granted that it would be an injustice to defer them until PCRA review. The second exception typically applies to a defendant who receives a short sentence or no sentence. The PCRA requires that a defendant still be in custody or under probation supervision in order for the court to have jurisdiction, so a defendant who receives a short sentence typically will not be able to file an appeal and then litigate a PCRA petition because the sentence will have expired.

Here, the Court found that none of the exceptions applied.

With respect to the first exception for extraordinary claims, the Court found that because the trial court needed to schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of the claim, the claim was not apparent from the record. In other words, if the claim were so strong and so obvious that it should be resolved immediately, then it would not have been necessary for the trial court to hold a hearing. The court would have been able to just grant it from the record.

In addressing the second exception, the Court ruled that the defendant failed to argue that he had good cause for raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a post-sentence motion, and the trial court did not make a finding of good cause for him to do so. Most importantly, the Superior Court found the defendant did not make a knowing waiver of his right to PCRA review. The Superior Court opined that the defendant’s attempted waiver of his right to file PCRA claims was based on new counsel’s misinterpretation of the relevant case law. Instead of asking if the defendant agreed to waive the right to litigate a PCRA after the conclusion of the direct appeal, the new attorney asked the defendant if he agreed to waive the right to raise normal appellate issues of trial court error. In order for the colloquy to be correct, the lawyer would have to ask the defendant if he agreed to waive his PCRA rights, not his direct appeal rights. It is possible to raise both ineffective assistance of claims and regular direct appeal claims in cases where the waiver is executed properly or in cases where the first exception for extraordinary claims applies. The Court did not address the third exception as the defendant was not statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review.

Ultimately, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the defendant to address his premature ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the post-sentence motions. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal without prejudice for the defendant to file a timely PCRA petition and raise those claims. Procedurally, the Court probably should not have actually dismissed the appeal. The appeal was properly filed, it just raised claims that were not cognizable at this stage. Therefore, the Court should have simply affirmed. This wording, however, will likely not make a significant difference for the defendant as he will still be able to raise his claims by filing a PCRA petition. Either way, it is important to understand these exceptions and make sure you retain a lawyer who understands them if you want to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before filing a direct appeal. In most cases, it makes sense to do the direct appeal and then litigate a PCRA petition, but in some cases, the PCRA claims are so strong or the sentence is short enough that it makes sense to claim that trial counsel was ineffective right away.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/23/24 Zak Goldstein 1/23/24

Can prosecution witnesses testify by video? Sometimes.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In most cases, witnesses in criminal cases may not testify by video. This is particularly true for the prosecution as the defendant has a confrontation clause right to confront their accusers, and the appellate courts have held that that right includes the right to cross-examine witnesses face-to-face in the courtroom. The legislature, however, has provided that under certain circumstances, child witnesses may testify by video from somewhere else in the courthouse in a different room from the defendant. In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Lamont, the Superior Court upheld the defendant’s convictions for sexual assault charges and held that the trial court properly allowed the child complainant to testify contemporaneously via video.

The Facts of Lamont

In 2019, the complainant told her grandmother that the defendant, her grandmother’s boyfriend, had molested her. The complainant lived near the grandmother’s house, and the defendant would sometimes babysit the complainant while the complainant’s mother was at work. The grandmother confronted the defendant. He admitted to touching the complainant but claimed it was an accident. He promised to apologize. (This is a good example of why it is best to just remain silent when confronted with criminal allegations. Claiming that touching someone inappropriately was an accident is generally not going to help your case.)

After the defendant apologized to the complainant, the complainant told the grandmother the defendant had in fact molested her several times rather than just once. Again, the grandmother confronted the defendant. This time the defendant just stood there. The grandmother left for work, and the defendant left the home with all his belongings. The grandmother then contacted the police.

The defendant called the grandmother and begged her not to press charges. He apologized, threatened to commit suicide, and claimed he did not know why he molested the victim. (Again, this is incredibly damaging for a criminal case.) The grandmother put the call on speakerphone, and the complainant’s mother and her best friend overheard the conversation.

Prosecutors inevitably filed serious sexual assault charges against the defendant. Despite confessing to everyone, he proceeded by way of jury trial. Prior to the jury trial, the Commonwealth file a motion under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985 notifying the defendant of its intention to have the complainant testify via video. The trial court held a hearing granting the Commonwealth’s motion and granted it. The complainant testified at trial via video. The jury convicted the defendant of serious Megan’s law offenses, and the defendant appealed.

Did the trial court properly let the complainant testify by video?

The defendant raised a number of issues on appeal, but the most interesting was his challenge to the trial court’s decision to allow the child complainant to testify via video. Pennsylvania law sometimes allows for child complainants to testify in a room other than the courtroom and have that testimony transmitted contemporaneously via video.

Prior to allowing a child victim to testify via video, however, the court must hold a hearing in open court or in camera and allow the parties to present evidence. Based on the evidence, the court must make a decision as to whether testifying either in an open forum in the presence of the fact finder or in the presence of the defendant will result in the child complainant suffering serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child victim’s ability to reasonably communicate. In making this determination the court may observe the child complainant inside or outside the courtroom and/or hear testimony from a parent or custodian. Serious emotional distress does not just mean that the child will be upset. It does have a specific definition which deals with whether it will impair the child’s ability to communicate.

In this case, the defendant objected to the video testimony and argued that the complainant’s fear was not testifying in front of the defendant. Instead, the defense argued that the complainant’s real fear was that no one would believe her. The defendant claimed the complainant’s hesitance to testify in front of him came from speaking about a traumatic event, not from having to testify in open court, and therefore that the Commonwealth did not show the complainant would be unable to reasonably communicate in his presence.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court approved of the trial court’s decision to allow the contemporaneous video testimony. The Superior Court relied on the record from the pre-trial hearing in the courtroom at which the mother and complainant testified. The Court noted the mother’s testimony regarding the changes in her daughter’s behavior after disclosing the incidents. Specifically, the mother testified that her daughter, the complainant, used to be involved in numerous sports and that she no longer participated in any of them. She said the complainant’s temperament changed from “very quiet” to “attacking” and explained the complainant had been nervous about testifying in front of the defendant. She stated the complainant had a “sigh of relief” when the mother told her she could testify by video.

Further, the Superior Court noted the victim’s testimony explaining that it was important when she gave a statement previously that the defendant was not there because it made it easier for her to focus on her testimony and not on the defendant.

In making its decision, the Superior Court noted that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the changes in the complainant’s demeanor and body language when she thought of testifying in front of the defendant. It believed the trial court had the best opportunity to assess the complainant’s state of mind in the context of the entire circumstances surrounding the proceeding before making its decision. The Court found the trial court’s on-the-record observations supported its finding that the defendant’s presence would have caused serious emotional distress and impaired the victim’s ability to communicate in the courtroom. Further, the Court found that the defendant suffered no prejudice because the trial court instructed the jury that video testimony is not out of the ordinary. Therefore, the Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction.

It is important to note that the video testimony must be contemporaneous and subject to cross-examination. Pre-recorded testimony is almost never allowed, and the defense must still have the opportunity to cross-examine a complainant. The video must also work - if there are issues with the connection, the quality of the audio or video, or the ability for the jury to hear and see the complainant, then that could be the basis for a challenge to this type of testimony, as well. Ultimately, this rule undermines a defendant’s right to confrontation. The whole purpose of subjecting witnesses to cross-examination live in the courtroom is to see if they will stick to their story when they have to face the accused. Indeed, that is the very definition of confrontation, and allowing witnesses to testify to a camera rather than the jury makes it easier for them to lie. Nonetheless, for now, the courts have approved of this type of video testimony for at least some juvenile alleged victims.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania? We can help.

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.