Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 11/18/22 Zak Goldstein 11/18/22

PA Superior Court: Juvenile May Not Be Prosecuted for Corruption of Minors

Zak Goldstein Criminal Lawyer — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court has decided the case of In re: J.C., holding that a juvenile court does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate a juvenile defendant delinquent for the offense of corruption of minors. The corruption of minors statute plainly applies only to someone who is over 18 years of age, and so a juvenile defendant may not be charged in juvenile court with a violation of this statute.

The facts of In re: J.C.

A police officer in Monroe County obtained an arrest warrant for J.C., alleging that J.C. had sexually assaulted a female classmate while the two were riding on a school bus. The school district deleted surveillance video of the incident during a software update, but the complainant reported the incident to school officials. The officials then questioned J.C., and J.C. admitted that he had done it. The Commonwealth then charged him in juvenile court with aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and open lewdness.

J.C. filed a motion to suppress the statement, arguing that school officials were required to give him Miranda warnings before questioning him. J.C. also moved to dismiss the case due to the school district’s destruction of the video evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and J.C. eventually entered into an admission (juvenile guilty plea) to the charge of corruption of minors. The court accepted the admission, and the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosse the remaining charges. The court adjudicated J.C. delinquent. J.C. filed timely post-dispositional motions. The court denied the motions, and J.C. appealed. On appeal, J.C. argued both that the court should have granted his motions and that certain portions of his sentence were unconstitutional or illegal.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

J.C. did not actually argue that the admission was illegal because corruption of minors could not apply to him, a minor. The Superior Court, however, has the authority to review cases for jurisdiction sua sponte, and in this case, the Court, on its own, recognized that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept the admission.

Corruption of minors is defined as follows:

(1) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor in violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i)

The Court recognized that the statute, by its plain language, seeks to prevent prohibited actions between minors and individuals 18 years or older, otherwise defined as an adult. Here, J.C. was clearly not an adult – he was a minor at the time of the incident. Therefore, he could not be prosecuted for corruption of minors because the statute applies only to someone who is older than 18. There were other offenses he could have been prosecuted for, as he originally was, but it was illegal for the court to accept an admission to a charge which does not apply to juveniles. The court lost jurisdiction when the Commonwealth withdrew the properly filed charges and charged J.C. only with a charge that applies to adults.

Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the disposition and remanded the case back to the juvenile court for further proceedings. It did not rule on whether the Commonwealth could reinstate the original charges. This ruling benefits J.C. in that it vacates his adjudication, but ultimately, it could make things worse for him as the Commonwealth may seek to proceed on the original, more serious sex offenses. Nonetheless, it is clear that a juvenile court may not hear a prosecution against a juvenile defendant for corruption of minors as that statute applies only to adults.

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Zak Goldstein 11/9/22 Zak Goldstein 11/9/22

PA Superior Court: Police May Enter Car To Retrieve Ghost Gun Without Warrant If Gun In Plain View

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Malik Smith, overturning a previously granted motion to suppress relating to the search of a vehicle from which the police found a “ghost gun.” The Superior Court concluded that the trial court should not have suppressed a gun found in a car pursuant to a warrantless search of that car because the police properly entered the car under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement.

The Facts of Com v. Malik Smith

The defendant was pulled over in his vehicle for operating the vehicle with excessive tint on the windows in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. The defendant was the lone occupant of the vehicle and was directed to roll down all the windows. As Officers approached the vehicle, one of the Officers observed a firearm on the rear floorboard. The officers ordered the defendant to exit the car, put him in handcuffs, and put him in the back of the police car. The defendant did not have a license to carry and was eventually charged with various violations of the uniform firearms act (VUFA). Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that police should have obtained a search warrant prior to the search and that the search was not legal under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement because the police did not know if the defendant had a license to carry. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling on Appeal

The Superior Court reviewed the legal conclusions de novo, limited by the factual findings of the trial court. In its review, the court determined that the plain view doctrine allowed for the seizure of the firearm without a warrant. The Superior Court prefaced this determination based on a previous case Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041 (Pa. Super. 2008). In Collins the court set out a three-pronged standard: “(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.”

First, the Superior Court determined that the traffic stop was lawful and thus when the officer observed the firearm, it was from a lawful vantage point. The traffic stop for the window tint was justified because window tint violates the Motor Vehicle Code. Therefore, police had the authority to conduct the initial stop and pull the vehicle over.

Second, the court reviewed the second factor of whether it was immediately apparent that the firearm was incriminating - in other words, was it obviously illegal or some kind of contraband. In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that possession of a firearm is not enough to infer criminal activity. When the officer observed the firearm, however, based on his years of experience, he was able to see that it had been modified, and was a “ghost gun.” Using a totality of the circumstances approach, the Superior Court determined that the incriminating nature of the firearm must have been immediately apparent, meeting the second prong. This factor is the most dubious under Hicks, but ghost guns are generally not legal in Pennsylvania, so had the officer not been able to tell that it was a ghost gun, the court might have reached a different conclusion. Finally, the court found probable cause to believe a crime had been committed based on the incriminating appearance of the firearm. Because the officer lacked advance notice and an opportunity to obtain a warrant, the officer had a lawful right to access the firearm and conduct a search.

Having met the three prongs needed to meet the plain view exception, the Superior Court determined that the seizure was lawful and did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It therefore reversed the order of the trial court and remanded the case for trial. This case unfortunately represents a step away from the broad privacy rights granted by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Alexander and Commonwealth v. Hicks. In Commonwealth v. Alexander, the Supreme Court held that police should get a search warrant prior to searching a car. In Hicks, the Court held that police may not assume that someone is possessing a gun illegally because many people possess firearms perfectly legally under the Second Amendment. Now, however, the Superior Court has begun to carve out significant exceptions to these two basic principles to the detriment of the defendant in this case and to the rights of citizens everywhere to be free of warrantless searches.

Zak Goldstein 11/7/22 Zak Goldstein 11/7/22

PA Superior Court: Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Case Where Commonwealth Sought to Proceed Without Victim

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, finding both that statements made to emergency personnel are non-testimonial and therefore generally admissible under the confrontation clause. The court also held that the trial court erred in dismissing the case where the Commonwealth indicated that it wanted to proceed and planned to seek to introduce the complainant’s statements to those EMTs and responding officers in the complainant’s absence. The court recognized that in general, the remedy for failing to present a necessary witness at trial is that the trial court should find the defendant not guilty. Further, it is fairly well-established that statements made as part of calling for help in response to an emergency do not implicate the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the case and remanded the matter for a trial.

Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald

In this case, the defendant appeared for a non-jury trial after the Commonwealth had requested two continuances due to its failure to locate the complainant. For this third listing, the Commonwealth indicated that it would move forward without the complainant. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that there had been no opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and that introducing the complainant’s out-of-court statements in her absence would violate the confrontation clause. The confrontation clause gives a defendant the right to confront their accusers; this is generally accomplished through cross-examination.

The Commonwealth disagreed, contending that it would not introduce any evidence that would violate the confrontation clause. The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to make an offer of proof, and the Commonwealth announced its intention to enter a 911 call made in an emergency situation, to present photographs from police officer’s body cameras and observations of the scene, and to play a portion of body camera footage that showed the victim interacting with EMS. The Commonwealth suggested that it did not intend to introduce any hearsay statements through police officers.

After hearing this offer of proof, the trial court ruled that the proffered statements would be testimonial. The court therefore dismissed the charges.

The Proffered Evidence

The evidence in question was the following:

The complainant made a 911 call and informed the operator that her boyfriend, the defendant, had assaulted her and threatened her over a period of hours throughout the day. Pittsburgh Police Officer Tyler Newman responded to the 911 call and encountered the complainant, who indicated that the defendant had been physically assaulting and threatening to kill her over multiple hours. Officer Newman observed injuries on the complainant consistent with this story, and photographs of the injuries on her face, neck and collarbone were preserved from the officer’s body camera to be later introduced at the trial. EMS arrived on scene, and Officer Newman’s body camera captured a conversation between the complainant and a paramedic. The video showed that the paramedic questioned her to determine the extent of her injuries. Officer Newman also asked what she had been assaulted with, to which she replied she had been attacked by hand.

The police located the defendant based on the complainant’s description and found that the defendant was heavily intoxicated. They charged him with two counts of simple assault and one count each of terroristic threats and strangulation. The case was scheduled for a preliminary hearing. The complainant appeared for the preliminary hearing, and the defendant waived that hearing. Thus, his attorney never cross-examined the complainant.

The trial court dismissed the case, and the Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider, attaching the transcript of the 911 call, transcript of the video, and still photographs. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Decision

First, the Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the appeal should be quashed as interlocutory. As the trial court’s order resulted in the dismissal of the case, the order was a final order, and the Commonwealth therefore had the right to appeal.

Second, the Superior Court rejected the argument that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible due to the confrontation clause. The confrontation clause, as explained in the United States Supreme Court case of Crawford v Washington, prohibits out-of-court testimonial statements. Not all out-of-court statements are testimonial, however. Generally, statements are testimonial when they are intended to establish events for a subsequent criminal prosecution. Statements made in response to an ongoing emergency are often not testimonial.

Here, the complainant escaped from the defendant and went to a neighbor’s apartment. She called 911 in an attempt to obtain assistance from the police, not in order to provide a statement that would be used at a trial. The emergency was still ongoing, and follow-up questions asked by the operator were focused on assessing the threat to police and the victim to help with police response to the emergency. Citing the precedent of Davis v Washington, where a 911 call about an ongoing domestic disturbance was admitted as evidence and the US Supreme Court confirmed that the Confrontation Clause only applied to testimonial statements, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court in this case was mistaken in ruling in favor of the defense. Therefore, the trial court should not have even reached the issue of whether to dismiss the case because the statements themselves were admissible.

Finally, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court’s remedy was improper. The remedy for the Commonwealth seeking to proceed without a particular witness is to find a defendant not guilty following the close of the Commonwealth’s case; it is not to dismiss the case. Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for trial.

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Zak Goldstein 10/25/22 Zak Goldstein 10/25/22

PA Superior Court: Contraband is Not a Strict Liability Offense

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Arnold, holding that the crime of contraband is not a strict liability offense. Strict liability offenses are those which do not require a defendant to act with any mens rea or guilty conscience. They are disfavored in criminal law, and although the contraband statute does not actually identify a specific mens rea, the Superior Court found that the default mens rea of recklessness applies to this charge.

The Facts of Arnold

The defendant was arrested and detained in Butler County for a probation violation. He was transported to the Butler County Prison and placed in a holding cell. A corrections officer searched him during processing and found a pill for which the defendant did not have a prescription. The guard confiscated the pill, and the Commonwealth charged the defendant with contraband. The defendant proceeded to a trial, and he testified that he did not realize the pill was in his sock or shoe because his leg had been amputated, he wore a prosthetic leg between the knee and shoe, and he could not feel anything in the shoe as he did not have an actual foot. In addition to the pill in his sock, he had been found with another controlled substance in his cell. Later, the guards searched his cell and found three pieces of film that contained suboxone in the defendant’s wheelchair. He denied knowing about it.

The jury found him guilty of contraband and possession, and he received a 2-4 year incarceration sentence. Contraband provides for a two year mandatory minimum, so the court was required to impose the mandatory minimum sentence.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court Appeal

The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must find he acted with a specific mens rea in order to find him guilty of contraband and that making contraband a strict liability offense would violate due process. The Superior Court agreed.

The contraband offense is defined as:

A person commits a felony of the second degree if he sells, gives, transmits or furnishes to any convict in a prison, or inmate in a mental hospital, or gives away in or brings into any prison, mental hospital, or any building appurtenant thereto, or on the land granted to or owned or leased by the Commonwealth or county for the use and benefit of the prisoners or inmates, or puts in any place where it may be secured by a convict of a prison, inmate of a mental hospital, or employee thereof, any controlled substance included in Schedules I through V of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, (except the ordinary hospital supply of the prison or mental hospital) without a written permit signed by the physician of such institution, specifying the quantity and quality of the substance which may be furnished to any convict, inmate, or employee in the prison or mental hospital, the name of the prisoner, inmate, or employee for whom, and the time when the same may be furnished, which permit shall be delivered to and kept by the warden or superintendent of the prison or mental hospital.

This statute does not include a mens rea – in other words, it does not explicitly state that a defendant must act knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, or negligently. Instead, the statute appears to provide strict liability for bringing drugs into a prison. The Superior Court, however, recognized that where the legislature does not specifically state that a serious offense should be a strict liability offense, the crimes code requires a court to read in a minimum mens rea of recklessness. Here, the trial court had not done so. It did not require the jury to find that the defendant at least acted recklessly with respect to bringing the drugs into the prison. Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.