Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/15/22 Zak Goldstein 4/15/22

PA Superior Court: Police May Not Enter House Based on Consent From Person Who Clearly Does Not Live in House

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lehnerd, holding that actual or apparent authority must be established before an officer may enter a residence. Evidence obtained from a warrantless search and without permission to enter from a person with actual or apparent authority is illegally obtained and must be suppressed. Where police know that the person giving the consent to enter the house does not actually have authority to grant permission, they may not enter the house without a warrant.

Commonwealth v. Lehnerd

Two Pennsylvania State Police troopers found the defendant’s pickup truck overturned on a highway after responding to a dispatch call about a one-vehicle accident. The driver was not present. One of the troopers searched for registration documents in the truck and found empty beer cans. A neighbor informed the troopers that the driver had asked to borrow their phone to call for a ride and the driver smelled of alcohol. The troopers ran the license plates on the vehicle and determined that the defendant was the owner and found their address. The defendant’s parents then arrived at the scene and informed the troopers that the defendant owned the car, and they had driven the defendant home.

After leaving the scene, the troopers drove to the defendant’s home and knocked on the door. No one came to the door. While the troopers were waiting, the defendant’s parents arrived, and the defendant’s mother told the troopers that she believed the defendant was home. The troopers asked if the defendant’s mother could let them in, and she did so. The troopers entered the defendant’s house and escorted him out to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant was arrested for intoxication based on the tests, and he submitted to a blood alcohol breath test at the local State Police barracks, where it was shown that his blood alcohol level was .163%.

The defendant was charged with DUI General Impairment Incapable of Driving Safely, DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, Abandoning Vehicle on a Highway, and Failure to Activate Hazard Lamps, in addition to three other Vehicle Code offenses. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his house due to the troopers’ warrantless entry into his house and the subsequent illegal seizure.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to suppress on the grounds that the defendant’s mother had apparent authority to give consent for the troopers to enter the defendant’s house. The defendant was convicted of DUI General Impairment Incapable of Driving Safely, DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, Abandoning Vehicle on a Highway, and Failure to Activate Hazard Lamps. The defendant filed a post sentence motion seeking a new trial, which was denied. The defendant filed an appeal, continuing to argue that the evidence from his house was illegally obtained.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s DUI convictions and remanded for a new trial, granting the motion to suppress evidence. The defendant argued that his mother had neither actual nor apparent authority to permit the troopers to enter his home, and the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Although a warrant is typically needed for an officer to enter a home, voluntary consent is an exception to this requirement. An occupant with authority over the premises may consent to an officer’s entry and search. The officer must demonstrate reason to believe that an individual has apparent authority to grant permission for entry.

The Superior Court reviewed relevant cases to make its decision. If an individual is not inside the house to let an officer in and they do not tell the officer that they are a current occupant, the officer cannot legally search the house despite the individual informing the officer they can enter. The fact that the person who gave consent in this case was the defendant’s mother did not constitute apparent authority because the defendant was an adult who clearly lived in a separate residence from his mother. The defendant’s mother was not already inside the house and showed no evidence of occupying the house, such as having a key, when she informed the troopers that they could enter the defendant’s house. In fact, one of the troopers testified that they were aware the defendant’s mother did not live there and was not staying there. Due to the defendant’s mother’s lack of apparent or actual authority to grant permission of entry, the Superior Court remanded for a new trial.

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Zak Goldstein 4/3/22 Zak Goldstein 4/3/22

PA Superior Court: Phone Call About Possible Drunk Driving Did Not Justify Warrantless Search of Suspect's Home

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Edgin, holding that police officers illegally entered a defendant’s home under the guise of exigent circumstances. The officer’s based the warrantless search on the fact that bystanders had reported that the defendant may have been driving drunk prior to arriving home. It seems obvious that the officers should have obtained a search warrant prior to breaking into his home, and fortunately, the Superior Court agreed.

Commonwealth v. Edgin

A police officer in Centre County was dispatched to investigate a call about a possible intoxicated driver. Multiple 911 calls came in to dispatch concerning the driver. One of the 911 callers reported observing the individual driving a truck that was swerving in and out of its designated lane. The caller followed the truck and then observed the defendant exiting the vehicle and entering a residence through a garage door. When an officer arrived on scene, he observed a truck that matched the description given by the callers. This truck had some damage to it. Specifically, it had dents and scrapes, and it was missing a mirror. There was also a piece of wood shoved between the rim and the tire.

The officers attempted to make contact with the defendant. They went to the door of the house and announced themselves as officers. They knocked loudly on the front door and the rear sliding door multiple times with no response. The officers would later testify that they were concerned about the man’s well being and inquired about making entry into the residence. Additionally, although it is unclear from the opinion, one of the officers believed that the individual may have been diabetic, and this officer had prior experience with diabetic emergencies. Claiming a this prior experience and a purported belief that the individual may have needed medical assistance due to the damage on the truck, the officers decided to break into the house without a search warrant.

While inside the residence, the officers again announced themselves loudly and searched the house for the driver. They then came across the defendant asleep in a bedroom on the second floor of the residence. The officer testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and had to shake the male several times to wake up him. The officers then called for an ambulance. The defendant was taken back to the back of an ambulance where one of the 911 callers identified him as the driver. Additionally, the defendant was then advised of his Miranda rights, and he was subsequently interrogated. The defendant denied driving and that his truck was ever downtown. Police also took the defendant to the hospital for a blood draw.

Police arrested the defendant and charged him with DUI. The defendant then filed a motion to suppress, arguing that all evidence recovered from the defendant’s home and any evidence that resulted from the entry into his home should be suppressed because the officers entered his home without a warrant. At the motion to suppress hearing, the above facts were placed into the record. The trial court concluded that the there were exigent circumstances that justified the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home. Specifically, the trial court focused on the fact that the defendant was a known diabetic and that there were multiple 911 calls concerning this incident. Further, one of the 911 callers specifically witnessed the defendant exiting his truck and entering his residence. According the trial court, there were valid exigent circumstances present to justify the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home.

After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant proceeded by way of a non-jury trial. He was subsequently found guilty and he then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the officers entered his house without a warrant and that there were not valid exigent circumstances that allowed them to circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

When do exigent circumstances allow the police to enter a home without a warrant?

Police generally may not enter a home without a search warrant or exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are basically an emergency. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a court should consider a number of factors. Those factors include:

1) the gravity of the offense;

2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;

3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause;

4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered;

5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended;

6) whether the entry was peaceable;

7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night;

8) whether this involves a hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 9) whether evidence is likely to be destroyed without a warrant; and

9) whether there is a anger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.

These factors are to be balanced against one another in determining whether a warrantless intrusion was justified. Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court. In making its decision the Superior Court analyzed the above-mentioned factors. First, the trial court found that because DUI is a misdemeanor offense, this severely weakened the officers’ right to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant was armed, the defendant would have escaped if he had not been apprehended, or any injuries or property damage. Further, the Superior Court rejected the argument that the dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s bloodstream constituted a “per se exigency” that permitted the officers to enter his home without a warrant.

Finally, the Superior Court also rejected the argument that the officers could enter the defendant’s house under the guise that they needed to provide medical assistance to him. The Superior Court noted that the defendant was able to drive himself home and then enter his home without assistance. The Superior Court specifically rejected the argument that a high degree of intoxication can create a medical emergency that allows the officers to enter a home without a warrant. As such, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the officers had a legitimate reason to enter his home to provide medical assistance. Therefore, the Superior Court held that there were no real exigencies that permitted the officers to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Consequently, his conviction will be vacated and the defendant will receive a new trial. The Commonwealth will also not be able to use the evidence it obtained from the illegal entry of the defendant’s residence at this trial.

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Zak Goldstein 4/1/22 Zak Goldstein 4/1/22

Attorney Goldstein Wins New Trial in Superior Court Appeal of First Degree Murder Case

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. V.G., reversing that defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and the accompanying mandatory sentence of life without parole. In this case, the evidence introduced at trial showed that the defendant attended a house party. During the party, he was assaulted and robbed by a larger man. He pulled a gun and fired it, shooting and killing the man who had robbed him and shooting and injuring the friend of that man who was rapidly approaching him as if he too might have had a gun. The defendant testified at trial to the above facts and that he had acted in self-defense. Despite his testimony, the trial judge announced that he did not believe the defendant and refused to provide him with the jury instructions for self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life without parole.

V.G. retained Attorney Goldstein and filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, Attorney Goldstein argued that the trial court had unfairly deprived V.G. of his entire defense by refusing to instruct the jury on the defenses of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The standard for whether a jury instruction relating to a defense should be provided to the jury is solely whether there is some evidence in the record that would support the instruction. In this case, the defendant had specifically testified to his actions and that he took them in self-defense, so there was at least some evidence in the record to support both defenses. The trial judge had erred in simply choosing not to believe the defendant, whereas the question of whether he was telling the truth should have gone to the jury.

The Superior Court agreed. It reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. V.G., who would have had to serve a life sentence for first degree murder, will now receive a new trial.

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Zak Goldstein 3/15/22 Zak Goldstein 3/15/22

PA Superior Court Strikes Down Mandatory Minimum For Driving On a DUI Suspended License

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jackson, holding that the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) (driving on a DUI suspended license) is unconstitutionally vague. This decision is significant because so many individuals, oftentimes unknowingly, violate this law on multiple occasions and therefore are subjected to the mandatory minimum of at least 90 days of imprisonment. This decision holds that this mandatory 90-day sentence is unconstitutional, and therefore countless individuals will no longer be subjected to it.

Commonwealth v. Jackson

The defendant was arrested under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), which makes it a crime to drive while a person’s operating privileges is suspended or revoked as a result of a DUI or chemical testing refusing. The defendant pleaded guilty to this offense, but it was his second time violating this statute. Pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), if a person has a prior conviction for this offense, then the person must “undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.” As such, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 90 days of house arrest and imposed a fine of $1,000.00. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the sentencing component of the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the defendant relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Eid, which held that the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i) (which is identical to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)’s sentencing provision) was unconstitutionally vague because it did not provide a statutory maximum sentence for the offense. The defendant argued that this logic should apply to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)’s sentencing provision and that it should also be held as unconstitutional.

What is 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)?

75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) provides:

(i) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the person's operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or the former section 3731, because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3802 or former section 3731 or is suspended under section 1581 (relating to Driver's License Compact) for an offense substantially similar to a violation of section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days.
(ii) A second violation of this paragraph shall constitute a summary offense and, upon conviction of this paragraph, a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the defendant and vacated the sentence. Notably, the trial court had also agreed with the defendant and in its opinion wrote that he received an illegal sentence because of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Eid. The Superior Court held that the sentencing provision that was found to be unconstitutional in Eid was “identical” to the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, “because 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) does not provide for a maximum term of incarceration, it is unconstitutionally vague and inoperable for the same reasons expressed in Eid.” Pennsylvania law requires that almost all sentences have both minimum and maximum terms. As this statute does not allow for a maximum sentence that is different from the minimum, it was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court vacated the defendant’s sentence, and he will receive a new hearing at which no mandatory minimum will apply.