Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/2/21 Zak Goldstein 7/2/21

SCOTUS: Warrantless Entry Into Home Not Automatically Justified by Flight of Misdemeanor Suspect

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Lange v. California, holding that the police may not automatically enter a fleeing misdemeanor suspect’s home. This decision is significant because police have frequently justified the entry into a defendant’s home on the basis that the suspect ran away from the police and they needed to enter the home in “hot pursuit.” This decision now restricts law enforcement and potentially only allows an officer to pursue a fleeing misdemeanor suspect into his home when there is a valid law enforcement emergency.

In determining whether a claimed emergency is legitimate, courts must now apply a totality of the circumstances approach to determine whether the officer was justified in entering a misdemeanor suspect’s home without a warrant. Further, it should be emphasized, that this decision only applies to misdemeanor cases. The police still can often enter a fleeing felony suspect’s home without a warrant.

Lange v. California

The defendant drove past a California highway patrol officer while playing his music very loudly and repeatedly honking his horn. The officer began to follow the defendant and then eventually activated his overhead lights to signal to the defendant that he should pull over. When the officer activated his lights, the defendant was about a hundred feet from his home. Rather than stopping, the defendant continued to his driveway where he entered his garage. The officer activated his lights solely due to the disturbance that the defendant was causing while driving.

The officer then parked his vehicle and followed the defendant into his garage and began to question the defendant. While questioning the defendant, he noticed that the defendant was showing signs of intoxication and he subsequently had the defendant perform field sobriety tests. The defendant did not perform these tests to the officer’s satisfaction and was arrested. The defendant later submitted to a blood test that showed his BAC was more than three times the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with DUI and a low-level noise infraction. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all the evidence that was obtained after the police entered his garage arguing that it had been a warrantless entry that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Further, the prosecutor argued that because the defendant had fled from the officer, the officer did not have to obtain a search warrant to enter the defendant’s home because it was an exigent circumstance that permitted a warrantless entry into the defendant’s home.

The defendant’s motion to suppress was denied and the defendant was subsequently convicted of the aforementioned charges. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. The California Court of Appeal denied the defendant’s appeal, holding that the police are always allowed to enter a suspect’s home when said suspect is fleeing after the commission of a crime, regardless of whether it is a misdemeanor or not. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the defendant’s case. Undeterred, the defendant then filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court to hear his case. The Court agreed to take his case because “[c]ourts are divided over whether the Fourth Amendment always permits an officer to enter a home without a warrant in pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect.”

The United States Supreme Court’s Decision

The United States Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded it for additional proceedings. The Court held that there is no blanket fleeing suspect exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Specifically, the Court held that police cannot automatically enter one’s home to pursue a suspect without considering the type of crime the suspect may have committed.

Courts across the country will now have to apply a totality of the circumstances approach to determine whether a valid law enforcement emergency exists to permit an officer to enter one’s home, without a warrant, to pursue a fleeing misdemeanor suspect. According to the Court, examples of such valid law enforcement emergencies include: imminent harm to others, a threat to the officer himself, destruction of evidence, or escape from the home. If any of these scenarios are applicable, then the police will not need a warrant to enter a suspect’s home. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction is vacated and his case is remanded back to the trial court. The trial court will have to make a determination, based on the facts of his case, whether the officer was legally justified in entering the defendant’s home without a warrant.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Laweyrs — Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/30/21 Zak Goldstein 6/30/21

PA Superior Court: Threatening and Later Hitting Someone Sufficient Evidence for Terroristic Threats Conviction

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Campbell, affirming the defendant’s conviction for terroristic threats. The Superior Court’s decision in this case is not surprising given that the defendant threatened the complainant and then proceeded to physically attack him. However, other terroristic threats cases are not always this obvious. Further, the Commonwealth will frequently charge terroristic threats in addition to other crimes of violence. As such, if you are charged with terroristic threats, it is imperative that you have a skilled attorney representing you because it requires a very specific attention to details in orderly to properly defend against this charge.

Commonwealth v. Campbell

The defendant was painting the floor of the complainant’s house in South Philadelphia. The defendant asked the complainant to give him $500 for more materials to which the complainant responded that he would only give the defendant $300. As a result of this, the defendant became angry and started yelling and cursing at the complainant. The complainant would later testify that he became scared because of the defendant’s yelling. The complainant then tried to call the police, but the defendant slapped the phone out of his hand before he could do so.

After he slapped the phone out of the complainant’s hand, the defendant then went to his van. While he was out there, the complainant was able to call the police. The defendant then returned to the complainant’s house and confronted the complainant on his front porch. The two men got into a physical confrontation which resulted in the defendant punching the complainant in the mouth, knocking the complainant’s two front teeth out. The defendant said to the complainant “if you don’t give me money, I’m going to finish you.” After this exchange, the defendant left the complainant’s residence.

After the defendant left, the complainant retreated to his van to wait for the police. Before the police arrived, the defendant came back to the complainant’s house, this time with his four children. The defendant walked up to the complainant’s car and struck him with a tire iron. A short time later, the police arrived. The complainant initially refused medical treatment because he was waiting for a locksmith to come to change his locks because the defendant had a key to his home. After the locksmith changed the locks, the complainant did go to the hospital for treatment. The record is unclear as to what other injuries the complainant sustained.

The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated assault and terroristic events. The defendant elected to proceed by a bench trial. At trial, the complainant testified to the aforementioned facts. The defendant also testified. He admitted to getting into a physical altercation with the complainant over money and punching him in the mouth. He also admitted to hitting the complainant with a weapon, but he said that he hit him with nunchucks and that this was done in self-defense. Finally, and most relevant for this blog, he admitted telling the complainant that if he did not give him his money, he would finish him.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found the defendant guilty of simple assault, possessing an instrument of crime, and terroristic threats. He was sentenced to two years’ probation. The defendant filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant only challenged his conviction for terroristic threats. As stated above, he admits that he made the above statement to the complainant. However, he argued that this was not sufficient to convict him of the charge of terroristic threats because the threat amounted only to a “spur-of-the moment threat made as a product of transitory anger.”

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for terroristic threats and found that his claim was “meritless.” In order to sustain a conviction for terroristic threats, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 1) made a threat to commit a crime of violence and 2) the threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize another. The Superior Court found that the purpose of the terroristic threats statute was to impose criminal liability on individuals who make threats which “seriously impair personal security.”

In reviewing the record, the Superior Court found that there was more than sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of terroristic threats. The fact that the defendant actually hit the complainant after making said threat showed that the defendant did not merely make said threat during a period of transitory anger. What was most damning for the defendant, was that he made the threat to the complainant, left the scene, and then returned again to attack the complainant. To the Superior Court, this showed that the defendant had intended to terrorize the complainant when he made said threat. As such, the defendant will not get relief and his conviction will stand.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Lawyers in Philadelphia

Zak Goldstein 6/17/21 Zak Goldstein 6/17/21

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Partially Defective Jury Instructions Still Require Showing of Prejudice

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has decided the case of Baxter v. Superintendent Coal Township, holding that the failure of trial counsel to object to a partially defective jury instruction relating to reasonable doubt does not automatically require a new trial in cases where the evidence was overwhelming. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the instruction in question was at least partially defective, the defendant was still required to show prejudice, meaning that the result of the trial might have been different had the instruction been completely accurate. In this case, the Court concluded that the evidence was overwhelming, so the defendant will not receive a new trial due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Facts of Baxter

In Baxter, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and related charges. Numerous witnesses who personally knew the defendant testified against him at trial. All of his state court appeals and PCRA petitions were rejected, and he eventually filed a federal habeas petition. In the petition, he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to an example that the trial judge gave of the meaning of reasonable doubt.

Specifically, the judge gave the following example:

If you were advised by your loved one’s physician that that loved one had a life- threatening illness and that the only protocol was a surgery, very likely you would ask for a second opinion. You’d probably get a third opinion. You’d probably start researching the illness, what is the protocol, is surgery really the only answer. You’d probably, if you’re like me, call everybody you know in medicine: What do you know about this illness? What do you know about this surgery? Who does this surgery across the country? What is my option.
At some moment, however, you’re going to be called upon to make a decision: Do you allow your loved one to go forward? If you go forward, it’s because you have moved beyond all reasonable doubt.

Baxter’s attorney did not object to this instruction at the time, and the rest of the reasonable doubt instruction was correct. Courts have repeatedly held that this example is defective and does not accurately convey the meaning of reasonable doubt. People facing a life-threatening illness are in fact very likely to move forward with even a risky procedure that could save them from the illness.

Baxter was convicted, and he eventually challenged the instruction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. § 2254 allows a defendant to challenge a state court conviction in federal court under certain circumstances. In this case, Baxter likely alleged that his original Post-Conviction Relief Act counsel was ineffective in raising the claim that trial counsel should have objected to this hypothetical. Where PCRA counsel has failed to raise a claim, federal courts have the ability to review the claim de novo under Martinez v. Ryan.

The Third Circuit’s Opinion

The Third Circuit accepted that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the instruction. The hypothetical does not provide an accurate example of reasonable doubt, and so counsel should have objected and challenged the issue in the state courts. The Third Circuit, however, found that Baxter was not entitled to a new trial because in addition to showing that trial counsel should have done something differently, a petitioner who is seeking relief under the PCRA or in a federal habeas petition must also show that had counsel done something differently, it could have produced a different result. This is known as prejudice. In other words, the petitioner must show that the ineffective performance tainted the outcome of the trial.

Baxter argued that improper jury instructions create a structural error that requires no showing of prejudice. Under his argument, he would therefore automatically receive a new trial regardless of how strong the Commonwealth’s case was. Structural errors do require a new trial, and some examples include violating the right to a public trial, a complete deprivation of the right to counsel, lack of an impartial judge, an unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of the defendant’s race, and the denial of the right to proceed pro se.

The Third Circuit rejected this argument. It found that Baxter still had to show prejudice. Further, it concluded that because there were so many eyewitnesses who knew Baxter and claimed that he did the shooting, the strength of the case was overwhelming. The Court also reasoned that the rest of the instruction was correct and adequately conveyed the idea of reasonable doubt to the jury. Therefore, because the example likely did not impact the jury’s decision, Baxter could not show prejudice. He will therefore not receive a new trial.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Zak Goldstein 6/16/21 Zak Goldstein 6/16/21

United States Supreme Court Limits Reach of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Van Buren v. United States, holding that a person does not violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) by accessing information on a computer or network to which the person has lawful access even if they access the information for improper reasons. This is a huge win for everyday individuals because had this case been decided differently, potentially millions of people could have been subjected to criminal liability for violating their employers’ policies. As such, this decision acts as a check on the government from prosecuting behavior that is not inherently criminal.

Van Buren v. United States

The defendant, a former police sergeant, worked for a Georgia police department. The defendant and his fellow officers were warned about a certain individual in town. This individual was known to police as “very volatile” and officers were told to be careful when around him. Despite these warnings, the defendant formed a personal relationship with him. Eventually, the defendant asked the individual for a personal loan. Unbeknownst to the defendant, this individual recorded his conversation with him and then took it to the local sheriff’s office where he complained that the defendant tried to “shake him down for money.” Eventually, the FBI obtained this taped conversation.

The FBI then decided to run a sting operation on the defendant. They concocted a scheme where the defendant would run a license plate for the individual in exchange for $5,000. The defendant then used the state law enforcement computer database to search for this license plate. This would have violated his police department’s policy. After obtaining the FBI-created license-plate entry, the defendant then reached out to the individual. After he made this contact, the defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with a felony violation of the CFAA which subjects an individual to criminal liability to anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access.” The defendant proceeded by jury trial where he was found guilty of the aforementioned charge and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The defendant then filed a timely appeal with the Eleventh Circuit.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, he argued that the CFAA’s clause that states “exceeds authorized access” applies only to those who obtain information to which their computer access does not extend, not to those who misuse access that they already have. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s argument. The Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant violated the CFAA by accessing the law enforcement database for an “inappropriate reason.” Undeterred, the defendant filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed to hear his case.

What is the CFAA?

The CFAA subjects individuals to criminal liability to anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access” and then subsequently obtains information based on this improper access. The statute defines the term “exceeds authorized access” to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” The CFAA applies to all information from all computers that connect to the Internet. In addition to criminal penalties, the statute also allows persons who suffered damages to sue the perpetrators for monetary relief.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision

The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant did not violate the CFAA. In making its decision, the Supreme Court first reviewed the plain language of the statute. The Court focused on the clause “exceeds authorized access” because that was the most relevant text in the defendant’s case. The Supreme Court held that an individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization, but then obtains information located in a particular area of a computer that is off-limits to him. In other words, an individual only violates the CFAA when he accesses information that he was not entitled to obtain. An individual does not violate the CFAA if he accesses information, that he is otherwise entitled to access, but does so in violation of a company policy. The Government had argued for a much more expansive view of the statue. However, the Court rejected this interpretation because it would have allowed the government to prosecute individuals when they violated workplace policies. Consequently, the defendant’s conviction is reversed and his sentence is vacated.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys