Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/30/20 Zak Goldstein 4/30/20

PA Supreme Court: Deputy Sheriff May Not Conduct Traffic Stop for Expired Registration Sticker

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Copenhaver, holding that deputy sheriffs may not conduct traffic stops on the basis of an expired car registration sticker. In general, deputy sheriffs may only conduct stops of motorists when they observe a “breach of the peace” or the commission of a felony, or misdemeanor offense. Because an expired registration does not constitute a breach of the peace under Pennsylvania law, sheriff’s deputies may not stop motorists to investigate or issue citations even where the deputies have the same training as a police officer.

The Facts of Copenhaver

In Copenhaver, a deputy sheriff conducted a vehicle stop of the defendant’s pickup truck after seeing that the truck had an expired registration sticker. Upon approaching the truck, the deputy smelled the odor of alcohol and marijuana coming from the passenger compartment. The deputy ordered the defendant to exit the vehicle, administered field sobriety tests, and eventually arrested him on suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The Motion to Suppress

After prosecutors filed the DUI charges, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the deputy sheriff. Specifically, the defendant alleged that the deputy did not have the authority to conduct the traffic stop, and therefore all evidence as a result of the encounter should be suppressed. The defendant argued that an expired registration tag does not give a deputy sheriff the authority to make a stop because it does not amount to a breach of the peace for purposes of a deputy’s common law authority to make an arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and found the defendant guilty of DUI and other traffic offenses. The defendant appealed, and the Superior Court denied the initial appeal. The defendant then appealed his DUI conviction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the case.

The PA Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered that all evidence from the stop should be suppressed. The Court found that operating a vehicle with an expired registration, standing alone, is not a breach of the peace. The Court reasoned that a “breach of the peace” arises from “an act or circumstance that causes harm to persons or property, or has a reasonable potential to cause such harm, or otherwise to provoke violence, danger, or disruption to public order.” Operating a car with an expired registration sticker simply does not pose any risk to the general public, so the deputy did not have the authority to stop the defendant. Therefore, the stop should not have occurred, and the evidence must be suppressed.

When can a sheriff’s deputy make a stop or an arrest in Pennsylvania?

While police officers have general authority in their jurisdictions to enforce Pennsylvania law and investigate summary violations, misdemeanors, and felonies, the powers of a sheriff’s deputy are limited. A sheriff’s deputy does not have this general investigative power. Instead, a sheriff’s deputy may only investigate or make arrests for crimes that they see – this means they can make a stop or arrest where they actually observe the commission of a felony, misdemeanor, or a breach of the peace. They do not have the general authority to investigate crimes or enforce all traffic laws. Therefore, the sheriff’s deputy here violated the defendant’s rights, and the conviction must be reversed. It’s important to remember that this does not mean that if a sheriff tries to pul you over, you do not have to comply. You should still comply and address any violations of your rights in court at a later date.

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Zak Goldstein 4/23/20 Zak Goldstein 4/23/20

PA Supreme Court: Philadelphia Police May Not Ignore Search Warrant Requirement for DUI Blood Draw Just Because There Has Been an Accident

Zak Goldstein - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Trahey, finding that the Philadelphia Police Department may not rely on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement for a DUI-related blood draw just because there has been a fatal automobile accident. The Court reversed the Superior Court’s holding and ruled that the police must obtain a search warrant where a suspect refuses to consent to a blood draw. The police may not simply claim that they did not have time to do so in every case.

The Facts of Trahey

In Trahey, the defendant was charged with homicide by vehicle while DUI. Prosecutors alleged that on September 4, 2015, the Friday before Labor Day, 911 dispatchers received a call that a motorist had hit a bicyclist with a pickup truck in Philadelphia. The accident was reported at 9:15 pm, but Philadelphia Police officers did not arrive on the scene until 10:01 pm because the department places a low priority on responding to motor vehicle accidents.

When the officers arrived, the bicyclist had already been transported to the hospital, and he died shortly thereafter. Bystanders told the officers that the defendant had been driving the pickup truck. The officers spoke with the driver and smelled an odor of alcohol. They also observed that his speech was slow and steady, his eyes were glassy, and his gait was unsteady. Therefore, they arrested him for driving under the influence.

The officers spent about half an hour at the scene before they left for the Police Detention Unit with the defendant. On the way to the PDU, they were called back to the scene by Accident Investigation Division Officers. One of the AID officers observed that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated and became concerned that more than an hour had already passed since the accident. The officer then sent the defendant to the PDU for a blood test. The officers were concerned about the timing because PA law makes it difficult for prosecutors to pursue DUI cases where the testing does not occur within two hours of the defendant last operating a motor vehicle.

The defendant arrived at the PDU and was questioned by a different AID officer. That officer decided to conduct a blood test instead of a breath test. The officer read the defendant warnings which have since been found to be illegal – specifically, that if the defendant refused to consent, he could face enhanced criminal penalties due to his refusal. After receiving these incorrect warnings, the defendant agreed to the blood test, and a nurse drew his blood at 11:20 pm.

The Motion to Suppress

Prosecutors charged the defendant with DUI, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle, and involuntary manslaughter. The defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood draw, arguing that the police violated his rights by telling him that if he did not consent, he would face enhanced criminal penalties due to the refusal. In the recent case of Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court held that states could not criminalize the refusal to submit to a warrantless blood draw because a blood draw is a significant search.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion at which the various officers testified as to what happened. The Commonwealth argued both that the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw and that exigent circumstances existed which relieved the police of the duty to get a search warrant should the court find that the defendant did not actually consent.

The trial court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument, finding that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw because he was coerced into consenting when the officer incorrectly told him that he would face criminal penalties for the mere act of refusing to consent. Further, the court found that exigent circumstances did not exist because the police could have conducted a breath test or obtained a search warrant and that the Philadelphia Police should create procedures under which they can more efficiently obtain search warrants.

The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court reversed, finding that the evidence should be admissible. The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and ordered that the blood results should be suppressed. The Supreme Court relied on a number of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in making its ruling.

First, in Missouri v. McNeely, the United States Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a DUI suspect’s blood always constitutes a per se exigency that obviates the requirement that police obtain a warrant prior to conducting a blood test. The US Supreme Court recognized that technological advances such as cell phones, fax machines, and scanners make it possible for cities and states to set up procedures by which police can quickly obtain a search warrant when necessary. Therefore, a trial court hearing a motion to suppress must look at the specific facts of each case before finding exigent circumstances.

Second, in Birchfield, the US Supreme Court held that states may not make it illegal to refuse a warrantless blood draw. This means that states cannot make it a stand-alone crime to refuse a blood test where the police have not obtained a search warrant. States also may not impose increased penalties for DUI convictions where there was a refusal to consent to a blood draw. States may, however, continue to punish defendants who refuse a blood test or who refuse to consent to a blood draw after the police have obtained a search warrant.

Third, in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the US Supreme Court held that police may almost always take blood from an unconscious motorist who is suspected of an alcohol-related DUI because of the fact that alcohol dissipates relatively quickly and the suspect cannot be given the chance to consent. Additionally, a breath test is not possible because the suspect is unconscious, and accidents which result in people being unconscious are likely to be serious and require more police resources.

Based on these decisions, the Court ruled that the blood should have been suppressed in this case because the police did not have exigent circumstances for a warrantless blood draw and the defendant had not actually given voluntary consent. The Court found that if the police were worried about alcohol consumption, they could have done a breath test first, evaluated the results, and then decided whether or not to get a warrant for blood. Although exigent circumstances may have existed to do some kind of testing, the police could have quickly done a breath test without any requirement that they get a search warrant. Despite the fact that controlled substances remain in the bloodstream for much longer, they chose to do a blood test instead. If the police wanted to obtain the defendant’s blood, then they were required to either obtain voluntary consent or a search warrant.

Allowing an exception in this case would undermine the US Supreme Court’s decisions and essentially result in a finding that exigent circumstances apply in every single accident case in Philadelphia and that the Philadelphia Police are never required to obtain a search warrant. Therefore, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s ruling which granted the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth will have to proceed in the case without the results of the blood test.

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Zak Goldstein 4/14/20 Zak Goldstein 4/14/20

PA Superior Court: Overheard Statement Made To Other Patient After Treatment Not Covered By Psychotherapist Privilege

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Cook, holding that an incriminating statement made to another patient of an inpatient mental health treatment center which was overheard by a security guard is not covered by the psychotherapist privilege. The Superior Court found the statement admissible despite the fact that the guard had a minor role in providing treatment to patients and the fact that the defendant had been involuntarily committed to the facility.

The Facts of Cook

In Cook, the Pennsylvania State Police began investigating a murder in 1991. In 2016, the defendant was charged with the murder. Specifically, prosecutors filed charges for criminal homicide and robbery. Suspecting that the defense would likely object to the admissibility of certain statements the defendant had allegedly made, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine prior to trial asking the trial court to find that those statement would be admissible at trial. The statements had allegedly been made while the defendant was involuntarily committed to a mental health treatment center in Minnesota. During that commitment, the defendant allegedly made an incriminating statement to another patient which was overheard by a Security Counselor who worked for the facility. The defendant argued that the statement was privileged under 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5944, which governs confidential communications to psychiatrists and therapists.

The trial court issued an order finding that the incriminating statement, in which the defendant admitted to committing a murder in Philadelphia, was privileged and could not be introduced into evidence at trial. The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the statements were not confidential because they were made to a fellow patient rather than a psychologist or psychiatrist and because the Security Counselor had simply overheard the defendant in a public setting. Therefore, the Commonwealth argued the the statements were not made in the course of treatment by a treatment provider.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to reconsider at which the security counselor testified. The counselor testified that he was basically a security guard and that his job was to ensure the safety and security of the facility. He would count patients for their medications and meals and make sure that they were taking their medication. He would also document any unusual patient behavior and let the nurses know. Notably, he did not administer medications, he did not prescribe medications, and he would only be present for group meetings and interactions for security purposes. He was not involved in making treatment recommendations.

The security counselor heard the statements when the defendant was in the facility’s library. This was not part of a treatment session, and treatment was not conducted in the library. There were no doctors or nurses present at the time. The defendant made the statement to the other patient while they were sitting together on the couch in the library, and the security counselor was a few feet away. The defendant knew that the security counselor was present. The security counselor visibly took notes on the exchange.

Following the hearing, the trial court re-entered its original order, finding that the testimony was privileged. The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Opinion

The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s order on appeal and found that the incriminating statement is admissible. The court noted that evidentiary privileges are limited and must be strictly construed. The psychotherapist privilege applies only under limited circumstances.

Does Pennsylvania have a psychotherapist privilege?

The 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5944 provides:

§ 5944. Confidential communications to psychiatrists or licensed psychologists
No psychiatrist or person who has been licensed . . . to practice psychology shall be, without the written consent of his client, examined in any civil or criminal matter as to any information acquired in the course of his professional services in behalf of such client. The confidential relations and communications between a psychologist or psychiatrist and his client shall be on the same basis as those provided or prescribed by law between an attorney and client.

Can a therapist testify about things that you told them in therapy?

The psychotherapist privilege acts to bar testimony by the treating psychologist or psychiatrist as well as disclosure of certain records. The privilege does not always apply, however. While documents prepared during the course of treatment may sometimes fall within the privilege, the privilege applies only to confidential communications between psychiatrists or psychologists and their patients/clients that were made in the court of treatment. Not all records and documents regarding mental health treatment are protected. The privilege does not extend to reports, documents, or statements that do not contain communications made by the patient to the therapist.

The privilege extends to members of the treatment team, but to be privileged, a statement must be made by the client “in confidence” to a member of the treatment team and '“in the course of facilitating the treatment plan.”

Here, the defendant made his statement in a private conversation to a fellow patient during a recreational time in the library. It was not part of a therapy session, and the statement was not made to a member of the treatment team. Thus, the statements were not confidential or made in the course of treatment. Instead, they were statements made during a private conversation between the defendant and a third-party which were overheard by a security guard. Therefore, the statements are not protected by the privilege and can be used against the defendant at trial.

When does the psychotherapist privilege not apply?

As the court’s opinion illustrates, there are a number of situations in which the privilege may not apply. The privilege may not apply if:

The statement is not confidential - meaning it is made to someone other than the therapist.
The statement is made outside of a treatment setting where other people can hear it and no steps have been taken to keep the conversation private.
The statement is not made during the course of treatment.

This opinion unfortunately fails to reflect that the guard does appear to have been involved in treatment both by documenting patient behaviors for the nurses and that the defendant was committed to the facility involuntarily. Given that he was receiving involuntary, inpatient treatment, the court should have found that any statement made while he was there was privileged as it was all part of his treatment. Nonetheless, this opinion, like many, illustrates that it is much better to not make incriminating statements regarding serious crimes as courts are extremely resultant to prohibit the admission of such statements at trial. When the police tell you that anything you say can be used against you in court, they mean it.

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Zak Goldstein 4/7/20 Zak Goldstein 4/7/20

US Supreme Court: Police Have Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Car Where Owner Has Revoked Driver’s License

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Kansas v. Glover, holding that a Kansas deputy sheriff had reasonable suspicion to pull over a car after running the car’s license plate and learning that the registered owner had a revoked driver’s license. This is an absolutely disastrous decision for privacy and civil rights as it almost goes without saying that the mere fact that the car is registered to a particular owner tells the police absolutely nothing about whether or not the owner is actually driving the car or whether the driver of the car has a valid driver’s license. This decision continues a trend of anti-fourth amendment rulings from the United States Supreme Court in the context of automobile stops.

The Facts of Glover

Glover had an unusual set of facts in that instead of actually calling live witnesses for a motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated to a certain set of facts. In this case, the defendant was charged with driving as a habitual violator under a Kansas traffic law. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the stop of his car. At the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to the following facts:

Deputy Mark Mehrer is a certified law enforcement officer employed by the Douglas County Kansas Sheriff’s Office.
On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mehrer was on routine patrol in Douglas County when he observed a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ.
Deputy Mehrer ran Kansas plate 295ATJ through the Kansas Department of Revenue’s file service. The registration came back to a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck.
Kansas Department of Revenue files indicated the truck was registered to Charles Glover Jr. The files also indicated that Mr. Glover had a revoked driver’s license in the State of Kansas.
Deputy Mehrer assumed the registered owner of the truck was also the driver, Charles Glover Jr.
Deputy Mehrer did not observe any traffic infractions, and did not attempt to identify the driver [of] the truck. Based solely on the information that the registered owner of the truck was revoked, Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop.
The driver of the truck was identified as the defendant, Charles Glover Jr.

Obviously, this is not the normal way that a motion to suppress is litigated. Normally, the Commonwealth or Government would be held to the burden of proving that a stop occurred in a constitutional manner. In order to do so, the Government would have to call live witnesses to testify as to what happened, and the credibility and observations of those witnesses would be subject to attack on cross-examination. Here, the parties agreed to the above stipulations, leaving only the narrow legal issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car where the registered owner’s license was suspended and where the officer had not seen anything to suggest that the driver was not in fact the owner.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court reversed again, finding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion without taking any steps to determine who the actual driver was before pulling over the car.

The United States Supreme Court’s Decision

The United States Supreme Court accepted the appeal and reversed again, finding that the sheriff had reasonable suspicion to stop the car despite the fact that the sheriff based his decision solely on the fact that the driver’s license of the registered owner was listed as revoked. The sheriff had obtained no other evidence, did not know who was actually driving the car, and had seen no other traffic violations. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that it was reasonable for the sheriff to assume that Glover was driving the car and make the stop.

This is a terrible decision. Reasonable suspicion typically requires an individualized, reasonable belief based on all of the facts and circumstances that some sort of criminal activity is afoot. Here, the sheriff clearly did not have that because he had not seen who was driving the car and any number of people could have borrowed Glover’s car. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled against the defendant.

Despite this ruling, there are still ways to litigate a motion to suppress in Philadelphia, PA based on similar facts. First, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that reasonable suspicion would not have existed had the officer observed that someone else was driving the car or that the person driving the car could not have been Grover based on age, race, or other physical characteristics. Second, the concurrence noted that reasonable suspicion existed in this case in part due to the nature of the Kansas statute which led to Glover’s license revocation. Glover’s license had been revoked due to repeated violations of Kansas’s traffic laws, which may give rise to an inference that he is the type of person who is likely to continue driving despite having a suspended license. Had the license been revoked solely for one traffic infraction, reasonable suspicion may not have existed. This inference also could have been challenged through the user of statistics regarding the likelihood of driving with this type of suspended license in that jurisdiction. Finally, Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Constitution provide greater privacy protections than the United States Constitution. Therefore, a criminal defense attorney in Pennsylvania should make sure to bring a motion to suppress under both the federal and state constitutions as a Pennsylvania appellate court could (and previously has) find that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not allow this type of stop.

The ultimate mistake here by the criminal defense lawyer was likely not conducting any cross-examination of the sheriff. Had the defense lawyer litigated a normal motion to suppress, he or she may have been able to establish that the sheriff knew or should have known that it was not Glover driving the car or that the officer had credibility issues which would have provided an alternative basis for granting the motion to suppress. Nonetheless, this is a very bad decision for privacy and Fourth Amendment rights.