Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 3/31/20 Zak Goldstein 3/31/20

PA Superior Court: Hospital Interrogation May Require Miranda Warnings

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Harper, holding that trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to 1) move to suppress the defendant’s confession for lack of Miranda warnings, 2) object to the introduction of the defendant’s confession at trial based on the corpus delicti doctrine, and 3) object to impermissible lay opinion testimony from the arresting officer that the defendant’s gun shot wound must have been self-inflicted.

The Facts of Harper

In Harper, police officers charged the defendant with persons not to possess firearms (VUFA 6105) and firearms not to be carried without a license (VUFA 6106) after he made incriminating statements to a police officer while in the hospital. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of a local police officer who testified that he and his partner responded to a report of a shooting. They were told to go to the hospital to speak with the defendant. When they arrived, the defendant was in a hospital bed and had received medical treatment for a gunshot wound. The officer saw that the defendant had a gunshot in his knee area.

The officer testified that based on his experience and his observation of the angle and location of the wound, the defendant had a self-inflicted gunshot wound. This would be a problem for the defendant with respect to the gun charges because it would establish that he must have possessed a firearm illegally in order for the wound to have been self-inflicted. The criminal defense attorney failed to object to this opinion testimony from the officer.

Suspicious that the wound had been self-inflicted, the officer began questioning the defendant. The officer told the defendant that he was going to perform a gunshot test on his hands to see if he had recently fired a gun. He was bluffing, but the defendant believed him. He also told the defendant that he was going to check his clothes for residue, as well. The officer then actually administered a fake test by swabbing his hands with a Q-tip and saline. The defendant promptly confessed to shooting himself, thereby establishing the illegal gun possession.

After successfully obtaining this full confession, the police decided that it was then time to administer Miranda warnings. The defendant received his Miranda warnings and then confessed again. The United States Supreme Court has held that this kind of two-step Miranda warning procedure is unconstitutional.

The police never found the gun. There was no evidence at trial that anyone saw the defendant shooting anyone, getting shot at, or possessing a gun. The parties stipulated that he had a felony conviction which made him ineligible to possess a firearm. He did not testify. The court found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to three to six years’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation.

The PCRA Petition

Instead of filing a direct appeal to the Superior Court, the defendant pursued a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition in the Court of Common Pleas. In the Petition, the defendant alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial attorney. Specifically, he alleged that his attorney was ineffective in 1) failing to move to suppress the statement on Miranda grounds, 2) failing to object on corpus delicti grounds, and 3) failing to object to the officers opinion testimony regarding the wound being self-inflicted. The trial court denied the PCRA Petition, and the defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Are Miranda warnings required for hospital interrogations?

First, the defendant alleged that his criminal defense attorney should have moved to suppress his hospital confession on the grounds that police failed to provide him with Miranda warnings prior to questioning him. In general, the police must provide Miranda warnings prior to questioning a suspect when the suspect is in custody AND the police are going to ask questions or make statements reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement. Here, it was clear that the police asked questions which were designed to obtain incriminating information. Therefore, the real issue was whether the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when they questioned him at the hospital given that they had not transported him to the police station, put him in handcuffs, or told him that he was under arrest.

The Superior Court found that he was in custody. A person is in custody when the officer’s show of authority leads the person to believe that he is not free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter. A court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as “the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transported against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat, or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions.”

The Superior Court found that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. First, the officers believed that he was likely guilty and so it is likely that their behavior would have reflected that belief. Second, the officers did not simply ask questions. Instead, they issued commands that the defendant submit to the fake gunshot powder residue test. Third, based on the defendant’s condition and the commands issued by the officers, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave. Therefore, the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, and a motion to suppress his statement would have been successful. The Court found that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress the statement because such a motion would have been granted. The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction as there was no other evidence linking him to possession of a firearm.

What is corpus delicti?

Second, the PCRA Petition also alleged that the trial lawyer was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the statement on corpus delicti grounds. Corpus delicti is a doctrine of criminal law which stands for the proposition that the Commonwealth must show that a crime actually occurred before using a defendant’s statement to convict him at trial. In order to prove corpus delicti, the Commonwealth must show that the evidence is more consistent with a crime than with an accident. This protects a defendant from being convicted based solely on a statement where it is possible that no crime actually occurred. In order for a statement to be admissible, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti by a preponderance of the evidence. In order for the statement to actually be considered by the fact finder, the Commonwealth must prove a crime occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, the Commonwealth failed to establish the unlawful possession of a firearm with any evidence other than the defendant’s statement. It showed only that the defendant had been shot. It did not show, without his statement, that he had actually possessed the gun or that anyone ineligible to do so had possessed the gun. Accordingly, it was just as possible that someone else who could possess a gun lawfully had shot the defendant. Therefore, the Commonwealth failed to establish corpus delicti. Had the defense attorney objected on this basis, the court would have sustained the objection, and the confession would have been inadmissible. Accordingly, the Superior Court found the defense attorney ineffective on this basis and would have reversed the conviction for this reason, as well.

May a police officer testify that a gunshot wound is self-inflicted?

Finally, the defendant alleged that his trial attorney provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the officer’s opinion testimony that the wound was self-inflicted. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701, some opinion testimony from witnesses is admissible where the testimony is a) rationally based on the witness’s perception, b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

The defendant alleged that the officer’s testimony violated part c of the rule in that it was really based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that would require the officer to be qualified as an expert in gunshot wounds. The Commonwealth never sought to tender the officer as such an expert or establish that he really had the qualifications to provide this type of opinion. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the defense attorney was ineffective in failing to object to this improper opinion testimony that the wound was in fact self-inflicted. Given that the Court agreed with the defendant with respect to all three allegations in the PCRA Petition, it reversed his conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial.

If you need a criminal defense attorney in Philadelphia, PA, we can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, DUI, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 3/28/20 Zak Goldstein 3/28/20

PA Supreme Court: Failure to Provide Interpreter for Jury Selection Requires New Trial

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Diaz, upholding the Superior Court’s ruling that a defendant who needed but was not provided with a Spanish interpreter during the first day of jury selection should receive a new trial. The Court ruled that the failure to provide a defendant with an interpreter during a critical stage of trial results in a Sixth Amendment violation and automatically requires a new trial even if the defendant cannot prove prejudice (that the lack of an interpreter actually affected the proceedings).

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Facts of Diaz

In Diaz, the defendant was charged with rape of a child, endangering the welfare of a child, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, corruption of minors, and conspiracy. Bucks County prosecutors alleged that the defendant sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s minor daughter multiple times when she was between the ages of ten and fourteen years old.

The defendant spoke some English, but he was not totally fluent. He retained private counsel for the preliminary hearing, and the Magisterial District Justice held the hearing in English without an interpreter. After the preliminary hearing, the defendant requested that his attorney obtain a Spanish interpreter for further proceedings because he felt that he had trouble understanding what happened at the preliminary hearing.

Prior to the argument on pre-trial motions, the defense attorney requested a Spanish interpreter for the defendant. There was no interpreter available that day, and the trial judge seems to have been upset that the defense attorney made the request at the last minute. After the judge asked why the request had not been made earlier, the defense attorney withdrew the request and informed the court that the defendant would only need an interpreter for his own testimony.

The trial court decided to move forward with the hearing on the pretrial motions and the first day of jury selection without the interpreter, but the judge agreed that an interpreter would be provided on the subsequent days of trial. Despite the defendant repeatedly saying that he did not really understand what was going on, the defense attorney agreed that that would work. The trial judge even mentioned that they should definitely get an interpreter for the second day of trial because “we got a PCRA looking at us in the face.” Nonetheless, the court proceeded with jury selection without an interpreter. In fact, the first day of trial, which took place without the interpreter, included pretrial motions, jury selection, opening statements, and direct and cross examination of the complainant. The defendant received an interpreter for the rest of the trial.

The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges. He was sentenced to 20-40 years’ incarceration and required to register as a sexually violent predator. The defendant appealed, new counsel was appointed, and the new attorney tried to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Because a criminal defendant generally cannot do that in Pennsylvania, the Superior Court dismissed the appeal.

The PCRA Petition

The defendant then filed a PCRA petition alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court appointed counsel for the PCRA. PCRA counsel amended the petition to raise numerous claims of ineffective assistance. This led to the reinstatement of the defendant’s appellate rights. The direct appeal was denied, and counsel then filed a second PCRA petition alleging that the defendant should receive a new trial because trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to properly request an interpreter for the whole trial.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing in which it heard from various witnesses as to whether the defendant could understand and speak English. The court eventually concluded that the defendant did not speak English well enough to have his trial without an interpreter. Therefore, the trial court granted the PCRA petition and awarded a new trial for the defendant, finding that counsel was ineffective in failing to insist on an interpreter.

The Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed the granting of the PCRA Petition, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Commonwealth appealed again to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the appeal.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court, finding that the defendant should have received an interpreter for the entire trial. In general, there are two standards for a PCRA Petition when dealing with the ineffective assistance of counsel. First, there is the general Strickland standard in which a defendant must show 1) a claim of arguable merit, 2) that counsel had no reasonably strategic basis for acting or failing to act, and 3) that the defendant actually suffered prejudice. This standard applies to most situations – for example, the failure to litigate a motion, the failure to object to certain evidence, and the failure to present witnesses or investigate potential defenses. This standard is more difficult to meet because a defendant not only has to show that the defense attorney should have done something differently, but also that it really could have made a difference in the proceedings.

Second,, there are some errors that are so fundamental to the right to a trial that they constitute structural errors and do not require a showing of prejudice. This standard applies in circumstances including: 1) the actual or constructive denial of counsel at a critical stage of trial; 2) when counsel fails entirely to provide meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case, and 3) circumstances wherein no lawyer, regardless of general competency, could have provided effective assistance of counsel. This also includes situations in which a defendant is prevented from conferring with counsel.

Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the failure to provide an interpreter constituted a structural error in the proceedings because the defendant had no ability to communicate with his lawyer regarding the case during the trial. Therefore, defense counsel failed to provide the effective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the court proceeding through the first day of trial without an interpreter. The defendant will receive a new trial.

If you need a criminal defense lawyer in Philadelphia, PA, we can help.

Zak Goldstein 3/26/20 Zak Goldstein 3/26/20

PA Supreme Court Revives Sexually Violent Predator Designation

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Butler, reversing the Superior Court and finding Pennsylvania’s scheme for designating some sex offenders as “sexually violent predators” or “SVPs” constitutional. The Court rejected the Superior Court’s prior ruling that the mechanism for finding a defendant to be an SVP was unconstitutional because it allowed a judge to make the decision instead of a jury. This opinion will likely have an immediate and dramatic effect as prosecutors throughout Pennsylvania, many of whom had stopped pursuing the SVP designation in sex offense cases, will likely begin moving to have many defendants classified as sexually violent predators under Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law. This classification requires lifetime Megan’s Law Registration for most defendants and carries with it a number of other negative consequences.

The Facts of Butler

In Butler, the defendant pleaded guilty to statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors after having sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl on approximately 50 occasions. Under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), the defendant was required to undergo an assessment by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (“SOAB”) to determine whether he should be designated as an SVP. The SOAB recommended that he be designated an SVP, and the trial court held a hearing on the issue at sentencing. The judge found that the Commonwealth met its burden under the statute of producing clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was a sexually violent predator, and so the judge ordered that the defendant be designated as such. The trial court also imposed a sentence of 12 to 30 months’ incarceration followed by 90 months’ probation.

The defendant filed post-sentence motions, and the trial court denied those motions. He appealed to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court overturned the SVP portion of his sentence. The Superior Court found that Pennsylvania’s procedures for designating SVPs were unconstitutional because they allowed the trial judge to impose the additional punishment of being an SVP by making factual findings that should be made by a jury. Therefore, the Superior Court ruled that the defendant did not have to register as an SVP and that the whole scheme was unconstitutional because it allowed the judge to impose criminal punishment without a jury finding. Due to this ruling, prosecutors throughout Pennsylvania mostly stopped moving for SVP hearings, but the Commonwealth appealed in this case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

What is a sexually violent predator?

The SVP designation is particularly problematic in Pennsylvania both because of the stigma that it entails and because it requires lifetime Megan’s Law registration even for offenses which would otherwise require a shorter registration period such as 15 years or 25 years. Under SORNA, an SVP must appear in person every three months to register and be photographed by the State Police. They must appear in person to report any changes to their registration information. They must submit to the registry their names, addresses, computer IP addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, employer information, professional licensing information, vehicle information, and birthdates. Failure to comply with the Megan’s Law and sexually violent predator registration requirements is a serious felony.

Once an SVP registers with the State Police, the State Police notify the local police, and the local police must notify the SVP’s victim of the offender’s name, residence, address of employment, and any address at which the SVP is enrolled as a student. Local police must notify neighbors, the local county’s children and youth agency director, local school superintendents, local day-care centers and preschool programs, and local colleges and universities regarding the SVP. This notice must provide the person’s name, address, offense for which the person was convicted, a statement that the person has been designated an SVP, and a photograph of the person.

The offender must also attend monthly counseling sessions in a program approved by the SOAB and is financially responsible for paying for those sessions unless he or she can prove indigence. The offender must verify compliance with the counseling requirements during the quarterly registration, and failure to comply with the counseling requirement is a misdemeanor.

Many of these requirements are far worse than those imposed on other Megan’s Law registrants, particularly than those imposed on Tier I offenders. However, even someone who has been convicted of a Tier I offense can be designated a sexually violent predator.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the Commonwealth’s appeal and reversed the ruling of the Superior Court. The Superior Court had ruled that the SVP scheme was unconstitutional because the SVP designation constitutes criminal punishment and the fact-finding necessary to impose criminal punishment must be completed by a jury instead of a judge.

The Supreme Court rejected this finding, holding that despite all of the horrific consequences of SVP registration, the SVP designation is not a criminal punishment but instead an attempt by the legislature to help the offender and avoid re-offending. Because the Court ruled that the designation does not constitute criminal punishment, there is no requirement that a jury make the findings necessary for a person to be labeled a sexually violent predator. The Court also strongly approved of the fact that Pennsylvania did amend the statute to allow for an SVP to petition the trial court for removal from Megan’s Law after 25 years on the list.

This decision is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz in which the Court held that requiring someone to register with Megan’s Law constitutes criminal punishment. Ultimately, the Court has now found that sex offender registration in general constitutes criminal punishment and cannot be imposed ex post facto, but the increased requirements of the SVP designation are not an additional criminal punishment. Therefore, the Court rejected the defendant’s arguments in Butler.

It is still important to note that there are a number of pending appeals regarding Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law registration scheme and whether it is constitutional to make someone register based solely on the offense of conviction without any individualized fact finding as to whether the person is actually a risk to society. In the short term, it is extremely important that anyone who is charged with a sex offense retain a lawyer with experience in this field as avoiding the SVP designation is absolutely critical given the additional negative consequences that stem from such a finding. Our lawyers have extensive experience defending clients against sex offense charges and in contesting the sexually violent predator designation. We regularly work with some of the best experts in this field to have our clients evaluated and convince prosecutors and judges that they do not need to register for life.

If you need a criminal defense lawyer in Philadelphia, PA, we can help.

Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

Zak Goldstein 3/6/20 Zak Goldstein 3/6/20

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Court May Consider Total Weight of Drugs Handled on Different Occasions at Sentencing

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of United States v. Diaz. The Court held that a trial court may consider the cumulative weight of drugs possessed by a defendant for purposes of his sentencing guidelines. This decision is important because it allows a trial court to aggregate all of the drugs that a defendant possessed on different occasions when calculating the guideline sentencing range, which can make the recommended sentence much higher. Even minor differences in the weight of drugs involved can have a dramatic effect on a criminal defendant’s sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Diaz

The defendant was charged along with five co-defendants with conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute heroin. One of the co-defendants, Guzman, allegedly orchestrated the conspiracy. He distributed drugs to his co-defendants, including his mother and the defendant. All of the defendant’s co-defendants pleaded guilty. The defendant, however, pleaded not guilty and went to trial.

After being indicted, the defendant represented that he could not afford counsel and he was appointed a Criminal Justice Act (CJA) counsel to represent him. Shortly after his CJA counsel was retained, she accepted a position as an assistant district attorney with an unknown prosecutor’s office. As such, she withdrew from the defendant’s case and he was appointed a new attorney on July 13, 2016. The defendant was not satisfied with his new attorney’s representation. According to the defendant, his new attorney pressured him to plead guilty, did not accept his advice on submitting pre-trial motions, and failed to turn over discovery to him. Consequently, the defendant filed a pro se motion to remove his new attorney from the case. The court held a hearing, and the trial court attempted to resolves their issues. Despite the trial court’s best efforts, it was not able to assuage the defendant’s concerns. The court therefore gave the defendant a new court-appointed attorney.

Unfortunately for the defendant, his relationship with his new attorney was not great, either. On December 5, 2016, the defendant wrote the trial court a letter stating that he had not received requested documents from his new attorney. The trial court then issued an order acknowledging receipt of the defendant’s letter and then forwarded a copy of said order to his attorney. It is unknown if the attorney responded to the defendant.

A few months later, on February 7, 2017, the defendant wrote to the trial court again stating that he still did not have his requested discovery. The trial court then ordered the attorney to file a response to the defendant, however he did not. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed another motion requesting a new attorney. The trial court did not seek any additional information from the attorney or the defendant. The trial court also did not schedule a hearing to address the defendant’s request or replace the attorney. About a month after the latest request from the defendant seeking new counsel, the attorney wrote to the trial court requesting a continuance. He also stated that he and the defendant had resolved all of their issues and that the defendant wished to continue having the attorney represent him. At the April 7, 2017 pre-trial conference, the defendant did not raise any issues between him and his attorney.

This harmony was short lived. Ten days after the pre-trial conference, the defendant again wrote to the trial court stating that the attorney failed to adequately represent him and to provide him his requested discovery. It is unclear if the trial court made a formal acknowledgment of this letter. Approximately two months later, the defendant wrote to the trial court again complaining of his attorney’s supposed shortcomings. However, the defendant did not specifically request a new attorney. On August 16, 2017 the defendant’s case proceeded to trial with the defendant being represented by his current attorney.

At his trial, multiple witnesses were called to testify against the defendant. These witnesses included his co-defendants (who had already pleaded guilty) and various DEA agents. Additionally, the Government introduced intercepted communications between the defendant and his co-defendants. The testimony showed that although the defendant was not the leader of the organization, he was involved in the drug trafficking. Specifically, the calls showed that he would primarily “bag” up the drugs and that he would also engage in selling on his own behalf. The testimony showed that on multiple occasions the defendant would bag 500 bags of heroin, which amounted to approximately 15 grams. At the conclusion of his trial, the defendant was found guilty of conspiring to distribute and possession with the intent to distribute.

At his sentencing hearing, there was some debate about the weight of drugs that were involved in this case. The defendant argued that only 15 grams of heroin should be attributed to him instead of the 30 grams that the Government alleged. This is significant because U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(12) governs the guidelines for 20-30 grams of heroin and, it may go without saying, but the guidelines are harsher for 20 grams in comparison to 15 grams. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to 33 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. After his sentencing, the defendant filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised three issues: the trial court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s motion for appointment of new counsel, the improper admission of one of the DEA agent’s testimony, and finally the trial court’s attribution of more than 20 grams of heroin to the defendant at sentencing. For purposes of this blog, only the defendant’s issue of whether the trial court improperly attributed more than 20 grams of heroin to the defendant at sentencing will be discussed.

Does the Weight/Type of Drugs Matter for Determining a Defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines?

Yes. A defendant’s sentencing guidelines can be dramatically affected by the weight and type of drug that was involved. This is true in Pennsylvania too. In Pennsylvania, a defendant’s guidelines can be substantially different depending on how much heroin he possessed. For example, let’s assume that a defendant is convicted with Possession with Intent to Deliver with 50 grams of heroin and that he has no prior record. His guidelines on the case would be 22-36 months +/- 12. However, if this same defendant was convicted with 49 grams of heroin, his guidelines would be 9-16 months +/- 9 months. As one can see, the weight of the drugs is significant and one gram can make a huge difference in determining one’s sentencing guidelines.

The federal guidelines are no different. In the instant case, the defendant was arguing that the evidence only showed that he possessed 15 grams of heroin. This is significant because per the federal sentencing guidelines, that would make his offense graded as a level 14. However, if the drugs had a weight of 30 grams (as alleged by the Government), then the offense is graded as a 16. Assuming the defendant was a zero (which is unclear from the Third Circuit’s opinion), his guidelines would have been 15-21 months if it was just 15 grams. However, if it was actually 30 grams, then his guidelines would be 21-27 months. Therefore, the weight of drugs can have a significant impact on the guidelines regardless of whether your case is in federal or state court.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction and sentence. Regarding the weight of the drugs, the Third Circuit found that there was an “ample basis for determining that the defendant was responsible for at least 20 grams of heroin.” The defendant would frequently bag 500 bags of heroin which amounted to 15 grams of heroin. Additionally, the defendant did this more than once. As such, the trial court found that the trial court did not err in attributing at least 20 grams of heroin to the defendant for purposes of sentencing. Therefore, his sentence will stand and he will not get a new trial.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.