Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 1/26/20 Zak Goldstein 1/26/20

PA Superior Court: Search of Cell Phone After Expiration of Search Warrant Violates Fourth Amendment

Zak Goldstein - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Bowens, holding that the police may not search a cell phone after the warrant authorizing the search has expired even if the police initially had technical difficulties with the phone and did not view any data that would have been generated after the warrant expired. This is an important decision because it shows that PA appellate courts continue to reject prosecutors’ attempts to create a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania.

Commonwealth v. Bowens

On October 12, 2016, a Pennsylvania State Trooper observed a vehicle abruptly change lanes from the passing lane to the right lane, nearly hitting another vehicle. After activating the emergency lights on his vehicle, the trooper observed the driver of the vehicle reaching over towards the glove box as he pulled the car onto the shoulder of the road. The defendant was sitting in the front passenger seat. While speaking with the defendant and the driver, the trooper noticed that the men seemed nervous. The driver informed the trooper that the car belonged to his girlfriend in New Jersey. He also stated that he and the defendant were travelling from York to Lancaster and then to Chester and Philadelphia.

While the trooper was speaking with them, another trooper learned that there were arrest warrants outstanding for both men. The trooper then took the men into custody and took possession of their cell phones. The trooper then set the defendant’s phone to airplane mode and placed it inside an aluminum foil-lined pouch for safekeeping. The trooper impounded the vehicle and conducted an inventory search. The glove box was locked, and both the defendant and the driver denied having the key. They also denied knowing anything about the contents of the glove box. The trooper then contacted the driver’s girlfriend who gave him permission to search the glove box. She also stated that the driver had the key.

The trooper obtained a search warrant to search the glove box. Inside the glove box, he found heroin, drug paraphernalia, and two firearms. The trooper then obtained a search warrant for the cell phones and provided them to a detective with the Northern York County Regional Police Department who was a forensic expert in the field of cell phone data extraction. The search warrant expired on October 16, 2016 at 10:45 AM. On October 20, 2016, the detective notified the Trooper that he had completed the cell phone extraction, which revealed text messages between the defendant and his companion using language common to the illicit drug trade. The defendant’s phone also contained photographs of cash and of a handgun similar to the one found in the glove box.

The defendant was subsequently charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver (“PWID”), conspiracy to PWID, Receiving Stolen Property, Firearms Not to be Carried without a License, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The defendant then filed a motion to suppress. At the motion to suppress hearing, the trial court denied his motion in part and granted it in part. The defendant argued that the contents of the defendant’s phone search should be suppressed because his phone had been searched after the search warrant had expired. However, the trial court held that because the phone had been in airplane mode, there were no “staleness concerns that would be present in other factual scenarios where the probable cause determination would have expired.” Further, the trial court found that delay in searching the phone “was a product of coordination delays between the police possessing the software and the expertise to do the job.” The court did hold that any information that was sent to the phone after the search warrant had expired would be inadmissible at trial.

The defendant then proceeded to a jury trial where he was found guilty of all the charges, and he was sentenced to 15 years 9 months’ to 31 years 6 months’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely post-sentence motion. After the trial court denied the motion, he filed his appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised several issues. However, for purposes of this blog, only the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the drug and firearms offenses and whether the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the data that was found on his phone.

Do Search Warrants Expire in Pennsylvania?

Yes. Rule 205(A)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a search warrant must be executed within a specific period of time, not to exceed two days from the time of the issuance or if the warrant is issued for a prospective event, then only after the event has occurred. There are not exceptions to Rule 205(A)(4) and the failure to adhere to this rule amounts to a “federal constitution violation.”

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress. The Court found that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court found that because the detective searched the phone past the expiration date of the search warrant, this amounted to warrantless search. Additionally, the Superior Court found that this error was not harmless, because the evidence from the cell phone extraction was the only evidence that the Commonwealth presented to support its conspiracy charge.

Additionally, the Superior Court found that there was not enough evidence to convict the defendant of possessing the firearms or the drugs. The Superior Court reasoned that the Commonwealth did not prove that the defendant had constructive possession of the contraband at the time of the traffic stop. The Superior Court stated that the defendant did not have access to the key to the glove compartment because it was in possession of his co-defendant and there was no evidence presented that he had control over the contraband. Rather, the only thing the Commonwealth proved was that the defendant was merely present in the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop.

Consequently, the defendant’s sentence was vacated. His convictions for PWID, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Receiving Stolen Property, and Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License are also vacated and the Commonwealth cannot retry him on those charges because the evidence was not sufficient to convict him of them. Therefore, the only charge remaining against him is the conspiracy charge and he will get a new trial on that charge.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/25/20 Zak Goldstein 1/25/20

PA Supreme Court: Defendant Seized Under Fourth Amendment When Police Officer Has His ID

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Cost, holding that the defendant was seized without reasonable suspicion or probable cause when a police officer asked for the defendant’s identification and then retained possession of it while continuing to question the defendant. Because no person would feel free to terminate the police encounter and leave while the police officer still has that person’s identification, the police were required to have reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity in order to support the seizure. This case recognizes the basic fact that when police ask for a defendant’s identification and then hold onto it while continuing the conversation, they have usually seized a defendant for Fourth Amendment purposes.

The Facts of Cost

In Cost, the defendant was arrested for various violations of the uniform firearms act in Philadelphia and filed a motion to suppress the gun which police had recovered. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, a Philadelphia Police Officer testified that he had been patrolling a high crime area in Philadelphia in an unmarked vehicle at approximately 9 pm. His partner saw the defendant and three other men in an alley. They suspected, without seeing anything actually illegal, that something could be going on back there. Therefore, they circled the block, stopped in front of the alleyway, and began to conduct an investigation. They did not activate the emergency lights or sirens on the police vehicle.

The officers got out of the car and walked over to the individuals. They asked the individuals if any of them lived back there and then asked if they had any ID. They all handed ID cards of some kind to the officers. The officer then continued to question them while holding onto the ID about whether they had anything on them that he needed to know about. At that point, the defendant began to take off a backpack. The officer asked him if there was anything in the backpack that he needed to know about, and the defendant responded that there was a gun in the backpack. This promptly led to the recovery of the gun and the arrest of the defendant for firearms charges. The officer testified that the defendant’s path was unrestricted and he could have walked away at any time and that the whole encounter took less than a minute. He never told the four men that they were free to leave. At some point, he ran their names through NCIC, but nothing came back. He also wrote down some information from the IDs on a notepad.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court found that the officer had not seen anything illegal prior to asking for ID, and once the officer asked for the ID and then held onto it while continuing to question the men, the men were not free to leave. Accordingly, the officer conducted an illegal seizure because he did not have reasonable suspicion to detain them. This required the suppression of the gun. The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court reversed the decision suppressing the gun. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the appeal.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Motion to Suppress the Gun

The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and reinstated the trial court’s ruling. The Supreme Court found that merely asking a person for their identification does not automatically turn a mere encounter into a Terry stop that requires reasonable suspicion or probable cause. However, the Court recognized that once the person has produced the ID, the person would never feel free to leave without their ID while the officer is holding onto it. Thus, if the officer does not return the identification and instead continues to ask questions or conduct an investigation while holding a suspect’s property, the officer has usually effected a seizure which requires some level of suspicion such as reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Here, the officer had no seen the defendant do anything illegal whatsoever, and the officer seized him by holding onto his identification while continuing to question him. Therefore, the trial court properly suppressed the gun. This is a good case for privacy rights as it recognizes that a person who has been asked for their identification and has turned over that identification is not going to simply feel free to walk away without their own ID. This continues a trend of relatively progressive Fourth Amendment decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which have started to reintroduce a respect for privacy rights into the criminal justice system.

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Zak Goldstein 1/16/20 Zak Goldstein 1/16/20

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Mistake of Age is Not a Defense to Charges of Transporting a Minor to Engage in Prostitution

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of United States v. Tyson, holding that a mistake-of-age defense is not applicable to the charges of transporting a minor to engage in prostitution or producing child pornography. The decision also holds that knowledge of the victim’s age is not required to secure convictions under either of these statutes. This decision is not surprising given that the majority of circuit courts have held that mistake of age or knowledge that a victim is underage is a defense to the aforementioned charges.

United States v. Tyson

In August 2017, the defendant contacted a seventeen-year-old female on Facebook to engage her in prostitution. After communicating for several days via Facebook and text messages, the defendant traveled from Pennsylvania to New York City. The defendant picked up the complainant and her friend and brought them to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He then rented several rooms at a hotel in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania between August 15 and August 20, 2017. Phone records reveal that several individuals from Harrisburg contacted the complainant to engage in commercial sexual activity. On August 22, 2017, after a relative of the defendant brought the victim to a Quality Inn in New Cumberland, FBI agents and local law enforcement recovered her during a sting operation. Investigators then interviewed her and reviewed her phone. After they reviewed her phone, they found a video of her performing oral sex on the defendant.

On October 18, 2017, the defendant was indicted for knowingly transporting a minor to engage in prostitution and producing child pornography. Before trial, the Government filed a motion in limine to prohibit the defendant from eliciting evidence to establish mistake of age and from asserting mistake of age as an affirmative defense. The District Court granted the motion. The Court reasoned that evidence of mistake of age is irrelevant because the statutes that the defendant was charged under do not require proof of a defendant’s knowledge that the victim was a minor.

After this ruling, the defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement. According to the terms of the plea agreement, Government agreed to recommend to the District Court that the sentences be served concurrently for a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. The agreement also preserved the defendant’s right to appeal the District Court’s order granting the Government’s motion in limine. On December 19, 2018, the District Court sentenced the defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. The defendant then filed a notice of appeal with this court challenging the District Court’s order.

What is a Motion in Limine?

A motion in limine is a motion that can be filed by either the prosecution or the defense. The purpose of this motion is to have the judge make a ruling on a particular piece of evidence or argument that the party intends to make outside the presence of the jury. In criminal trials, it is common for defendants to file these motions to keep out particular pieces of evidence. There are strategic reasons for filing these motions. In jury trials, a defense attorney may not want to be seen objecting to particular pieces of evidence because it can be interpreted by the jury that they are attempting to hide something. As such, motions in limine are useful because a defense attorney is able to pre-emptively “object” to this evidence and keep it out before it is heard by the jury. It also allows both sides to know what evidence will be admissible at trial before the trial starts.

Motions in limine can also be used to preclude a particular party from arguing certain defenses. In the instant case, the Government filed a motion in limine to prevent the defense from arguing mistake of age defense. However, defendants can use motions in limines to prevent the prosecutor from making certain arguments. For example, prosecutors frequently like to argue witness intimidation even when there is no evidence to support this. As such, a defense attorney can file a motion in limine to preclude the prosecutor from making this argument when there is no such evidence to support this claim. This is just one example. Therefore, defense attorneys should anticipate what evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial so they can file motions in limine to keep out harmful evidence and arguments against their clients. In state court, it is relatively uncommon for the prosecution to make motions in limine prior to trial. In federal court, however, prosecutors routinely file motions in limine in an attempt to undercut potential defense arguments. Therefore, it is important if you are facing federal charges to retain an attorney who has the experience to fight these motions.

The Third Circuit’s Ruling

The Third Circuit denied the defendant’s appeal. The Court analyzed the relevant statutes and other appellate decisions that have addressed this issue, including United States Supreme Court decisions. In its analysis, the Third Circuit found that the majority of other circuit court decisions have held that that it is not necessary for a defendant to know that the age of a victim to convict him of either transportation of a minor to engage in prostitution or production of child pornography. The Third Circuit found that by not specifically requiring knowledge of the victim’s age in the statutory language, Congress eliminated an offender’s opportunity to prey on children without consequence by claiming ignorance of the victim’s age. Further, the Third Circuit found that any potential prejudice to defendants was outweighed by the Government’s compelling interest in protecting children. Because knowing a victim’s age is not relevant to convicting a defendant under these statutes, a defendant cannot use the mistake of age defense. Consequently, the defendant will not get a new trial, and he will be forced to serve his sentence.

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Zak Goldstein 12/25/19 Zak Goldstein 12/25/19

PA Superior Court: Constructive Possession Allows for Firearms Conviction Even When Firearm Not Immediately Accessible

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Gomez, affirming the defendant’s conviction for gun charges even though the gun was not on him and was not immediately accessible to him because it was in a locked safe. The Court also affirmed the defendant’s conviction for receiving stolen property with respect to the firearm, which had been reported stolen, because it found that the circumstances showed a guilty conscience on the part of the defendant. This second part of the holding is important because it highlights the fact that mere possession of stolen property, including a gun, cannot support a conviction for theft or receiving stolen property. Instead, a defendant must have knowledge that the property was stolen.

Commonwealth v. Gomez

The defendant was stopped in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania while operating his vehicle. After he was stopped, he repeatedly refused to provide his license, registration, and insurance information. The defendant was not the sole occupant in the car as there were two other individuals in the car with him. According to the officers, the defendant and his companions were making furtive movements and were acting “strangely.” Specifically, the defendant called his attorney and also invited people on social media to come witness the stop by the police. His companions were flailing their hands and kicking bags. Based on these actions, the officers stated that they believed they were in danger. After repeatedly asking the defendant and his companions to exit the vehicle, the officers broke the window and physically removed them from the car.

The police then searched the vehicle. They found and recovered two firearms that had the defendant’s DNA on them. These firearms had previously been reported stolen. One of the firearms was recovered in a locked safe, while the other was found in the front center console. Also, the key to the safe was found on the defendant’s key ring. In addition to the firearms, the police also recovered heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, suboxone, marijuana, and other drug paraphernalia. The defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with possession with the intent to deliver (hereinafter “PWID”), various charges under the uniform firearms act (including persons not to possess a firearm (hereinafter “VUFA 6105”), receiving stolen property, and several traffic related offenses.

The Commonwealth chose to proceed under a bifurcated trial for the charges against the defendant. Specifically, the Commonwealth elected to try the defendant under the VUFA 6105 cases first and then would try him under the remaining charges. The reason the Commonwealth would do this is because they are then allowed to introduce the defendant’s prior conviction showing that he is prohibited from possessing a firearm. In the defendant’s case, he had a prior conviction for PWID which made him ineligible to possess a firearm.

The defendant chose a jury trial for the VUFA 6015 charges. At his trial, the above-mentioned facts were presented as well as his prior PWID convictions. Following the presentation of the evidence, the jury was instructed on the relevant law. Notably, defense counsel did not make any objections. At the conclusion of deliberations, the defendant was found guilty of the two charges. A few months later, the defendant proceeded with a bench trial on his remaining charges. The defendant stipulated to all the evidence presented at his previous trial. He was found guilty of the remaining charges. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to 12.5-25 years of state incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, the defendant made three arguments: first, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew the weapons were stolen; second, that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he had actual possession of the gun that was found in the safe (he did not appeal his conviction for the firearm found in the center console); and finally that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury regarding possession of the firearm. For purposes of this blog, only the defendant’s second argument will be addressed.

Can I Be Convicted of a Possessory Offense Even if I am Not Actually Holding the Contraband?

Yes. You can still be convicted of a possessory offense even if you are not in actual physical possession of the contraband. Constructive possession is a legal term of art that allows a trier of fact to find that a defendant was in possession of the contraband even when they are not physically controlling it. To find that someone “constructively possessed” contraband, the finder of fact will analyze the facts to determine if the totality of the circumstances shows that the defendant was the possessor of the contraband. The trier of fact is allowed to rely on circumstantial evidence in making its decision too.

How Can a Prosecutor Prove that I Knew an Object Was Stolen?

Mere possession of a stolen good is not sufficient to convict a defendant of RSP. A prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the object was stolen or should have known that it was. To prove this, a prosecutor, like he can to prove possession, can use circumstantial evidence to show that a defendant knew or should have known an item was stolen. Prosecutors will often use the timing of a stolen good to show that a defendant had knowledge that it was stolen. For example, let’s assume that someone reports their car stolen at 12:00 PM. If a defendant was seen with the vehicle at 12:30 PM, a prosecutor can argue that he stole the car (or at the very least knew it was stolen) given the length of time between when the car was reported stolen and when the defendant was seen with it. This is just one example. Prosecutors can also argue that a defendant’s statement, how he was acting when he was arrested, alterations to the object, etc. can be sufficient proof to show that the defendant knew or should have known the object in question was stolen.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court upheld the defendant’s conviction for illegally possessing the firearm in the safe. Regarding whether the evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant possessed the firearm, the court analyzed the facts of the case. The Superior Court found that even though that the gun was in the safe, and not immediately accessible to him, there was sufficient evidence to show that it was his firearm. Specifically, the defendant’s DNA was on the gun; he was in possession of the key to the safe where the gun was found; and the gun was found in his vehicle. As such, the Superior Court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of illegally possessing the gun in the safe.

Additionally, the defendant’s other issues that he raised on appeal were also rejected. The Superior Court found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that he knew or should have known that the firearms were stolen. The Superior Court agreed with the defendant’s argument that there was not any direct evidence presented at trial that he knew the guns were stolen. However, the Superior Court found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that he knew or should have known they were stolen. In support of this, the Superior Court referenced the defendant’s prior convictions showing that he was not eligible to possess the firearms and his actions during the traffic stop. The Superior Court conceded “that this is not evidence that he knew the firearms in his possession were stolen…Nevertheless, these circumstances are sufficient to enable a fact-finder to infer that [the] defendant believed that the firearms were probably stolen.” Accordingly, he will be forced to serve his sentence and will not get a new sentencing hearing or a new trial.