PA Superior Court Decides Automatic Gunshot Detector May Contribute to Finding of Reasonable Suspicion

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court just announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Raglin, holding that “Shot Spotter” gunshot detection technology coupled with additional factors may provide sufficient reasonable suspicion for police to make a Terry stop. The Superior Court made its decision without any evidence as to whether this Shot Spotter system is reliable or not, including whether a gun was even fired on the day in question. This decision could have significant consequences for individuals who live in urban locations where city officials are more likely to employ this unproven technology.

Commonwealth v. Raglin

On February 27, 2015, a police officer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was working at his desk when he received a notification from Shot Spotter that a gunshot occurred in “zone 5.” Shot Spotter is a system of censors that is supposedly sensitive enough to distinguish between gun shots and fireworks. Additionally, the police claim Shot Spotter is accurate enough to pinpoint the location of the shot within 25 yards, although the Commonwealth did not present any conclusive evidence to this effect at the motions hearing in this case.

After receiving the gunshot detection notification, the operator dispatched multiple police officers to the location. Pittsburgh Police Sergeant Baker was one of the first officers on scene. When he arrived, he observed two black males in the street who were close to the location of the shot. One of these males was the defendant. When these two individuals saw the officer, they both separated and left the area in separate automobiles. Sergeant Baker followed both vehicles for a period of time, but eventually lost track of the vehicle not operated by the defendant. The vehicle operated by the defendant was observed making several turns and eventually pulled over on Thomas Boulevard.

The Superior Court then offers conflicting accounts of what happened next, but supposedly just as Sergeant Baker activated his lights, the defendant got out of his car. Immediately after this, the defendant began to walk towards Sergeant Baker. Sergeant Baker ordered the defendant to place his hands on the trunk where he conducted a pat-down search.  Another officer arrived shortly thereafter and noticed a handgun on the center console of the defendant’s vehicle in plain view. Narcotics were also recovered, although it is unclear from where they were recovered. The defendant then admitted that he had an active arrest warrant and a gun and “was trying to get away.” At this point, the defendant was officially placed under arrest.

Prosecutors charged the defendant with various offenses including: Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Knowing and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance, Receiving Stolen Property, and various Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (including persons not to possess a firearm and carrying a firearm without a license), and driving with a suspended license. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun and drugs, arguing that the police lacked the reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessary to stop his vehicle and detain him.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and subsequently found him guilty of all charges in a waiver trial. The court sentenced the defendant to 4-8 years incarceration, followed by a one year of probation. He appealed to the Superior Court, again arguing that police simply did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary for the stop.

What Is the Difference Between Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause?

As discussed above, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence in his case. Typically, a motion to suppress is a motion that asks a court to exclude evidence against a defendant because it was obtained when police did something illegal such as making a stop without “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion.” Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are similar, but distinct legal concepts. Probable cause is mentioned in both the United States Constitution (the Fourth Amendment) and the Pennsylvania Constitution (Article I, Section 8). In order for the government to arrest you, there must be probable cause that you committed a crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined probable cause as “the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”

Reasonable suspicion is a different and lesser standard. Unlike probable cause, reasonable suspicion is not mentioned in either the U.S. or Pennsylvania constitutions. Despite its absence, courts have allowed police officers and other government officials to stop people on reasonable suspicion after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. Reasonable suspicion is not as rigorous of a standard as probable cause. A person cannot be arrested or have their home searched based on reasonable suspicion. However, police may detain an individual for an investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion as “a less stringent standard than probable cause and depends on the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances.” A police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect that criminality is afoot. The issue in the defendant’s case is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first place.

Does a Shot Spotter Provide Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause? 

The defendant’s case is unique in that he did not become a person of interest until the police received a shot-spotter notification that a gun had been fired. When the police first saw the defendant, he was not committing any crimes or visibly carrying a gun. They merely saw him outside and, allegedly, within 25 yards of where a shot had occurred. Pennsylvania law is very clear that being in a high-crime area, does not qualify as reasonable suspicion to stop someone.  This obviously makes sense because if this were the law, the police could stop anyone simply because they lived in a bad neighborhood. However, if someone runs from the police in a high crime area, that is often sufficiently suspicious for the police to stop that person.

In the defendant’s case, he was in a high crime area, but he did not run. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that walking away from the police after seeing them in a high crime area is not sufficient for the police to stop a person on the basis of reasonable suspicion. In the defendant’s case, he did leave the area after he saw Sergeant Baker. However, once Sergeant Baker initiated a stop, the defendant complied and proceeded to walk towards Sergeant Baker. The defendant also followed his order by placing his hands on his trunk.

What is most significant about the Superior Court’s opinion is what was not in the record. Specifically, there was nothing in the Superior Court’s decision about how reliable this Shot-Spotter technology is. In fact, the Superior Court wrote in its opinion that it was “not prudent” to consider the reliability of this program. Further, there was nothing on record that the police recovered a bullet casing, despite the Shot-Spotter stating that a gun had just been discharged. The Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence as to whether police even looked for a shell casing or tested the defendant for gunshot residue.    

The Pennsylvania Superior Court Finds That the Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion

Despite the above-stated omissions, the Superior Court held that Sergeant Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. The Superior Court provided four reasons why Sergeant Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. First, the Shot Spotter itself provides some level of suspicion even though there was nothing in the record to indicate how accurate the technology is; second, the defendant was close to the area where a shot occurred; third, the defendant’s strange act of jumping out of his vehicle just as Sergeant Baker activated his lights; and finally because this all occurred in a high crime area.

Ultimately, it appears that the Superior Court put a heavy emphasis on the Shot-Spotter technology. In one of their footnotes, they described Shot Spotter as providing “strong evidence that a crime has likely occurred,” yet they stated that they did not find it “prudent” to know how accurate this technology is. It will be interesting to see if the defendant appeals this decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Currently, “Shot-Spotter” is in use in Philadelphia, but that could change, and it is in heavy use in Camden, NJ.

Motions to Suppress

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Criminal cases can be won and lost with a motion to suppress.  If you are facing criminal charges, you need an attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to litigate these motions, even when the law has yet to be determined. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

Hearsay Is Not Ordinarily Admissible at a Violation of Probation Hearing

Commonwealth v. Godson - Is Hearsay Admissible During a Probation Violation Hearing?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Godson, reaffirming prior holdings in which the courts have held that hearsay is not ordinarily admissible at a violation of probation hearing. In Godson, which is an unpublished opinion, the Court recognized the general rule in Pennsylvania that in order for hearsay to be admissible at a violation of probation or Gagnon II hearing, the Commonwealth must show "good cause." 

In Godson, the defendant originally entered a guilty plea to charges of Aggravated Assault by Prisoner. He received a sentence of 6-23 months of incarceration followed by two years of reporting probation. The defendant quickly violated that probation in a number of different ways, including by failing to participate in court-ordered mental health treatment. In response, the probation officer moved to revoke his probation, and the trial court held a violation of probation hearing. 

At the hearing, the court heard from a staff member from the mental health facility at which the defendant had sporadically obtained treatment. The staff member testified that he learned from other staff members that the defendant had been disruptive and attempted to escape from the facility. The defendant broke a window as part of his attempted escape. Although the staff member who testified at the hearing had no personal knowledge of the broken window or attempted escape, the trial judge revoked the defendant's probation, re-sentenced him, and ordered that the defendant pay restitution for the cost of the fixing the broken window. 

The Appeal of the Violation of Probation Sentence 

The defendant appealed, and the Superior Court reversed the restitution order. The Superior Court noted that it is well-settled that the Confrontation Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the use of hearsay testimony against a defendant at a probation hearing without a finding by the trial court of good cause. Here, the parties agreed that the trial judge failed to make any finding with respect to whether there was good cause for allowing the staff member who had no personal knowledge to testify about the broken window and the cost of replacing it. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded it for further proceedings.  

The Rule Against Hearsay at a Probation Hearing 

The rule against hearsay at a probation revocation hearing is extremely important. Prosecutors and probation officers in Philadelphia often attempt to introduce hearsay at Gagnon II hearings as it is much simpler and easier for them than actually requiring live witnesses to appear. This is particularly true in cases where defendants are under supervision for convictions relating to domestic violence. In domestic violence cases, it is not uncommon for the problems which led to the defendant's criminal charges to continue even after he or she has been put on probation. In some cases, the complainant from the original case will call the probation officer and make new accusations, and the probation officer will then bring those accusations to the judge without asking the complainant to appear for the hearing. It is fundamentally unfair for a defendant to face a probation violation without having the opportunity to cross-examine the accuser. Therefore, this rule protects the rights of the defendant to challenge the accusations against him or her in open court and makes sure that the judge does not have to make a ruling based entirely on hearsay.

Probation Violation? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Probation Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or a potential violation of probation, we can help. We are award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers with the experience, skill, and expertise necessary to fight for you and protect your rights. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges and in dealing with probation violations and probation detainers. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today. 

The Collective Knowledge Doctrine in PA

Commonwealth v. Yong 

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yong, holding that an investigating officer’s knowledge of facts sufficient to establish probable cause may be imputed to a second officer who arrests the suspect when the officers are working as a team. This is true even when the arresting officer has no individual knowledge of the facts giving rise to probable cause.

In Yong, Philadelphia Police Officers conducted a narcotics investigation targeting the 2300 block of North Fairhill Street in Philadelphia. Police Officer Joseph McCook (the "eyes" of the operation) and his partner conducted surveillance on September 21, 22nd, and 23rd of 2011. While conducting the surveillance, they observed Yong make a number of exchanges of United States currency for small objects which they believed to be drug transactions in which Yong was the seller. Based on the alleged drug activity observed during the three-day surveillance, Officer McCook obtained a search warrant for a property that was involved in these transactions. The officers returned to execute the search warrant later in the day on the 23rd. The warrant team included Police Officer Gerald Gibson. Officer Gibson had not been present for any of the surveillance and had no knowledge of Yong or Yong’s alleged involvement in any drug sales.

Relying on the search warrant, police entered the house located at 3202 North Fairhill Street. Officer McCook, who had witnessed the alleged drug sales, was towards the rear of the group. When the officers entered the house, Yong was standing in the living room. Officer Gibson, who had never seen Yong before, grabbed Yong, patted him down, and found a .38 caliber revolver in Yong’s waistband. The search of the property also led to the recovery of drug paraphernalia, including new and unused packaging.  

Possession with the Intent to Deliver and Gun Charges

The Commonwealth charged Yong with Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Criminal Conspiracy, and various gun charges including firearms not to be carried without a license and persons not to possess a firearm. Yong’s defense attorney moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that Officer McCook’s probable cause could not be imputed to Officer Gibson because Officer Gibson was not part of the prior narcotics surveillances. This was important because Pennsylvania appellate courts have long held that even where officers have a search warrant for a home, the officers need specific probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search the occupants of the home unless the occupants are identified or described in the search warrant. Because Officer Gibson did not know anything about Yong and Yong was not identified as a person to be searched by the search warrant, the defense argued that Officer Gibson had violated Yong’s rights by patting him down without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The defense argument relied on the fact that Officer McCook had not specifically directed Officer Gibson to search or arrest Yong because Pennsylvania courts have also held that an officer who does not have probable cause may conduct a search or make an arrest when specifically directed to do so by an officer who does have probable cause.  

The Criminal Appeal 

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court found that Officer McCook’s knowledge and probable cause could be imputed to Officer Gibson, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately agreed. The Court recognized the bad incentives that the decision could create for police officers in that it encourages officers who are working together to take a chance and conduct a search or make an arrest and hope that one of the other officers will later turn out to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The Court attempted to limit this incentive and its holding by limiting the application of the decision to the narrow facts of this case.

What is the Collective Knowledge Doctrine?

The Court held that the officer who does not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause may conduct the search or seizure only where that officer is specifically working as part of the same team and is near the officer who made the original observations. The Court rationalized its holding by suggesting that Yong’s arrest was inevitable. Officer McCook had observed Yong engaged in drug sales, so even if Officer Gibson had not arrested Yong, Officer McCook would have arrested Yong once he got into the house and saw him. This is an extension of the existing inevitable discovery doctrine. However, the Court was clear that it is not sufficient for officers to be part of the same police force or to be independently investigating the same criminal conduct. The officers must actually be working together and nearby, and one of the officers must have the requisite level of suspicion. In that limited situation, an officer does not violate a suspect’s rights by conducting a search or arrest. Although this opinion does create bad incentives for police officers to gamble on a potentially illegal search, it is relatively limited as it probably does not represent a substantial expansion of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

Facing Drug or Gun Charges? We Can Help

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers

The Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC will fight for your rights at trial or on appeal. Our attorneys have successfully defended thousands of cases in Philadelphia and the surrounding counties, and we can help with all types of state and federal charges in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a top-rated defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court: Trial Court May Hear from Variety of Witnesses in Deciding Whether Child Complainant May Testify Via Closed Circuit TV

Commonwealth v. Tyrrell

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, rejecting the defendant’s challenge to his convictions for Rape of a Child and related charges. In this appeal, the Superior Court rejected the defendant’s arguments that 1) the trial court improperly permitted the complainant to testify via closed circuit television and 2) the trial court should have excluded the testimony of the minor complainant because the testimony was tainted.

The Criminal Charges

In Tyrrell, the defendant was charged with rape of a child, rape of a child resulting in serious bodily injury, indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor, and corruption of minors for molesting S.B., his then 8-year-old daughter. The offenses allegedly occurred on April 2, 2014, and the defendant gave a statement confessing to the crimes on August 24, 2014. The defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession, opposed the Commonwealth’s motion to introduce the testimony of the complainant via closed circuit television, and also challenged the admissibility of the complainant’s testimony by arguing that the testimony had been tainted through the suggestions of others. The trial court rejected all three arguments, and the defendant was convicted. The court sentenced him to 50-100 years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation, and he appealed.

Pennsylvania's Tender Years Act – When May A Child Witness Testify Via Closed Circuit Television?

On appeal, the Superior Court also rejected the arguments. With respect to the closed circuit television issue, the defendant argued that the complainant should have been required to testify in open court in front of the jury. However, the Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a “Tender Years Act” which permits children who are 12 years old or younger to testify via closed circuit television under certain circumstances. When the prosecution moves that a child witness be permitted to testify via closed circuit television, the court must hold a hearing to determine, based on the evidence presented to it, whether requiring the child to testify in an open forum in the presence and full view of the jury and defendant will result in the child victim or child witness suffering serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child victim or material witness’s ability to reasonably communicate.

The statute further provides: “in making this determination, the court may do all of the following:

1) Observe and question the child victim or child material witness, either inside or outside the courtroom.

2) Hear testimony of a parent or custodian or any other person, such as a person who has dealt with the child victim or child material witness in a medical or therapeutic setting.”

The statute makes it clear that the court must hold a hearing and either hear from the child or from a witness who can testify as to the emotional state of the child. If the court is satisfied that the child cannot testify without suffering from substantial emotional distress which will impair the child’s ability to communicate, then the court may permit the child to testify in a different room. Only the attorneys for the parties, the judge, the court reporter, an advocate for the child, and persons necessary to operate the recording equipment may be present in the room in which the child testifies. The defendant, the jury, the public, and any other court staff may not be present in the room.

Here, the defendant challenged the trial court’s determination that the complainant could testify via closed circuit television. In a pre-trial hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of a licensed professional counselor. The counselor testified that in her expert opinion, she believed it would be traumatic for the complainant to testify in open court in front of her father and others. She believed that it would be traumatic because of how hard it was for the complainant to disclose the sexual assault and because many children still feel loyalty to their parents even after they report having been sexually assaulted.

The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of a caseworker for the county’s Children and Youth Services (called DHS in Philadelphia). The caseworker testified that the complainant suffered because the allegations against the defendant broke up her family. She had been placed in foster care, and she had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and PTSD. She had also told the caseworker how scared she was and that she was dreading the court date. The caseworker felt that the complainant was not ready to stand in a public courtroom and testify.

Based on this testimony, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to permit the child to testify from a different location, and the Superior Court approved of the trial court’s decision. The Superior Court reasoned that there is no specific requirement as to who or what kind of witness must testify in order to make the showing necessary under the Tender Years Act. The Tender Years Act does not require a current counselor, a medical doctor, or even a parent to testify in making the necessary showing. Instead, the plain language of the Act permits the Court to evaluate the child witness for itself and for the Court to hear from any adult witness who has the relevant knowledge of the effect that testifying would have on the child. The child does not necessarily have to testify, and the child’s current counselor or doctor does not have to testify. The Superior Court therefore held that the trial court properly permitted the complainant to testify via closed circuit television.

Tainted Testimony Is Not Admissible in Child Abuse Cases  

The Superior Court also rejected the argument that the complainant’s testimony should have been excluded due to taint. In every case, witnesses must be competent to testify. Competency requires:

1. the ability to communicate,

2. the mental capacity to observe the occurrence itself and the capability of remembering what it is that the witness is called to testify about, and

3. 3) a consciousness of the duty to tell the truth.

In prior decisions, PA appellate courts have recognized that child witnesses are particularly susceptible to the world of make-believe and of suggestions, and taint has been described as “the implantation of false memories or distortion of actual memories through improper and suggestive interview techniques.” Therefore, where there is evidence that the testimony of a child witness has been tainted, it may be possible to exclude the testimony of the witness because the witness does not have the capability of remembering what it is the witness is called to testify about.

A defendant may move prior to trial to exclude the testimony of a tainted witness. When the defendant makes such a motion, the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence of taint and the burden of proving that the witness was tainted by clear and convincing evidence. This means that a defendant must be able to show that the witness’s testimony stems from repetitive, suggestive, or coercive interview techniques either on the part of an interested party such as the other parent or on the part of investigators.

Here, the Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the testimony of the complainant had been tainted. The first disclosure of the sexual assault took place in the victim’s journal which she later provided to a counselor. She also did not initially disclose the sexual assault to investigators during the forensic interviews. The court found that the defendant failed to show that anyone had suggested to the complainant that she make the allegations or that any of the questioning was inappropriate. The witnesses testified that they did not use leading questions or in any way coerce the witness into making the allegations, and both the trial court and Superior Court accepted that testimony. In this case, the Court found that the record simply did not support the defendant’s arguments that the complainant should have been required to testify in open court or that the complainant’s testimony was tainted by the investigators.

Challenging Tainted Testimony and Tender Years Act Motions in Sexual Assault Cases

Although the defendant did not win in this particular case, the Superior Court’s opinion explores two significant issues which often arise in sexual assault cases involving children. First, it is important to fight against any attempts on the part of the Commonwealth to take shortcuts and protect its witnesses from open cross-examination. The Confrontation clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions give criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them. These clauses have been interpreted as providing defendants the right to have their attorneys cross-examine adverse witnesses in open court with the idea that cross-examination is the best method for determining whether or not witnesses are telling the truth. When the Commonwealth can shield its witnesses from appearing in open court, it makes it easier for the witnesses to fabricate stories because it is easier to lie when you do not have to face the person that you are lying about. Therefore, it is important to challenge the Commonwealth’s motions in these types of cases and fight for open cross-examination. Second, it is critically important that the defense attorney fully investigate these cases and be extremely familiar with the discovery and contents of the forensic interviews that prosecutors typically rely upon. If it can be shown through the Commonwealth’s evidence or through the testimony of defense witnesses that the complainant has been coached and had his or her testimony tainted through the suggestions or coercion of others, then it may be possible to have the testimony excluded.

Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. The Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC have successfully defended thousands of clients. We are experienced and understanding defense attorneys who will use our skill, expertise, and knowledge of the law to fight for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a defense lawyer today.