PA Superior Court Allows Individual Challenges to PA's Sex Offender Registration Statute
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, holding that, in some cases, SORNA creates an unconstitutional presumption that a defendant will commit future sex offenses. This is a huge decision because it may provide individual defendants with an opportunity to challenge their registration requirements even if they are convicted of a sex crime. This is particularly important because some crimes require that, if convicted, a defendant register under Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law even when the crime was not sexual in nature. In Muhammad, the Court found that the individual defendant should not have been required to register a a sex offender despite her SORNA conviction because she had no prior record, was unlikely to re-offend, and was convicted of interfering with the custody of a minor, which is not actually a sex crime.
Commonwealth v. Muhammad
The defendant’s sister and her former partner shared custody of their three-year-old child. In 2014, pursuant to a valid custody order, the former partner was to have primary physical custody of the child and the defendant’s sister was to have custody of her on the weekends. Both parties had written notice that if any party felt that another party had violated the order, they were to file a motion in court.
The former partner was incarcerated between April 2015 and June 2016. During this time, the child was in the care of the defendant’s sister. After she was released from prison, the former partner contacted the defendant’s sister so that she could see the child and spend time with him. Upon agreement, the former partner picked up the child in Philadelphia. There was also an agreement that she would return him that following Sunday. While the child was in her care, the former partner noticed that the child had bruises. As such, she decided that she would not return the child to the defendant’s sister.
On that Monday, the defendant’s sister arrived at the former partner’s house in Reading, Pennsylvania. She was accompanied by the defendant and her friend. The defendant’s sister grabbed the child and tried to put him in the vehicle. A struggle ensued with other members of the former partner’s family. Eventually the defendant drove away with her sister, the child, and the former partner’s 17-year-old daughter. While driving, the 17-year-old daughter began yelling for help. The defendant told the 17-year-old daughter that she was not going home.
The Reading Police were called and they attempted to call the defendant as she was driving away. Eventually, an officer was able to speak with the defendant and he told her to bring the children back home. The defendant told the officer that she was not going to do that. She would also not let the 17-year-old daughter speak to the police either. Eventually, the defendant drove to the Chestnut Hill train station where they gave the three-year-old child to the defendant’s mother and sister. The defendant then drove to the bus station in Philadelphia. The defendant bought the 17-year-old a bus ticket back to Reading. The 17-year-old then borrowed a stranger’s phone and called the former partner and told her what happened. The Reading police arrived in Philadelphia and drove the 17-year-old home. The next day, the three-year-old child was returned to the former partner.
The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with interference with custody of children, false imprisonment, unlawful restraint, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The defendant elected to proceed by bench trial where she was subsequently found guilty of all charges. Unfortunately, because of her conviction for interference with the custody of children, she was required to register under SORNA despite the fact that she had not even committed a sex crime.
Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion raising a series of constitutional challenges to SORNA. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion. She was subsequently sentenced to three to twenty-three months’ imprisonment and was forced to register under SORNA. Notably, at her sentencing, the trial court found that this was the defendant’s first contact with the criminal justice system and this incident was “totally out of character for her.”
The defendant then filed a timely post-sentence motions which were denied. She then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, she argued that SORNA was unconstitutional as it created an irrebuttable presumption that those who are convicted of the enumerated offenses “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses.” The defendant further argued that this deprives individuals like her of the fundamental right to reputation.
The Superior Court’s Decision
The Superior Court reversed the lower court and held that the defendant did not have to register under SORNA. The Court found that the defendant’s appeal amounted to an “irrebuttable presumption” challenge. An irrebuttable presumption is unconstitutional when it 1) encroaches on an interested protected by the due process clause, 2) the presumption is not universally true, and 3) reasonable alternative means exist for ascertaining the presumed fact. The Superior Court then applied this test to the specific facts of the defendant’s case.
In doing so, the Superior Court found that “SORNA encroaches on a due process right of [the defendant].” According to the Superior Court, registering as a sex offender creates a presumption that the defendant is a dangerous adult who is likely to commit further sexual offenses. This designation would affect her future employment prospects and limit her ability to obtain education and housing. Consequently, she would have a difficult time functioning as a productive member of society. Further, the Superior Court also stated that the current SORNA statute fails to provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to rebut the claim that she is a danger to reoffend.
The Superior Court then reviewed the record to see if whether SORNA’s presumption that sexual offenders present a high risk of recidivating was applicable for the defendant. In this case, there was no evidence that the defendant intended to commit any sexual acts towards anyone. Further, this was her first conviction for any crime. As the trial court stated during her sentencing hearing, this was “out of character” for the defendant. Therefore, there was no evidence to suggest that she was at a high risk to commit any sexual offenses.
Finally, the Superior Court found that there are other reasonable alternatives exist to determine whether someone is at risk of being a sex offender. According to the Superior Court, the Commonwealth could have utilized the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board to determine whether the defendant was at risk for engaging in sexual misconduct. They did not do that in this case. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the facts of the defendant’s case satisfy all the requirements that she was unconstitutionally presumed to be a sex offender. Therefore, the order that she must comply with SORNA is vacated and she will no longer have to register as a sex offender.
It is not totally clear yet what the long term effects of this ruling will be or if it will be appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. However, based on this ruling, it may be possible to challenge the registration requirements at sentencing for a defendant who has been convicted of a SORNA offense.
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