PA Supreme Court: The Attorney General Can Now Intervene When the Philadelphia DA Concedes PCRA Relief

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 32 EM 2023 (Pa. June 16, 2026), reversing a Philadelphia judge's decision to vacate a second-degree murder conviction for which the District Attorney's Office had agreed to concede relief. Exercising its rarely used King’s Bench authority, the Court held that a Philadelphia prosecutor’s agreement does not substitute for a judge's independent review, and it announced a new rule for Philadelphia. From now on, whenever the DA’s Office concedes that a defendant is entitled to relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, the PCRA court must give the Office of Attorney General notice and a chance to intervene before it rules. Justice Dougherty wrote for the Court.

The decision strikes at one of the most important programs of the current District Attorney’s administration. Since 2018, the DA’s Office has conceded relief in more than 120 old cases, most of them murders, and it has agreed to undo roughly three quarters of the death sentences that were on the books when the District Attorney took office. Brown holds that those agreements cannot carry a case on their own, and it writes an adversary into the process by letting the state Attorney General step in as a full party. For a defendant who was counting on an agreed concession to move a case forward, the path just became longer and less certain, and the AG’s Office tends to reflexively oppose the grant of relief in nearly every case.

The Facts of the Case

The case grew out of a 2003 robbery and murder at a Rite Aid at 12th Street and Girard Avenue in Philadelphia. A store employee tipped off a group about the cash kept in the store’s safes. After a failed robbery attempt, the group returned the next day, and one of the men shot and killed the manager, Michael Richardson, during the robbery. A jury convicted Lavar Brown of second-degree murder for his role in the robbery conspiracy, and the court sentenced him to life in prison. Brown was later convicted of a separate, unrelated first-degree murder and sentenced to death, and his Rite Aid conviction served as an aggravating circumstance supporting that death sentence.

The claim at the center of this appeal surfaced years later. In a 2021 petition, Brown argued that the Commonwealth had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to tell the defense that a cooperating witness, Ronald Vann, had falsely accused a young woman named Kennisha Paige of taking part in the robbery. Paige could not have been involved because she was in a residential facility for girls, hundreds of miles away, on the day of the murder. Brown pointed to four documents from the investigation that, in his view, showed Vann had named Paige and that detectives had later confirmed her alibi. His theory was that a witness willing to accuse an innocent person was a witness the jury might not have believed when he pointed the finger at Brown.

What Happened in the PCRA Court

The DA’s Office agreed. In 2021, it conceded that Brown was entitled to a new trial. The families of Brown’s murder victims asked to intervene, but the PCRA court allowed them to participate only as friends of the court, without access to the prosecution’s files.

The trial judge was openly skeptical. Again and again, he told the parties that the documents did not actually show Vann had accused Paige. As he put it at one hearing, “on the face of the documents that were submitted to me, I can’t tell that that, in fact, happened.” He said more than once that he wanted an evidentiary hearing and that he wanted to hear from the detectives and prosecutors who had worked the case. Then, after the defense and the District Attorney’s Office both told him a hearing was unnecessary, the judge reversed course. On May 5, 2023, he granted a new trial with the Commonwealth’s consent, without holding a hearing and without deciding whether the claim was even timely. The victims’s families petitioned the Supreme Court, which took the unusual step of granting King’s Bench review.

The Supreme Court's Decision

The Court reversed on every front. It first held that the claim may have been untimely. Brown’s conviction became final in 2007, and he raised the Brady claim more than thirteen years later. The PCRA’s one-year deadline is jurisdictional, and a court must decide timeliness claim by claim before reaching the merits, no matter what the parties have agreed. The PCRA court never addressed the deadline at all. As the Court reminded, “[t]he agreement of the parties . . . does not suffice to vest a court with jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 324 A.3d 452 (Pa. 2024).

On the merits, the Court held that Brown never proved the one fact his entire claim depended on, that Vann accused Paige in the first place. A prosecutor cannot suppress evidence that does not exist. The documents were inconclusive, and one of them cut the other way, because it discussed the Rite Aid murder without mentioning Paige at all. None of Vann’s many recorded statements named her, and two detectives declared that they would have documented any such accusation. Because a genuine dispute of fact remained, the Court held that the PCRA court had to hold an evidentiary hearing before it could grant relief, whether or not the parties wanted one.

The Court's Findings About the DA’s Office

Much of the opinion focused on how the District Attorney’s Office handled the case. The Court found that the Office fell short of its duty of candor to the court. It withheld a 2003 memorandum showing that Vann had named both Brown and his co-conspirator months earlier than the Office told the judge, a fact that undercut the very theory the Office was advancing. It joined a stipulation the Court found false, and it repeated the same misstatements in its filings. It never interviewed a single witness before conceding, and it opposed both an evidentiary hearing and the families’ efforts to see the file. Quoting the Third Circuit’s decision in an earlier concession case, the Court noted that “[c]andor is especially critical when proceedings are non-adversarial.” Wharton v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 95 F.4th 140 (3d Cir. 2024).

The Court then walked through a series of other cases, including Wharton, Murchison, and Perrin, in which state and federal courts had rejected the Office's concessions or faulted its conduct. It concluded that the problem was not that the Office concedes relief, which a prosecutor must do when the law and facts require it, but that too many of its concessions have gone untested and have proven unreliable.

The New Rule for Philadelphia

To address that perceived pattern, the Court used its constitutional rulemaking power to require that, in any Philadelphia PCRA case where the DA’s Office concedes relief, the PCRA court give the Attorney General notice and an opportunity to intervene before ruling. The Attorney General does not replace the District Attorney and may well agree that relief is warranted (although this particular AG’s Office almost certainly will not). The point, the Court explained, is to restore an adversary to a one-sided proceeding so the judge can reach a reliable result. The Court grounded the Attorney General’s right to intervene in the Commonwealth Attorneys Act and limited the rule to Philadelphia because, in its words, that is where the problem is.

The Court divided. Justice Dougherty's opinion drew the votes of Justices Mundy, Brobson, and McCaffery, with Brobson and McCaffery also writing separately. Justice Donohue, joined by Chief Justice Todd, agreed that the grant of a new trial had to be reversed but would not have imposed the new intervention requirement. Justice Wecht dissented and would have declined to hear the case at all.

The Takeaway

Brown is a significant decision, and for defendants in Philadelphia it is a difficult one. For years, a concession from the District Attorney’s Office was often the surest route to relief in an old case. After Brown, that concession no longer clears the path. The Attorney General, which usually defends convictions reflexively and is far less sympathetic, can now enter the case as a full party and oppose relief, which means more litigation, more delay, and in many cases a contested hearing where there would have been none.

The decision also reaffirms principles that matter in every post-conviction case, not just the ones the District Attorney concedes. The PCRA’s time limits are jurisdictional, and a petitioner must plead and prove a timeliness exception for each claim, even a claim the Commonwealth agrees has merit. A prosecutor’s agreement is never a substitute for judicial review, and a judge faced with a real dispute of fact must hold a hearing. For defense counsel, the lesson is to build a complete record rather than lean on the Commonwealth's agreement. That means proving timeliness, gathering the underlying evidence, and preparing to litigate the claim on its merits even when no one is on the other side.

Finally, the Court split three ways, and two justices, including the Chief Justice, would not have created the new procedure. The Court described its rule as subject to future refinement through the normal rulemaking process, so this is likely not the last word on how Philadelphia’s concession cases will be handled. It is also unclear how long this rule will remain in effect, whether it is retroactive to cases on appeal, and whether it would survive even if Philadelphia one day elects a different District Attorney.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, serving a state or federal sentence, or considering a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or federal habeas petition, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and we have won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

U.S. Supreme Court: Obtaining a Person’s Google Location History Is a Fourth Amendment Search

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The United States Supreme Court has decided Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), holding that police conduct a Fourth Amendment search when they obtain a person’s cell-phone location data from Google. The decision extends the Court’s landmark ruling in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), to the geofence warrants that law enforcement has increasingly used to identify suspects by sweeping up the location data of every phone near a crime scene. Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan held that the police conducted a search “because an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location data,” and that they intrude on that interest even when they take it “for only a limited time, and from a third-party tech company.”

The decision is a significant win for digital privacy and for the defense, but it does not end the case. The Court decided only that a search occurred. It left for the lower court whether this particular warrant was valid, and it did not disturb the separate ruling that has allowed the evidence into Mr. Chatrie’s prosecution so far.

The Facts of Chatrie

On May 20, 2019, a man robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. He handed the teller a note demanding $100,000, threatened to hurt her and her family, and claimed he had lookouts outside. When she said she could not access that much money, he brandished a firearm, ordered everyone to the floor, and forced the manager to put $195,000 into a bag before leaving on foot. Witnesses and surveillance footage showed that the robber had approached from a corner of an adjacent church while appearing to talk on a cell phone, but the investigation stalled and he remained at large.

Weeks later, the police applied to a Virginia magistrate for a geofence warrant directed to Google. A geofence warrant does not name a suspect. It draws a virtual perimeter around a location and compels a company to turn over data about the cell phones that were inside it around the time of a crime. The goal, as the Court put it, “is to find out who was there and so who might have done it.” The warrant here used a 150-meter circle around the credit union and followed a three-step process Google had developed with law enforcement: first, Google would produce anonymized location data for every phone in the geofence during the hour surrounding the robbery; second, the police would narrow the list and Google would provide more data, now reaching outside the geofence over a two-hour window; and third, Google would hand over names and other identifying information for a final, narrowed set of users.

The data came from a Google service called Location History, which more than 500 million users worldwide had turned on. Location History logs a phone’s location roughly every two minutes, drawing on Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cell sites, GPS, and IP address information to fix the phone’s position within about twenty meters. It can even estimate elevation, which can reveal what floor of a building a phone is on. The district court described it as “the most sweeping, granular, and comprehensive tool” available for collecting and storing location data.

Running the warrant’s process, Google produced anonymized data for 19 phones at step one, the officers narrowed the list to 9 at step two, and the final list at step three contained 3 users. One was Okello Chatrie. His Location History showed that he entered the geofenced area about ten minutes before the robbery and headed toward a residential area immediately after leaving the bank. A federal grand jury charged him with robbery and related firearms offenses, and he moved to suppress the location evidence.

The lower courts splintered. The district court found that the warrant “plainly violates the rights enshrined in [the Fourth] Amendment” but admitted the evidence anyway under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the different ground that no search had occurred at all, reasoning that Chatrie had no reasonable expectation of privacy in “two hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google.” Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit split evenly, 7 to 7, on whether a search had taken place and affirmed in a one-sentence order. The Supreme Court agreed to decide that single question: whether obtaining the location data was a search.

What the Supreme Court Decided

The Court held that it was. The analysis tracked Carpenter, which held that obtaining historical cell-site location information from a wireless carrier is a search because people have “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.” Everything that drove Carpenter, the Court explained, “applies as well or better” to Location History. The data is more precise, fixing a phone within about twenty meters rather than within a sector of one-eighth to four square miles. It is more frequent, averaging 720 location points a day against roughly 101 for the cell-site data in Carpenter. And it is more personal: users treat Location History as a record of their own movements, much like the “emails, documents, photographs, or calendars” that a person “reasonably views as his own” even when a company stores them.

The Court rejected the government’s argument that two hours of data is too brief to matter. Quoting Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), it noted that “even short-term monitoring” can reveal “a wealth of detail about [his] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” The Fourth Amendment, it added, has never been understood to apply only once an intrusion “goes too far”; it applies regardless of “the quality or quantity of information” obtained. The concern is that the government can reach “all of a cell-phone user’s movements,” giving it “a virtual panopticon with which to scrutinize its citizens’ activities,” and the ability to pick out a short window from that database after the fact is “more a practical benefit to the government than a limit on its intrusive powers.”

The Court also refused to apply the third-party doctrine, which ordinarily strips Fourth Amendment protection from information a person hands over to a business. As in Carpenter, location data is “qualitatively different” from the bank records and dialed phone numbers in the Court’s older cases, and it is “not truly shared” in any ordinary sense. The government argued that Location History is different because users must switch it on, but the Court was unpersuaded. Google “repeatedly prompts users” to enable the service, sometimes warning that a device will not “work correctly” otherwise, while saying nothing about how often it records location, how precise that location is, or that the data may end up with the government. Treating each app and feature as a separate, voluntary surrender of privacy, the Court said, “misapprehends the very nature of modern cell-phone use,” where almost everything requires some affirmative opt-in.

The holding is direct: “It does not matter if the time period scrutinized was only two hours. Nor does it matter that the materials obtained were handed over by a third-party tech company.” Accessing Location History is a search.

Where the Court stopped is just as important. A search is not automatically unconstitutional; the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable ones, and a search conducted under a valid warrant is generally reasonable. The Court called this an “uncommon, multi-step” warrant and declined to decide whether it satisfied the requirements of probable cause and particularity at each step. Describing itself as “a court of review, not of first view,” it sent that question back to the Fourth Circuit. It also left untouched the good-faith ruling that allowed the evidence in to begin with.

The Court divided 6 to 3. Justice Kagan wrote for five members. Justice Gorsuch agreed that a search occurred but would have reached that result by treating the Location History as Chatrie’s property rather than through the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote separately to say she would have gone further and held the warrant invalid at steps two and three, where it gave officers what an earlier case called a “roving commission” to gather more data without returning to a magistrate. Justice Alito, joined in part by Justices Thomas and Barrett, dissented, arguing among other things that the third-party doctrine should control and that the opinion was effectively advisory because it would not change the outcome of Chatrie’s case. Justice Barrett also dissented separately.

The Takeaway

Chatrie matters on two levels. Doctrinally, it confirms that Carpenter was not confined to its facts. The government had hoped to read Carpenter narrowly, as a rule about long-term tracking of a single suspect that left short, location-specific requests like geofences untouched. The Court rejected that reading and made clear that the warrant requirement turns on the nature of the surveillance, not the number of hours of data the police choose to take. Justice Alito’s dissent warns that the majority’s reasoning will not stay limited to location data, and points to Amazon purchase histories, Google search histories, and payment apps as the next disputes. Whatever one makes of that concern, it cuts in the defense’s favor: the logic of Chatrie gives defendants a serious argument that other revealing digital records held by third parties are protected as well.

On the practical level, the decision matters for any case built on digital location evidence. The government can no longer defend a geofence or similar location search by claiming that no search occurred and no warrant was needed. That forces the fight onto the warrant itself, which is where the defense has the better arguments. As Justice Jackson’s concurrence and the district court’s own findings show, these multi-step warrants often let officers decide for themselves which users to pursue, with little guidance from the magistrate, and the data reached movements to and from homes, a school, and a hospital. Those are the particularity and probable-cause defects that suppression motions should target on remand and in future cases.

Two cautions are worth stating plainly. First, Chatrie himself has not won. The Court decided only that a search occurred and remanded everything else, including the good-faith question that has kept the evidence in his case from the start. A favorable ruling on the constitutional question does not guarantee suppression when a court is willing to excuse the violation as reasonable reliance on a warrant. Second, this particular technique is already fading. Google has represented that, as of July 2025, it stores Location History on users’ own devices and can no longer respond to geofence warrants for that data. The lasting significance of Chatrie lies less in the specific procedure it addressed than in the principle it confirms: new tools do not shrink old protections, and the government generally needs a warrant before it can turn a person’s phone into a record of everywhere they have been.

Finally, the real takeaway from Chatrie is that the Court has drastically limited the third-party doctrine for electronic data. In this case, it applied to the location data stored by Google. But ultimately, the Court seems inclined to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in other types of electronic data where even though the generation of that data is arguably optional, the reality is that people have no choice if they want to exist in the modern world. The Court has now applied it to cell phone location data and Google location data, and it could expand into other areas. The Pennsylvania Constitution has already recognized this and has a much more limited version of the doctrine.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

PA Superior Court: The Commonwealth Cannot Appeal a Pretrial Ruling That Lets the Defense Present Evidence

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Broomes, 2026 PA Super 103, ruling that prosecutors could not appeal a trial judge’s decision to let the defense cross-examine the complaining witness in a domestic violence case. The trial court had allowed the defendant to question the alleged victim about her own dropped charges for stealing from him. The prosecution tried to appeal that decision before the trial even started. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that prosecutors do not get to appeal a pretrial ruling simply because the judge decided the defense could present its evidence.

The decision matters because it limits how much prosecutors can delay a trial. They are allowed to appeal before trial when a judge throws out their evidence. They are not allowed to appeal just because a judge lets the defense ask its questions or present its case. When that happens, the prosecution has to go to trial and raise its objections in front of the jury instead of putting the case on hold with an appeal.

The Facts

The defendant was charged in Monroe County with attempted homicide, aggravated assault, and related offenses. Prosecutors alleged that he struck the complainant in the head with a large rock and then drove his car, with her inside, over an embankment, causing a crash.

Before the case reached trial, the complainant had herself been arrested for theft and identity theft. The allegation was that she had taken money from the defendant’s bank and credit accounts while he was in jail. A prosecutor who handled the case decided to drop those charges, later explaining that the police investigation was weak and that no deal had been made with her in exchange. The charges were dropped before any hearing, so no judge ever found there was enough evidence to support them.

The defense wanted the jury to hear about this. Its theory was that the complainant had made up part of her story in order to take the defendant’s money, which gave her a reason to lie. To build that argument, the defense planned to cross-examine her about the dropped theft charges.

What Happened in Court

On the morning of trial, prosecutors asked the judge to block that line of questioning, arguing that a person’s arrest is not a fair basis for attacking her credibility. The judge disagreed and ruled that the defense could ask about it. Rather than go forward, the prosecution announced that it would appeal, and the trial was called off before the jury was even sworn.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court declined to hear the appeal. Pennsylvania gives prosecutors a limited right to appeal certain rulings before trial, but that right is meant for situations where a judge keeps out the prosecution’s own evidence. This was the opposite situation. The judge had not kept out any of the prosecution’s evidence. He had only allowed the defense to present its case. Because the ruling was about the defense’s evidence, the court held that the prosecution had no right to appeal it and dismissed the appeal.

Why It Matters

Broomes is a good result for the defense. It confirms that prosecutors cannot stop a trial and run to the appeals court every time a judge lets the defense ask a question or present evidence. That keeps cases moving, which is especially important for a defendant who is in custody. Here, the attempt to appeal pushed the trial back by roughly a year all over a ruling the prosecution could have challenged with an objection at trial.

It is worth being clear about what the decision did not do. The court decided only that the prosecution could not appeal yet. It did not decide whether the defense’s questions about the dropped charges are ultimately proper. That issue still has to be worked out when the case returns for trial. For now, the trial judge’s ruling stands and the case can move forward.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, serving a state or federal sentence, or considering a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or federal habeas petition, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and we have won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

PA Superior Court: No Discovery Violation Where Police Failed to Turn Over Videos to Prosecutors Until Days Before Trial

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2026 PA Super 115 (June 8, 2026), holding that the Commonwealth did not commit a discovery violation where the arresting officer failed to provide forty videos to the prosecution until days before trial and the prosecution promptly notified the defense once it received them. The Court also approved the trial court’s decision to respond to the late disclosure by granting a continuance rather than excluding the videos. The precedential opinion confirms that Rule 573 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure reaches only evidence within the possession and control of the prosecution. Evidence sitting in a police file may not trigger the rule’s remedies, no matter how long the police have had it or how early the defense asked for it.

Commonwealth v. Lloyd

In November 2023, police charged the defendant with arson and related offenses for allegedly setting fire to the porch of her relatives’ home in Armstrong County. After the case was held over for trial at the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a discovery request seeking, among other things, any videos in the possession of law enforcement.

The case moved slowly. In January 2024, the trial court granted a defense motion for a competency examination, and the court later ordered treatment to restore the defendant’s competency to stand trial. The court found her competent in October 2024, granted her request for a non-jury trial in November 2024, and scheduled trial for January 29, 2025.

On January 24, 2025, five days before trial, the parties filed dueling motions. The Commonwealth moved for a continuance, alleging that although it had previously requested discovery materials from the arresting officer, it did not receive a disc of videos from him until that same week. The prosecution first told defense counsel about the disc on January 22, 2025, and advised the next day that it contained forty videos, each running about half an hour. The defendant responded with a motion in limine under Rule 573 asking the court to exclude the videos. Her counsel filed the motion before even obtaining the disc and without any opportunity to review roughly twenty hours of footage or to consult with the defendant about it.

The defendant also opposed any continuance. She noted that the Commonwealth had listed the case for trial four times in 2024 without ever mentioning outstanding discovery, and she attributed the late production to the “bad conduct of the arresting officer.” She argued that a continuance was “not feasible” because she remained in custody and her competency might deteriorate while she waited still longer for trial. In her view, the Commonwealth had more than a year to obtain and review the videos, and its continuance request was a last-minute reaction to her motion to exclude them.

The trial court summarily denied the motion in limine, granted the continuance, and rescheduled the non-jury trial for April 1, 2025. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the videos without further objection from the defense. The footage included gas station security video of the defendant pumping gasoline into a container and carrying it away on foot, along with residential videos showing her walking toward the fire scene with the container and later walking away and discarding the container in a dumpster. The trial court found the defendant guilty and later sentenced her to three to seven years of incarceration. After the court denied her post-sentence motion, she appealed, arguing that the videos should have been excluded and the continuance denied.

Rule 573 and the Remedies for Late Disclosure

Rule 573(B)(1)(f) requires the Commonwealth, on request, to disclose tangible objects, including documents and photographs, that are material to the case. The Commonwealth also has a continuing duty under Rule 573(D) to disclose additional evidence and to promptly notify the defendant when new material surfaces. If a court finds a discovery violation, Rule 573(E) gives it broad discretion to choose a remedy, which can include excluding the evidence.

The case law places an important limit on the rule, however. The Commonwealth need not turn over evidence that is not within its possession or control. As the Superior Court explained in Commonwealth v. Long, 753 A.2d 272, 278 (Pa. Super. 2000), “[o]ur cases uniformly hold that the prosecution does not violate discovery rules when it fails to provide the defense with evidence that it does not possess and of which it is unaware during pre-trial discovery, as when the evidence is in police custody.”

Even when a violation occurs, exclusion is the exception. The Superior Court has suggested that in most cases, “[a] continuance is appropriate where the undisclosed statement or other evidence is admissible and the defendant’s only prejudice is surprise.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 955 A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. Super. 2008). Absent any violation, Rule 106(A) permits the trial court to grant a continuance “in the interests of justice.”

One caveat is worth noting. Rule 573 does not alter the Commonwealth’s obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which extend to favorable evidence in the possession of the police even when the prosecutor is unaware of it. Lloyd did not argue that Brady was at issue in her appeal.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed. Reviewing the evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, the Court concluded that Lloyd never established a discovery violation in the first place. The disclosure duty imposed by Rule 573 extends to evidence in the Commonwealth’s possession and control, not evidence that sits solely in police custody. Lloyd did not dispute that the videos remained with the police until the prosecution received them shortly before the scheduled trial date, or that the prosecution promptly notified her counsel once it had them. She also pointed to no facts suggesting the prosecution knew of or had access to the videos any earlier.

The Court acknowledged Lloyd’s frustration with the Commonwealth’s repeated trial listings that made no mention of outstanding discovery, but it held that this was not the type of delay Rule 573 was intended to address. The Court reiterated that “Rule 573 . . . does not, itself, impose a duty of due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth.” The rule requires prompt notification of additional evidence, and the prosecution provided it.

Because there was no violation, the remedies provision of Rule 573(E) never came into play, and the trial court properly denied the motion in limine. The Superior Court likewise found no abuse of discretion in the continuance, endorsing the trial court’s explanation:

The interests of justice required that both sides have a reasonable opportunity to review the new evidence, whether inculpatory, exculpatory, or neither. . . . [S]imply postponing the trial was the proper way to protect [Lloyd]’s right to a fair trial. Precluding evidence that had not been reviewed by either the Commonwealth or [Lloyd] was not the solution.

The panel added that even if the Commonwealth had violated Rule 573, the trial court still would not have abused its discretion by ordering a continuance as the remedy for the late disclosure.

The Takeaway

The decision draws a hard line between the police and the prosecution for discovery purposes, and that line seems inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s Brady obligations. A defendant can request videos at the outset of the case, the police can hold them for more than a year, and the defense still has no remedy under Rule 573 so long as the prosecutor discloses the evidence quickly once it finally arrives. For a defendant in custody, the consequences are real. The defendant waited in jail for an additional two months while the parties reviewed footage that, in her view, the Commonwealth should have obtained long before, and she did so while her competency remained a serious concern.

The opinion also shows where the fight has to happen in these cases. The outcome might be different if the defense can establish that the prosecution itself knew of or had access to the evidence earlier, so counsel should press for a record of when the district attorney’s office learned of the material rather than focusing only on when the police collected it. The defendant did not develop that record, and the Superior Court noted that she made no attempt to do so even at the post-sentence stage. Claims involving favorable evidence stand on different footing as well. Brady reaches favorable evidence in police hands regardless of what the prosecutor knows, so late-surfacing material that actually helps the defense presents a much stronger claim. The defendant may have also had a viable Rule 600 speedy trial motion due to the delays as the Commonwealth must exercise due diligence during the life of the case and may not juts seek continuances indefinitely.

Lloyd also confirms how difficult it may be to win exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction in Pennsylvania. But the analysis also took place based on what the trial court did, and appellate courts are often deferential to the trial courts on review in these types of cases. Courts typically treat a continuance as the standard cure when the only prejudice is surprise, even on the eve of trial and even when the defendant is in custody. A defendant seeking exclusion generally needs to show something more, such as evidence that the prosecution withheld material it actually possessed or prejudice that additional time cannot fix in order to win an appeal. In practice, however, many trial courts may exclude the evidence or dismiss a case, or the continuance may trigger a speedy trial problem for the Commonwealth.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.