Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 9/27/18 Zak Goldstein 9/27/18

PA Supreme Court Permits Filing of Second PCRA Where Attorney Filed First Petition Too Late

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Peterson. In Peterson, the Court held that where a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) Petitioner’s lawyer files the petition late, thereby resulting in the dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with the Act’s procedural requirements, the Petitioner may file a second PCRA Petition even outside of the one-year deadline for filing a PCRA. This is a great decision by the Court. It recognizes that a criminal defendant should not lose the ability to file a PCRA solely because a defense attorney, without telling the defendant, provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a PCRA Petition on time.

The Facts of Peterson

In Peterson, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder in 1993 and received two consecutive life sentences. In 1995, the General Assembly enacted major amendments to Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, including an amendment which required that all petitions be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. The amendments included three exceptions to the one-year deadline. The relevant exception in this case provides: “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”

These amendments gave Peterson the right to file a PCRA by January 16, 1997. Peterson’s family retained a private attorney to file a PCRA. The attorney drafted the PCRA but filed it one day late on January 17, 1997. The petition alleged that Peterson was not competent to plead guilty and therefore his plea was not a knowing, intentional, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights because Peterson had suffered a gunshot wound to his head that damaged the frontal lobes of his brain.

The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing and gave defense counsel time to obtain an expert to provide an opinion on Peterson’s mental competency at the time of the guilty plea. The court scheduled a hearing on November 5, 1997. The hearing apparently never took place on that date, and the docket does not indicate the reason why did it did not take place. Nothing happened for nearly fifteen years.

In September 2012, Peterson wrote a letter to the clerk of courts asking about the status of his case. The PCRA court then rescheduled the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, a doctor testified that Peterson suffered brain damage prior to his plea and that he would not have had the ability to comprehend his position as one accused of murder. The doctor further opined that Peterson would not have been able to cooperate with his criminal defense lawyer and participate in his own defense.

Although not relevant to the disposition of the appeal, It is important to note that PCRA litigation often requires the defense to present actual evidence or expert testimony. It is not enough merely to allege in a Petition that a defense attorney should have retained the services of an expert witness. Instead, the defense attorney generally must retain, identify, and usually provide a report for the expert witness prior to filing the PCRA Petition or the defendant will not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The Commonwealth did not hire its own expert. Instead, it called Peterson’s trial attorney and probation officer to testify. They both testified that they interviewed Peterson prior to the plea and he understood what was going on. The PCRA Court found the trial attorney and probation officer more credible and denied the Petition.

The Superior Court Appeal

Peterson appealed the denial of the PCRA Petition to the Superior Court. The Superior Court, acting sua sponte (meaning on its own), recognized that the first PCRA Petition had been filed one day beyond the relevant deadline. Therefore, the Superior Court quashed the appeal without reaching the merits of whether the PCRA Court properly denied the petition.

Peterson then filed a second PCRA Petition, asking the trial court to reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc due to the ineffective assistance of counsel provided by the attorney who filed the first petition late. The trial court granted that second petition. It ruled that Peterson did not know of the deadline, did not know that his attorney had missed the deadline, and that Peterson could not have known these facts until he received the Superior Court’s opinion dismissing the direct appeal. Therefore, the trial court reinstated his appellate rights under the previously-mentioned exception to the one-year deadline.

With his appellate rights reinstated, Peterson again appealed the denial of the petition to the Superior Court. The Commonwealth also appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have reinstated Peterson’s right to appeal. The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth and again dismissed the appeal. The Court found that Peterson’s lawyer had not abandoned him but had simply filed a petition late. The Court held that while the PCRA timeliness requirements sometimes require harsh outcomes, the PCRA confers no authority to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.

The Petition for Allowance of Appeal

Peterson filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal and ultimately reversed the decision of the Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the complete abandonment of a petitioner by counsel has previously qualified petitioners for the after-discovered evidence time bar. At the same time, the failure of a PCRA lawyer to raise the best possible claims has traditionally not provided petitioners with a basis for filling subsequent petitions beyond the one-year deadline. Thus, the Court recognized that there is a difference between a complete deprivation of a petitioner’s rights, in which the petitioner cannot have any issues addressed at all, and an allegation that a PCRA lawyer should have raised certain claims instead of others.

The Court found that this case resulted in a complete deprivation of rights due to the obvious ineffective assistance of counsel in filing the petition late. Therefore, the Court found that Peterson qualified for the after-discovered evidence exception. Peterson was completely deprived of any consideration of his PCRA Petition. His lawyer’s ineffectiveness was a newly discovered fact, and Peterson did not know of this fact and could not have known of this fact through the exercise of due diligence. He filed his second PCRA Petition within sixty days after he learned that the petition had been filed late. Therefore, the Superior Court erred in dismissing the appeal, and Peterson will be entitled to have the appeal heard on the merits.

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If you are facing criminal charges, have been arrested, or are considering an appeal, we can help. Our experienced and understanding criminal defense attorneys have successfully defended thousands of clients. We have won cases involving serious charges like Homicide, Robbery, Rape, as well as appeals and PCRA Petitions. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 9/19/18 Zak Goldstein 9/19/18

U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Reverses Murder Conviction for Failure to Present Cogent Defense

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, et. al., holding that trial counsel’s failure to present a cogent defense based on the actual evidence presented at trial constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court found that because defense counsel’s entire defense was based on facts which were not at all based on the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, defense counsel was ineffective in defending Workman.

The Facts of Workman

In August 2006, Workman’s co-defendant shot the victim during an accident which occurred in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Hearing the shots, the defendant found the victim and co-defendant and then proceeded to shoot at the co-defendant a total of eight times. One of these bullets ricocheted off a solid object and struck the victim in the chest. The victim also had been shot by the co-defendant. Unfortunately, the victim died as a result of his injuries. According to the assistant medical examiner who testified a trial, either of the two bullets that struck the victim could have caused his death.

Workman and the co-defendant were charged with first-degree murder. Prior to the trial, the Commonwealth offered Workman a plea bargain of twenty years of incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea. Workman rejected this offer because, according to trial counsel, he could not be convicted for killing someone who was already dead. This theory was problematic because the facts did not support trial counsel’s theory because it was unclear as to whether or not the victim was still alive when Workman’s bullet struck him.

What is Transferred Intent?

Despite the undisputed fact that Workman did not intend to kill the victim, the Commonwealth proceeded on the theory of transferred intent and argued that Workman, in firing at the co-defendant, had intended to illegally kill the co-defendant. Therefore, his intent to kill co-defendant transferred when his bullet struck the victim. At trial, the medical examiner would testify that the wound to the victim’s chest, caused by the ricocheted bullet fired by Workman, was “much more immediately fatal,” but that the other bullet fired by the co-defendant could have caused death. Despite the evidence to the contrary, Workman’s defense attorney proceeded under the theory that the victim was already dead when Workman’s bullet struck him. Further, Workman did not present any evidence at his trial. Additionally, his trial counsel’s opening statement was five sentences long. The defense lawyer simply stated that the defense did not plan to present any evidence.

After the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Workman’s trial attorney made a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that Workman could not be convicted of killing the victim because the victim was already dead. Workman’s trial attorney did this despite the fact that the evidence of record did not support this claim. The medical examiner had specifically testified that Workman’s bullet could have been the cause of death, and no one testified to the contrary or otherwise rebutted that testimony. The trial court denied trial counsel’s motion. Undeterred, trial counsel made the same argument during closing argument to the jury. Unfortunately for Workman, the jury was not persuaded, and it convicted Defendant of first-degree murder. The jury acquitted the co-defendant. Workman received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. He filed direct appeals that were ultimately denied, and after his appeals were resolved, he filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

Workman’s first PCRA petition was denied. Notably, in this petition, his PCRA lawyer did not allege that his trial counsel failed to present a realistic defense or that he provided incorrect advice that led Defendant to reject a plea offer. Instead, his PCRA attorney alleged that trial counsel’s only failure was in not requesting a jury instruction that indicated that the transferred intent doctrine also applied to Workman’s claim of defense of use of force to protect a third person. This was a bad claim for a PCRA because the jury instruction had actually been provided to the jury.

Habeas Petition

Workman then filed a pro se habeas petition to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In his petition, he alleged that because of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance, he rejected a guilty plea and did not testify. Defendant’s habeas petition was subsequently denied by the federal district court, and he then appealed to the Third Circuit. Although not addressed in this article, a considerable portion of the Third Circuit’s opinion focused on the procedural issues and whether or not Workman’s petition could be heard at all because of his failure to raise the issues in his PCRA petition. The Third Circuit held that the PCRA lawyer was ineffective in failing to raise these issues in his PCRA petition. Therefore, Workman should not be penalized for the lawyer’s ineffectiveness and could proceed on the merits.

What is Ineffective Assistance of Counsel?

In Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court held that if you are charged with a crime, you are entitled to an attorney. In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to a constitutionally adept attorney. In other words, if a defendant’s attorney is so bad, it is possible that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel could be violated. In Pennsylvania, if you wish to proceed with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, you must file a PCRA petition (as the defendant in this case did). Over the years, both Pennsylvania and Federal courts have made it relatively difficult to prevail on these claims. The courts give great deference to the trial attorney’s strategy. Nonetheless, if a petitioner can show that his claim has arguable merit, no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act, and the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, then he or she may be successful in getting a new trial.

Third Circuit Holds that Both the PCRA and Trial Attorneys Were Ineffective

In Workman, the Third Circuit was merciless in its criticism of Workman’s trial and PCRA attorneys. In regards to his PCRA attorney, the Court stated “it appears that [PCRA] counsel’s claim was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that was actually given. This is the epitome of a doomed claim.” Because he did not raise any of the obvious and legitimate claims that should have been raised, the Third Circuit found that he was ineffective. Consequently, because defendant’s PCRA counsel was ineffective, he was still eligible for relief despite the procedural failures of his PCRA and habeas petitions.

The Court then addressed his trial attorney’s failures. The Court stated that “counsel’s utter and complete failure to test the Commonwealth’s case with appropriate cross-examination of [the medical examiner], his failure to present witnesses…in support of his position, or to adapt his argument to the testimony in evidence” rendered him ineffective. Further, the Court also held that his counsel “acted as not an advocate of is client but of his theory” and that he “fail[ed] to understand what was happening in the case in which he was ostensibly participating.” As such, because Workman’s trial counsel failed to adapt to the evidence that was presented at trial, he was ineffective. Workman will receive a new trial.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 8/28/18 Zak Goldstein 8/28/18

PA Supreme Court: Prosecutor May Call Defendant Dangerous, Cold-Blooded Killer During Closing Argument

Criminal Defense Lawyer - Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Clancy, clarifying what type of rhetoric prosecutors may use during closing arguments. This decision arguably provides prosecutors with more leeway to use prejudicial, inflammatory euphemisms and to categorize the defendant in a negative way during closing.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Clancy

In Clancy, the defendant was charged with shooting and killing the decedent in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania following a physical altercation. After the physical altercation, the defendant allegedly pulled a gun and fired multiple shots at the decedent. The decedent was hit three times in the back and died. After the shooting, the defendant had a polite conversation with an individual in a convenience store who had nothing to do with the incident. The defendant then fled to Pittsburgh and evaded arrests for a few months. He eventually turned himself in.

Prosecutors charged the defendant with first degree murder and carrying a firearm without a license. At trial, the defense’s strategy was to argue that his actions did not amount to first-degree murder because he “had been moved by passion as a result of the fight with [complainant]." The defendant testified at his trial and stated that “[his] anger took over [him].” He further testified that he neither aimed the gun at the complainant or intended to shoot him. This type of argument, if believed by the jury, could have led to a conviction for third degree murder or some form of manslaughter. Although manslaughter and third degree murder still typically carry significant jail time, that can be a "win" in a murder case because a conviction for first degree murder requires to judge to impose a mandatory sentence of life without parole.

The Commonwealth presented several witnesses to the fight. Additionally, prosecutors showed a video that partially depicted some of the events at issue. Finally, during closing argument, the prosecutor referred to Defendant as “a dangerous man” and a “cold-blooded killer.” Defense counsel did not object to this characterization.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of all charges. The judge sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as required for a conviction for first-degree murder. The defendant then filed several post-sentence motions, which were denied. He appealed to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal.

Following the conclusion of the direct appeal proceedings, the defendant then filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act “PCRA” petition. In his petition, he claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object during closing arguments when the prosecutor referred to the defendant as a “dangerous man” and a “cold-blooded killer.” The petition further alleged that the prosecutor’s statements amounted to an impermissible expression of personal belief and that these statements inflamed the jury. Accordingly, the petition sought a new trial at which the Commonwealth would be barred from making such inflammatory arguments.

In response to the filing of the Petition, the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the trial attorney was called to testify. He testified that he did not believe that the prosecutor’s arguments were objectionable and that he thought it was strategic not to object. The PCRA court denied the defendant’s PCRA Petition, and he filed an appeal of the PCRA court's ruling to the Superior Court.

What is Ineffective Assistance of Counsel?

Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act allows for a defendant to obtain a new trial if his or her trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective. In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant has to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the ineffectiveness of his or her trial lawyer “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” More specifically, a defendant must show that 1) the underlying legal claim was of arguable merit; 2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and 3) the petitioner was prejudiced—that is, but for counsel’s deficient stewardship, there is a reasonable likelihood the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. If the defendant fails to prove any of these elements, then he or she will not be successful in PCRA litigation.

What May Prosecutors Say During Closing Argument?

A prosecutor has significant leeway in what he or she can say during closing argument, but there are limits. When a prosecutor goes beyond the limits, then a new trial may be granted by the trial court, on appeal, or in PCRA litigation. The most obvious restriction is that a prosecutor may not argue evidence that is not in the record. For example, assuming that a motion to suppress was granted because the police engaged in illegal conduct, the prosecutor could not make reference to the evidence that was suppressed.

However, more relevant for the instant case, a prosecutor is also limited in how they characterize the defendant and the evidence in the case. This is because appellate courts have recognized that the jury may attach special importance to the arguments of the prosecutor by virtue of the office the prosecutor holds. For example, a prosecutor may not state his or her personal belief in the guilt of the defendant. They also may not use many epithets. Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that a prosecutor may not employ direct or indirect personal assertions of guilt.

What is the “Unavoidable Prejudice Test?”

However, the Court also acknowledged that judges must look at the entire circumstances of the trial before determining whether a prosecutor’s comment(s) should warrant a new trial. This is referred to as the “unavoidable prejudice test.” This test was articulated Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus. The test is:

Where the language of the district attorney is intemperate, uncalled for and improper, a new trial is not necessarily required. The language must be such that its unavoidable effect would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict. The effect of such remarks depends upon the atmosphere of the trial, and the proper action to be taken is within the discretion of the trial court.

The Stoltzfus court held that there must be a consideration of what happened during the trial before determining whether a prosecutor’s comments are grounds for a new trial. In Stoltzfus, the Court reasoned that because defense counsel had attacked the credibility of the Commonwealth witnesses, it was not reversible error when the prosecutor attacked the credibility of the defendant and his testimony. By contrast, in Commonwealth v. M. Johnson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the defendant a new trial when the prosecutor, in his closing argument, stated that defendant was guilty by association, because of his relationship with some of the witnesses, even though the record did not support that assertion. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that prior holdings on this issue were not entirely clear and decided to clarify the rule governing what prosecutors may say during closing.

The Court's Ruling

In Clancy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified what constitutes permissible argument from a prosecutor. To determine whether the statement from the prosecutor is legally sound, the court must evaluate the substance of the challenged remark and its effect upon the jury. This is a two-prong analysis. The substance prong requires the court to examine the challenged remark in the context of the issues presented at trial. In other words, there must be some evidentiary support or an assertion by the defense that justifies the Commonwealth’s statement. If the statement does not have evidentiary support or was not made in response to the defense's arguments or questions, then the court must consider whether the intemperate statement had an impermissible effect on the jury.

Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s statements had a reasonable evidentiary foundation. The defendant shot at the complainant several times and struck him three times in the back. Further, immediately after the shooting he had a “polite” conversation with an unrelated individual and went to a convenience store. Further, because the defense argued that he had acted in the heat of the moment, the prosecutor was allowed to argue that the defendant was “dangerous” and that he acted in “cold-blood” to rebut the defense’s theory of the case. Because the Court held that there was evidentiary support for these statements, it did not consider the effect of these statements on the jury. Accordingly, because these statements were permissible, the trial attorney was not ineffective for failing to object to these statements during the prosecutor’s closing argument, thereby resulting in the denial of the PCRA Petition.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta - Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. We have also successfully represented clients in direct appeals to the Superior Court and in Post-Conviction Relief Act litigation. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 8/23/18 Zak Goldstein 8/23/18

PA Supreme Court Rejects First Amendment Challenge to Witness Intimidation Conviction Based on Rap Lyrics

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Knox, holding that rap lyrics can support convictions for witness intimidation and terroristic threats even where there is no evidence that the defendants actually sent the video of the rap to the complainants. The court rejected the idea that the First Amendment right to free speech shielded the authors of the lyrics from criminal liability because the song communicated a true threat to the complainants.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Knox

In April 2012, a Pittsburgh police officer initiated a routine traffic stop of a vehicle driven by the defendant. While the officer was questioning the defendant, the co-defendant got into the driver’s seat and then sped away and crashed the vehicle. The police caught up, searched the vehicle, and recovered fifteen bags of heroin, money, and a stolen firearm on the driver’s-side floor of the car. When they arrested the defendant, he gave the police a fake name. A detective eventually arrived on scene, recognized the defendant, and provided the arresting officers with his real name. Based on these facts, the defendant and his co-defendant were subsequently charged with several offenses, including weapons charges.

While the charges were pending, the defendants wrote and recorded a song titled “F—k the Police,” which was put on video with still photos of the defendants displayed in a montage. In the photos, the two looked into the camera and motioned as if firing weapons. The video was uploaded to YouTube and also publicized on Facebook. Prosecutors did not establish who uploaded the video to the internet.

The song’s lyrics expressed hatred towards the Pittsburgh police. The lyrics of “F—k the Police” contain descriptions of killing police informants and police officers. The song specifically mentioned the officers involved in the defendant's case and that the defendants knew when those officers’ shifts end. It suggested that the officers may be attacked in their homes. Further, the lyrics also contained a reference to an individual who previously murdered three Pittsburgh police officers.

The Pittsburgh police discovered this song and then arrested and charged the defendant with terroristic threats and witness intimidation. At the trial, one of the officers testified about the “street slang” for some of the lyrics mentioned in the song. Examples include “cop killa” as a type of bullet that can pierce armored vests; “strapped nasty” means carrying multiple weapons; and “busting heavy” means to shoot many rounds.

One of the officers involved in the defendant's first case testified at trial. He testified that when he heard the song he was “shocked” and it made him “nervous.” He further stated that it was one of the reasons why he left the Pittsburgh police force. A detective involved in the defendant's first case also testified and said he found the song to be very upsetting and that it made him concerned for his safety.

At the conclusion of the trial, it was clear that the song was the sole basis on which the Commonwealth sought convictions for witness intimidation and terroristic threats. The defendant argued that the song was protected speech and that any conviction would violate his First Amendment rights. The trial court rejected the argument and found him guilty of witness intimidation and terroristic threats. He then filed a timely appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur and heard the appeal.

What is the First Amendment?

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. ”

— The First Amendment

First Amendment protections apply broadly to different types of expression including art, poetry, film, and music. The bedrock principle of the First Amendment is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.

However, not all speech is protected. In Schenck v. United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes was famously quoted as saying that the First Amendment does not protect against someone falsely shouting “fire” in a theater and causing a panic. Further, threats of violence fall outside the First Amendment’s protective scope. In response to threats of violence, the United States Supreme Court adopted the “true-threat doctrine.”

What is the “True-Threat Doctrine?”

The “true-threat doctrine” originated from the United States Supreme Court case Watts v. United States. In that case, the defendant was convicted of a federal statute making it a crime to threaten the President. In Watts, the defendant stated that, in essence, he would not report to the draft and “if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” Though the Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional, the Court went on to say that the defendant’s conviction could only be upheld if his words conveyed an actual threat, as opposed to political hyperbole. In Watts, the Court held that, given the circumstances in Watts (it was uttered during a political debate, the audience reacted with laughter, and that it was a conditional threat) that the statement was merely just an expression of political dissent and not a true threat.

In subsequent years, courts across the country have struggled to define the “true-threat doctrine.” Some jurisdictions utilize an objective standard, while other jurisdictions put great emphasis on the speaker’s subjective intent when making a statement. In Knox, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there should be an inquiry into the speaker’s mental state and thus evidentiary weight should be given to contextual circumstances of the utterance.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Affirms Defendant's Conviction

In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convictions for terroristic threats and witness intimidation. Specifically, the justices did not find persuasive the argument that the defendant's song was an “artistic expression of frustration.” The Court rejected the First Amendment argument because of the fact that some of the officers involved in his first case were mentioned by name and the lyrics described in graphic terms how he intended to kill them.

To the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “the lyrics are both threatening and highly personalized to the victims.” Its conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the song references the officers’ shifts. Additionally, because the lyrics were directly related to the defendant's first case (i.e. the one officer confiscating cash from Appellant to which he says that said officer “knockin’ my riches”) was further support that the defendant's song was personalized to the officers. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also did not find persuasive the fact that the song was not directly sent to the officers. The fact that the song was published on YouTube and Facebook, despite no direct evidence that the defendant posted it on these mediums so that the police would see it, was sufficient to convict the defendant of these crimes.

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