Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Superior Court: Violation of Philadelphia Police Directives Does Not Require Suppression of Drugs
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. McCleary, holding that suppression of the evidence is not required when Philadelphia Police Officers violate their own police department’s directives. In McCleary, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that drugs recovered by the police officers may be admissible at trial even though police did not follow department protocol related to obtaining consent to a search of a private home.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. McCleary
In McCleary, Philadelphia police officers responded to a radio call for a burglary in progress at a certain address. When they arrived at that address, they walked into the eventual-defendant’s house through an open door. In the living room, they found the defendant speaking with two other police officers. The arriving officers relieved the two who had already arrived and tried to figure out what was going on.
The defendant told the police officers that a woman who was present on the scene had tried to break into his home and that he had a valid Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order against her. The woman responded that she lived there, had the right to be present in the home, and that she had belongings in the second-floor bedroom which would prove that she lived there. The officers did not take any steps to verify if the defendant in fact had a valid PFA.
Instead, the officers asked the defendant if they could see if the woman had belongings in the second-floor bedroom. The defendant twice told them that they could. The officers then walked upstairs to the bedroom. In the bedroom, they found in plain view a scale, a sandwich bag with marijuana, a box of unused drug packaging, eleven bags of crack cocaine, and clear plastic Ziploc bags. The defendant told the officers that the drugs belonged to him. The officers arrested him and charged him with Possession with the Intent to Deliver.
Motion to Suppress the Drugs
The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress his statements and the drugs. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress and ultimately granted the motion to suppress. The trial judge found that police violated with Philadelphia Police Department Directive 5.7, Sections 12 through 16, which address the procedure by which Philadelphia Police Officers are expected to obtain valid consent to search a home. The court found that the officers violated their own police directives by failing to obtain signed consent, failing to inform the defendant of his right to refuse consent, failing to consult with a supervisor, and failing to verify the defendant’s valid PFA and arrest the woman who was alleged violating it. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and ruled that the evidence would be inadmissible at trial, thereby essentially excluding the Commonwealth’s entire case.
The Commonwealth’s Appeal
The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court. In the appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Philadelphia Police Directives do not have the force of law. The Commonwealth argued that because police are not required by law or the constitution to follow them, the remedy for a violation of the directives should not be suppression of the evidence.
The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth’s arguments. It found that exclusion of the evidence via a successful Motion to Suppress is only required where the Government has violated a person’s right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure as provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Exclusion is not automatically warranted simply because the police failed to comply with a Rule of Criminal Procedure or the police department’s directives or regulations. Instead, suppression is only required when the police violate the constitution or certain statutes.
When can police search a home without a warrant?
The Superior Court held that the question was not whether police violated their directives; instead, the question which the trial court should have addressed was whether the police obtained constitutionally valid consent to search the property. Although law enforcement officers must ordinary obtain a search warrant prior to searching a home, there are some exceptions to this rule. One of the main exceptions to the warrant requirement is consent. If you tell the police that they can search your house, then they do not have to get a warrant prior to doing so.
How will a court decide if police voluntarily obtained consent to search a home?
In evaluating consent, previous appellate decisions have suggested that courts consider the following factors:
the presence or absence of police excesses;
whether there was physical contact;
whether police directed the citizen’s movements;
police demeanor and manner of expression;
the location and time of the interdiction;
the content of the questions and statements
the existence and character of the initial investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness;
the degree to which the transition between the traffic stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can be viewed as seamless, thus suggesting to a citizen that his movements may remain subject to police restraint; and
whether there was an express admonition to the effect that the citizen-subject is free to depart, which is a potent, objective factor.
Here, the Court evaluated the factors and found that there was nothing coercive about the police request to see the rest of the home. Certainly, they should have followed their directives, but their failure to do so did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that the drugs may be admissible in the prosecution for Possession with the Intent to Deliver.
Notably, one of the three judges on this panel dissented, arguing that the trial court had in fact found that the police officers simply were not credible on the issue of whether they truly obtained consent. The trial court simply considered the violation of the directives as part of analyzing whether the police were telling the truth. This is important because once the defense files a motion to suppress in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth must produce sufficient evidence to show that it is more likely than not that the police complied with the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions during the search and/or interrogation. If the trial judge finds that the police are not credible, then the judge may grant the motion to suppress for that reason even if what the police claim they did was legal. Thus, on remand, the defense may still argue that the judge found that the police were not credible and that the judge should clarify his or her opinion. However, it is clear that as a matter of law, a violation of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Directives does not automatically result in suppression of the evidence.
Facing criminal charges? We can help.
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients at the trial and appellate level in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We know the law and the defenses that will work in your case, and we recognize the types of defenses and arguments that are going to withstand appellate scrutiny. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court Finds Police Command to Remove Hands from Pockets Requires Reasonable Suspicion
Criminal Defense Attorney Demetra Mehta, Esq.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently decided the case of Commonwealth v. Hemingway, and it has significant repercussions for criminal defendants who want to litigate a motion to suppress.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Hemingway
The facts of this case were as follows: Altoona Police Department patrolmen Joseph Detwiler and Derek Tardive responded to a noise complaint “in a high crime area.” No information or description was given regarding any person involved in the noise complaint. Once at the location, officers observed Mr. Hemmingway and another man speaking with two women in a car. Mr. Hemmingway had his hand in his pocket, and neither he nor the man he was with were inside the building where the noise complaint originated. Despite the fact that the noise complaint came from inside the building and the men were distinctly outside of the building, the officers decided to investigate the men because they were concerned that “if they responded to the noise complaint first, the men would not be there when they got outside."
Officer Detwiler ordered Mr. Hemingway to remove his hand from his pocket. Officer Tardive ordered Mr. Hemingway to put his hands on his head and stated that he would be conducting a pat-down search. Rather than comply, Mr. Hemingway immediately fled on foot. After the foot chase, the officers recovered Mr. Hemingway’s shoe. Near the shoe, they found four bags of a white powdery substance, later identified as cocaine. Mr. Hemingway was arrested and charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), resisting arrest, escape, and disorderly conduct.
The Motion to Suppress
In November 2016, Mr. Hemingway’s defense attorney filed a suppression motion, arguing police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to justify their initial attempt to stop and frisk. This motion argued Mr. Hemingway’s mere presence in a high crime area and the fact that he had his hand in his pocket did not reasonable suspicion make. In February 2017, the suppression court convened a hearing at which Officer Detwiler testified, and at which Officer Tardive’s preliminary hearing testimony was read into the record.
On March 17, 2017, the suppression court granted the motion to suppress, finding that Mr. Hemmingway was subjected to an unlawful investigative detention as the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
The Criminal Appeal
Not liking this opinion, the Commonwealth appealed, seeking relief by arguing the following points: 1) the suppression court erred in concluding that Officers Detwiler and Tardive did not possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot and that the defendant was armed and dangerous, and 2) the suppression court erred in suppressing controlled substances that were not found pursuant to a search of defendant, but were discarded by him before or during his struggle with police.
In support of its arguments, the Commonwealth cited the following facts: 1) that the time of the encounter was 2:00 a.m.; 2) the area was a high crime area; 3) Appellee’s interactions with the vehicle were consistent with drug transactions; 4) Appellee “shoved his hand into his pocket when he made eye contact with the officers.
Before delving into its analysis of the sort of encounter Mr. Hemingway had with these officers the court noted: “ [t]here are three types of encounters between law enforcement officials and private citizens.” 1) A “mere encounter” which need not be supported by any level of suspicion but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. 2) An “investigative detention” which must be supported by reasonable suspicion and subjects the suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but it does not have the coercive conditions that would constitute an arrest. (The courts determine whether reasonable suspicion exists by examining the totality of the circumstances.) 3) An arrest, or “custodial detention,” which must be supported by probable cause.
In Mr. Hemingway’s case, the court had to determine 1) the type of encounter and corresponding level of suspicion required to support that encounter; and 2) whether the facts supported said level of suspicion.
Previously the Superior Court has found that “to determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an investigatory detention, [it] must discern whether, as a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person involved. To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201–1202 (Pa. Super. 2002). Therefore, the focal point of its inquiry in this case would be if, considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would have thought he was being restrained had he been in the defendant’s shoes.
Now, a mere encounter is a “request for information.” It does not need supported by any level of suspicion and, carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. However, in order to conduct a pat-down of a person, police must have reasonable suspicion: A police officer is entitled to conduct a limited search of an individual to detect weapons if the officer observes unusual and suspicious conduct on the part of the individual which leads the officer to reasonably believe that criminal activity is afoot and that the person may be armed and dangerous.
In Pennsylvania, there is some precedent regarding police requests that defendants remove their hands from their pockets, and the level of encounter resulting from such orders. However, in this case, the Court concluded that although it could draw from such precedent, every incident is a fact-specific inquiry and partially dependent on the timing of the request. In Martinez, two police officers in an unmarked vehicle pulled up alongside the defendant, requested that she come over to them, turn around, take her hands from her jacket, and put them on the car. See Martinez, 588 A.2d at 515. The officers exited the vehicle and approached Martinez from either side, preventing her from leaving. Id. The Martinez Court thus concluded that she had been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and that reasonable suspicion was necessary to justify the stop. Id. at 515-16.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has previously stated in the case of Commonwealth v. Carter that if, during a mere encounter, an individual on his own accord, puts his hands in his pocket, he or she has created a potential danger to the safety of a police officer, the officer may justifiably reach for his side arm and order the individual to stop and take his hand out of his or her pocket. Such reaction by a police officer does not elevate the mere encounter into an investigative detention because the officer’s reaction was necessitated by the individual’s conduct.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Zhahir, has also recognized that when police officers are investigating an allegation of narcotics trafficking in a high crime area, they are justified in asking a defendant, who matches a police description, to remove his hands from his pockets. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Coleman, police officers were dispatched to a robbery in progress involving two black males wearing green hooded jackets covered by black coats. Police saw a man who they believed matched the flash description, and the officer inquired if he had a gun. In response, Coleman fumbled with his hands in his pockets. The officer then ordered Coleman to take his hands out of his pockets. Coleman refused, so the police took him to a police van, and two knives were recovered from his pockets. In this case, the court concluded that the officer’s request did not constitute a seizure and that the combination of 1) the description of the robber and 2) Coleman’s refusal to remove his hands from his pockets was sufficient to justify an investigative detention and protective frisk.
This is different when a police officer creates his own dangerous situation and then uses that self-created danger as a basis for escalating the encounter into a seizure. See Carter, 779 A.2d at 594 (noting that telling suspect to put his hands in his pockets, then ordering him to take them out, police officer manufactured danger himself.)
In Mr. Hemingway’s case, the Superior Court decided that the initial interaction between officers and the defendant was not a mere encounter. Because, as noted above, a mere encounter constitutes a request for information and carries no official compulsion to stop and respond. As noted above the police may not manufacture their own dangerous situation to escalate a mere encounter into a seizure. Here, the defendant already had his hands in his pockets when the officers initiated the encounter. The Superior Court ruled that the interaction commenced with Officer Detwiler’s command that the defendant remove his hands from his pocket. Thus, the initial interaction was not a “mere encounter,” but was, instead, an investigative detention that must be supported by reasonable suspicion.
In this case the officers had no description of any suspects; they only had a complaint about noise. There was no report that anyone was armed with a weapon, nor was Mr. Hemingway’s behavior particularly suspicious. When the police arrived, Mr. Hemingway was speaking to two women, and his hands happened to be in his pockets. For these reasons the Superior Court declined to overturn the findings and rulings of the trial court.
As I wrote above this case does have some repercussions for defendant’s hoping to successfully litigate a motion to suppress. First, it re-establishes that the police may not manufacture a crisis and then use that to escalate their interaction with a suspect. Second, absent other indicators of danger, a suspect having his or her hands in his or her pockets when the police first encounter them is not, by itself an indication of danger. That written, the court was clear that these interactions are to be treated on a case-by-case basis.
Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys
What that means for anyone facing a possessory crime is that they should immediately contact an attorney in order to prepare a defense. Once an issue like this is missed, it is very difficult to revive on appeal or even though a PCRA. If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. We offer a free criminal defense strategy session to every potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an award-winning defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court: Back Seat Passenger Not Automatically in Possession of Drugs and Guns in the Front of Car
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Parrish, reversing the defendant’s conviction for Possession with the Intent to Deliver (“PWID”), Conspiracy, Possession of a Controlled Substance, Paraphernalia, and gun charges such as Violation of the Uniform Firearms Act Section 6106. In Parrish, the Superior Court found that the evidence was insufficient to convict Parrish of the gun and drug charges because Parrish was merely the back seat passenger in a car which had guns and drugs in the front of the car.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Parrish
Parrish involved a motor vehicle stop. Police pulled a car over in Luzerne County for having illegally tinted windows. The vehicle pulled over on command, but as police approached the car, they noticed that it was rocking back and forth as if people were moving around inside of it. They could not see what caused the rocking because of the tinted windows. When the police got up to the car, the driver of the car rolled down the window. The officers immediately smelled marijuana and saw a plastic bag containing marijuana in plain view. They also saw the driver straddling the center console between the two front seats and the grip of a silver handgun protruding from under the front passenger seat. Obviously, that is a strange place for the driver of the car to sit. They saw the defendant, Parrish, seated behind the driver’s seat with his hands on the headrest of the driver’s seat.
Because they saw drugs and a gun in plain view, the officers immediately arrested the driver and Parrish. They searched the entire car. They found a black bag on the passenger side in the front of the car. That bag contained a loaded gun, 250 packets of heroin, 12 packets of methamphetamine, a baggie of loose heroin, two scales, and other drug paraphernalia and ammunition. They found marijuana on the passenger-side door and a .40 caliber handgun protruding from underneath the front passenger-side seat. The glove compartment contained an extra magazine of bullets, and in the trunk, they found a bulletproof vest. They found $1,335 in cash on the defendant and $2,168 on the driver. Parrish cooperated with the police during his arrest. He gave his real name, and he did not attempt to run.
Gun and Drug Charges Based on Constructive Possession
Police charged Parrish with various drug and gun charges, as well as Receiving Stolen Property. Before trial, the court separated the felon in possession of a firearm charge from the remaining charges so that the jury would not be prejudiced by knowing that the defendant had a prior criminal record. The defendant then proceeded by way of jury trial, and the jury convicted him of all charges.
At trial, police testified to the above facts. They also confirmed that Parrish was not the registered owner of the car, and he did not have a key to the glove compartment or trunk. Police also believed that based on the positions of the men in the car, the defendant was probably not the driver. They did not test any of the items for fingerprints or DNA. The Commonwealth also presented an expert witness to testify that based on the totality of the circumstances, the drugs in the bag were likely for sale and possessed with the intent to deliver.
In this case, the defense presented evidence, as well. The defendant called a friend to testify that he had been at a party at the friend’s house all afternoon on the day of the arrest. Parrish stayed at the party until approximately 2 am. The friend then asked the driver of the car to drive the defendant home. When the defendant left the party, he was not carrying a satchel or any kind of bag. The friend also saw defendant lay down in the back seat when the defendant got into the car. The jury convicted the defendant of all charges, and the trial court sentenced him to 88 to 176 months of incarceration in state prison.
The Appeal of the Criminal Case
The defendant filed post-sentence motions for reconsideration of the sentence, for a new trial, and for discovery which the prosecution had apparently not provided prior to trial. The trial court denied those motions, and the defendant appealed to the Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant raised four issues:
whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions,
whether the trial court should have awarded a new trial based on the weight of the evidence,
whether the court abused its discretion in allowing one of the police officers to testify as an expert witness that the fact that there were two guns in the car meant that one probably belonged to the defendant, and
that the sentence was illegal because the court ordered a restitution payment in a case with no victim.
The Superior Court’s Decision
The Superior Court only addressed the first issue because it resolved the case in the defendant's favor. The court noted that sufficiency of the evidence claims involve viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner and determining whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, a conviction may be sustained entirely based on circumstantial evidence, but a jury is not permitted to simply guess.
Here, the jury convicted Parrish of both gun charges and drug charges. Both types of charges required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Parrish possessed the illegal items. Because the items were not physically on him, the prosecution’s case depended on a constructive possession theory. Possession can be found by proving actual possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession. Constructive possession exists when the defendant has the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. It may be proven by circumstantial evidence. At the same time, the defendant’s mere presence at the place where contraband is found or secreted is insufficient, standing alone, to prove that he exercised dominion or control over the items. Location and proximity to contraband alone are thus not conclusive of guilt. Instead, the Commonwealth must be able to prove at least that a defendant knew of the existence and location of the contraband.
Here, the court reversed the conviction because the defendant was sitting in the back of the car and all of the guns and drugs were in the front. Further, the evidence established that Parrish was not carrying any type of bag when he entered the car, he did not have the keys to the car, and he was not the owner or operator of it. There was no evidence that he had ever been seated in either of the car’s front seats. Neither of the recovered firearms was registered to him, and the police had failed to test any of the items for fingerprints or DNA. The Commonwealth also failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the defendant knew of the contents of the black bag in the front because the bag was opaque. The court also rejected the idea that the defendant could have moved from the front of the vehicle to the back due to his height and weight and the size of the vehicle. The court also ignored the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness, which was likely improper, and it ultimately reversed the defendant’s conviction.
Facing criminal charges? We can help.
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta
Constructive possession is an issue that often comes up in gun cases and drug cases. In many cases involving traffic stops, the contraband in the vehicle is not actually physically on the defendant. In these types of cases, there are often defenses based on constructive possession because the prosecution may not be able to prove who in the car, if anyone, possessed the prohibited items. Even where the drugs or guns are in the actual possession of the defendant, there may be constitutional defenses to the search and seizure of the vehicle and its occupants. If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation for contraband recovered during a car stop, we can help. We offer a free criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer today.
PA Supreme Court: Obvious Typo in Search Warrant Affidavit Does Not Invalidate Otherwise Legitimate Search Warrant
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein
What happens if a search warrant has a mistake in it?
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Leed. In Leed, the Court held that a statement contained in one paragraph of a search warrant affidavit, which when read in context of the entire affidavit appears to be an inadvertent error, does not render the affiant’s information stale and therefore lacking in probable cause.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Leed
Leed involved the use of confidential informants. A detective with the Lancaster County Drug Task Force spoke with a confidential informant who claimed that the defendant was selling large quantities of cocaine and marijuana in Lancaster. The CI claimed to have recently purchased cocaine from the defendant and that the defendant lived at a certain address in Lancaster.
Some time later, a different detective met with a second CI who also claimed that the defendant was selling powder cocaine and marijuana. Both CIs identified the defendant from driver’s license photos. Later, a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Agent spoke with a third individual, who told them that the defendant had been using a storage locker at a storage facility in Lancaster. The DEA agents confirmed that the defendant had rented that storage locker and recently visited it. One of the detectives then requested that a K9 unit conduct a sweep of the storage locker, and the dog gave a positive response to the locker.
Based on this information, the Lancaster County detectives obtained a search warrant for the storage unit. When detectives executed the search warrant, they found 15 pounds of marijuana, $9,900 in cash, plastic bags, a scale, a bank statement, income tax return, and other personal documents in the locker. They then obtained an additional search warrant for the defendant’s bank records.
Police charged the defendant with Possession with the Intent to Deliver and arrested him. While he was in custody in the county prison, the defendant made a phone call to his mother and said incriminating things in the phone call. Prison phone calls are obviously recorded. Based on the confessions in the phone call, police obtained a third search warrant for the defendant’s mother’s home, where they found more money and a cell phone.
The Motion to Suppress
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the information in the search warrant application was stale and therefore lacking in probable cause. Specifically, the defendant focused on a mistake in the warrant's accompanying Affidavit of Probable Cause. In the warrant, the detective mistakenly wrote that the police conducted the K9 sniff of the storage locker on March 21, 2013 instead of March 21, 2014, meaning that the sniff would have taken place more than a year before the search warrant was executed. This would arguably have made the information stale as the fact that the locker may have contained drugs in it a year earlier does not really mean that it is likely to still contain drugs a year later.
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth called the detective to testify that the March 21, 2013 date was an error and he really meant March 21, 2014. The defendant objected on the basis that extrinsic testimony should not have been permitted because challenges to search warrants are usually limited to the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit. Nonetheless, the court permitted the detective to testify that he had made a drafting mistake.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court agreed that it could not consider the detective’s testimony because the only thing that mattered was the actual text of the affidavit. The court, however, found that a common sense reading of the affidavit as a whole suggested that the date was a typo and that the canine sniff had taken place more recently. Therefore, the court concluded that the information was not stale and that there was probable cause to issue the warrant for the storage unit. The defendant ultimately proceeded to trial on the drug charges and was found guilty of Possession with the Intent to Deliver. The court sentenced him to 20 to 60 months’ imprisonment, and the defendant appealed.
The Criminal Appeal
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately agreed to review the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth and upheld the trial court’s decision. It recognized that search warrants may only be issued based on probable cause. The magistrate or judge who signs off on the warrant may consider only the affidavit of probable cause provided by the detective who applies for the warrant. The Court also noted that the age of the information supporting a warrant application is a factor in determining probable cause. If the information relied upon is too old, then the information is stale, and probable cause may no longer exist. However, staleness is not determined by age alone. Instead, the magistrate (and subsequently the suppression court) must consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether information is stale and probable cause exists. Finally, when a defendant in Pennsylvania challenges a search by arguing that the search warrant lacked probable cause, the only evidence that the suppression court may consider is the affidavit which was prepared in support of the search warrant application. The suppression court should provide deference to the magistrate’s decision, but if the warrant was clearly lacking in probable cause, then the results of the search should be suppressed.
The Court ultimately concluded that the typo with respect to the date of the K9 search did not invalidate the rest of the warrant. The purpose of requiring a search warrant to be based on probable cause is to ensure that police do not act arbitrarily or without sufficient information to justify intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. At the same time, where police clearly have probable cause, obtained a warrant, and simply made a typo which appears to be an obvious mistake based on the other information contained in the warrant, the police should not be punished for the typo. Otherwise, police will respond by being as vague as possible so that they cannot be punished later for typos and other drafting mistakes.
Therefore, the Court held that where the substance of an affidavit, read as a whole, evidences that there is a substantial likelihood that a specific paragraph contains an error, such that any reasonable possibility that the police will act without the requisite probable cause is eliminated, the error will not be viewed in isolation and the warrant will be deemed valid, so long as the probable cause affidavit is otherwise sufficient. Accordingly, an obvious typo will not be enough to defeat an otherwise valid search warrant. At the same time, major mistakes in a warrant or mistakes which are not obviously typos could still lead to a successful challenge to a search. Here, the court found that it was obvious that the detectives made a mistake because the warrant was otherwise in chronological order. Therefore, the court ruled against the defendant.
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Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We are experienced and understanding defense attorenys who will fight for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an attorney today.