PA Legislature Revises SORNA in Attempt to Fix Unconstitutional Megan's Law Provisions

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted HB 631, amending Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute which governs who must register as a sex offender under Megan’s Law, the type of information that must be provided, how often that information must be provided, and for how long an offender must register. HB 631 is the legislature’s response to recent appellate decisions finding various provisions of SORNA unconstitutional. However, HB 631 fails to address many of the issues that led to SORNA being found unconstitutional in the first place, and many of its provisions remain subject to litigation when applied to offenders who were convicted of crimes for acts which were committed prior to December 20, 2012.

Recent Changes in SORNA

Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law registration scheme has gone through a number of significant changes in the last few years. For example, in 2012, the original SORNA law took effect. SORNA made Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration scheme more punitive by imposing registration requirements on juveniles, increasing the number of offenses which require registration upon conviction, and retroactively increasing the length of the registration period for many people who had already been convicted.

For example, SORNA made M2 Indecent Assault a Tier I Sex Offense requiring 15 years of registration upon conviction. M2 Indecent Assault did not previously require Megan’s Law registration for a first offense. Various provisions in SORNA also attempted to retroactively require registration for people who had already been convicted of Indecent Assault even if they had been convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment.

Since the enactment of the law, Pennsylvania appellate courts have found many of these provisions unconstitutional. For example, courts quickly concluded that requiring people to register as adults for life following juvenile delinquency adjudications was irrational and unconstitutional. More recently, in Commonwealth v. Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that retroactively requiring people to register under SORNA for longer periods of time, for offenses that did not require registration at the time that they were committed, and under more onerous conditions, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The ex post facto clause prohibits the Government from imposing criminal penalties for actions which were not illegal at the time that they were taken. It also prevents the Government from retroactively increasing the punishment for a given crime.   

The Pennsylvania Superior Court quickly followed suit in Commonwealth v. Butler, holding that because Megan’s Law registration can be considered criminal punishment, Pennsylvania’s Sexually Violent Predator classification process violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. The SVP procedure violates a defendant's jury trial rights because it allows a judge, instead of a jury, to find that a defendant should be required to register as a Sexually Violent Predator for life. It also allows the judge to make this finding under a clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction.

The Effect of Muniz and Butler on Pre-2012 Offenders

An important side effect of the Supreme Court’s Muniz decision is that it arguably eliminated the registration requirement completely for anyone who had been convicted of a sex crime for conduct which occurred prior to December 20, 2012. This is because the SORNA statute explicitly repealed the prior Megan’s Law scheme that was in effect at the time. Thus, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that SORNA could not be applied retroactively to people who had been convicted of crimes for conduct which took place prior to the December 20, 2012 enactment, the Court left no alternative registration scheme in place for these offenders. With SORNA unconstitutional for those people and Megan’s Law repealed, even lifetime offenders (such as those convicted of rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) who properly had to register prior to December 20, 2012, would arguably be eligible for removal from the State Police registry. The legislature responded quickly in an attempt to aovid this outcome. 

The Legislature’s Response to Muniz and Butler

Concerned that many people would no longer have to register at all, the Pennsylvania Legislature responded by amending the SORNA statute in the hopes of “re-capturing” pre-December 20, 2012 offenders. The act amends SORNA “to address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Butler (2017 WL3882445).” It is debatable, however, whether the amendments are constitutional. It is also questionable whether they address the problems identified in Muniz and Butler.

Changes for Post-2012 Registrants

For the most part, the amendments made very few changes to SORNA as applied to offenders who committed the acts for which they must register after December 20, 2012. For example, SORNA no longer requires registration for one offense. A conviction for the interference with custody of children where the defendant is the child’s parent, guardian, or lawful custodian no longer requires registration.

The amendments also created a mechanism by which even Tier III lifetime registrants and Sexually Violent Predators may petition the court for removal from Megan’s Law. Now, a registrant who avoids conviction for any offenses punishable by more than a year for twenty-five years following his or her release from custody may petition to have the registration requirement lifted. A petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is not a threat to others. It is unclear how many petitioners will receive relief under this provision, and it is important to note that even if the Petitioner meets this heavy burden, the court is not required to actually grant the removal petition.

Finally, the new amendments relax the in-person registration requirement for some registrants. An offender who must register more than once a year may register in-person once and by phone for the other registration requirements that year if the offender is compliant with all of the requirements for the first three years of registration and does not get convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year.

Although these changes are relatively minor, they do provide some relief to Tier III and SVP offenders who would otherwise have to register for life with no hope of ever obtaining removal from Megan’s List. It is likely that the legislature included this provision so that the Commonwealth's lawyers could argue that the statute is now less punitive and therefore does not violate the ex post facto clause.

Changes for Pre-2012 Registrants

With respect to registrants who committed the crimes for which they were convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment, the changes primarily seek to decrease the requirements to what they would have been under the old Megan’s Law Scheme. For example, the period of time for which the offender must register has been reduced to what it would have been under the pre-SORNA Megan’s Law. Thus, offenders must either register for ten years or for life, whereas new offenders could have to register for 15 years, 25 years, or for life. 

The information that offenders must provide to the State Police continues to be roughly the same. A registrant still must inform the State Police of where they live, work, and go to school. They must all inform the State Police if any of those things change, and the State Police will continue to post that information on the internet and to provide that information to local police departments. The amendments also make it a crime to fail to comply with these requirements, and they make it even more difficult on “transient” offenders who do not have a fixed address.   

The most surprising part of the new bill is that the amendments do not change the procedure by which an offender may be classified as a Sexually Violent Predator. An offender may still be found to be a Sexually Violent Predator by the sentencing judge under the clear and convincing evidence standard, and the requirements for Sexually Violent Predators are still essentially the same with the exception that they may petition for removal from the list after 25 years. It is entirely unclear how this re-enactment of the same unconstitutional sentencing scheme will survive appellate review.  

SORNA Litigation

The appellate courts have not yet addressed whether the new amendments to SORNA are constitutional. It is likely that there will be numerous challenges both to the legislature’s attempt to retroactively apply the statute to pre-SORNA offenders given that SORNA repealed their original registration requirement and to the continuation of the same procedures for making the Sexually Violent Predator determination. Although appellate decisions may eventually bring relief to thousands of people, the ongoing litigation leaves many people uncertain as to their registration requirements. If you are currently subject to registration requirements, it is important that you continue to register with the State Police as required until the State Police or a court inform you that you no longer have to register. If you believe that you should no longer have to register, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney about the possibility of petitioning the state police or the trial court for removal from Megan’s Law. It is also likely that other issues will arise as attorneys have more time to review the changes in the new bill. 

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help. 

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal, post-conviction relief act petition, or Megan's Law removal petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

Goldstein Mehta LLC Defense Attorneys Obtain Successful Outcomes in Robbery, PWID, Gun, and Assault Cases

Criminal defense attorneys Demetra Mehta and Zak Goldstein continue to obtain successful results in and out of the courtroom. In the last few months, our defense attorneys have won cases involving drug charges, gun charges, assault allegations, and juvenile robbery charges. If you are facing criminal charges, call 267-225-2545 for a complimentary criminal defense strategy session with one of our award-winning defense attorneys. Some examples of our recent not guilty verdicts and successful motions to suppress include: 

Commonwealth v. T.C. - Motion to Suppress Granted in Drug Delivery Case

Criminal Lawyer Demetra Mehta

Attorney Mehta focuses on getting the best results for her clients. In the case of Commonwealth v. T.C., she successfully moved for the suppression of 13 grams of crack cocaine. Attorney Mehta also beat the accompanying DUI charge. In this case, the government alleged Attorney Mehta's client was driving while intoxicated. The arresting police officer claimed that he pulled T.C. over because the head lights of T.C.'s vehicle were not on at night. But Attorney Mehta knew better. She recognized that this was a late-model car, and she quickly obtained proof that the car's headlights actually turn on automatically at night. Through skillful cross-examination, she was able to demonstrate this key fact to the trial judge during the motion to suppress. This led to not only the eventual suppression of the large quantity of drugs in the car but also all observations of her client, meaning the government could not proceed on the DUI charges, either. With the motion to suppress granted, prosecutors were forced to withdraw all charges. T.C. now faces no criminal record from this arrest!

Commonwealth v. G.R. – Not Guilty in Self-Defense Assault Case

G.R., the assistant manager of a local market, was charged with Simple Assault in Philadelphia for allegedly getting into a fight with a co-worker at work. Prosecutors alleged that G.R. punched a co-worker in the throat, fracturing his larynx, after the co-worker engaged in a verbal altercation with G.R. relating to work responsibilities. Although a broken bone can often lead to Aggravated Assault charges, prosecutors moved only to prosecute G.R. in the Philadelphia Municipal Court on the Simple Assault charge. Despite the fact that G.R. was charged only with misdemeanors, the stakes were high for G.R. because G.R. stood to lose his job in the event of a conviction relating to an assault of someone at work. 

Attorney Goldstein defended G.R. and obtained a full acquittal in a trial before the Municipal Court Judge. Attorney Goldstein established that G.R. acted in self-defense by cross-examining the complainant on the size difference between the two men, the discrepancies, contradictions, and omissions in the complainant’s statement, and the complainant’s lack of medical records to show that he had actually sustained the injuries that he claimed.

Attorney Goldstein established that the complainant, a much bigger man, got in G.R.’s face, pushed him repeatedly, and made a movement consistent with lining up to throw a punch before G.R. ever responded with force. A background check of the complainant also revealed that he had prior convictions for conspiracy to commit homicide as a juvenile and simple assault as an adult. Mr. Goldstein successfully moved for the admission of those convictions into evidence in order to show that the complainant was actually the initial aggressor. Mr. Goldstein then called G.R. to the stand to testify that he had acted in self-defense and believed that the complainant was about to throw a punch. The judge rejected the complainant’s inconsistent testimony and promptly acquitted G.R. on self-defense grounds. 

Commonwealth v. J.L. – Motion to Suppress Granted in Case Involving Drugs, Guns, and Cash

Our criminal defense lawyers recently won a motion to suppress of physical evidence in a case involving drug charges and gun charges in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. J.L. was pulled over by police one night as the passenger in a vehicle. Police claimed that the vehicle smelled like marijuana and that J.L. made furtive movements as they approached the car. Police also claimed that J.L. seemed very nervous and lacked identification when the police spoke with him.

Police decided to remove him from the car and frisk him based on these observations. The officer claimed to feel a pill bottle. Believing that the pill bottle would likely contain contraband, the officer then went into J.L.’s pockets, removed the pill bottle, and found crack cocaine in the bottle. The officer also claimed that J.L. had a large amount of cash in his pocket. Officers then searched the rest of the car and found more drugs and a gun in the trunk. 

Prosecutors initially charged J.L. and the driver of the car with possession both of the drugs allegedly found in J.L.'s pocket as well as the larger quantity of drugs and guns in the trunk. Prosecutors listed the case for a preliminary hearing on the felony charges, and J.L. retained the criminal defense attorneys of Goldstein Mehta LLC for the preliminary hearing. Our attorneys were able to convince the prosecutor that they could not prove that J.L. constructively possessed the items in the trunk, including the larger quantity of drugs and the gun, because J.L. did not own the car and had never been seen accessing the trunk. Prosecutors agreed, withdrew the felony charges, and remanded the case to the Philadelphia Municipal Court only on the charges of possessing the crack cocaine in the pill bottle. 

When the case was listed for trial, Attorney Goldstein moved to suppress the crack cocaine. In general, when police pull a car over in Pennsylvania, they may remove a passenger from the vehicle without any level of reasonable suspicion. However, in order to conduct a Terry frisk of the occupant of a car, the police must have reasonable suspicion both that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity and that the suspect is likely to be armed and dangerous. This means that police must be able to provide an articulable belief, consisting of real reasons, for why the officer believed that criminal activity was afoot and that the defendant was likely to have a weapon.

Here, the officer testified that he believed the defendant was likely concealing weapons or contraband in the car due to his furtive movements, nervousness, lack of identification, and the odor of marijuana in the car. He therefore decided to conduct a frisk. The officer failed to realize, however, that a Terry frisk is limited only to a cursory pat down for weapons. When an officer feels something that is plainly contraband during a frisk, the officer may then conduct a full search and remove the object for further inspection even when the officer does not believe the object is a weapon. But the officer must be immediately able to tell that the item in question is contraband. The officer cannot conduct a full search of a defendant’s pockets and the containers therein solely because the officer feels some kind of object and doesn’t know what it is or may contain.

After the officer testified that he could immediately tell that the item in question was a pill bottle, Attorney Goldstein provided the Court with Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law in which the Court held that a pill bottle cannot automatically be considered contraband. In most cases, it is perfectly legal to possess a pill bottle, and most pill bottles are not used to transport contraband. Accordingly, it is not immediately apparent that a pill bottle contains contraband. Based on this Supreme Court case, Attorney Goldstein successfully argued that the officer exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk and that the pills should be suppressed. The judge agreed and granted the motion. The Commonwealth elected not to appeal and withdrew the charges. 

Commonwealth v. W.D. – ARD Obtained in Possession with the Intent to Deliver Marijuana Case 

W.D. was charged with selling a significant amount of marijuana from a car. Philadelphia Police conducted a narcotics surveillance targeting a block known for high drug activity. During the course of that surveillance, they were able to successfully have a confidential informant purchase drugs in a house on that block. Based on those controlled buys, police obtained a search warrant for the house and returned to execute the warrant. While they were preparing to execute the warrant, police allegedly observed W.D. selling marijuana to dozens of buyers from a car parked up the block. When police went to execute the search warrant, they also searched W.D. and the car in which he was sitting and found a quantity of marijuana and a large amount of money. Accordingly, police charged W.D. with Possession with the Intent to Deliver. 

Fortunately, W.D. had no prior criminal record and was enrolled in college. Our defense attorneys worked with W.D. to put together a strong application for ARD on his behalf. We obtained proof of employment, college enrollment, and character letters from family members and friends. Using this mitigation packet, we were able to convince prosecutors to offer entry into the ARD program for the felony Possession with the Intent to Deliver charges. Prosecutors almost never offer ARD for PWID, but in this case, W.D. will have to complete a short period of probation, community service, and pay a small fine. Once those requirements have been completed, the charges will be dismissed and W.D. can have the entire case expunged with no admission or finding of guilt. 

In Re: J.G. – Not Guilty Verdict Obtained in Juvenile Robbery Case 

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

Attorney Goldstein successfully obtained a full acquittal in a juvenile delinquency Robbery case. In this case, J.G. was charged with strong-arm robbery and related theft charges for allegedly trying to steal the complainant’s cell phone. Prosecutors claimed that J.G. and a group of other juveniles had surrounded the complainant, held him down, and gone into his pockets, taking cash and trying to take a cell phone.

J.G. insisted on his innocence and our defense lawyers took the case to trial in Philadelphia Family Court. By cross-examining the arresting officer on the inconsistencies between the description of the robbers given by the complainant and the clothing that J.G. was actually wearing when arrested, and pointing out that J.G. had neither the complainant’s cell phone or money when arrested, Attorney Goldstein successfully convinced the Family Court judge that police had arrested the wrong person. Accordingly, the judge found J.G. Not Guilty of Robbery and all other charges. J.G. will continue to have no criminal record and may have all of the charges expunged.  

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FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES OR CONSIDERING AN APPEAL? WE CAN HELP. 

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

Third Circuit Rejects De Facto Life Sentences for Most Juvenile Offenders

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals has just announced its decision in United States v. Grant, rejecting effective life imprisonment sentences for most juveniles as unconstitutional. Although other federal circuits had already addressed this issue, this was a case of first impression for the Third Circuit which will have dramatic consequences for juvenile offenders who are tried as adults in Pennsylvania and those who are already serving what would effectively be life sentences without parole. 

United States v. Grant

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

In March 1987, local law enforcement in Elizabeth, New Jersey became aware of an organized group of teenagers that referred to themselves as The E-Port Posse (“The Posse”). The Defendant was a member of The Posse. The Posse operated a narcotics network that sold cocaine in Elizabeth and would routinely use threats and physical violence to further its enterprise.  

An example of this is occurred in August 1989. The defendant, who was 16 years old at the time, encountered a group of rival drug dealers while delivering drugs for The Posse. The defendant spoke to one of these dealers and told him not to be in the Posse’s territory. The rival drug dealer refused to leave. In response, The defendant struck him in the head with a gun while another Posse member assaulted him. The rival drug dealer fled and the defendant and his associate shot him in the leg. The rival drug dealer survived the incident.

Later that month, the defendant encountered the rival drug dealer’s brother, who was also a drug dealer. The defendant warned the brother not to sell in Posse territory. The defendant confronted the brother in an apartment courtyard where he tried to get the brother to go into an apartment. The brother escaped, but the defendant ordered his associate to shoot the brother to prevent said escape. The associate killed the brother. 

In 1991, a superseding indictment charged the defendant with RICO offenses; Racketeering; Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute cocaine; two counts of Possession with the Intent to Distribute cocaine; and two counts of Possession of a Weapon in Relation to a Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking. Although the defendant was not specifically charged with murder, the attempted murder of the rival drug dealer and the actual murder of his brother were the predicate offenses for the racketeering charge.   

The defendant was tried as an adult even though he was under the age of 18 when these crimes were committed. A jury came back with a split verdict, but found the defendant guilty of RICO, racketeering, and drug and gun possession counts. The jury found that the defendant attempted to murder the rival drug dealer, and murdered his brother. At sentencing, the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory sentencing guidelines of life without parole (hereinafter “LWOP”) on the RICO counts, as well as a concurrent forty-year term of imprisonment on the drug-trafficking counts, and a five-year consecutive term of imprisonment on the gun possession count. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

The defendant caught a break with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Consequently, the defendant received a new sentencing hearing.

At the resentencing hearing, the District Court determined that because of the defendant’s upbringing, debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-conviction record, he was not incorrigible, and thus an LWOP sentence was not appropriate. However, the District Court imposed a term of sixty years imprisonment to run concurrently with the drug charges which resulted in a new effective sentence of sixty-five years without parole. Based on this sentencing, the defendant would have been eligible for release when he reached the age of 72 years old. He appealed again. 

Adolescent Development and the Supreme Court

Over the past two decades, adolescent brain development has been an important issue in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. This began with its decision in Roper v. Simmons which banned the death penalty for juvenile offenders. In its decision, the Roper Court utilized science and social science to reason that juveniles lack maturity, have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures. In other words, the United States Supreme Court has found that children’s brains are not as developed as those of an adult and thus they should not be held to the same moral standard when addressing criminal conduct and sentencing. 

The United States Supreme Court further expanded on its jurisprudence in the subsequent years. In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life without parole is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders who commit crimes other than homicide. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that that mandatory LWOP even in homicide cases is unconstitutional. Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that Graham and Miller apply retroactively (in other words, if someone was sentenced to LWOP prior to the Court’s rulings in Graham and Miller, then they would be entitled to a new sentencing hearing).

It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court never held that a juvenile cannot be sentenced to LWOP for a homicide offense. However, the bar was set very high to impose such a sentence. As the Grant court stated in its opinion “[o]nly those who are permanently incorrigible may receive such a sentence.” This logic is part of the reason why the defendant in this case challenged his sentence. The trial court essentially sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole.

Third Circuit Rejects Effective Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Offenders as Unconstitutional  

The defendant appealed, arguing that because he would not be eligible for parole until he was 72 years old and that his life expectancy was also 72 years, he had been sentenced to a de facto life without parole sentence. Remember, the sentencing court previously found that he was not incorrigible, and thus, under the logic of Miller, he should receive a parole hearing before he is expected to die. The Third Circuit agreed with the Defendant.

In its decision, the Third Circuit focused on the Miller ruling which held that juvenile life without parole is only for incorrigible juveniles. Further, the Court extrapolated from the previously mentioned Supreme Court decisions that de-facto life without parole cannot be reconciled with Graham and Miller’s holdings that sentencing judges most provide non-incorrigible juvenile offenders “with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and that LWOP has “diminished penological justification.” The Third Circuit also looked to other circuit court decisions (i.e. the 7th, 9th and 10th) which held that term-of-years sentences, in those respective cases, violated the holdings of Graham and Miller.

Ultimately, the Third Circuit established new requirements for a sentencing court before it imposes a term-of-years sentence on a non-incorrigible juvenile offender. First, the sentencing judge must conduct an individualized evidentiary hearing to determine the non-incorrigible juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy before sentencing him to a term-of-years sentence. Next, the sentencing court must “shape a sentence that properly accounts for a meaningful opportunity to be released.” The Third Circuit concluded that this is before the age of retirement. The Court chose retirement because “society accepts the age of retirement as a transitional life stage where an individual permanently leaves the work force after having contributed to society over the course of his or her working life.” The Court said that juvenile offenders should have an opportunity to “reconcile with society and achieve fulfillment outside prison walls.” Nonetheless, the sentencing court must also consider the § 3553(a) factors (i.e. the seriousness of the offense, public safety, deterrence, etc.) too, and though a non-incorrigible juvenile offender should be presumptively sentenced below the age of retirement, there may be legitimate reasons why a juvenile offender should not be released before the age of retirement.

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help. 

Criminal Defense Attorneys Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing , we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

Commonwealth Court Limits Government’s Ability to Seize Property under the Forfeiture Provision of the Controlled Substances Act

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has announced its decision in Commonwealth v. $301,360.00 U.S. Currency and one 2011 Lexus, RX 350, Vin# 2T2BK1BA48C081250. The Court’s decision dramatically restricts the government’s ability to seize, through civil forfeiture, property it claims was used to facilitate violations of the Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter “CSA”).

Commonwealth v. $301,360.00 U.S. Currency and one 2011 Lexus, RX 350, Vin# 2T2BK1BA48C081250 

On June 11, 2014, two individuals were driving the Lexus in question on Interstate 80 in Monroe County, Pennsylvania when it was pulled over for tailgating. Interstate 80 is a major highway that runs from California to New Jersey. The Lexus was not owned or registered to either of the two occupants inside the car. Both occupants of the car and its owner were from the state of New York. The car was also registered in New York.  

During the stop, the Pennsylvania State Trooper noticed numerous indicators of what he believed to be criminal activity. Specifically, he said that prayer cards, the driver’s tattoos, a strong smell of air fresheners, the vehicle traveling on a known drug route, the occupants’ criminal histories, and their inconsistent stories to the officer caused him to believe that the two individuals were engaged in narcotics trafficking. Because of these suspicions, the Officer requested permission to search the Lexus. The occupants consented to the search.

During the search of the Lexus, the officer recovered $301,360 in vacuum-sealed bags in a hidden compartment. No drugs or paraphernalia were recovered during the search. The police then seized the cash and the Lexus and the driver received a warning for tailgating. A week after the stop, the police performed an ion scan on the cash and the compartment where the money was found. This scan showed trace amounts of cocaine, heroin, THC, and procaine on the cash and trace amounts of heroin and THC in the compartment. However, there was no evidence that this money had ever been circulated in Pennsylvania, a fact that the Commonwealth would later concede.  

The Commonwealth then filed a forfeiture petition on the cash and Lexus. Their petition alleged the money and Lexus was used to “facilitate a violation of the Drug Act.”  The actual owner of the Lexus filed a response claiming lawful ownership of the cash and Lexus and requested that her property be returned to her.

A non-jury trial was held on April 6, 2016. Prior to the trial, the owner filed a Motion in Limine to preclude any evidence concerning the ion scan because the expert who conducted the ion scan only compared the levels of narcotics to Pennsylvania standards. This is significant because there was no evidence that showed the money had ever been circulated in Pennsylvania. For unknown reasons, the trial court did not decide the Motion in Limine.

At the trial, the Commonwealth called multiple witnesses including the Trooper who stopped the Lexus and Staff Sergeant Marshall who performed the ion tests on the cash and the compartment. The owner of the Lexus did not present any evidence. Following the trial, the court granted the Commonwealth’s petition and found that the Commonwealth established a substantial nexus between the property and criminal activity. Specifically, the trial court found 27 indicators of criminal activity, including the ion scan evidence, in making its determination that the cash and Lexus were used to facilitate a violation of the CSA. The trial court also found that the owner failed to rebut the presumption of forfeiture by proving the innocent owner defense. The owner then filed an appeal.

What is Forfeiture for a Violation of the CSA?

The logic behind Civil Forfeiture for violations of the CSA is to eliminate the economic incentives of drug trafficking. These forfeiture statutes allow the government to take property away when they prove that there is a nexus between the property and a violation of the CSA. The government does not need a criminal conviction to obtain the property. Worse, an acquittal does not prevent the government from seizing one’s property via civil forfeiture.

All sorts of property can be subject to forfeiture including: cars, money, homes, and other property that the government can link to drug trafficking. It is likely one has heard anecdotal stories about people whose homes were seized by the government under these forfeiture statutes because a family member used the home in some nefarious way. Courts are mindful of this and consequently are not in favor of forfeiture. Thus, the courts will strictly construe the forfeiture statutes. Nonetheless, a person who was not engaged in drug trafficking can lose their home because of the actions of a family member or someone else living in their home. If the government files a forfeiture petition against you it is imperative you speak to an attorney immediately because you can lose your property, including your home.   

As a preliminary matter, the Pennsylvania General Assembly repealed and replaced the provisions of the Forfeiture Act that were used in this case. Nonetheless, this case will still be relevant in future litigation. The current and relevant forfeiture laws concerning the CSA are codified under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5802, § 5803, and § 5805. § 5805 lays out the procedure that the Commonwealth must follow to seize property that is allegedly connected to a violation of the CSA. § 5802 is specifically titled “Controlled Substances Forfeiture,” however § 5803(b)(4) also addresses forfeiture when there is probable cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be used in violation of the CSA.  

At the trial, the Commonwealth does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property in question was used or intended to be used in violation of the CSA. Rather, the standard is the preponderance of the evidence standard which is the lowest standard available. In essence, the Commonwealth must show that it is more likely than not that a nexus exists between the property and the criminal activity.

If the Commonwealth meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the claimant to prove that 1) he/she is the owner of the property, 2) the property was acquired lawfully, and 3) the property was not used/or intended to be used unlawfully. The claimant can also allege that they are entitled to the innocent owner defense which requires that the owner lacked either knowledge or consent to the use of the property to facilitate a violation of the CSA.

The Commonwealth Court Demands More Convincing Evidence to Seize One’s Property Under CSA Forfeiture

In Commonwealth v. $301,360.00 U.S. Currency and one 2011 Lexus, RX 350, Vin# 2T2BK1BA48C081250, the Commonwealth Court found that the evidence in the case was not sufficient to form a substantial nexus to a violation of the CSA. First, the Court attacked the ion scan evidence. The Court focused on the fact that the Commonwealth failed to show that the money was ever circulated in Pennsylvania. This is significant because money can have traces of narcotics on it through casual contact. However, the levels of these narcotics vary depending on the geographic area of where the money was circulated. In other words, the levels of narcotics found on currency in Pennsylvania are different than those found in New York.

 Pennsylvania courts have made clear that ion scan evidence is irrelevant if it cannot be determined where the money was circulated. Because the Commonwealth could not establish that the money was ever circulated in Pennsylvania and its expert only used casual contact levels for Pennsylvania, and not other states (i.e. New York) the Commonwealth Court held that this evidence was not relevant and thus could not be used to establish whether there was a substantial nexus between the property and violations of the CSA.

Next, the Court focused on the fact that no drugs or drug paraphernalia were recovered in the Lexus and no drug charges were filed against either of the occupants. This omission, the Commonwealth Court stated, makes establishing a nexus to illegal activity “difficult.” Further, the fact that the occupants gave inconsistent stories is not indicative of illegal activity because they were under no obligation to speak to the officer. Additionally, the Commonwealth offered no support as to why tattoos and prayer cards are indicative of criminal activity. Finally, Pennsylvania court precedents hold that a large amount of cash that is bundled and driving on a known drug highway does not establish the requisite nexus for forfeiture. As such, the Commonwealth Court found that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden and reversed the trial court.

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