Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/27/22 Zak Goldstein 7/27/22

PA Supreme Court: Police Often Must Get Search Warrant to Obtain Homicide-by-DUI Defendant's Blood from Hospital

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, holding that the defendant’s blood was illegally seized for drug testing because the police obtained it from a hospital without getting a search warrant. The Commonwealth had attempted to use various statutes and theories to justify the warrantless seizure, but because no exigent circumstances were present which would justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court ruled that the police violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court therefore suppressed the blood results.

Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams

The defendant drove his car at about two miles per hour over train tracks, where a train collided with his vehicle. The train pushed it for a quarter of a mile before it stopped moving. The defendant and his daughter were transported to a hospital, while his fiancée who had also been in the car was pronounced dead at the scene.

Lieutenant Steven Lutz, the officer in charge, spoke to several individuals who explained that the defendant’s car smelled like burnt marijuana. Lieutenant Lutz told Sergeant Keith Farren to interview the defendant and obtain a legal blood draw. A legal blood draw requires consent or a search warrant from a subject before being seized for testing. Sergeant Farren determined that the defendant was not conscious enough to give consent, as he had been drifting in and out of consciousness. This would often justify a warrantless search under the Supreme Court’s case law, but prior to obtaining the blood, the officer learned that the hospital had already drawn the defendant’s blood.

Sergeant Farren completed paperwork authorizing the defendant’s blood to be tested, and it was revealed that the defendant’s blood contained Delta-9 THC, an ingredient in marijuana. The defendant was arrested and charged with homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, II, or III metabolite, DUI: general impairment, careless driving, careless driving – unintentional death, aggravated assault while DUI, and aggravated assault by vehicle.

The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the blood test results, arguing that the police did not have probable cause that he was driving under the influence, that his blood was seized without a warrant, and that Section 3755, which allows the police to obtain blood from a hospital without a warrant, did not justify the seizure.

Of note, Section 3755 states that if a person who is suspected to be DUI must seek medical treatment, then a physician must take blood samples from the individual and transmit them within 24 hours to the Department of Health or a laboratory for testing. These results then may be released to the individual tested, his attorney, his physician or government officials.

During the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Lutz testified that the defendant’s blood was obtained through a legal blood draw, citing Section 3755. Notably, Sergeant Farren never referenced Section 3755 during his testimony, instead explaining that he attempted to obtain the defendant’s blood through an implied consent form. Both officers acknowledged that they could have obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood but did not do so.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, stating that the blood test results were admissible under the exigent circumstances exception. The defendant’s trial by jury commenced, and the Commonwealth admitted his blood test results. The defendant was found guilty of DUI offenses, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, aggravated assault while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle, and careless driving.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The defendant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence, but this motion was denied. He then appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his first motion to suppress evidence. He argued that the Commonwealth did not comply with Section 3755, that even if the Commonwealth had complied with Section 3755, this compliance alone is insufficient to overcome the warrant requirement, and that there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court concluded that the original finding of exigency was erroneous because there was no urgent need for Sergeant Farren to dispense with obtaining a search warrant for the seizure of the defendant’s blood test results. The Superior Court agreed with this opinion. As the hospital had already preserved the blood evidence, Sergeant Farren had plenty of time to obtain a warrant. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted and remanded for a new trial.

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to address whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow legal precedent in holding that Section 3755 does not independently support implied consent and whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow the legal precedent from Mitchell v. Wisconsin by finding that exigent circumstances did not exist to support a warrantless testing of the defendant’s blood. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and agreed to hear the appeal.

The Supreme Court ultimately decided with the defendant. The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth’s Mitchell argument. In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court found that exigency almost always exists when the police need to obtain blood from an unconscious defendant because the defendant cannot be asked to consent and any controlled substances in the blood quickly begin to dissipate. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argued that exigency was established due to probable cause that the defendant was driving under the influence of marijuana, he had to be transported to the hospital, he was not fully conscious, and he was unable to communicate with Sergeant Farren. The Commonwealth further agued that the police could not have applied for a search warrant as they had other duties to attend to regarding the crash and other emergencies.

The defendant argued that the police officers testified that they could have obtained a search warrant during his trial. The seizure occurred after the blood was drawn, meaning the blood had already been preserved and nothing would dissipate, but testing did not occur until three days later, demonstrating a lack of exigency.

The Supreme Court concluded that there was no exigency because there was very little chance that the blood evidence would be destroyed if the officers took time to obtain a search warrant. The blood evidence had been properly preserved in this case.

The Supreme Court also addressed the Commonwealth’s argument about Section 3755 and concluded that the Commonwealth did not adhere to the requirements of the statute. Sergeant Farren did not comply with Section 3755; specifically, in his paperwork to obtain the defendant’s blood, he invoked 75 Pa.S.C.A. 1547. He also sought the defendant out to obtain consent, which is not necessary when invoking Section 3755, and there was no mention during the trial that any emergency room personnel took the defendant’s blood due to adherence to Section 3755. The Supreme Court also vacated the portion of the Superior Court’s holding that Section 3755 was unconstitutional because it determined that Section 3755 did not legally apply to this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately found that police violated the defendant’s rights and that the blood evidence should be suppressed. It remanded the case for a new trial. Thus, where the hospital has already preserved a suspect’s blood, the police must get a search warrant prior to seizing that blood from the hospital. They may not rely on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/6/22 Zak Goldstein 4/6/22

Not Guilty - Attorney Goldstein Wins Aggravated Assault (F1) Bench Trial

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire recently won a full acquittal for his client in the case of Commonwealth v. L.S. In that case, L.S. was charged with Aggravated Assault (F1), Burglary (F1), and a slew of other serious charges. Prosecutors alleged that L.S. had gone along with some other family members to a family friend’s house to fight her after the friend’s boyfriend had disrespected one of those family members. Once there, the group supposedly entered the house and began beating up the friend and her boyfriend, using knives as well as kitchen appliances to injure them and send them to the hospital. Based on some questionable identifications, police arrested L.S. and her mother and charged them with countless first-degree felonies.

Fortunately, L.S. retained Attorney Goldstein for trial. She elected to have a bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, meaning that she decided to allow a judge to decide whether she was guilty or not guilty instead of a jury. In Philadelphia, bench trials sometimes have advantages in that it is possible to get to trial faster, the judges are generally fair, and the penalties are sometimes much lower in the event of a conviction on some or all charges because a bench trial takes significantly less time than a jury trial.

At trial, the Commonwealth called numerous witnesses to testify to the alleged assault and that L.S. had been present for it. Attorney Goldstein, however, had carefully reviewed the discovery and transcripts from the preliminary hearing and realized that many of the witnesses had not been totally sure that L.S. was in fact one of the people involved. The police had showed photo arrays to each potential witness, and although they testified that they thought L.S. looked like one of the people who went to the house, they were not 100% sure. Of course, their stories changed when they came to court for trial. By the time of trial, they had decided that they had no doubt at all that L.S. was one of the assailants.

Attorney Goldstein cross-examined the witnesses using their statements to police and from prior hearings and was able to show that it was very questionable whether L.S. had even been there. Through this cross-examination and the presentation of character witnesses, Attorney Goldstein was able to convince the trial judge that the Commonwealth could not prove its case. The judge found L.S. and her co-defendant not guilty of all charges. L.S. will continue to have no record, and all charges will be expunged.

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Zak Goldstein 4/1/22 Zak Goldstein 4/1/22

Attorney Goldstein Wins New Trial in Superior Court Appeal of First Degree Murder Case

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. V.G., reversing that defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and the accompanying mandatory sentence of life without parole. In this case, the evidence introduced at trial showed that the defendant attended a house party. During the party, he was assaulted and robbed by a larger man. He pulled a gun and fired it, shooting and killing the man who had robbed him and shooting and injuring the friend of that man who was rapidly approaching him as if he too might have had a gun. The defendant testified at trial to the above facts and that he had acted in self-defense. Despite his testimony, the trial judge announced that he did not believe the defendant and refused to provide him with the jury instructions for self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life without parole.

V.G. retained Attorney Goldstein and filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, Attorney Goldstein argued that the trial court had unfairly deprived V.G. of his entire defense by refusing to instruct the jury on the defenses of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The standard for whether a jury instruction relating to a defense should be provided to the jury is solely whether there is some evidence in the record that would support the instruction. In this case, the defendant had specifically testified to his actions and that he took them in self-defense, so there was at least some evidence in the record to support both defenses. The trial judge had erred in simply choosing not to believe the defendant, whereas the question of whether he was telling the truth should have gone to the jury.

The Superior Court agreed. It reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. V.G., who would have had to serve a life sentence for first degree murder, will now receive a new trial.

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Zak Goldstein 2/3/22 Zak Goldstein 2/3/22

PA Superior Court: Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance in Advising Defendant Not to Testify

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Washington, holding that a defense attorney was ineffective when he gave incorrect legal advice that persuaded his client not to testify at his own trial. This decision is significant because it requires attorneys to provide correct and competent advice when advising their clients whether to testify at trial. Defense attorneys must have a thorough understanding of the rules of evidence when advising their clients whether to testify or even go to trial. This decision provides additional protections to criminal defendants.

Commonwealth v. Washington

Police observed a disturbance outside of a Lancaster City restaurant and lounge. The officers made contact with the involved parties, one of whom was the defendant. The defendant became combative with the officers, yelled profanities, and refused to be arrested. As a result of the defendant’s behavior, the officers used a taser on him to “control the situation.” The defendant was then subsequently arrested and was charged with terroristic threats, resisting arrest, and other related offenses.

The defendant was then taken to Lancaster County Prison. While in prison, he allegedly told his cellmate that he wanted to kill the officers involved in his arrest. According to his cellmate, the defendant solicited him in plotting to kill the officers. The cellmate reported the defendant’s plot to the authorities and gave the names of the specific officers that the defendant allegedly intended to kill. As a result of this, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with four counts of criminal solicitation to commit homicide. The defendant then proceeded to a jury trial on the solicitation charges. At this trial, the cellmate was the main witness against the defendant.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of three counts of criminal solicitation to kill the officers involved in his original arrest. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 25 ½ to 60 years’ incarceration. The defendant then filed an appeal which was denied. He also declined to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The defendant then filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. However, for reasons that will not be explored in this blog, it was denied. The defendant then filed another PCRA petition. The defendant raised several issues, including that his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him not to testify at trial.

The trial court held a PCRA hearing. At this hearing, defendant’s original trial counsel could not recall if he and Appellant had any pre-trial conversation regarding whether the defendant would testify, but if he did have such a conversation, it would have been “very brief.” However, the trial counsel did state that the defendant turned to him and said “this is not going well, I need to testify…because I need to be able to explain to the jury how [the cellmate] got this information.” At this point, the defendant and trial counsel discussed whether the defendant should testify. The trial attorney then told the defendant that “I don’t want you to get on the stand because the prosecutor could bring up the aggravated assault conviction and then the jury…will think you’re violent.” The trial attorney believed that if the defendant were to testify his conviction for aggravated assault and the details of that conviction would come in for impeachment purposes. Based on that belief, the trial attorney advised the defendant not to testify.

At the hearing, the trial attorney admitted that if the aggravated assault conviction was not admissible for impeachment purposes, “then there would have been no reason to advise [the defendant not to testify]” because he really wanted to explain to the jury how his cellmate got that information. Though the defendant also had a burglary conviction that could have been used for impeachment purposes, the trial attorney stated that he “wasn’t even thinking about the burglary conviction.” Additionally, the trial attorney testified that the defendant was “not a foolish man” and therefore did not have any concerns that the defendant would have “opened the door” to allowing the prosecutor to cross the defendant on his prior aggravated assault conviction. Based on this advice not to testify and the reasons for it, the defendant did not testify at this trial.

The defendant also testified at the PCRA hearing. He testified that prior to trial there was no understanding that he was going to testify. However, as the trial progressed, he told trial counsel that he “wanted to testify so [the jury] could know the whole story as to how any information that was on [his] paperwork was being transmitted by [his cellmate].” Specifically, the defendant would have explained that he had his paperwork in his cell and this was how the cellmate knew the names of the officers involved in Appellant’s first case. The defendant confirmed that his trial counsel told him that if he testified the jury would hear about this prior aggravated assault conviction and he relied on his advice when deciding not to testify.

Following the hearing and submission of post-hearing briefs, the trial court denied the defendant’s PCRA petition. The defendant then filed a timely notice of appeal. The Superior Court then denied his appeal. Undeterred, the defendant then filed a petition for re-argument before an en banc panel of the Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant raised three issues, however for purposes of this blog, only the issue of whether trial counsel’s advice concerning his aggravated assault conviction was so unreasonable that the defendant did not and could not have made a knowing and intelligent decision not to testify at trial.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the lower court’s decision and granted the defendant a new trial. In making its decision, the Superior Court reviewed prior case law and the rules of evidence. Rule 609 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence allows for a witness to be impeached with a prior conviction for a crime if it involves dishonesty or a false statement (also referred to as “crimen falsi”). The Commonwealth conceded that aggravated assault was not a crime that involved crimen falsi. Additionally, there was a prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that held that a defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he advised a defendant to waive his right to testify because he could be impeached with his prior drug and firearms convictions.

The Superior Court also agreed that that the trial attorney’s advice to the defendant was improper. Additionally, the Superior Court did not find that the fact that the defendant had a prior burglary conviction, that is a crimen falsiconviction, relevant because the trial attorney specifically testified that his sole reason for advising the defendant not to testify was because of his prior aggravated assault conviction. Further, the Superior Court was not concerned that the defendant’s testimony was probably speculative. The relevant inquiry is whether his decision not to testify would have been different absent his trial attorney’s ineffectiveness. In this case, it is clear that the defendant would have testified had his attorney provided competent legal advice. Therefore, the defendant’s convictions are vacated and he will get a new trial.

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