Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
US Supreme Court: An Unauthorized Rental Car Driver Can Probably Litigate a Motion to Suppress
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Byrd v. United States, holding that the defendant probably held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car he was driving despite the fact that the car had been rented by his girlfriend and she had not listed him as an authorized driver in the rental agreement.
The Facts of Byrd
Byrd dealt with a traffic stop in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania State Police pulled over a rental car driven by the defendant. The defendant was the only person in the car. During the course of the traffic stop, the troopers learned that the car was a rental and that the defendant was not listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver. The troopers told the defendant that they were going to search the car and that they did not need his permission because he was not an authorized driver. They then searched the car, including the trunk. They found body armor and 49 bricks of heroin.
When Byrd’s girlfriend rented the car, she signed a rental agreement. The agreement specifically listed the limited number of people people who could drive the car. It also stated:
Permitting an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle is a violation of the rental agreement. This may result in any and all coverage otherwise provided by the rental agreement being void and my being fully responsible for all loss or damage, including liability to third parties.
Byrd’s girlfriend did not list him as an authorized driver. Therefore, they both violated the rental agreement when he drove the car. Of course, there is a difference between technically violating a rental agreement and stealing a car.
The Federal Criminal Case Against Byrd
Due to the significant quantity of drugs recovered by police, federal prosecutors in the Middle District of Pennsylvania assumed the case and prosecuted Mr. Byrd for distribution and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) as well as possession of body armor by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 931(a)(1). Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that police had no basis for searching the car and that because his girlfriend had rented the car and loaned it to him, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car despite the fact that he was not part of the rental agreement. The trial court denied the Motion to Suppress, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Both found that he could not challenge the search because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car due to the fact that he was not on the rental agreement.
The Criminal Appeal
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car even when the driver is not authorized to drive the vehicle by the rental agreement. The Court held that, as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list that person as an authorized driver. The Court therefore remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether Byrd was in fact in otherwise lawful possession and control of the rental car and whether the police had probable cause to search the vehicle.
The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Court’s analysis focused on whether Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. In order to challenge a potentially unconstitutional search in federal court, the person challenging the search must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place that the police searched. For example, a person is going to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own home or the pockets of their pants and therefore would be able to challenge a search of those places. But a person generally does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a neighbor’s home. This means that if you store your drugs in your neighbor’s house, the police could use those drugs against you even if they found them by searching your neighbor’s house illegally without a search warrant. Thus, the case hinged on whether Byrd had the ability to challenge the search or whether he had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he was not authorized to drive the car. His girlfriend, as the person who rented the car, clearly would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy while driving the car if police sought to introduce evidence of a search against her.
The Court noted that one who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns and possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Ownership of property, however, is not the only factor in determining whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although ownership is not necessarily required, mere presence in the area that was searched also may not be enough to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, there typically must be some kind of property right or right to exclude other people from the property. A car thief, for example, would not have any property rights in a car or right to exclude other people from the car. Therefore, a car thief would not be able to challenge the search of the car that he or she stole.
The Court concluded that there is a difference between violating an important provision in a car rental agreement and potentially increasing one’s exposure to civil liability in the event of an accident and actually stealing a car. A car thief has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car, but someone who is not on the authorized driver’s list does not automatically stand in the same position as a car thief.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further fact-finding by the trial court. The Court ordered the trial court to consider whether Byrd had committed a criminal offense in having his girlfriend rent the car for him knowing that he could not rent it such that he was no better than a car thief. If so, then the trial court could be justified in finding no reasonable expectation of privacy because Byrd would essentially have stolen the car. The Court also permitted the trial court to determine whether State Police had probable cause to search the vehicle. If they did, then the question of whether Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy would be irrelevant because federal law permits police to search a vehicle without a search warrant as long as they have probable cause.
Byrd was a unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court. It is an important decision because of its common-sense approach. It seems obvious that someone should not lose all of their rights to be free of an illegal search and seizure solely because they have not properly followed the requirements of a car rental agreement. Instead, courts should use common sense and look at whether the person who was subjected to the search would have reasonably expected to have privacy in the vehicle and whether society would view that expectation as reasonable. Here, unless Byrd was the equivalent of a car thief, he should not be subjected to an illegal search by the police regardless of the technicalities of a complicated car rental agreement which contained all sorts of other provisions.
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Can a Juvenile's Confession Be Used Against Them in Court?
PA Superior Court Finds Juvenile's Waiver of Miranda Rights Involuntary
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of In Re: N.B., finding that the trial court properly suppressed N.B.'s confession due to an involuntary waiver of N.B.'s Miranda rights. The Court's ruling relied heavily on the fact that the juvenile defendant's mother essentially forced him to confess to the police, thereby rendering his decision to waive his Miranda rights and confess involuntary.
In the Interest of N.B.
The facts of In Re: N.B. were relatively straight forward. The defendant’s mother believed that N.B. and his twin brother, D.B., engaged in sexual misconduct involving a 9-year-old girl who lived in a neighboring apartment. On April 29, 2015, the mother confronted both the defendant and his brother about her suspicions. The mother subsequently reported the allegations to the defendant’s school district because she was concerned about his behavior.
A lieutenant with the Bradford Police Department contacted the mother and asked her to bring in the defendant and his brother to the police station for an interview. The mother complied and brought both boys to the police station to be interviewed about the sexual misconduct allegations. The lieutenant then read both the brothers Miranda warnings and explained to the mother that although she could be present for the interviews, he preferred to interview the boys individually and alone. The warnings were read to defendant and his brother “quickly.” The mother agreed to allow the defendant to be interviewed alone. The mother told defendant to “be brave [and] to tell the truth” prior to exiting the room. This interrogation was recorded.
The defendant fully complied with his mother’s instructions and confessed to numerous sex crimes involving the nine-year-old girl and agreed to speak with the lieutenant again if necessary. The defendant’s brother also complied with his mother’s instructions and confessed to numerous sex acts with the same girl. Consequently, on October 16, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a written allegation of delinquency based on the defendant’s confession. On December 1, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the confession. On February 17, 2016, a the family court held a suppression hearing. The mother, the lieutenant, and the defendant testified at this hearing.
The mother testified that the defendant suffered from developmental delays and had difficulty in school. The mother stated that she repeatedly told the lieutenant that she wanted to get her son the help and treatment that he needed, in addition to the consequences for his actions. She also explained that she did not believe the defendant knew that he could refuse to answer the lieutenant’s questions or leave the police station.
The defendant testified that he was in the seventh grade when this occurred. He stated that although he was older than his classmates, he was “behind” in school. He further testified that he had difficulty learning, paying attention, and understanding his teacher’s instructions. Additionally, he testified that he was failing some classes and that he received mental health treatment in school.
In regards to the legal system, the defendant testified that he did not know anything about it. In regards to Miranda warnings, the defendant did not attach any significance to them other than associating them with a television show. Further, he explained that he did not understand that he could refuse to answer the lieutenant’s questions or leave the police station. The defendant testified that he believed had to comply with his mother’s instructions.
The lieutenant testified at the suppression hearing, too. He testified that he did not yell or threaten the defendant. Further, he stated that he was calm during the questioning and the defendant was not restrained in any way. He also testified that the door to the room was closed, but not locked during questioning.
At the conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the suppression court filed an order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. Specifically, the suppression court found that the defendant had not waived his Miranda rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The suppression court also found the defendant to be credible in his testimony. The Commonwealth appealed.
Does the Law treat Juveniles Differently from Adults When Considering Whether a Waiver of Miranda was Knowingly, Voluntarily and Intelligently?
The answer is yes. A popular misconception is that if the police do not read you your Miranda warnings, then the case against you should be thrown out. This is not correct. An officer’s failure to read you your Miranda warnings is only relevant when you are 1) in custody for purposes of Miranda and 2) you are asked questions that are reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response. If those two prongs are not satisfied, then you will not be successful in a motion to suppress. If an officer does read you your Miranda rights, you can still be successful in suppressing your statement if you did not provide a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. Therefore, if you are charged with a crime and provided the police with a statement, you need a skilled attorney who is capable of suppressing the statement.
Juvenile adolescent development has been a hot topic issue in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Most of the jurisprudence focused on punishment (i.e. whether a juvenile could get the death penalty or whether a juvenile could serve the rest of his/her life in prison). However, not all cases focused on punishment. For example, in 2011, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina. This decision focused on juveniles and Miranda. In this case, the Court held that the age of a child is relevant when determining whether a juvenile is in custody for purposes of Miranda. As such, a child does not necessarily have to be in a police station to be in custody for purposes of Miranda. A teacher’s classroom could satisfy this element based on the facts of the particular case.
What Factors Apply to Whether a Juvenile's Mirandized Statement Will Be Admissible?
In Pennsylvania, courts will look at several factors in determining whether or not a juvenile has waived his Miranda rights. Specifically, the court will look at: the juvenile’s age, experience with the criminal justice system, comprehension, whether an interested adult is present, the duration and means of the interrogation, the defendant’s physical and psychological state, the conditions attendant to the detention, the attitude of the interrogator, and any other factors that could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion. As one can see, this is a very fact intensive inquiry. Courts do not go through the same level of intensiveness when determining whether an adult made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights.
PA Superior Court Upholds the Suppression Court’s Order Suppressing Defendant’s Statement Because His Waiver Was Not Knowing, Intelligent and Voluntary.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the Suppression Court’s order suppressing the defendant’s statement. In its opinion, the Superior Court focused on several points. First, and arguably most importantly, the court found that the defendant did not have an interested adult present with him when making his waiver. The Superior Court found that because the defendant’s mother instructed him to “be brave [and] tell the truth” she was not considered an “interested person.” Instead, defendant believed he was forced to be there by his mother and that he had to confess.
Additionally, the Superior Court considered the fact that the defendant was intellectually limited, which supported his position that he did not understand his rights, specifically that he was not allowed to leave. Because the trial court found him to be credible, the Superior Court had to adopt that conclusion as well. The Superior Court therefore found that the defendant has basically been coerced into waiving his rights by the circumstances and the orders from his mother. It held that the defendant did not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.
Motions to Suppress Statements
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers
Successfully moving to suppress a statement is a very fact intensive exercise that requires a skilled attorney. If you are charged with a crime and you gave a statement to the police, you need an attorney with the knowledge and expertise to fight your case. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully litigated countless suppression motions. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.
PA Supreme Court: Arrest Warrant Does Not Allow Police to Enter Home
Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Romero. In Romero, the Court held that the police must obtain a search warrant prior to entering a private residence to arrest someone. The police may no longer enter a private home armed only with an arrest warrant. Instead, in order to avoid the risk that police will enter the wrong house, they must also obtain a search warrant from a magistrate after showing the magistrate that they have probable cause to believe the person to be arrested will be found in that location.
The Facts of Romero
In Romero, police were looking for a man named Earnest Moreno who had absconded from a halfway house in Philadelphia. Moreno was on state parole and left the facility. His parole agent obtained a warrant for his arrest and began attempting to locate him. The agent, assisted by Deputy United States Marshalls, attempted to execute the arrest warrant at an address in Philadelphia where they believed that he might live. The residence actually belonged to Moreno’s half-brother, Angel Romero, and his wife, Wendy Castro.
The agents did not find Moreno in the house. Instead, they found a marijuana grow operation. After finding the marijuana, the agent contacted the Philadelphia Police Department. Philadelphia Police obtained a search warrant and searched the house. They recovered marijuana, paraphernalia for growing marijuana, a gun, and identification which linked the defendants to the house.
Motions to Suppress
Romero and Castro moved to suppress all of the contraband found in their house. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and Romero and the agent testified at the hearing. The agent testified that he had a number of different reasons for believing that he would find Moreno at the house. First, it was the address listed on Moreno’s most recent driver’s license, which had expired years prior. Second, the last time Moreno had been arrested, he gave the police that address. Third, he testified that someone from the halfway house told him that Moreno gave them that address when he entered the facility. Finally, he testified that his investigation revealed that Moreno’s family continued to live at the address in question, but he refused to reveal how he learned that information. He agreed that there were other possible addresses for Moreno, but based on those four factors, he believed the address that he searched to be the most likely location for finding Moreno.
He then described the search. He testified that he knocked on the door, announced his and the other officers’ presence, and then was permitted to enter the residence by someone inside. He could not recall whether the occupants actually said he could enter, but he testified that they did not say no. He did remember that the residents began to object to the search of the home, but the agents and marshals ignored those objections. The officers then found the marijuana grow operation.
Romero testified also. He testified that he had previously lived at the address in question with his wife and two children. He testified that Moreno was his half-brother, but he said that he did not associate with him because Moreno was addicted to heroin. He said that he had not spoken with Moreno in fifteen years, did not know where Moreno lived, did not know that Moreno was on parole, and did not know that Moreno had listed that address on his expired driver’s license. He said that Moreno did not receive mail at that address. He also contradicted the agent’s description of the search. He claimed that he heard a knock, his wife opened the door, and police entered without permission. They then began searching the house without speaking to anyone except to tell Romero to sit down after cursing at him.
The trial court granted the Motion to Suppress. The court found that authorities did not need a search warrant to enter the house. Instead, the trial court concluded that the agent simply had to show that his belief as to why Moreno lived at that location was reasonable. However, the trial court found that the belief was unreasonable. It concluded that the information possessed by the parole agent was simply too old to justify the belief that Moreno would be found at that address. Therefore, the court granted the motion and excluded the evidence of drugs, guns, and paraphernalia that the agents found while searching for Moreno.
The Criminal Appeal
The Superior Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. The Superior Court felt that “so long as the authorities had reason to believe that the subject of an arrest warrant . . . lived in and could be found in the apartment, they had a valid basis to search the apartment for the subject of the warrant.” Further, the Superior Court concluded that the agent’s belief was reasonable because Moreno had allegedly given the halfway house that address despite the agent’s refusal to testify from where that information came.
Petition for Allowance of Appeal
The defendants appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Superior Court. The Court recognized that under prior United States Supreme Court decisions, police officers may enter the home of the subject of an arrest warrant to effect an arrest, but they must obtain a valid search warrant before entering the home of a third party. Although this standard makes sense in theory, it poses real problems in practice. The problem with this standard is that the police often do not know whether the place that they want to search is the suspect’s home or the home of a third party. In some cases, police may know exactly where the subject of an arrest warrant lives. In others, they may have trouble finding out. Even where police have solid, recent information as to a suspect's whereabouts, the suspect may have recently moved or gone into hiding. That person may also be living with others who have not have done anything wrong and who have their own privacy interests.
The Court therefore concluded that police must have probable cause to believe that the suspect will be found at the location. The Court then had to decide whether the probable cause requirement means that police must obtain a search warrant prior to entering the house or whether the probable cause could simply be challenged by a defendant after-the-fact if the police guessed wrong. The Court rejected the idea that police officers could determine for themselves whether they have probable cause that a defendant will be found at a particular location. Instead, the Court concluded that police must first obtain a search warrant, based on probable cause, from a magistrate or judge prior to entering a private residence.
This ruling does not prevent the police from arresting someone based on probable cause or an arrest warrant where the police encounter that person in public. They may also obtain consent to enter a private residence. However, in order to enter a residence without consent and search from someone, a police officer must first obtain an arrest warrant and a search warrant from a judge. This means that even where police know where the person lives, they cannot enter the house without a search warrant even if they have already obtained an arrest warrant.
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If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentence, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today
PA Superior Court Finds Police-Created Exigent Circumstances Support Warrantless Blood Draw in Homicide by DUI Case
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Trahey. In Trahey, the Court held that because Philadelphia Police were understaffed, failed to respond to the incident in a timely manner, and did not have procedures in place for quickly obtaining a warrant by electronic means, officers were justified in conducting a warrantless blood draw of a suspect who had been arrested on suspicion of Homicide by DUI. The opinion is an absurdity which suggests that because the Philadelphia Police have not taken adequate steps to investigate cases and create procedures for quickly obtaining search warrants even in potential homicide cases, they can ignore the United States Supreme Court's holding in Birchfield that drawing a suspect's blood in a DUI case requires voluntary, uncoerced consent or a search warrant.
Commonwealth v. Trahey
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
On September 4, 2015, which was Labor Day weekend, 911 dispatchers received a report that a car had struck a cyclist on the 4900 block of Wynnewood Avenue in Philadelphia. Despite the call about someone being struck, police were not dispatched to the scene until approximately 45 minutes after receiving the call. Officers testified that this was “due to the lower priority of auto accidents on the hierarchy of circumstances in which Philadelphia Police Officers are dispatched to emergency situations.” The 911 call did not mention that this may be a DUI-related crash or that someone had been seriously injured.
Upon arrival, police officers observed a smashed bicycle and a pickup truck that was partially on the sidewalk. The police testified that the truck’s hood and grill were damaged, its windshield was shattered, and there was blood on the street. The officers spoke to a group of bystanders who informed them that the defendant had been driving the truck and the cyclist, who he had hit, had been transported to the hospital. Unfortunately, the cyclist died as a result of this incident.
The defendant told one of the officers that he was the driver of the truck that struck the cyclist. While speaking with the defendant, the officer noticed that the defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his person, his speech was slow and slurred, his eyes were glassy, and he had an unsteady gait. Based on these observations, the officer believed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The officer arrested the defendant for DUI. It does not appear that any field sobriety tests were performed despite the fact that the officers were on the scene for approximately 45 minutes before they arrested the defendant. They then left the scene to transport the defendant to police headquarters for booking and presumably for a blood test.
While en route to police headquarters, the officers were called back to the scene by the Accident Investigation District (AID). AID is a unit that investigates car accidents and DUI cases. One of the AID officers examined the defendant and also noticed signs of intoxication. The AID officer learned that nearly ninety minutes had already passed since the crash. This is significant because police have two hours to do a blood test or a breathalyzer after they arrest someone on suspicion of DUI. After two hours, the results of the test become significantly less accurate. The rules therefore suggest that a court should not allow prosecutors to use the results of an untimely test. Consequently, one of the AID officers sent the defendant back to the police headquarters for a blood test and/or breathalyzer.
When the defendant arrived at police headquarters, he gave verbal consent to the blood testing, and he signed a 75-439 form which is the written version of these warnings. However, on this form, he did not check the box that consented to blood testing. After all of this, the defendant had blood taken from his arm. It was two hours and five minutes after the accident occurred. The defendant was subsequently charged with homicide by vehicle, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, involuntary manslaughter, and DUI. He then filed a pre-trial suppression motion in which he argued that the police subjected him to an unlawful search by taking his blood without a search warrant.
The Motion to Suppress
Several police officers testified at the hearing. They generally testified that officers would not have had sufficient time to seek a warrant for the chemical testing of the defendant’s blood within two hours of the accident. They also testified that a significant amount of time had elapsed before the officers were able to respond to the accident scene and that they did not know this was potentially a DUI related accident. It is important to remember that the 911 call did mention that someone had been struck by an automobile, yet apparently this had no effect on the promptness of the Philadelphia police’s response time to the scene of the accident.
The officers provided a number of different reasons for why they could not get a warrant within the two-hour time frame. This included: it would have taken too long to type up the warrant, drive from the accident to the AID headquarters, communicate with the on-call prosecutor for approval of the affidavit, arrange to meet with an available commissioner to consider the warrant application, travel to arraignment court, wait for a commissioner, have the commissioner review the application, and then return to the police headquarters with the approved request. The officer estimated that the entire process could take anywhere from seventy minutes to three hours.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court held that the defendant’s oral consent was invalid because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota (which holds that the government cannot subject you to a penalty by refusing to consent to blood testing). However, the suppression court did not address the exigent circumstances argument posed by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth then filed a timely interlocutory appeal.
What is the “Exigent Circumstances” Exception to the Warrant Requirement?
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Usually, this means that if the government wants to go into your home or take something from your body (i.e. blood) the government needs a warrant to do so. However, throughout the years, both federal and Pennsylvania case law has evolved to include an “exigent circumstances” exception. Typically, this is limited to circumstances where there is a reasonable belief that evidence will be destroyed unless the police take prompt action. Courts use a totality of the circumstances approach to analyze the facts of a particular case in determining whether there were exigent circumstances.
To give an example of exigent circumstances, let’s say a police officer sees someone engage in a hand-to-hand exchange of drugs for money. The police then approach the defendant, and he runs into a house. The police officer follows him into this house and seizes drugs from his person. At a motion to suppress, the Commonwealth may reasonably be able to argue that there were exigent circumstances because if the police officer had not gone into the house, the defendant would have had time to flush the drugs down the toilet or find some other way to destroy them. Therefore, depending on all of the circumstances, a court could rule that the officer was not required to obtain a search warrant and deny the defendant’s motion to suppress.
The exigent circumstances exception has been applied in DUI cases, as well. This is understandable to some extent because alcohol in a person's blood dissipates relatively quickly. However, exigent circumstances do not automatically apply in DUI cases solely from the fact that alcohol eventually dissipates. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in the case of Missouri v. McNeely. The Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a person’s bloodstream is not a per se (automatic) exigency and held that the police are not free from the requirement of obtaining a search warrant to obtain a DUI suspect’s blood. However, McNeely also did not hold that the police must always get a warrant to take a DUI suspect’s blood. The McNeely court acknowledged that obtaining a warrant is not always practical in DUI cases. Therefore, in cases where the police do not get a warrant, courts must analyze the facts of a given case to determine whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to draw blood without a search warrant.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court Holds That Easily Resolved Logistical Challenges Qualify as Exigent Circumstances
In Trahey, the suppression court did not address the issue of exigent circumstances. Nonetheless, instead of remanding the case for the suppression court to consider whether there were exigent circumstances, the Superior Court improperly decided to conduct the analysis itself. Of course, it found that there were exigent circumstances in this case. What is absurd about the Superior Court’s decision is that the exigent circumstances that the Court found in favor of the Commonwealth were entirely created by the Philadelphia Police Department's poor performance in giving the call priority and failure to create electronic or telephonic procedures for obtaining a search warrant. Such procedures for quickly obtaining a search warrant in emergency situations obviously exist in countless jurisdictions both small and large throughout the country, but the Superior Court refused to suggest that a jurisdiction as large as Philadelphia should be expected to implement them.
The Superior Court gave a slew of reasons as to why there were exigent circumstances in this case. One of the reasons was that that the officers did not arrive on scene until 45 minutes after the accident. However, this was because the emergency dispatch in Philadelphia does not prioritize car accidents for police response (apparently even when the 911 call indicates that someone has been hit). Further, when the police arrived on scene, it took an additional 45 minutes for the officers to determine that the defendant may have been under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. This determination was not because the officers had the defendant engage in any field sobriety tests. Rather, it took this long based on their observations of the defendant and conversations with him and bystanders. Additionally, the Superior Court noted that on this particular night, the Philadelphia police lacked manpower because only 5 AID officers were assigned to Philadelphia on Labor Day weekend.
As such, all of these exigent circumstances were a consequence of the failures of the Philadelphia Police to be adequately prepared. Thus, arguably, the police created the exigent circumstances in this case. Courts have held that if the police create the exigent circumstances, they are not entitled to sidestep the protections of the Pennsylvania and the United States Constitution. However, the Superior Court’s decision in Trahey does exactly that: it incentivizes the police to not be prepared so that they can later claim exigent circumstances and evade the Constitution's search warrant requirement. Trahey will likely be appealed, and hopefully an en banc panel of the Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will reverse it and require law enforcement to comply with the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.
Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys
Philadelphia DUI Defense Attorneys
DUI cases can be complicated. However, there are several ways to beat them. If you are charged with DUI, you need a skilled attorney with the knowledge and expertise to fight your case. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended countless DUI cases. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.