PA Superior Court: Trial Court Must Bifurcate Felon in Possession of Firearm Charges from Other Criminal Charges

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, holding that when the Commonwealth prosecutes 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105 (Persons Not to Possess a Firearms) (hereinafter § 6105), along with other charges, the trial court must sever the § 6105 charge from the other offenses and hear those other offenses first when the defendant’s prior conviction is only relevant for purposes of § 6105. This is a significant decision because it prohibits the Commonwealth from circumventing PA Rule of Evidence 404. Rule 404 prohibits the Commonwealth from telling the jury that the defendant has a criminal record, barring certain exceptions which do not apply in the typical gun case.  

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Brown

On March 26, 2015, a paratransit driver in Westmoreland County was at work. He was in the process of picking up patients and transporting them to various medical facilities. While working, he had a leather jacket with him, and in one of the pockets, he had a loaded gun. The jacket was draped over the driver’s seat in a way that made it accessible to the backseat passengers. The driver picked up the defendant and transported him to Latrobe Hospital. There were other occupants in the vehicle with the defendant. While driving, he felt a tug on his jacket. Although he was concerned about the gun, the paratransit driver decided he would not check on his gun until he transported the other occupants to their destinations. When the driver dropped the defendant off, he noticed that his gun was missing. He then called the police. Police went to the defendant’s house, frisked him, and searched the house, but they did not find the gun. The defendant told the police that he did not have it. 

Police eventually determined that the defendant’s nephew had the gun. When they questioned the nephew, he led the police to the gun and explained that the defendant gave it to him along with $50 for storing it. Police arrested the defendant and charged him with Theft, Receiving Stolen Property, § 6105, and Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License (VUFA 6106). Appellant had previous convictions for aggravated assault and robbery. These prior convictions made it illegal for him to possess a firearm. 

Pre-Trial Motions

Prior to trial, the defense attorney filed a Motion for a Bifurcated Trial for the § 6105 charge. The defense attorney argued that it would be prejudicial for the jury to hear that his client had the prior convictions. The trial judge agreed to bifurcate, however, seeking to aid the Commonwealth in its prosecution, the judge allowed the prosecution to proceed with the case as it saw fit. In other words, the trial court did not require that the Commonwealth present evidence of the § 6105 offense and relevant, unfairly prejudicial convictions after it presented evidence of the other alleged crimes like theft and receiving stolen property. Unsurprisingly, the Commonwealth chose to proceed with the § 6105 case first, and then that same jury heard evidence relating to the other charges. Consequently, the jury knew of the defendant’s prior criminal history before it heard the evidence for the other charges. The jury convicted the defendant and found him guilty of all four charges. The trial court sentenced him to three and a half to eight years of incarceration. Appellant appealed, and on appeal, he raised several issues. First, he attacked the sufficiency of the evidence. However, the main issue for purposes of the appeal was whether he was unfairly prejudiced when the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to proceed with the § 6105 charge before the other charges. 

Can the Prosecution Introduce Evidence of a Prior Criminal Record in a Criminal Trial? 

Generally, no. The rules of evidence often prohibit this because of the fact that juries are extremely likely to convict when they hear that a defendant has a prior criminal record. Rule 404 (a)(1) prohibits the use of evidence of a person’s character to show that on a particular occasion that this person acted in accordance with that character or trait. 404(b)(1) prevents the introduction of a crime in order to show that individual committed this particular crime. What these two subsections seek to prevent is the Commonwealth introducing evidence that a defendant, at some point in his or her life, did something morally wrong or committed some crime to show that he or she committed the crime that they are currently charged with. Obviously, this is a significant rule. If a jury were to hear that the person on trial had previously been convicted of a crime, then the jury is much more likely to convict. There are certain exceptions to this rule. For example, the Commonwealth can file what is referred to as a “Prior Acts Motion” to introduce prior crimes committed by a defendant to show a common scheme, motive, knowledge, lack of mistake, or intent. For example, if the defendant has been charged with burglary in which he or she wore a unique mask, the Commonwealth could probably introduce evidence of prior Burglary cases in which the defendant wore the same mask to show the identity of the defendant. These 404(b) exceptions typically do not apply in a routine gun case, and the Commonwealth did not file the required motion to admit prior bad acts evidence in advance. 

However, the Commonwealth may also introduce evidence of a prior crime when it is an element of the crime charged (i.e. § 6105). However, courts have consistently held that the introduction of the underlying conviction that makes the defendant ineligible to possess a firearm should be severed from the other parts of the case. The reason is obvious: as stated above, hearing that the defendant has a prior conviction will unfairly prejudice the jury. 

In Philadelphia, the common practice is that the Commonwealth and the defendant agree to have the judge decide whether the defendant has an underlying conviction that makes him or her ineligible to possess a firearm. Typically, there will be a stipulation because it is usually very clear whether or not the person is eligible to possess a firearm. Thus, the jury will not be privy to this information when deciding whether the Commonwealth met its burden for the other elements of § 6105 and the other, if applicable, charges against the defendant. Alternatively, the parties may agree to stipulate to an acquittal or conviction on the 6105 charge that matches the jury’s decision on the other charges. However, each jurisdiction has its own quirks, so you need an attorney who is familiar with the particular jurisdiction and its customs and practices to represent you if you are charged with § 6105.   

Superior Court Finds Commonwealth Must Bifurcate at Trial and Introduce Evidence for § 6105 After it Proves Other Charges

Although the Superior Court held that the trial court was correct in severing the § 6105 charge from the other charges, it stated that allowing the Commonwealth to choose the order in which to introduce evidence was “an exercise in futility.” The reason is obvious: allowing the Commonwealth to proceed with the § 6105 charge first clearly prejudiced the jury because the jurors became aware of the defendant’s prior convictions for robbery and aggravated assault. This, in essence, allowed the Commonwealth to circumvent the prohibitions outlined in Rule 404(b). The Superior Court saw through this and found that the defendant was clearly prejudiced and ordered that he receive a new trial. 

Call the Award Winning Law Office of Goldstein Mehta LLC if You Are Charged With Illegally Possessing a Firearm

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

Gun crimes are very serious, and you need a skilled defense attorney if you are charged with illegally possessing a firearm. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

Recorded Prison Visits and Phone Calls Are Admissible as Evidence Against You in PA

Are Prison Tapes Admissible at Trial? 

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Byrd. In Byrd, the Superior Court re-affirmed the long-standing rule that prison tapes and recorded prison visits may be used against a defendant at trial. This means that if a defendant says something incriminating in a recorded phone call, that incriminating statement can be used against the defendant as a confession as long as the defendant was on notice that the call could be recorded. 

The Facts of Byrd

Byrd involved gun charges and Possession With the Intent to Deliver charges. Police officers testified at a motion to suppress that they received a phone call for a specific address in McKeesport, PA that a female received threatening phone calls from a suspect who was parked outside of her residence in a grey, F-150 truck. Police arrived at the house, spoke with the woman who had called 911, and learned that a man known to her as “Reek” had threatened to kill her, had a gun, and was parked outside the house in the truck. She pointed at the grey truck.

The officer then went to confront the man in the truck, who turned out to be the defendant. The officer attempted to stop the defendant, and the defendant rolled the window down 2-3 inches. The officer could immediately smell a strong odor of marijuana through the window. The officer also testified that the defendant was acting in a nervous manner, his hands were shaking, and he was breathing rapidly. The officer called for back-up.

When back-up arrived, the officer ordered the defendant to get out of the truck. The defendant refused, so officers pulled him out. The defendant resisted, pulled away, and eventually began to run. Officers caught him. After placing him into custody, they returned to the truck and looked in the window. They observed a gun magazine under a piece of cloth on the front seat of the truck. They then searched the car. When an officer lifted the cloth, he found a .40 caliber handgun. Police also found other drugs and drug paraphernalia in the car which suggested that the defendant may have been likely to sell those drugs. 

After police arrested the defendant, he made a number of incriminating statements in recorded inmate visits while awaiting trial in custody at the Allegheny County jail. 

The Motion to Suppress

Prosecutors charged the defendant with persons not to possess firearms, carrying a firearm without a license, three counts of possession with the intent to deliver, and three counts of possession with a controlled substance. The defendant moved to suppress the gun and drugs. He also subsequently moved to suppress statements recorded at the Allegheny County jail after prosecutors notified his attorney that they planned to use the recordings at trial. Prison authorities had recorded conversations in which the defendant made incriminating statements to visitors while in custody. Thus, he moved to suppress the statements, arguing that the prison violated Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act when it made the recordings. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the priosn tapes and some of the drugs. 

The Criminal Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's order. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress both the physical evidence and the recorded statements. With respect to the physical evidence, the Court concluded that because officers had smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and because the defendant seemed nervous and resisted arrest, the officers had probable cause to search the entire vehicle for contraband pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Gary. As a general rule, police do not need a search warrant for a car because cars may be easily moved. Instead, police must establish at a suppression hearing only that they had probable cause to search a vehicle. The odor of marijuana, coupled with the defendant’s behavior, gave the officers the probable cause necessary to search the car.

The Admissibility of Prison Phone Calls in Pennsylvania

The Superior Court also found that the prison phone calls were admissible in evidence against the defendant. The Court noted that Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act makes Pennsylvania a two-party consent state. This means that a person may not make secret audio recordings of another person in Pennsylvania. It can actually be a felony to do so, and a violation of the Act typically leads to the suppression of the evidence. Under the Wiretap Act, both parties to a call must consent to its recording, or they must at least be on notice of a potential recording and implicitly consent to the recording by continuing to make a call, anyway.

Although the trial court reasoned that the defendant had not been sufficiently warned that the phone calls would be recorded, the Superior Court rejected this analysis. The testimony at the motions hearing was that inmate visitation at the Allegheny County Jail is conducted over a closed-circuit system using telephone receivers. Guards take a visitor to the jail to a windowed cubicle with chairs and a telephone receiver. The inmate is escorted to a room on the other side of the visitor window with another telephone receiver. The inmate picks up the receiver, enters his or her jail ID number, and then the visitor picks up the receiver. Before the parties speak through the phone, a recording stating that the visit “may be monitored or recorded” is played. However, there is nothing in the inmate handbook which indicates that the visits are recorded and there was no testimony regarding whether [Byrd] heard the recording before each visit. The Commonwealth called the defendant’s visitor, however, to testify that she did hear the warning before the conversations. Additionally, in some of the phone calls, the defendant attempted to whisper and suggested that he did not care if he was being recorded, suggesting that in addition to hearing the warning, he did know that he was being recorded.

Prison Tapes Are Admissible

The Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the evidence did not establish that he actually heard the warning or that the warning that he “may be” recorded instead of “would be” recorded somehow rendered the recording illegal. The Court concluded that the defendant was properly warned that he could be recorded, knew that he was being recorded based on the things that he said, and that he implicitly consented to the recordings by continuing with the visits, anyway. Thus, the Court found that the evidence was not obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act and could be used at trial.

The bottom line is that prison phone calls, and in many cases in-person prison visits, are recorded. This is particularly true in Philadelphia where all prison phone calls are recorded and a warning is played before each call. As long as the prison provides some sort of notice that the phone calls could be recorded, those conversations are admissible in evidence against a criminal defendant if the defendant says something incriminating. They are often even more damaging to a case than a detective or police officer claiming that a defendant confessed because in many cases, the jury will actually be able to listen to the recordings. Many prosecutors throughout the Commonwealth will listen to these recordings prior to trial and see if the defendant confessed at any point during a visit or phone call, and if the defendant did, it could seriously undermine the defense at trial. There is very little that can be done to mitigate the potential damage caused by incriminating statements once they are made. Even statements which seem harmless can often be used against a defendant if the prosecutor can suggest that the defendant was speaking in code or that the statement meant something else. The Superior Court’s opinion re-affirms that prison inmates have very few privacy rights, and if they make recorded phone calls, law enforcement may listen in and use those phone calls at trial.

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If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentence, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today

PA Superior Court Decides Automatic Gunshot Detector May Contribute to Finding of Reasonable Suspicion

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court just announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Raglin, holding that “Shot Spotter” gunshot detection technology coupled with additional factors may provide sufficient reasonable suspicion for police to make a Terry stop. The Superior Court made its decision without any evidence as to whether this Shot Spotter system is reliable or not, including whether a gun was even fired on the day in question. This decision could have significant consequences for individuals who live in urban locations where city officials are more likely to employ this unproven technology.

Commonwealth v. Raglin

On February 27, 2015, a police officer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was working at his desk when he received a notification from Shot Spotter that a gunshot occurred in “zone 5.” Shot Spotter is a system of censors that is supposedly sensitive enough to distinguish between gun shots and fireworks. Additionally, the police claim Shot Spotter is accurate enough to pinpoint the location of the shot within 25 yards, although the Commonwealth did not present any conclusive evidence to this effect at the motions hearing in this case.

After receiving the gunshot detection notification, the operator dispatched multiple police officers to the location. Pittsburgh Police Sergeant Baker was one of the first officers on scene. When he arrived, he observed two black males in the street who were close to the location of the shot. One of these males was the defendant. When these two individuals saw the officer, they both separated and left the area in separate automobiles. Sergeant Baker followed both vehicles for a period of time, but eventually lost track of the vehicle not operated by the defendant. The vehicle operated by the defendant was observed making several turns and eventually pulled over on Thomas Boulevard.

The Superior Court then offers conflicting accounts of what happened next, but supposedly just as Sergeant Baker activated his lights, the defendant got out of his car. Immediately after this, the defendant began to walk towards Sergeant Baker. Sergeant Baker ordered the defendant to place his hands on the trunk where he conducted a pat-down search.  Another officer arrived shortly thereafter and noticed a handgun on the center console of the defendant’s vehicle in plain view. Narcotics were also recovered, although it is unclear from where they were recovered. The defendant then admitted that he had an active arrest warrant and a gun and “was trying to get away.” At this point, the defendant was officially placed under arrest.

Prosecutors charged the defendant with various offenses including: Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Knowing and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance, Receiving Stolen Property, and various Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (including persons not to possess a firearm and carrying a firearm without a license), and driving with a suspended license. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun and drugs, arguing that the police lacked the reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessary to stop his vehicle and detain him.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and subsequently found him guilty of all charges in a waiver trial. The court sentenced the defendant to 4-8 years incarceration, followed by a one year of probation. He appealed to the Superior Court, again arguing that police simply did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary for the stop.

What Is the Difference Between Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause?

As discussed above, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence in his case. Typically, a motion to suppress is a motion that asks a court to exclude evidence against a defendant because it was obtained when police did something illegal such as making a stop without “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion.” Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are similar, but distinct legal concepts. Probable cause is mentioned in both the United States Constitution (the Fourth Amendment) and the Pennsylvania Constitution (Article I, Section 8). In order for the government to arrest you, there must be probable cause that you committed a crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined probable cause as “the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”

Reasonable suspicion is a different and lesser standard. Unlike probable cause, reasonable suspicion is not mentioned in either the U.S. or Pennsylvania constitutions. Despite its absence, courts have allowed police officers and other government officials to stop people on reasonable suspicion after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. Reasonable suspicion is not as rigorous of a standard as probable cause. A person cannot be arrested or have their home searched based on reasonable suspicion. However, police may detain an individual for an investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion as “a less stringent standard than probable cause and depends on the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances.” A police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect that criminality is afoot. The issue in the defendant’s case is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first place.

Does a Shot Spotter Provide Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause? 

The defendant’s case is unique in that he did not become a person of interest until the police received a shot-spotter notification that a gun had been fired. When the police first saw the defendant, he was not committing any crimes or visibly carrying a gun. They merely saw him outside and, allegedly, within 25 yards of where a shot had occurred. Pennsylvania law is very clear that being in a high-crime area, does not qualify as reasonable suspicion to stop someone.  This obviously makes sense because if this were the law, the police could stop anyone simply because they lived in a bad neighborhood. However, if someone runs from the police in a high crime area, that is often sufficiently suspicious for the police to stop that person.

In the defendant’s case, he was in a high crime area, but he did not run. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that walking away from the police after seeing them in a high crime area is not sufficient for the police to stop a person on the basis of reasonable suspicion. In the defendant’s case, he did leave the area after he saw Sergeant Baker. However, once Sergeant Baker initiated a stop, the defendant complied and proceeded to walk towards Sergeant Baker. The defendant also followed his order by placing his hands on his trunk.

What is most significant about the Superior Court’s opinion is what was not in the record. Specifically, there was nothing in the Superior Court’s decision about how reliable this Shot-Spotter technology is. In fact, the Superior Court wrote in its opinion that it was “not prudent” to consider the reliability of this program. Further, there was nothing on record that the police recovered a bullet casing, despite the Shot-Spotter stating that a gun had just been discharged. The Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence as to whether police even looked for a shell casing or tested the defendant for gunshot residue.    

The Pennsylvania Superior Court Finds That the Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion

Despite the above-stated omissions, the Superior Court held that Sergeant Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. The Superior Court provided four reasons why Sergeant Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. First, the Shot Spotter itself provides some level of suspicion even though there was nothing in the record to indicate how accurate the technology is; second, the defendant was close to the area where a shot occurred; third, the defendant’s strange act of jumping out of his vehicle just as Sergeant Baker activated his lights; and finally because this all occurred in a high crime area.

Ultimately, it appears that the Superior Court put a heavy emphasis on the Shot-Spotter technology. In one of their footnotes, they described Shot Spotter as providing “strong evidence that a crime has likely occurred,” yet they stated that they did not find it “prudent” to know how accurate this technology is. It will be interesting to see if the defendant appeals this decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Currently, “Shot-Spotter” is in use in Philadelphia, but that could change, and it is in heavy use in Camden, NJ.

Motions to Suppress

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Criminal cases can be won and lost with a motion to suppress.  If you are facing criminal charges, you need an attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to litigate these motions, even when the law has yet to be determined. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

The Collective Knowledge Doctrine in PA

Commonwealth v. Yong 

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yong, holding that an investigating officer’s knowledge of facts sufficient to establish probable cause may be imputed to a second officer who arrests the suspect when the officers are working as a team. This is true even when the arresting officer has no individual knowledge of the facts giving rise to probable cause.

In Yong, Philadelphia Police Officers conducted a narcotics investigation targeting the 2300 block of North Fairhill Street in Philadelphia. Police Officer Joseph McCook (the "eyes" of the operation) and his partner conducted surveillance on September 21, 22nd, and 23rd of 2011. While conducting the surveillance, they observed Yong make a number of exchanges of United States currency for small objects which they believed to be drug transactions in which Yong was the seller. Based on the alleged drug activity observed during the three-day surveillance, Officer McCook obtained a search warrant for a property that was involved in these transactions. The officers returned to execute the search warrant later in the day on the 23rd. The warrant team included Police Officer Gerald Gibson. Officer Gibson had not been present for any of the surveillance and had no knowledge of Yong or Yong’s alleged involvement in any drug sales.

Relying on the search warrant, police entered the house located at 3202 North Fairhill Street. Officer McCook, who had witnessed the alleged drug sales, was towards the rear of the group. When the officers entered the house, Yong was standing in the living room. Officer Gibson, who had never seen Yong before, grabbed Yong, patted him down, and found a .38 caliber revolver in Yong’s waistband. The search of the property also led to the recovery of drug paraphernalia, including new and unused packaging.  

Possession with the Intent to Deliver and Gun Charges

The Commonwealth charged Yong with Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Criminal Conspiracy, and various gun charges including firearms not to be carried without a license and persons not to possess a firearm. Yong’s defense attorney moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that Officer McCook’s probable cause could not be imputed to Officer Gibson because Officer Gibson was not part of the prior narcotics surveillances. This was important because Pennsylvania appellate courts have long held that even where officers have a search warrant for a home, the officers need specific probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search the occupants of the home unless the occupants are identified or described in the search warrant. Because Officer Gibson did not know anything about Yong and Yong was not identified as a person to be searched by the search warrant, the defense argued that Officer Gibson had violated Yong’s rights by patting him down without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The defense argument relied on the fact that Officer McCook had not specifically directed Officer Gibson to search or arrest Yong because Pennsylvania courts have also held that an officer who does not have probable cause may conduct a search or make an arrest when specifically directed to do so by an officer who does have probable cause.  

The Criminal Appeal 

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court found that Officer McCook’s knowledge and probable cause could be imputed to Officer Gibson, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately agreed. The Court recognized the bad incentives that the decision could create for police officers in that it encourages officers who are working together to take a chance and conduct a search or make an arrest and hope that one of the other officers will later turn out to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The Court attempted to limit this incentive and its holding by limiting the application of the decision to the narrow facts of this case.

What is the Collective Knowledge Doctrine?

The Court held that the officer who does not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause may conduct the search or seizure only where that officer is specifically working as part of the same team and is near the officer who made the original observations. The Court rationalized its holding by suggesting that Yong’s arrest was inevitable. Officer McCook had observed Yong engaged in drug sales, so even if Officer Gibson had not arrested Yong, Officer McCook would have arrested Yong once he got into the house and saw him. This is an extension of the existing inevitable discovery doctrine. However, the Court was clear that it is not sufficient for officers to be part of the same police force or to be independently investigating the same criminal conduct. The officers must actually be working together and nearby, and one of the officers must have the requisite level of suspicion. In that limited situation, an officer does not violate a suspect’s rights by conducting a search or arrest. Although this opinion does create bad incentives for police officers to gamble on a potentially illegal search, it is relatively limited as it probably does not represent a substantial expansion of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

Facing Drug or Gun Charges? We Can Help

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The Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC will fight for your rights at trial or on appeal. Our attorneys have successfully defended thousands of cases in Philadelphia and the surrounding counties, and we can help with all types of state and federal charges in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a top-rated defense attorney today.