Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/3/22 Zak Goldstein 6/3/22

PA Superior Court: Stop Illegal Even Though Defendant in High Crime Area and Sweating in 86 Degree Weather

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Anderson, holding that the defendant was illegally stopped by the police because they did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him solely because he was in a high crime area and sweating in very hot weather. This conclusion seems obvious, but a panel of the Superior Court had initially overruled the trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress. Fortunately, an en banc panel of the Superior Court granted re-argument and reconsidered.

Commonwealth v. Anderson

A Harrisburg, PA police officer was driving an unmarked vehicle with four other uniformed and armed police officers through a fried chicken store’s parking lot that was known to the officers as a high crime, high drug area. One of the officers observed the defendant on the ground next to a pick up truck. He appeared to be crawling on the ground, but he was not doing anything illegal. The officers approached the defendant and noticed that he was sweating a lot. Of course, it was 86 degrees outside with 67% humidity. The officers asked the defendant if he was okay. He responded that he had dropped something on the ground. The police then left him alone for a little bit.

The defendant entered the fried chicken restaurant. After he went inside, the officers noticed that the driver’s side window of the truck was down. They believed that to be uncommon in this section of the city. They also noticed that the truck was not parked within the lines of the parking space, leading to speculation that the driver could have been intoxicated. The officers continued to watch the defendant while he was inside the restaurant. They noticed that he did not order food, but he did purchase a soda. He also appeared to be pacing while inside.

The defendant exited the restaurant. He looked at the officers and then began to walk in the other direction. The officers approached the defendant again and asked to speak with him. One of the officers asked for ID, and the defendant provided his identification card. With the identification still in his possession, the officer then specifically asked the defendant if he was on parole and if there was anything illegal on his person. The defendant responded that he was on parole but that he did not have anything on his person. Notably, the officers did not document that the defendant was profusely sweating nor exhibiting signs of being under the influence during this second encounter with the defendant.

Apparently unsatisfied with the defendant’s answers, one of the officers asked for permission to search the defendant. The defendant gave verbal consent to search him. The officer searched the defendant’s pockets and found nothing of significance. He then swept over the defendant’s groin region and felt a hard and distinct bulge and, according to the officer, “it was immediately apparent to me that he had a substantial amount of crack cocaine down the front of his pants.” The officer would later testify that “before [the crack] was recovered, I remember specifically saying to my partner, he has an ounce of crack down his pants. And sure enough, we removed 28.3 grams of crack cocaine.” At this point, the officers decided to place the defendant under arrest. The defendant attempted to flee, but he was tackled a few feet away and was subsequently arrested and charged with various drug offenses.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress. Specifically, the defendant argued that the officers lacked both reasonable suspicion and probable cause when the first stopped him. Additionally, the defendant argued that his consent to the officers’ search was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made. At the motion to suppress hearing, the officers testified to the above facts. Additionally, the defendant testified and stated that one of the officers had patted him down before he even went into the restaurant. Also, he said that after he left the restaurant, the officers patted him down again and rubbed and grabbed his testicles and penis. He also disputed that he ran because he said the officers had a K-9 unit on scene during these interactions.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the suppression court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. The suppression court found the testifying officer to be credible, but the court found that the officers had exceeded the scope of consent that the defendant had granted to him. Specifically, the court said that “there was nothing in the verbal exchange between the officer and the defendant as to what the officer was looking for, or where the officer intended to search” and thus a reasonable person would not have expected the officer to search his groin area. Additionally, the suppression court found that the second interaction with the police began as a mere encounter and then escalated into an investigative detention and that the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that would have justified that stop. The Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s First Decision

In its first decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court and remanded the matter for further proceedings. In this initial non-precedential decision, the majority concluded that both interactions involving the defendant and the police were mere encounters. The majority held that the defendant’s consent was not the product of an illegal detention and that the officers had not exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent.

The dissent agreed with the trial court and opined that the encounter had escalated from a mere encounter to an investigative detention. The defendant then filed an application for re-argument en banc, arguing that the majority erred in concluding that the police were not performing an investigative detention and that the officers exceed the scope of his consent. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s request and withdrew the three-judge panel decision issued in this matter.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the suppression court’s order. Regarding the first interaction with the defendant, no one disputed that the initial contact with the officers was a mere encounter. Therefore, the Superior Court analyzed the second encounter to determine whether or not a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Based on its review of the record, the Superior Court found that the interactions between the defendant and the officers was not a mere encounter. The Court reached this conclusion because the officers asked him if he had identification on him and whether he had anything illegal on his person and therefore a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave in this situation. Further, the Superior Court held that officers did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant in the first place. The en banc panel of the Superior Court found that the evidence that was presented at the suppression hearing showed that the officers had “nothing more than a ‘hunch’ that something was amiss.” The fact that the defendant was present in a high crime area, near a truck (that had windows down) that was not parked properly, and that the fact that the defendant was sweating in 86 degree weather was not sufficient to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative detention. Further, because the defendant was illegally stopped in the first place, his consent to search was invalidated. It was almost important that police had possession of his identification. Therefore, the suppression order stands, and the Commonwealth will not be able to use the evidence that was suppressed in its trial against the defendant.

Read the Opinion

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Zak Goldstein 2/15/22 Zak Goldstein 2/15/22

PA Superior Court: Police Generally May Not Search Car Incident to Arrest Without Search Warrant

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lutz, holding that the police generally may not search a car incident to the driver’s arrest without first obtaining a search warrant. This is an important holding because it provides substantial protections for Pennsylvania citizens that are not provided by federal law. Further, the court also suggested that police may not be able to go into a car to retrieve contraband under the plain view doctrine without first obtaining a warrant, as well.

The Facts of Lutz

In Lutz, the defendant was arrested for DUI as well as possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence which the police had recovered from her vehicle, namely the marijuana as well as a marijuana pipe.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, Sergeant Nunemacher of the Lansford Police Department testified that he responded to a report of a suspicious vehicle parked at the foot of a private community on a water authority road. Police regularly patrolled this area because it was known for drug activity and as an area where people dump garbage. When he arrived, he found the defendant’s vehicle parked in a rocky area. He heard loud music coming from the car.

The defendant exited the vehicle and approached the officer. The officer quickly concluded that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and called for backup. He asked the defendant to participate in field sobriety tests as well as to take a breathalyzer, but she did not really comply. He ultimately arrested her for DUI.

The officer then checked on the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant had left her keys in the ignition, and the car was still running. When the officer looked into the car, he saw a marijuana pipe sitting on the driver’s seat. He went into the car to turn off the car and retrieve the pipe. The defendant told the officers that they might find some marijuana in the car, so the officers then searched the rest of the car and unsurprisingly found marijuana.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court found that police were not required to obtain a search warrant because the pipe was contraband which was in plain view and because they were allowed to search the car incident to the defendant’s arrest. The defendant appealed.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on appeal. The Superior Court found that with respect to the pipe, the officers had not violated the requirement that they obtain a search warrant prior to searching a vehicle because the officers found the pipe pursuant to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

Under Commonwealth v. Alexander, police generally must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a vehicle. There are exceptions, however, for exigent circumstances. In this case, there were no exigent circumstances that would allow a frisk of the vehicle, but the plain view exception applied.

The plain view exception allows police to conduct a warrantless search and seizure if four elements are met. First, the police must not have violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the location from which the item could be viewed. Second, the item must be in plain view. Third, the incriminating character of the item must be immediately apparently. Fourth, the police must have a lawful right of access to the item itself.

Here, the Court found that all four requirements were met with respect to the pipe. The police were on public property and able to see the pipe without going into the car. The pipe was plainly visible without opening the door or moving anything, and based on the officers’ experience, the pipe was clearly for use with marijuana instead of tobacco.

The fourth requirement, however, was a little bit more complicated. Police did not have a search warrant, so they could not really enter the defendant’s car. The Superior Court, however, found exigent circumstances from the fact that the defendant had been arrested and police needed to go into the car to turn the car off and retrieve the keys because the defendant had left the car running. Once they were in the car for the purpose of turning it off and getting the keys, the police were then allowed to retrieve the pipe without getting a warrant. They had a lawful right of access to the item from the exigent circumstances of needing to turn off the car.

This would have been a more difficult question had the car not been running. The Court’s opinion implies that in that case, the police would likely need to get a warrant prior to retrieving the pipe even if they could tell that it was contraband before they entered the car. This is an important issue which has not totally been resolved by the Pennsylvania courts as officers often claim to have seen contraband in plain view during traffic stops. Here, the Court relied on the exigency of needing to turn the car off to support the warrantless entry into the car, suggesting that if the car had been off, police would have needed to get a warrant prior to retrieving the pipe.

With respect to the rest of the search of the car for the items that were not in plain view, the police action was very clearly unconstitutional. As previously mentioned, in Commonwealth v. Alexander, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that police generally need to get a search warrant prior to searching a vehicle. As a general rule, there is a search incident to arrest exception which allows police to search a person who has been arrested for drugs or contraband as well as to inventory their belongings. The Court here held that that exception does not extend to a person’s vehicle once the person has been arrested, removed from the vehicle, and placed in handcuffs. At that point, there is no basis for believing that the person could retrieve a weapon and destroy evidence, so the exception does not apply. Therefore, the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress with respect to the marijuana in the car. The Court reversed the conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial without the illegally seized drugs.

Read the Superior Court’s Opinion

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Zak Goldstein 12/30/21 Zak Goldstein 12/30/21

PA Supreme Court Agrees: Odor of Marijuana Does Not Provide Probable Cause to Search Vehicle

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Barr, holding that the odor of marijuana alone no longer provides the probable cause necessary for the police to search a motor vehicle. Instead, the police may consider the odor of marijuana as a factor in terms of whether they have probable cause, but they may not search a car solely because it smells like marijuana. The Superior Court had previously reached a similar conclusion, and the Supreme Court has now upheld that decision.

The Facts of Barr

In Barr, a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper was training a newly-hired Trooper. The troopers were on routine patrol in Allentown, PA when they saw a vehicle make a U-turn. The U-turn was not illegal, but the troopers decided to follow the vehicle. The vehicle appeared to be speeding and it was past midnight, so the troopers continued to follow it. Eventually, the vehicle failed to properly stop at a stop sign, so the troopers pulled it over. The troopers approached the vehicle, and as they arrived at the window, they smelled the odor of marijuana. The defendant’s wife was the driver of the vehicle, the defendant was in the front passenger seat, and a third gentleman was in the rear passenger seat. He appeared to be drifting in and out of sleep.

After smelling the odor of burnt marijuana, the troopers directed the driver to get out of the car. The defendant began to argue with the troopers and insist that “no one is getting out of this fucking vehicle.” Backup officers from the Allentown Police Department arrived, and the defendant became more cooperative. The trooper then informed the occupants of the vehicle that he was going to search the vehicle due to the odor of marijuana. The driver and the defendant both provided proof that they had medical marijuana prescriptions to the troopers before the troopers conducted the search. By that time, Pennsylvania had in fact legalized medical marijuana.

The troopers believed that medical marijuana could only be consumed through a vape pen which would not produce an odor, and so they searched the car anyway. In the car, they found marijuana and a gun. They arrested the defendant and charged him with possession as well as violations of the uniform firearms act.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence. At the suppression hearing, he presented an expert witness who testified that medical marijuana smells the same as illegal marijuana and that green, leafy marijuana can be consumed legally by using a vaping pen. The pen would also produce an odor of marijuana. Accordingly, it would not be possible to tell from the odor alone whether the marijuana was legal or illegal. Because marijuana is now potentially legal in Pennsylvania and because the troopers had no other reason for searching the car, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court found that the troopers did not have probable cause for the search.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court agreed that the odor of marijuana alone does not always justify as search, but it found that the trial court should have considered it as a factor in terms of whether or not the search was supported by probable cause. The odor must be considered along with all of the other factual circumstances surrounding the search in order to determine whether the police had probable cause. Therefore, the Superior Court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to reconsider its ruling and consider all of the factors. The defendant then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Court accepted the case.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s ruling. It found that the police did not have probable cause to search the car based on the odor of marijuana alone. The enactment of the medical marijuana act in Pennsylvania made it so that many people may legally possess marijuana, and there is often no way to tell whether someone possesses marijuana legally or illegally. As marijuana is no longer per se illegal in Pennsylvania, its odor no longer provides probable cause for a search of a vehicle pursuant to the “plain smell” doctrine. Like the Superior Court, the Supreme Court concluded that the odor of marijuana could be a factor in determining whether or not police have probable cause, but the odor alone is not enough. The Supreme Court also agreed with the trial court that the evidence should have been suppressed, so it reversed the Superior Court’s ruling to the extent that the Superior Court had directed the trial court to reconsider in light of its opinion. Accordingly, the evidence will be suppressed, and the Commonwealth will be unable to proceed with the case. It is now established law in Pennsylvania that the odor of marijuana alone does not provide the police with the probable cause necessary for a search.

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Zak Goldstein 12/20/21 Zak Goldstein 12/20/21

PA Superior Court: Defendant’s Consent to Search Invalid Due To Language Barrier Between Defendant and Officer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Carmenates, holding that a defendant’s consent to search his vehicle and luggage was not knowing, voluntary, or intentional because of the considerable language barrier between the defendant and the officer. This decision is significant because there are so many individuals in the United States who do not speak English. As such, this decision protects them and requires that the police show that they made a truly knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of rights when they interact with a police officer in Pennsylvania.

Commonwealth v. Carmenates

The defendant was pulled over by police on Interstate 80 because, according to the police, he was following a tractor-trailer at an unsafe distance and at a speed slower than the flow of traffic. As the police officer approached the defendant’s vehicle, he noticed in the back seat several large duffel bags and a suitcase that was covered by a tan sheet and large stuffed toy bear. It should be noted that this entire interaction was recorded on the officer’s dashboard camera. The officer also observed numerous fast food and snack items, a fast-food drink items, air freshener spray bottles, and “religious paraphernalia” hanging from his rearview mirror. The officer did not observe any drugs or paraphernalia, nor did he smell any marijuana. Further, while interacting with the officer, the defendant did not make any furtive movements nor did he attempt to conceal anything.

When the officer attempted to speak with the defendant, the defendant immediately indicated that he only spoke Spanish. The officer did not speak Spanish, but told the defendant that they “could make it work.” To “make it work,” the officer used Google Translate on his cell phone to translate his statements from English to Spanish and the defendant’s statements from Spanish to English. The officer indicated that he did not have any problems understanding the responses he received from the defendant and the defendant never told the officer that he did not understand a question that was asked to him via Google Translate. The officer would later concede that Google Translate is “not 100 percent accurate at times.”

The defendant provided the officer with his driver’s license, insurance card, and registration card. After which, the officer requested that the defendant exited the vehicle. The defendant complied and the officer searched him for weapons. The officer then instructed the defendant to stand outside in the cold while he performed a criminal history check. The officer would later testify that he intended to issue a warning to the defendant, but before doing so asked him about his travel plans. A large portion of the defendant’s responses were not translated by Google Translate and some that were nonsensical. Despite this poor translation, the officer decided to continue using Google Translate to ask for the defendant’s consent to “see his luggage.” The officer could have used the Spanish-language consent form in his car and that would have been more specific, but for whatever reason he chose not use that form.

The defendant then opened his vehicle and retrieved the suitcase. However, the officer using gestures rather than words, directed the defendant to one of his black duffel bags. The defendant then grabbed the black duffel bag and complied with the officer’s non-verbal direction to open it. The bag contained a large amount of marijuana that was vacuum sealed in plastic bags. The defendant was subsequently placed in handcuffs and then the officer searched the remaining duffel bags and located approximately 39 pounds of marijuana. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

The defendant then filed a motion to suppress. At the motion to suppress hearing, the above facts were placed into evidence. The testimony and video recording indicated that the officer never informed the defendant that he was free to leave or that he was allowed to refuse consent to search his vehicle or his personal effects. Additionally, the record also showed that the defendant was never read his Miranda rights. The defendant would also testify at this hearing, through a translator. In short, he stated that he just spoke a few words of English and that he understood the officer’s request to see his luggage in the literal sense. He also testified that he thought he had to follow the officer’s orders because “he didn’t think that he had the option to say no.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the suppression court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the Commonwealth had failed to establish that the defendant had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently consented to the search of his vehicle and luggage. The Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Panel Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the suppression court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. For a more detailed analysis, please refer to our September 8, 2020 blog “Pennsylvania Superior Court: Consent to Search Defeats Motion to Suppress Even if Suspect Doesn’t Speak English.” The defendant then filed for an Application for Re-argument En Banc. The Superior Court granted re-argument and withdrew the panel’s previous decision.

Pennsylvania Superior Court’s En Banc Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the suppression court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The full panel of the Superior Court held that the defendant’s consent was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Superior Court was persuaded by the fact that Google Translate is “not 100 percent accurate at times” and that there was evidence that it produced inaccurate and nonsensical translations. Further, the officer’s use of the word “see” rather than a more precise term such as “search,” “examine,” or “look inside” was persuasive to the Superior Court that the defendant did not make a legally valid waiver of his constitutional rights. As such, the Commonwealth will not be able to use the recovered drugs and paraphernalia against him at his trial.