Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/8/21 Zak Goldstein 5/8/21

PA Superior Court: Nervousness and Fidgeting by Driver Do Not Justify Search of Car

Criminal Defense Lawyer.jpg — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mattis, holding that police cannot search a car during a routine traffic stop solely because the driver exhibited “extraordinary” nervousness and fidgeting. This case continues a recent trend of Pennsylvania appellate courts upholding the privacy rights of the Commonwealth’s citizens and seeking to rein in pretextual searches of people and automobiles, especially in marijuana cases.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and speeding in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. He moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that police had stopped him illegally and searched his car without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. In order to defend the legality of the search, the Commonwealth relied on the affidavit of probable cause for the defendant’s arrest and called the arresting State Trooper to testify.

The affidavit of probable cause indicated that a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper pulled the defendant over for driving 76 mph in a 55 mph zone. The defendant pulled over on command, and the trooper approached the vehicle. He obtained the defendant’s license and paperwork, but he noticed that the defendant was “extraordinarily nervous and fidgeting constantly.” He asked the defendant to get out of the vehicle. The defendant did so, and the Trooper asked for permission to search the car. The defendant gave him permission to search the car. Another Trooper was on scene and assisted with the stop. Police found marijuana, a pipe, and a grinder in the car. Fayette County apparently still prosecutes people for marijuana offenses.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant filed a motion to suppress. He argued that the Trooper did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong the stop beyond the initial purpose of investigating the speeding offense and that some nervousness and fidgeting did not justify any further investigation.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court recognized that police may stop a vehicle for a traffic infraction as the Trooper did here. However, once the purpose of the initial, valid, traffic stop has ended and a reasonable person would have believed he was free to leave, a second round of questioning with some official restriction on a person’s freedom of movement requires reasonable suspicion of some other crime for it to be justified. As a general rule, police may order the occupants of a vehicle to exit that vehicle for safety reasons during a legitimate traffic stop. But police may not extend the stop longer than necessary, and nervousness alone does not justify reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention or prolonging a stop.

Here, the Trooper testified that he made contact with the defendant and the defendant was nervous and fidgeting around in the vehicle. He confirmed that the defendant did not have any warrants and that he had valid paperwork for the car.

But without any additional reason, he then ordered the defendant to exit the vehicle. Most importantly, the Trooper retained possession of the defendant’s paperwork. The defendant was not free to leave because he obviously could not leave without his driver’s license. The Trooper, while still in possession of the documents, asked the defendant if he could search the car. The defendant granted permission.

The Court suppressed the resulting evidence because it found that the Trooper had improperly extended the stop. Although the Trooper had the right to ask the defendant to exit the vehicle as a general rule, he did so because of the defendant’s nervousness and not because of anything related to the speeding investigation. Because he held onto the paperwork, the defendant was not free to leave. Therefore, the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, and the Court ruled that the evidence should be suppressed because the consent given was not constitutionally valid.

The Superior Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial without the illeglaly seized evidence. The Commonwealth will likely have to withdraw the charges.

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Zak Goldstein 4/9/21 Zak Goldstein 4/9/21

PA Supreme Court: Separate Conviction for Related Traffic Ticket Bars Prosecution for All Other Charges

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that a defendant cannot be tried for a felony case if his traffic offense that arose out of the same criminal transaction was adjudicated. This decision is significant and it could result in hundreds of felony cases being dismissed. As a practical matter, it is unclear on how much of an effect it will have on future cases because the Philadelphia Police Department no longer issues a traffic citation when they also arrest a defendant for a non-traffic offense. Nonetheless, this will have a positive impact on many individuals who have outstanding felony cases in Philadelphia.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

The defendant was stopped for a traffic stop and was charged with driving with a suspended license, possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), and the knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance (“K/I”). The defendant was subsequently found guilty, in absentia, of the summary traffic offense. His other charges were not adjudicated. The defendant then subsequently filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (“Section 110”) requires that the government bring all known charges against a defendant arising out of a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district in a single proceeding. In other words, the defendant argued that when he was found guilty of the traffic offense, he could no longer be prosecuted because he had already been found guilty of a criminal offense that arose from this transaction. The trial court was not persuaded and denied his motion. The defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal.

Some insight into how Philadelphia Courts operate is necessary to understand this decision. First, Philadelphia Traffic Court was merged into Municipal Court in 2013 and thus became the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court. Next, in Philadelphia, the Municipal Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal offenses that are punishable up to five years. As an example, a defendant cannot plead guilty to an F1 Robbery in front of a Municipal Court judge because the court does not have jurisdiction to accept that guilty plea. Further, a defendant cannot have a trial for F1 Robbery for the same reason. In the instant case, the defendant was charged with PWID and because he was accused of distributing heroin, the maximum sentence (assuming it was his first PWID conviction) was fifteen years’ incarceration. Consequently, the Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s PWID charge at the trial stage. However, the Municipal Court did have jurisdiction to adjudicate his K/I charge because the maximum sentence he could have received was three years’ incarceration (assuming he had a prior K/I conviction) and thus that charge fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction.

On appeal at the Superior Court, the Commonwealth acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto held that Section 110 generally prohibits the government from proceeding with a prosecution subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Commonwealth conceded that they could not prosecute the defendant for the K/I charge because it fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. However, the Commonwealth argued that because the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over the PWID, then the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss for that claim. In defense of this position, the Commonwealth invoked Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code which states “[a] prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of [Section 110] under any of the following circumstances…(1) [t]he former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant of the offense.” In other words, their argument was that Section 112 applied to the defendant’s case because Municipal Court could not adjudicate the defendant’s PWID charge and it was irrelevant that his traffic case had already been adjudicated.

The Superior Court was persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision with respect to the PWID charge. The defendant then lodged an application for re-argument which was denied by the Superior Court. The defendant then subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hear the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The issue for this decision is which offense applies for Section 112. Is it the first offense (in this case the traffic charge) or the subsequent offense (the PWID charge)? The defendant argued that Section 112 bars subsequent prosecutions when the previous court had jurisdiction over the first case whereas the Commonwealth argued that prosecution should not be barred if the original court does not have jurisdiction over the subsequent offense.

In making its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked at the legislative history of Sections 110 and 112, appellate decisions that addressed these rules, and it analyzed the Model Penal Code which Section 112 was derived from. Based on this analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and determined that Section 112 was not applicable to the PWID charge because the Traffic Division did have jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s traffic case. As such, because Section 112 did not apply to his case, Section 110 did apply to the defendant’s PWID charge and therefore his case will be remanded back to the trial court for formal dismissal.

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Zak Goldstein 3/4/21 Zak Goldstein 3/4/21

PA Superior Court: No Probable Cause from Marijuana Odor to Search Parked Car

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein.jpg — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Grooms, holding that the smell of marijuana alone does not establish probable cause to search a parked automobile. This decision is significant because it adds to a growing list of appellate decisions that restrict the police’s authority to search a person’s property because the police smelled the odor of marijuana. Hopefully, this trend persists and the Superior Court continues producing opinions similar to Grooms.

Commonwealth v. Grooms

Swatara Township police officers were on routine patrol at the Harrisburg Mall. According to the officers, the Harrisburg Mall parking lot is a high-drug area and they frequently make narcotics arrests there. The officers were walking through the parking lot where they came across an unrelated individual who they subsequently arrested for possession of marijuana. They arrested this individual about three rows away from the defendant’s vehicle.

After they were done with that arrest, they continued their patrol where they detected an odor of marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle. The officers then approached the vehicle and confirmed that they were smelling “fresh” marijuana emanating from the defendant’s vehicle. They then shined their flashlights into the vehicle to observe any contraband in plain view, but did not see any contraband. The police then tried to open the defendant’s car door, but it was locked. The officers then retrieved their lockout tool to unlock the vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, they said the odor of marijuana was stronger. While searching the vehicle they located two bags of marijuana, a marijuana-filled cigar, crack cocaine and some ecstasy. At no point did the police obtain a search warrant. Shortly after they finished their search, they saw the defendant and a woman walking up to the vehicle. The defendant then told the police that “anything found in the car was his.” The defendant was arrested and charged with criminal use of a communication facility, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of cocaine and methamphetamine.

The defendant then filed a motion to suppress alleging that the police lacked probable cause to search his car. At the hearing, the above facts were placed on the record. During cross-examination, the officers conceded that they searched the defendant’s vehicle solely because they smelled marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle. The officers also conceded that they only waited a few minutes before they began searching the defendant’s car because their shift was going to end soon. Finally, the officers acknowledged that dry-leaf marijuana was legal for medical purposes in Pennsylvania.

At the conclusion of arguments, the trial court denied his motion to suppress. The trial court justified this by stating that the “odor of marijuana alone may establish probable cause.” The defendant then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial where the defendant was found guilty of the aforementioned crimes. He was then sentenced to 30 to 60 months’ imprisonment. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. In its decision, the Superior Court held that the odor of marijuana alone does not establish probable cause, but instead is a factor that may contribute to a finding of probable cause when assessed under the totality-of-the circumstances.

The reason for this is because of the passage of the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”) which legalized dry leaf marijuana for medicinal purposes. The Superior Court acknowledged that because of the MMA there would be “hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians” who could potentially be emitters of marijuana odor. Thus, it would be improper to subject law-abiding citizens to police detention solely on the basis of the odor of marijuana.

This was the logic in Commonwealth v. Barr. In that case, the police conducted a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped vehicle after they detected an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. In Barr, the Superior Court held that the odor of marijuana alone, absent any other circumstances, could not establish probable cause because so many Pennsylvanians lawfully possess marijuana. Thus, applying the logic of Barr, the Superior Court held that the trial court erred when it applied a per se rule that the smell of marijuana establishes probable cause. As such, the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed and his conviction is vacated.

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Zak Goldstein 10/29/20 Zak Goldstein 10/29/20

PA Supreme Court: Police Can't Search Your Phone Just Because You're Near Drugs and Guns

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that a defendant’s proximity to drugs and guns is not sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for a defendant’s cell phone. This decision is significant because cell phones often contain very private and intimate details about our lives. Additionally, they can also obtain very incriminating details that prosecutors will use against defendants at trial. Thankfully, Johnson places a higher burden on the government to access these details, and so this is a big win for both privacy advocates and criminal defendants.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

In 2014, Pittsburgh police officers received a 911 call from an anonymous caller. The call stated that shots were fired inside an apartment. The officers subsequently went to this apartment and as they approached the apartment, they smelled a strong odor of burning marijuana coming from inside of the apartment and could hear people talking, too. The officers then knocked on the door and announced their presence. They continued knocking for several minutes with no response.

Eventually, a woman opened the door and the officers entered the apartment and conducted a protective sweep and detained five individuals, one of them being the defendant. During their sweep, the officers observed in plain view two bricks of heroin on a shelf. They also recovered three stolen firearms hidden together above the apartment’s hot water tank. The five detained individuals were placed under arrest. Officers then secured the apartment and obtained a search warrant. When they searched the defendant, they found two cell phones on his person. During their search of the apartment, the officers recovered an additional 717 bags of heroin and three cell phones. Four months after they recovered the cell phones, the officers requested and obtained an additional search warrant for the cell phones that they recovered, including the phones found on the defendant.

The defendant was charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver (“PWID”), VUFA § 6105, Knowing and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance (“K/I”), and Small Amount of Marijuana (“SAM”). The defendant then filed a motion to suppress the drugs, cell phones, and firearms that were recovered in the apartment because he argued they were illegally obtained. This motion was denied. After this motion was litigated, the Commonwealth turned over additional discovery to the defendant. Specifically, they provided him with text messages that were recovered from his phone that “referenced stamp bags of heroin which had the same stamp as [the] bags recovered from the apartment.”

The defendant filed a subsequent motion to suppress these text messages, arguing that the search warrant should never have been granted given that the officers lacked probable cause to search his phone. The defendant argued that the police were going through his phone to figure out who the guns and drugs belonged to and that this was an improper attempt to ascertain that information. Unfortunately for the defendant, the suppression court did not agree with him and denied this motion to suppress too.

The defendant then elected to proceed by a bench trial. He was found guilty of PWID and K/I, but was found not guilty of VUFA 6105, and SAM. He then filed an appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court which was denied. According to the Superior Court, the fact that the defendant “was found ‘in close proximity to firearms and evidence of the distribution of heroin’ established a probable cause to believe more evidence relating to narcotics distribution would be found on his cell phone.” The defendant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who agreed to hear his case. For purposes of this blog, only the search warrant pertaining to the defendant’s cell phones will be addressed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the defendant’s case for a new trial. In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the notion that because there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for constructively possessing the drugs and guns that that there was also probable cause to search his cell phone for evidence of those same offenses. The Court stated that there must be a link or some facts to show that the cell phone contains evidence of criminality.

In the instant case, the Court found that there was no such link. There was nothing in the affidavit to suggest that the defendant was personally in possession of the drugs or that he was even aware they were in the apartment. Additionally, because the police originally went to the apartment on the basis of an alleged emergency, the police did not have the support of a long-term drug trafficking investigation to bolster their affidavit. The only thing that the affidavit of probable cause established was that the defendant was present in a place where illegal contraband happened to be found. This was not sufficient to get a search warrant for a cell phone. Therefore, the defendant should receive a new trial without the illegally seized evidence.

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