Do Police Need A Warrant To Search A Hotel Room?

Police Searches of Hotel Rooms and Other Rented Spaces

Under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, law enforcement officers need a search warrant anytime they want to search a suspect's private residence with few exceptions. If the police do not obtain a warrant prior to conducting the search of a home, then the owner of the home and any guests who are staying there could potentially have any incriminating evidence which was found in the search suppressed and excluded from trial. This same basic rule requiring police to get a search warrant also applies when police want to search a hotel room. If you are a guest in a hotel, the police cannot search your room without a search warrant. Unfortunately for the defendant in Commonwealth v. Williams, the Superior Court held that the defendant has the burden at the Motion to Suppress hearing of showing that the defendant actually rented or was staying in the hotel room.  

Commonwealth v. Williams

In Williams, the defendant was charged with three counts of Possession with the Intent to Deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence because police searched the hotel room in which the drugs were recovered without a search warrant. At the motions hearing, the prosecution established that police officers in Erie, Pennsylvania responded to a 911 call for a shooting on March 18, 2016 at the defendant's home. Once there, police found a dead pit bull, lots of blood, and a man who had been shot in the leg and face. Police did not find any other victims or the shooter, so they began interviewing the neighbors. One neighbor informed police that the defendant lived in the first floor apartment at that location, and he had seen one of the defendant's vehicles leaving the area around the time of the shooting. The officer looked in the window of the apartment and did not see anyone home, so he radioed for the car to be stopped. 

Other officers stopped the defendant in the car which the neighbor had seen. Once stopped, the defendant told police that he had been staying in a nearby a hotel with a friend because of ongoing domestic issues with his girlfriend. He showed the officer a key card for a hotel room, and he told the officer that the key was for room 111. He also told the officer that he was in room 111 at the time of the shooting.

Following this conversation, officers removed the defendant from the vehicle and frisked him. They also frisked the passenger and recovered a gun. At some point, after the conversation had occurred, officers also searched the car for weapons, and during this search, they found that the defendant had taken the hotel key card from his wallet and discarded it in the vehicle. Williams had apparently dropped the card between the driver's side seat and the center console of the vehicle, so the police took it. 

Based on this information, an officer went to room 111 and knocked on the door. When no one answered, the officer went to the front desk and spoke with hotel management. Management informed the officer that the key card was not for room 111 and that the card was actually for room 231. However, the employee did not know who had actually rented room 231. Further, the employee stated that the hotel did not have surveillance footage which would show who had rented the room. 

Apparently concerned that another shooting victim might be in room 231, the officer went and knocked on the door for that room. When no one answered, the officer decided that it was an emergency. Instead of waiting for a search warrant, he used the key card and opened the door. The officer immediately smelled marijuana and found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the room. He did a quick check of the room for shooting victims, and then he obtained a search warrant to recover the drugs and paraphernalia. 

For reasons which are not explained in the Court's opinion, the defense did not challenge the stop and search of the defendant's vehicle or subsequent seizure of the room key. Instead, the defense argued that the drugs in the hotel room should be suppressed because the police were required to obtain a search warrant prior to entering the room. The Commonwealth responded with two arguments. First, the Commonwealth aruged that the defendant failed to establish that Williams had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room because there was insufficient evidence to show that he had rented or was staying in the room. Second, the Commonwealth argued that the exigent circumstances surrounding the shooting justified the police decision to enter the room without a search warrant because there could have been another victim who needed medical assistance in the hotel room.  

The Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Warrant Requirement

The exigent circumstances doctrine permits law enforcement to enter a house without a warrant during a true emergency. If police reasonably believe that someone is dying inside a home, then the police do not have to wait for a search warrant before entering the home and rendering aid. Of course, if they find something incriminating in plain view during their attempts to render aid, then that evidence wil be admissible at trial. This issue often comes up in cases involving burglary alarms. If a burglary alarm goes off and police do not find anyone at the scene when they arrive to investigate, they may decide to enter the home without a warrant and check for burglars. If they find your drugs and guns inside the house while looking for burglars, it will often be difficult to have that evidence suppressed despite the absence of a search warrant. 

The trial court agreed with the defense and granted the Motion to Suppress. The trial court found that police were required to obtain a search warrant prior to entering the hotel room because a guest in a hotel room has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Further, the court found that the exigent circusmtances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply as police had no real basis for believing another shooting victim to be in the room. Therefore, the court found that even though the drugs were in plain view once police entered the room, the drugs should be suppressed because police only saw the drugs because they illegally entered the room without a search warrant. 

The Superior Court disagreed and reversed the Order granting the Motion to Suppress. The Court found that the defendant failed to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room. The defendant presented no witnesses, so the Commonwealth's evidence was essentially uncontradicted. Under Pennsylvania law, a defendant who is charged with a possessory offense like Possession of a Controlled Substance has automatic standing; this means that the defendant may always move for the suppression of the items sized. However, in addition to having standing, a defendant who moves to suppress evidence must also have had a reasonable expectation of privacy which was violated by some sort of law enforcement action. If the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, then it does not matter if the police followed the rules. For example, if the police illegally search your house and find evidence which they wish to use against me, then I would not be able to successfully have the evidence suppressed because I did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in your house. If they wanted to use the evidence against you, you would be able to win a Motion to Suppress because it was your house, but I would be out of luck. 

What is a reasonable expectation of privacy? 

The Court noted that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists when an individual exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Courts must evaluate the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the test does not depend solely on the subjective intent or belief of the defendant. Further, prior case law established that although it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove that evidence was obtained legally at a Motion to Suppress hearing, the burden remains on the defendant to show a reasonable expectation of privacy. 

Do the Police Need a Warrant to Search a Hotel Room? 

Pennsylvania law is very clear that a hotel room deserves just as much protection as a private home or office. A registered hotel guest enjoys a legitimate expectation of privacy in a hotel room during the period of time in which the room rental remains valid. However, the expectation ceases to be reasonable after the rental period has ended and/or the guest's right to occupancy has lapsed. A person also does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a room in which they are not staying.

Here, the defendant would have been in much better shape for the Motion to Suppress had he testified that he rented that particular hotel room and believed it to be private. However, he did not do so. Instead, he told police that he was staying in a different hotel room, and he actually tried to discard the key to the room. Further, when police spoke with hotel employees, they were told that the hotel did not know who had rented the room and also did not have any video surveillance which would show defendant staying in that room. Accordingly, the only evidence in the record was that defendant had a key to a room in which he did not admit to staying. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the defendant failed to establish that it was his room and correspondingly that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Police were not required to obtain a warrant prior to the search, so the Court did not even reach the issue of whether emergency circumstances justified the warrantless search. 

The Williams opinion, although intellectually dishonest, illustrates the dangers of relying on the Commonwealth's evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutional violation on the part of law enforcement. It also shows how unforgiving Pennsylvania's reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine can be compared to New Jersey's much more relaxed standard. Of course, it is obvious from the record that the room had been rented by Williams. A court could have easily inferred, as the trial court did, that it was his room. He had the key, he lied about which room he had rented because he knew there were lots of drugs in it, and the police only searched it because they believed it was connected to him. Indeed, if the prosecution did not believe that it was his room, then they would not have charged him with Possession. It is a certainty that the prosecution will not be withdrawing the charges despite arguing that it was not Williams' room on appeal. 

The Pros and Cons of Testifying as a Defendant in a Criminal Case

Nonetheless, once Williams claimed to have been staying in a different room, he probably needed to testify at the Motion to Suppress hearing in order to establish that it was his room. If he had testified  that it was his room, then the Court would not have been able to find that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy therein. There is often a great deal of reluctance to call criminal defendants to testify for fear that they will say something incriminating or open the door to some other type of incriminating evidence which would have been otherwise inadmissible. Additionally, if the defendant has prior convictions for certain crimes of dishonesty (burglary, robbery, theft, etc.), then the fact of those convictions may become admissible when the defendant testifies. However, in some cases, it is simply necessary. Here, Williams likely should have testified that it was his room. This is particularly true because the defendant's testimony during a Motion to Suppress hearing may not be used against the defendant at trial even if the Motion is denied unless the defendant testifies to something inconsistent at trial. Therefore, Williams had little to lose by conclusively establishing that it was his room.

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers Demetra Mehta and Zak T. Goldstein

Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

As always, if you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers have won motions to suppress drugs, guns, and other contraband in cases involving car searches, house searches, and searches of hotel rooms. We can help at both the trial and appellate level. Call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session.  

PA Supreme Court Limits Application of Designer Drug Statute

What Is A Designer Drug?

Designer drugs present a difficult issue for the criminal justice system and law enforcement. In general, the idea of a designer drug is not that difficult to understand. A designer drug is some type of substance that is designed to mimic the effects of an already-regulated controlled substance but altered in an attempt to avoid regulation and criminal liability. Setting aside the pros and cons of the war on drugs, it makes sense that if the government is going to criminalize marijuana, then the government would also attempt to criminalize synthetic substances like K2 that provide the same effect of marijuana despite having a different chemical structure.

Problems with Criminalizing Designer Drugs

In practice, the issue becomes much trickier. It is very difficult for the government to craft a legal definition in a statute prohibiting designer drugs which gives fair notice to the average person as to exactly what substances are illegal or regulated. There will always be questions: For example, how similar does the substance have to be? Does the similarity apply only to the effect of the substance, or does the similarity apply to the chemical structure? If it applies to the chemical structure, how can an ordinary person be expected to know the exact chemical structure of a drug, and how do we compare substances?  And if it applies to the effect of the drug, then how do you measure effect given that drugs have different effects on different people. Accordingly, designer drug prosecutions often involve challenges to the statute itself as well as conflicting expert testimony from the prosecution and defense as to whether the substance involved qualifies as a designer drug. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just dismissed a void-for-vagueness challenge to the Pennsylvania statute which criminalizes the possession and distribution of “designer” drugs. Despite upholding the constitutionality of the statute, however, the Court has dramatically limited its application by reading in an extremely heightened mens rea requirement for designer drug prosecutions. In Commonwealth v. Herman, the Court held that although a previous version of the statute which criminalized “analogues” of controlled substances was unconstitutionally vague, the current definition of a “designer drug” is not so vague as to render the statute unlawful. Nonetheless, the statute requires that the defendant actually know that the substance involved was a designer drug and not just that the defendant possessed the substance itself.  

The Pennsylvania Designer Drug Statute

The designer drug statute prohibits the “knowing or intentional . . . possession with intent to distribute, or possession, of a designer drug.” It defines a designer drug “as a substance other than a controlled substance that is intended for human consumption and that . . . has a chemical structure substantially similar to that of a controlled substance in Schedules I, II, or III . . . or that produces an effect substantially similar to that of a controlled substance in Schedule I, II, or III.”

In Herman, the defendant owned and operated a smoke shop in York County, PA. Undercover police officers entered the store and purchased alleged designer drugs labeled “Winter Haze” and “V-8 Air Freshener.” Upon testing the substances, the prosecution determined that they contained the chemical PB-22, which prosecutors alleged was either a controlled substance or a designer drug which was substantially similar to a controlled substance and synthetic cannabinoid (synthetic marijuana) called JWH-018. Accordingly, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, one count of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, and one count of possession or possession with intent to distribute a designer drug.

Void-For-Vagueness

After the defendant was held for court at the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus asking the trial judge in the Court of Common Pleas to dismiss the drug charges. The defense argued that the statute was so vague that it made it impossible for an ordinary person to know exactly what the law prohibits. Although much of the case dealt with various definitions under a previous version of the statute, the prosecution also involved the current definition of a designer drug. With respect to the designer drug charge, the defense argued that the Commonwealth failed to offer any evidence that PB-22 had a chemical structure similar to that of JWH-018 and that the Commonwealth’s evidence showed only that the physiological and toxicological properties of PB-22 were unknown. Therefore, the Commonwealth could not show that the compounds were substantially similar in either chemical form or effect.   

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s void-for-vagueness challenge with respect to the designer drug charge. Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the government may not impose sanctions under a criminal law that fails to give fair notice of the proscribed conduct. The doctrine safeguards against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by the government, and it prevents jury verdicts unfettered by any legally fixed standards as to what is prohibited by the statute. The Court noted that the inquiry into whether a statute is void-for-vagueness focuses on whether the law forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

Although the trial court found the statute to be unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling. The Court found that the “substantially similar” language used in the statute was not unusual or unduly vague and noted that such language has been upheld repeatedly both by federal courts and appellate courts in other states. Although the prosecution and defense experts differed as to the ultimate issue of whether the substances were in fact substantially similar, the issue of which expert was right was an issue for the jury. It was not a basis for finding that the statute violates due process. 

Possession of a Designer Drug Must Be Knowing and Intentional

Despite deciding to uphold the statute, the Court did have significant concerns about the difficulty in determining whether a substance actually qualifies as a designer drug. Accordingly, the Court emphasized the mens rea element of the crime. The act requires that a defendant possess the drug knowingly or intentionally. Therefore, the Court suggested that the defendant must know not only that he possesses the substance, but also that the substance is in fact a designer drug. Thus, the Court suggested that in order to obtain a conviction, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant knew the chemical he possessed had a molecular structure or effect substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance. This mens rea requirement would prevent the statute from becoming a "trap for unwitting members of the public who have no expertise in organic chemistry."

Instead, the Court found that the statute is quite reasonably aimed at those who traffic in novel compounds which are essentially the same as scheduled controlled substances but contain minor differences designed to evade the statutory schedules. Thus, the Court concluded that the General Assembly can “reasonably expect and require persons engaged in that activity to possess or obtain the specialized knowledge needed to conform their conduct to law.”

Although the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, the narrowing of the mens rea requirement would seemingly make it very difficult for the prosecution to obtain a conviction in most cases. Now, the Commonwealth must show more than the mere possession of a substance that qualifies as a designer drug by a defendant. Instead, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant actually knew that the substance would qualify as a designer drug. This will make it possible to prosecute the manufacturers and regular distributors of such substances, but the average person or small store-owner who possesses a designer drug may be able to avoid liability unless the Commonwealth can show an actual admission or incriminating statement on their part. Thus, the statute remains in effect, but its application has been substantially narrowed by the Court. 

We Can Help With Designer Drug Charges

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Lawyers | Philadelphia, PA

If you are facing designer drug charges or any other criminal charges in Pennsylvania or New Jersey, we can help. Our award-winning defense attorneys have successfully defended thousands of criminal cases. Designer drug cases are more complicated than regular possession cases and may require the use and cross-examination of expert witnesses. We have the experience and skill to fight for you and help you get the best possible result. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer today.  

Despite Partial Decriminalization, Marijuana Possession Provides Philadelphia Police Authority to Arrest and Search

Observing or Smelling Marijuana Often Gives Police Probable Cause to Search

As a general rule, both state and federal prosecutors may not use illegally obtained evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial. There are exceptions, but if the police search a defendant illegally and recover drugs, guns, or other contraband, the evidence may not be used in court. The defense may move to exclude the illegally seized evidence by filing a motion to suppress. Once the defendant moves to suppress the evidence, the court will hold an evidentiary hearing, and the Commonwealth must show that that the police obtained the evidence pursuant to a lawful search and seizure. In a recent case from the Superior Court, Commonwealth v. Edward Young, the Superior Court held that the trial court erred in suppressing a gun and marijuana because Philadelphia police officers were free to conduct a full search of the defendant after the defendant admitted that he had marijuana on him.

Commonwealth v. Young

In Young, plain clothes officers were patrolling what they described as a high crime area in Philadelphia. They observed the defendant standing outside of a corner store. When officers returned an hour later, they saw that the defendant was still standing in front of the store despite the fact that it was raining. The three officers got out of their unmarked car and approached the defendant. They identified themselves as police officers and asked him what he was doing. He told them he was waiting for a bus, and one of the officers then asked the defendant if he had anything on him which could harm the officers. The defendant responded that he did not have anything that could harm the officers, but he did have “two bags of weed.”

After the defendant admitted to possessing marijuana, the officers went into the defendant’s pockets and found both a gun and a small amount of marijuana. The defendant moved to suppress the gun and marijuana, and the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court found that the police had conducted an investigatory detention (“Terry stop”) which required them to have probable cause. Although it was a little fishy that the defendant would stand outside in the rain and claim to be waiting for the bus for over an hour, it did not actually establish that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, the trial court found that the police had conducted an illegal stop when three officers identified themselves as police and demanded to know if the defendant had any weapons on him. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed the evidence. 

The Commonwealth appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court reversed. The Superior Court noted that there are three different legal standards which govern encounters between pedestrians and police officers. The court held that because police had only asked two questions of the defendant, they had simply engaged in a mere encounter which did not require them to have reasonable suspicion prior to interacting with the defendant. Further, once the defendant voluntarily admitted to having marijuana, the police had full probable cause to conduct a search of the defendant and recover the gun. 

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR POLICE ENCOUNTERS

The Superior Court explained that under the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions, there are three legal standards which govern interactions between the police and pedestrians. First, police may always engage in a mere encounter with a person on the street. This means that even if they have not seen someone do anything illegal, police officers may approach a person, ask them some questions, and attempt to have a conversation with the person. The police may do that even if they suspect the person is engaged in criminal activity without any solid basis for that belief. If the subject of the mere encounter volunteers something incriminating or hands over contraband, then that evidence may be used in court. Here, the Superior Court rejected the trial court's reasoning that the fact that there were three officers involved and that they immediately asked about weapons converted the interaction into something more than a mere encounter.

Second, police may conduct a Terry stop and frisk when they have reasonable suspicion. Police officers have reasonable suspicion when they can state specific, articulable facts which lead them to believe that criminal activity may be ongoing. Reasonable suspicion is a fairly low standard, but it requires a showing that the police had more than just a hunch that the suspect was involved in a crime. If police have reasonable suspicion, then they may conduct a stop of a person in which that person is not free to leave or disengage from the interaction. In some cases, the police may also conduct a frisk of the suspect. However, in order to properly conduct a frisk, the police must have not only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but also reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. Even then, the frisk is limited to a pat down of the person’s outer clothing. The officers may pat the suspect down and feel for weapons, but they may not go into the person’s pockets or manipulate or squeeze any bulges. Further, a Terry stop must be limited and brief or it could escalate into the equivalent of an arrest.

An arrest or its equivalent requires the police to have probable cause. A stop becomes an arrest or its equivalent when a reasonable person would believe that they were under arrest. Important factors in evaluating whether a stop was the equivalent of an arrest may include whether police use handcuffs, provide Miranda warnings, point their guns at the person, transport the person in the patrol car or require them to go to the police station, and the number of officers involved in the encounter. If a police encounter rises to the level of an arrest, then the police must have probable cause that the defendant committed a crime. Probable cause requires a showing that it was more likely than not that the defendant committed a crime. If the police have probable cause, then they may fully arrest the defendant. They may also conduct a search incident to arrest, meaning they may conduct a full search of the defendant.  

In Young, the Superior Court held that the police had not exceeded the scope of a mere encounter when they simply approached the defendant, asked him what he was doing, and asked if he had any weapons on him. The police are always free to walk up to someone and ask the person some questions. Then, once the defendant admitted to having marijuana on him, the police were free to conduct a full search of the defendant because they had probable cause to make an arrest. Once they had probable cause to make an arrest, they were legally authorized to conduct a full search incident to arrest. Therefore, the police did not do anything illegal in finding the gun. The police did not surround the defendant or indicate that they were going to search him; thus, they did not do anything that made the interaction into something more than a mere encounter. 

MARIJUANA STILL PROVIDES PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AND SEARCH

It is important to note that police still had probable cause to arrest and search the defendant despite Philadelphia’s recent city ordinances providing police with the authority to issue citations for marijuana possession instead of making arrests. Although the police do not arrest most people who are caught with 30 grams of marijuana or less, possession of even a small amount of marijuana remains a crime under both state and federal law. Therefore, the police still have the discretion to make an arrest, which gives them the authority to conduct a full search of someone who admits to possessing marijuana.

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Philadelphia Marijuana Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges for drugs, guns, or other contraband, our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers can help. We have won countless motions to suppress in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, Court of Common Pleas, and in the surrounding counties. Call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session. 

PA Superior Court: Police May Not Use Pretext to Stop Defendant One Month After Drug Sales

Superior Court Enforces Limits on Police Stops

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just held that in the absence of more recent criminal activity, police may not conduct a Terry stop of a defendant for selling drugs one month after the defendant sold the drugs. In Commonwealth v. Parker, police officers in Lancaster County investigated drug sales in June and July of 2014. During that investigation, the defendant, who police knew only by the street name “Heart,” allegedly sold drugs to an undercover police officer. The officers recorded a description of Heart’s appearance and that he walked with a limp, but they did not attempt to stop or arrest him at that time.

In August, one of the officers from the drug surveillance operation saw the defendant near a local McDonald’s. The officer testified that he was 100% sure that the defendant was “Heart,” meaning he was the same person who had sold drugs to the undercover officer. The officer then made the decision to stop the defendant in order to find out his real name. The officer, however, did not observe the defendant doing anything illegal that day.  

Despite the fact that the defendant had not done anything illegal that day, two officers stopped the defendant as he was walking away from the McDonald’s. One of the officers who stopped him told him that there had been a disturbance at the McDonald’s and that he believed the defendant was part of the disturbance. He asked the defendant for his name, date of birth, address, telephone number, and social security number because the defendant did not have identification on him. After the officers confirmed the defendant’s identity, they released him. The officers agreed at the motion to suppress that the only reason they stopped him was to identify him for purposes of their drug investigation, and one of the officers specifically testified that the stop was part of a “ruse.”

Even Identifying Information Can Be Incriminating

Although the information obtained by police during the stop may seem relatively harmless, it turned out to be very incriminating. Police had used the phone number given by the defendant during the stop to set up the narcotics transactions earlier in the summer. Accordingly, despite learning only relatively basic identifying information, the phone number turned out to be very incriminating because it connected the defendant to the drug sales and increased the likelihood that the police were correct in believing him to be "Heart." 

The Motion to Suppress

Eventually, police arrested defendant Parker and charged him with Possession with the Intent to Deliver and Criminal Use of a Communications Facility. Prior to trial, Parker moved to suppress the information obtained by police during the pretextual stop, including the incriminating phone number. Parker’s attorneys argued that the police did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Parker on the day of the incident. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial judge found that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because they had seen him sell drugs in June and July. The defendant was eventually convicted of drug charges following a jury trial, and he appealed the denial of the motion to suppress.

Types of Police Encounters at Issue on Appeal

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The court noted that there are three types of police encounters. The most restrictive encounter is a “mere encounter.” A mere encounter does not require any level of reasonable suspicion or probable cause because the suspect is not compelled to stop or searched. Thus, if police had merely encountered defendant Parker, then the information they obtained could not be suppressed because police may conduct a mere encounter without any level of suspicion. 

The next level of encounter is an “investigative detention.” An investigative detention, often called a Terry stop, requires police to have reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion means that the police have specific, articulable facts leading the officer to believe that criminal activity is afoot. Here, the Commonwealth certainly argued that police would have had reasonable suspicion from observing the defendant engaged in drug sales earlier in the summer. Parker's attorneys, however, argued that the police did not have reasonable suspicion because the drugs sales did not take place that day. 

Finally, the most restrictive type of seizure, which was not really at issue in this case, is a full-blown arrest. An arrest requires probable cause, which means the officer is aware of facts making it objectively more likely than not that the defendant committed a crime. Whether or not an arrest has occurred typically involves an analysis of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe themselves to be under arrest. Some of the many factors in whether a stop is an arrest could include whether police used handcuffs, displayed weapons, told the suspect he or she was under arrest, gave Miranda warnings, or transported the suspect to the police station. 

Investigative Detention

The Superior Court agreed with the trial court that the defendant was subject only to an investigate detention. He was stopped and asked for information, but he was not handcuffed, transported, interrogated for a lengthy period of time, or told he was under arrest. However, he was not free to leave because he was stopped by two uniformed officers who told him that he was suspected of criminal activity and demanded information from him. Although the request for identification alone does not convert a mere encounter into an investigatory detention, the request for identification coupled with the police officers telling the defendant that they suspected him of wrongdoing would lead a reasonable person in his position to feel that he was not free to leave. Therefore, police were required to at least have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot in order to stop him.

Police Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion

The Superior Court found that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Parker because although he may have engaged in criminal activity in June, they had not seen him do anything at all on the day that they stopped him. He was simply walking down the street, and his lack of criminal activity prompted the police to invent a pretext that he had been part of a disturbance at the McDonald’s. Accordingly, the results of the illegal stop must be suppressed. Therefore, Parker will receive a new trial in the lower court at which the illegally obtained evidence cannot be introduced. 

Although the opinion is certainly of benefit to Parker and others in similar situations, the Superior Court's reasoning is unclear. The opinion focused almost entirely on whether the stop was a mere encounter or a Terry stop, and the Superior Court failed to fully explain why the police no longer had reasonable suspicion. Clearly, if Parker had sold drugs to the police earlier in the summer, then the police would have had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop and/or arrest Parker at that time. Probable cause, however, can become "stale." If police do not act on information quickly enough, then they may no longer be able to act on it. Police may have been able to obtain an arrest warrant for him, but they did not have the right to stop Parker without a warrant more than a month after the prior sales. Further, the court could have been concerned about the police use of lies to justify the stop and interrogation. 

We Can Help With Criminal Charges

If you are charged with selling or possessing illegal drugs, you need an experienced drug charges attorney who can investigate and evaluate your case, determine if your rights have been violated, and provide you with all of the options and a strong defense. You do not have to plead guilty just because the police found drugs on or near you or in a vehicle. The prosecution must prove that the search was legal and that the drugs were yours. We have the experience to challenge them every step of the way. Call 267-225-2545 for a confidential criminal defense strategy session.