Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/16/18 Zak Goldstein 8/16/18

PA Superior Court: Police May Stop and Search You If You’re Bleeding from a Gunshot Wound

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Edwards, holding that Philadelphia Police did not violate the defendant’s rights when they stopped and searched him because he was walking down the street while bleeding from a gunshot wound. The Superior Court relied on the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement in finding that police did not violate the defendant's rights when they stopped him even though they did not see him personally engaged in criminal activity.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Edwards

In Edwards, Philadelphia Police Officers were on routine patrol at around 1 am in the Kensington area. One of the officers noticed a black male, the defendant, limping in the bike lane on the west side of the street. He was walking towards the police car. As he got closer to the car, one of the officers noticed that he had blood coming down the left side of his leg. After noticing the blood, the officer attempted to get the defendant’s attention, but he ignored the officer and kept limping at a fast pace. The defendant ignored the officers as they backed up their car and tried to talk to him.

Eventually, police exited the patrol car and told the defendant to stop multiple times. The defendant initially did not stop, but he eventually turned and faced the officers. However, he continued to back away from them even after being told they were only interested in bringing him to the hospital for his leg injury. He told the officer he had been shot by a Hispanic male around the corner and that the officers should go look for the male.

The officers moved closer to the defendant, and the defendant then reached for his right jacket pocket while backing away. Based on this movement, the officers believed that the defendant was trying to hide something in his right jacket pocket. The officers also testified that the area was a high crime area known for drug sales, stabbings, shootings, and robberies. Therefore, the officers frisked the defendant, felt a hard object that they knew to be a gun in the right pocket, and then removed the gun from the defendant’s jacket. Police arrested the defendant and charged him with various VUFA charges, including possessing a concealed firearm without a license, possessing a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia, and felon in possession of a firearm.

The Motion to Suppress the Gun

After prosecutors charged the defendant with various gun charges, the defendant’s defense attorney filed a motion to suppress the gun. The motion to suppress alleged that police did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop and search the defendant because they did not see him engaged in any criminal activity and he did not ask for their help. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding both that police actually had probable cause to arrest him and that the police were justified in their actions due to the community caretaker doctrine. After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, the defendant proceeded by way of bench trial. The trial judge found him guilty and sentenced him to state prison after it was revealed at sentencing that he had shot himself. The trial judge also made negative comments at sentencing about the fact that although defense counsel highlighted the defendant's extensive family support, the defendant's mother was present but did not speak on his behalf.

The Criminal Appeal

Following sentencing, the defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant challenged both the denial of the Motion to Suppress as well as the trial court’s sentence. Unfortunately for the defendant, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling both with respects to the Motion to Suppress and the sentencing issue. The Superior Court relied heavily on the community caretaker doctrine as explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Livingstone.

What is the community caretaker exception?

In general, the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions require the police to get a search warrant before stopping and searching someone. However, there are many exceptions to this general rule. For example, police do not have to obtain a search warrant in order to stop someone on the street and conduct a frisk when they have reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. Police also may conduct a full search of a pedestrian when they have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime. In addition to these exceptions for investigatory stops, the Supreme Court has also created the community caretaker doctrine or community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement.

The community caretaker doctrine anticipates the possibility that police may be motivated by a desire to render aid or assistance rather than the investigation of criminal activity. Appellate courts have reasoned that police do not just investigate and prosecute crime – they also provide first aid, intervene in crises, and maintain the peace. Accordingly, police do not always need to get a warrant in order to take action when they believe that someone is in need of assistance.

In order for this exception to apply, the police must be able to point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance. When police can do that, they may be justified in conducting a stop or search without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that criminal activity is afoot. The police action must also be independent of the investigation of criminal activity, meaning it cannot be a pretext for conducting a search without the necessary level of suspicion. Finally, the level of intrusion must be commensurate with the perceived need for assistance. Thus, in Livingstone, the Supreme Court summarized the rule as follows:

“To summarize, in order for a seizure to be justified under the public servant exception to the warrant requirement under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that assistance was needed; the police action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence, and based on a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the action taken by police must be tailored to rendering assistance or mitigating the peril.”

The Superior Court's Decision

Here, the Superior Court found that the police acted reasonably and pursuant to the community caretaking doctrine. They saw the defendant limping, with a bloody leg, at 1:20 am in a dangerous area. They approached and offered medical assistance. The court found that they would have been neglecting their duties had they not done so. Further, the officer identified specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen was in need of assistance. The court also found that they were not looking for criminal evidence, meaning their actions were independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence. They were planning on taking the defendant to the hospital. They only frisked the defendant because he bladed his body away from the officer and placed his hand in his pocket as if he were trying to conceal something. Finally, the level of intrusion was commensurate with the need for assistance. The police had merely stopped to offer aid. Only after the defendant acted strangely by backing away, turning his body, and reaching in his pocket, did the police conduct any kind of search. The court found that that search was a legitimate safety frisk and upheld the decision of the trial court.

The Superior Court also rejected the defendant’s sentencing challenge. Here, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him when the trial judge pointed out that the defendant’s mother was present for sentencing but did not speak on his behalf. After the trial judge made that remark, the defense attorney asked to have the mother speak, but the trial judge refused to permit her to speak. The defense ordinarily must file a post-sentence motion explaining any challenges to a sentence in order to be able to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence, but here, the Superior Court found that the issue was not waived for appeal because the defendant’s attorney had attempted to call the mother as a witness but been prevented from doing so. The Superior Court reached the merits of the issue, but affirmed the sentence because the judge considered a number of factors and did not base the sentence only on the mother’s failure to testify at sentencing. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 8/5/18 Zak Goldstein 8/5/18

PA Superior Court: Prosecutors May Introduce Evidence that Defendant and Recanting Eyewitness Were Incarcerated Together

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Thomas, holding that the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the defendant and an eyewitness who later recanted were incarcerated in the same prison before trial together in order to suggest that the eyewitness recanted out of fear of the defendant. The Superior Court allowed this testimony despite the fact that the there was no concrete evidence to show that the defendant and the eyewitness had communicated while they were incarcerated together or that the defendant had pressured the witness in any way.

The facts of Commonwealth v. Thomas

Philadelphia Prosecutors charged the defendant in Thomas with first degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license (VUFA Sec. 6106), and possessing an instrument of crime. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court immediately sentenced him to the mandatory life in prison without parole on the murder charge as well as an aggregate 4.5 to 12 years of incarceration on the other charges.

The evidence at trial showed that the defendant, the decedent, and a group of other men were playing dice in Philadelphia. At some point during the game, the men concluded that the decedent was cheating. One player angrily walked away from the game, but the defendant told him that he was going to handle it. Witnesses testified that later, while the decedent was bending over to roll the dice, the defendant pulled a gun and shot at him from behind, causing the decedent to fall to the ground. The defendant then shot him two more times in the face. Two of the witnesses who testified that the defendant committed the murder were a man named K.F. and a man named E.M. Philadelphia Police responded to the scene and transported the decedent to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

Although K.F. gave a statement to police indicating that the defendant committed the murder, K.F. later recanted that statement and wrote a letter claiming that it was not the defendant who actually committed the murder. In response, prosecutors introduced evidence at trial that K.F. and the defendant were incarcerated at the same jail two months prior to trial. The defense attorney objected on the basis that telling the jury that the defendant was incarcerated would suggest to the jury that the defendant was a criminal, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the prosecution to introduce the evidence despite this potential for unfair prejudice against the defendant.

The Superior Court Appeal

After the jury convicted the defendant, he appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As one of the main issues, he claimed that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence that he and K.F. were incarcerated in the same prison at some point prior to the trial and K.F.’s recantation. K.F. had previously claimed in a video-taped statement that he watched the defendant shoot and kill the decedent. However, K.F. was subsequently arrested on unrelated charges of his own. Within one month of his arrest and incarceration in the same jail as the defendant, K.F. wrote a letter recanting his video-taped statement. Therefore, the Commonwealth argued that the incarceration in the same jail was relevant to show both the defendant’s consciousness of his own guilt and to explain why K.F. recanted his prior statement.

On appeal, the Superior Court agreed. It recognized that the courts have long recognized that any attempt by a defendant to interfere with a witness’s testimony is admissible to show a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Additionally, the Commonwealth may cross-examine a witness in an attempt to show that there are reasons, such as fear or intimidation, why a witness may have changed his or her story. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s cross-examination of K.F. was relevant to show both the defendant’s potential consciousness of guilt and why K.F. may have changed his statement.

At the same time, the court recognized that there could be some prejudicial effect to informing the jury that the defendant was incarcerated prior to trial. However, the court found that the trial judge sufficiently eliminated the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant by providing a cautionary instruction. In the instruction, the trial judge informed the jury that the jury should not consider the defendant to be a bad person or a person of bad character merely because he had been arrested and incarcerated pending trial. The judge made it clear to the jury that the only reason the defendant was in jail was because he was awaiting trial for this case, not because he was serving a sentence on some other case. The judge further instructed the jury not to draw any conclusions whatsoever from the mere fact that the defendant was in jail pending trial. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to ask these questions. It found the defendant’s other issues waived and upheld the conviction.

The court’s opinion, of course, completely ignored the fact that it was the Commonwealth’s fault that the defendant and the witness were held in the same jail. Philadelphia has at least four county prisons in which a defendant can be held while awaiting trial, and the jails have procedures by which inmates can be held separately from each other so that they do not have contact with each other. Prosecutors have the ability to house inmates in different counties or states when necessary and routinely do so. Here, the case suggests that the Commonwealth did nothing to inform the prison that the two inmates should be housed in different facilities. The Commonwealth also appears to have introduced no evidence that the two inmates actually came into contact with each other while incarcerated or that the defendant did anything to make the witness change his story. Nonetheless, the Superior Court seems to have ignored these basic facts in finding in favor of the Commonwealth.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients at trial and on appeal. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. If you have been arrested or may be under investigation, call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/21/18 Zak Goldstein 7/21/18

PA Supreme Court: Quality of Evidence Should Be Considered When Evaluating Whether After-Discovered Evidence is Cumulative or Corroborative

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Small, holding that the quality of evidence is relevant in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial based on the after-discovered evidence prong of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (hereinafter “PCRA”). In general, after-discovered evidence may help a defendant get a new trial after a conviction, but the evidence may not be cumulative or corroborative of the type of evidence that was already presented at the original trial. In Small, the Court held that stronger evidence in support of a proposition for which there was some evidence introduced at trial may require a court to grant a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Small

On March 7, 2011, the decedent was killed after he suffered a contact gunshot wound to the left side of his head after he left a local club in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. No one saw the actual shooting, but a number of witnesses saw the defendant with the decedent moments before the shooting. The Commonwealth alleged that the defendant shot the victim because of his loyalty to a Mr. Espada. Specifically, the Commonwealth alleged that the defendant, who grew up with Espada, killed the decedent because the decedent had previously assaulted Ms. Tyson, the mother of Espada’s children.

The Commonwealth presented multiple witnesses to support this theory. Because no one actually witnessed the shooting, the Commonwealth relied primarily on circumstantial evidence at trial. For example, the Commonwealth called Ms. Tyson to testify about the decedent’s assault of her. Mr. Williams, the defendant's sister’s boyfriend, testified that he saw the defendant and Espada with the decedent moments before his demise. Although he did not see the defendant shoot the decedent, he did see the defendant standing over the decedent’s body before he fled the scene. The Commonwealth also called Mr. Evans to testify that he and a Mr. Gibson pursued the person whom they believed to be the shooter immediately after the shooting. They stopped their pursuit after someone fired two gunshots in their direction.

The Commonwealth also called Mr. Knight, who was one of the defendant's friends. He testified at trial that he saw the defendant approach the decedent and put his arm around him. He also saw the defendant running towards the river immediately following the shooting and, later on in the night, make statements such as “we did what we had to do” and “if it came down to it, pin it on my boy [Espada].” The Commonwealth also called police as witnesses. Specifically, the officers testified that they were able to track footprints in the snow that lead from the crime scene, to the riverfront, and then back to the defendant's apartment complex. Additionally, they called a forensic pathologist who testified that the decedent died as a result of a “contact gunshot wound” and that the gun that killed the decedent had to be pressed into the left side of his face. In addition to this circumstantial evidence, the Commonwealth also presented the testimony of two inmates who were former cellmates with the defendant. Supposedly, the defendant admitted to both of these cellmates that he killed the decedent.

At trial, the defense did not call any witnesses. Instead, they relied on the Commonwealth’s witnesses to establish the theory that Espada was the shooter. On cross examination, the defense was able to ascertain that Ms. Tyson had just given birth to one of Espada’s children only two weeks prior to the decedent assaulting her. Additionally, they were able to ascertain that Espada was more upset about this assault than the defendant and thus had a stronger incentive to kill the decedent. Espada was also in close proximity to the decedent prior to his murder.

Further, the defense was able to show that Espada shot at Mr. Gibson and Mr. Evans immediately after the shooting. They also were able to show that Espada had confessed, on at least two occasions, to the murder of the decedent. The defense was able to elicit this through the testimony of the defendant's sister. She testified that Mr. Espada confessed to his then-girlfriend that he had killed the decedent. Finally, in regards to the two jailhouse informants, they were able to impeach them to show that they received favorable treatment in their own pending cases in return for their testimony against the defendant.

After-Discovered Evidence

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and firearms not to be carried without a license. The trial judge sentenced him to life in prison as required by law. The defendant then filed several appeals which were ultimately denied. He then filed a timely PCRA petition. The PCRA petition sought a new trial on after-discovered evidence grounds. The defendant attached as an exhibit a notarized statement from Ms. Tyson. In this statement, Ms. Tyson stated that she withheld from the police and the jury that Espada admitted to her that he, not the defendant, shot the decedent. She also provided details about Espada's appearance and demeanor after the shooting which suggested that he could have been the shooter.

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on May 12, 2015. At this hearing, Ms. Tyson testified that within twenty-four hours of the murder, Espada called her and confessed to the murder. Ms. Tyson also spoke with Espada in person and described him as a “hot mess” and that “he cut his hair and he just looked like he was up all night crying and stuff and he was like shaken up.” According to Ms. Tyson, Espada killed the decedent because of his prior assault on Ms. Tyson. Ms. Tyson testified that she did not tell the police this because her children were in foster care and she was receiving threats on Facebook. She also stated that the police threatened her and that the reason she came forward was because she wanted to remove the stress she bore from withholding this information. On January 19, 2016, the PCRA court granted a new trial based on the defendant's after-discovered evidence claim. The court stated that Ms. Tyson’s testimony satisfied all four factors (as discussed later) which a petitioner must meet in order to obtain a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. However, the PCRA court did not specifically address the credibility of Ms. Tyson; meaning it made no finding as to whether or not it found her testimony to be truthful.

The Commonwealth appealed. The Superior Court reversed the PCRA court. It held that Ms. Tyson’s testimony was merely corroborative and cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. The Superior Court further held that this testimony “goes to the very heart of the defense’s theory at trial” and faulted the PCRA court for accepting Ms. Tyson’s testimony “with no apparent corroboration.” It is important to remember that there was already testimony introduced at trial that Espada admitted to committing the murder. The defendant then filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

What is The After-Discovered Evidence Prong of the PCRA Statute?

The law on after-discovered evidence has been around for almost two centuries. Pennsylvania courts will allow a defendant to receive a new trial if they present evidence that meets four requirements: 1) the evidence could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; 2) the evidence is not merely corroborative or cumulative; 3) the evidence will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and 4) the evidence would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. This is a conjunctive test and a petitioner must satisfy each of these elements by the preponderance of the evidence standard. Additionally, there are timing issues. For example, a petitioner cannot file a PCRA petition while an appeal is pending, and the petition must be filed within one year of the petitioner's sentence becoming final or within sixty days of the discovery of the evidence if the petitioner is outside of that initial one year window. Further, the petition must still be serving the sentence in order to file a PCRA Petition. As shown by the elements, a petitioner can have an uphill battle in satisfying all four elements. The reason why it can be difficult to succeed on this motion is that the courts have articulated a public policy that seeks to limit continued litigation.

What is Merely Corroborative and Cumulative Evidence?

The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and ruled that the evidence was not necessarily corroborative or cumulative because it may have been evidence of a higher quality than the similar evidence which had been introduced at trial. However, because the trial judge did not specifically find that he or she believed the testimony, the Court remanded the case for a credibility determination.

In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that in its After-Discovered Evidence jurisprudence the Court never precisely defined what is “merely corroborative or cumulative” evidence. Accordingly, the Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. Specifically, the Court analyzed decisions from both New York and Georgia. In those states, the appellate courts analyzed the grade or the character of the evidence that was newly discovered. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found these positions persuasive and adopted them. Specifically, the Court held that “[i]f the new evidence is of a different and ‘higher’ grade or character, though upon the same point, or of the same grade or character on a different point, it is not ‘merely’ corroborative or cumulative, and may support the grant of a new trial based on after-discovered evidence.”

When applying this new rule to the instant case, the Supreme Court held that Ms. Tyson’s testimony, though technically cumulative, was a much higher grade and character, if believed, than what was presented at trial. Ms. Tyson was the mother of Espada’s children and thus her testimony would arguably be much more persuasive than what was presented at trial. Additionally, she would be able to testify about his physical appearance in the immediate after hours of this shooting, which could also be more persuasive than what was presented at trial.

Unfortunately for the defendant, despite this favorable ruling, he is not guaranteed a new trial. As stated above, the PCRA court did not make a clear credibility determination of Ms. Tyson in its opinion, which is necessary to rule on an after-discovered evidence petition. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose not to grant the defendant's petition. Instead, it remanded the case for the PCRA court to make the credibility determination.

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Zak Goldstein 7/20/18 Zak Goldstein 7/20/18

PA Supreme Court: Participants in a Multi-Person Fight Are Not Automatically in a Conspiracy Together

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Explains Conspiracy and Accomplice Liability and Reverses an Aggravated Assault Conviction

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

We previously wrote about the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Chambers. There, the Superior Court found that mace could constitute a deadly weapon where the use of the mace rendered the complainant vulnerable to and unable to defend himself from additional assaults from other people. This week, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction in Chambers, finding that the Commonwealth failed to prove either the existence of a conspiracy or accomplice liability beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court reversed the defendant’s convictions for Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”).

The Facts of Chambers

In Chambers, the defendant was charged with Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and related charges as a result of his participation in a street fight into which additional persons entered. The incident began when the complainant drove to an apartment complex in Philadelphia. Once the complainant arrived, he saw Chambers standing next to a Jeep which was blocking entrance to the driveway. The complainant beeped at the Jeep and asked Chambers and the Jeep’s occupants why they were blocking the driveway. He asked them to move. When they did not answer, the complainant continued to yell at them. Chambers did not say anything, but he gave the complainant a nasty look.

The complainant eventually drove up on the curb in order to drive by the Jeep and park. As he drove by, some kind of words were exchanged with Chambers. The complainant parked his car, approached Chambers, and asked Chambers why they were blocking the driveway. The verbal argument escalated into a fist fight, with Chambers throwing the first punch. The complainant defended himself. Once the incident became physical, other people jumped in and helped Chambers. A female approached the complainant from behind, tore his glasses from his face, and began scraping and scratching his cheek and forehead. The complainant continued to throw punches to defend himself, but he could not see what was going on. Chambers climbed on his back, pinned him down, and began punching him repeatedly. While Chambers was doing that, a woman sprayed mace in the complainant’s face. The witnesses did not identify any weapons other than the mace as being used during the fight.

Philadelphia Police eventually arrived on the scene and saw Chambers punching the complainant in the face. As the officer arrived, he heard some of the females in the group yelling at Chambers to stop. The officer grabbed Chambers, pulled him off of the complainant, and put him in his handcuffs. The complainant attempted to leave, but the officer grabbed him and also put him in cuffs. Chambers repeatedly yelled that he was going to kill the complainant in front of the officer. The officer observed that the complainant had a large cut on his face, and the complainant told the officer that someone cut him with a knife. The officer, however, searched everyone at the scene and did not find a knife. Additionally, witnesses testified that no one used a knife. There were also defense witnesses who testified that the complainant was much bigger than Chambers and had in fact instigated the fight. This defense witness also testified that he did not see a knife, but he heard Chambers yelling that the complainant had a knife and asking for others to find the knife.

Police transported the complainant to the hospital and decided not to charge him with any crimes. The complainant suffered broken ribs, a burned retina, a concussion, and a laceration above his eye which required stitches. Police decided to charge Chambers with aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, possessing instruments of crime, terroristic threats, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person.

Chambers proceeded by way of bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and the trial judge found him guilty of conspiracy and Aggravated Assault as a felony of the second degree. The trial judge’s decision to grade the Aggravated Assault as a second degree felony ultimately turned out to be critical to the appeal because Aggravated Assault as a second degree felony is very different from first degree felony Aggravated Assault.

F1 Aggravated Assault requires the causation or the attempt to cause serious bodily injury. F2 Aggravated Assault, however, involves causing or attempting to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon. Recognizing that Chambers himself had not used any kind of weapon against the complainant, the Commonwealth argued that Chambers had at a minimum attempted to cause serious bodily injury. The trial court found that Chambers did not cause serious bodily injury but had instead cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon under a theory of conspiracy liability because of the female who entered the fight and sprayed the complainant with mace. Thus, in the initial appeal, the Superior Court upheld the decision of the trial court, finding that the mace could be a deadly weapon under the right circumstances.

The Supreme Court Appeal

Following the Superior Court’s decision, Chambers appealed again to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not have to hear every appeal and instead chooses the cases which it wishes to review. In this case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed to review the case. This time, Chambers’s defense attorneys argued that the Superior Court erred in finding that he was on the hook for the F2 Aggravated Assault of the unknown female with the mace because Chambers had not used a deadly weapon himself and had not instructed or encouraged anyone else to join the fight or use a weapon.

The Supreme Court agreed. It recognized that because Chambers had not used the mace himself, the convictions could only be sustained if Chambers had engaged in a conspiracy to commit Aggravated Assault or had acted as an accomplice.

What is a Criminal Conspiracy?

First, the Court rejected the idea that Chambers had acted as part of a conspiracy to assault the complainant. Conspiracy is defined by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as follows:

(a) Definition of conspiracy. - A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a).

Thus, in order to prove a conspiracy, the Commonwealth must show an agreement to commit a crime, shared criminal intent between the conspiracy members, and an overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Once the Commonwealth proves these three things, a defendant may be convicted of both conspiracy as a separate crime and the underlying offense or offenses that the conspirators planned to commit.

The difficulty for the Commonwealth in proving conspiracy is that unless it has obtained the testimony of a cooperating witness or has engaged in a wiretap, it is difficult to prove the existence of a prior agreement. This is particularly true when a fight breaks out and a bunch of people jump into the fight. The mere fact that people help each other during a fight, even when those people know each other or are friends, does not mean that they made a prior agreement to commit a crime. Of course, even a quick signal to start a fight such as a nod to the other person could be evidence of a conspiracy. But here, there was no evidence of that. Chambers exchanged words with the complainant and then engaged in a one on one fight. There was simply no evidence whatsoever that Chambers encouraged other people to jump in or use mace. Accordingly, the Court found that the Commonwealth failed to prove a conspiracy and therefore any liability for the underlying offenses beyond the Simple Assault, REAP, and Terroristic Threats that Chambers committed himself.

What is Accomplice Liability?

Second, the Supreme Court also rejected the Superior Court’s reasoning that Chambers acted as an accomplice. Pennsylvania law provides the following definition for accomplice liability:

(c) Accomplice defined.—A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he:

(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or

(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or

(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

(d) Culpability of accomplice.—When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 306.

The Supreme Court rejected the accomplice liability for two reasons. First, the Commonwealth had never before suggested that Chambers acted as an accomplice. It did not allege that he was an accomplice in the Bills of Information which it submitted prior to trial, and it never argued at trial that Chambers was an accomplice of the woman with the mace. Second, there was simply no evidence in the record whatsoever that Chambers had encouraged anyone else to do anything. He did not tell anyone else to join the fight and he did not ask anyone to use mace on the complainant. He did not even make any non-verbal signals towards the others who joined the fight. He simply had not done anything to solicit another person to commit a crime, and he had not aided or agreed or attempted to aid a person in committing a crime. Although he did hold the complainant down, the Court viewed it as clear that he held the complainant down for the purposes of punching the complainant himself. He did not hold the complainant down so that other people could mace him.

This is an excellent case because conspiracy is one of the most over-charged offenses in Pennsylvania. In virtually every case in which more than one defendant is charged with a crime, the Commonwealth will tack on a conspiracy charge even when there is little or no evidence that the defendants agreed in advance to commit a crime. This is particularly true in cases involving fights among large groups of people. It is a fundamental to criminal law that people should be responsible for their own actions and not the actions of others. Thus, a person should not be on the hook for someone else’s decision to jump into a fight and use a weapon if that first person had nothing to do with that decision and was engaged in a “fair” one on one fight.

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