Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Appeals, Sex Crimes, Criminal Procedure Zak Goldstein Appeals, Sex Crimes, Criminal Procedure Zak Goldstein

PA Superior Court Upholds Limits on Snapchat Evidence in Child Sex Abuse Trial

The Superior Court upheld limits on Snapchat evidence and general expert testimony about sexual abuse responses. The decision addresses rape-shield motions, motive evidence, and credibility opinions.

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has upheld a trial court’s decision to limit how defense counsel could describe a minor complainant’s Snapchat communications in a child sexual abuse trial. In Commonwealth v. Slavskiy, decided November 3, 2026, the Court held that the defendant failed to follow the procedure for seeking admission of evidence covered by Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield Law. The Court also upheld the restriction on the merits and rejected a separate challenge to expert testimony about sexual abuse responses. It affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence of 30 to 60 years in prison.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Slavskiy

The Commonwealth charged the defendant in Centre County with sexually abusing his daughter. Before trial, the defense sought to introduce testimony that she had sent nude photographs through Snapchat. Counsel did not propose showing the photographs to the jury. He wanted to explain the conduct that allegedly led the defendant to discipline her.

The defense argued that the complainant accused the defendant after he discovered the messages and took away her phone during a custody dispute. The complainant testified that he frequently threatened to take her phone away. She said that he never actually turned off her phone or internet service.

The trial court allowed counsel to pursue the claimed motive to fabricate. It required counsel to describe the Snapchat material as “inappropriate content” without further detail. The court also permitted Dr. Veronique Valliere to testify generally about sexual abuse and victim responses, subject to restrictions on discussing the complainant’s particular experience. The jury convicted the defendant of three counts of rape of a child and one count of statutory sexual assault.

The Rape Shield Ruling

Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield Law, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104, generally restricts evidence about a complainant’s past sexual conduct in covered prosecutions. The Superior Court recognized exceptions, including evidence showing bias or a motive to fabricate. A defendant seeking to introduce evidence covered by the statute must follow the procedure for asking the court to admit it.

The Court held that the defendant failed to file the required written motion and specific offer of proof. Although counsel responded to the Commonwealth’s motion to exclude the communications and argued that they showed a motive to lie, the Court found that counsel never filed a motion seeking admission under the Rape Shield Law. The Court treated that omission as fatal to the claim. It also held that the trial court was not required to hold a hearing to decide whether to admit the evidence under an exception.

The Superior Court then addressed the merits as an alternative basis for affirming. The trial court permitted the defense to argue that the complainant retaliated after her father discovered material on her phone and disciplined her. The Superior Court concluded that counsel could present that theory using the general description the trial court allowed.

The Court reasoned that identifying the material as nude photographs would not, by itself, establish that the complainant was biased or that the accusations were false. It upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the defense to describe the alleged discipline and subsequent accusation without specifying the sexual content of the photographs. The ruling therefore depended in part on counsel’s ability to present the asserted motive through other testimony.

The Expert Testimony Ruling

The defendant also argued that Dr. Valliere improperly bolstered the complainant’s credibility. Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920, qualified experts may explain the general dynamics of sexual violence and types of victim responses and behaviors in covered criminal cases. The statute prohibits an expert from giving an opinion about any witness’s credibility.

The Court found that Dr. Valliere stayed within those limits. She had not interviewed anyone involved in the case or reviewed its individual facts. She did not offer an opinion about whether the defendant abused the complainant, how the complainant specifically reacted, or whether any witness testified truthfully. The Court held that similarities between the complainant’s behavior and the general behaviors Dr. Valliere described did not establish improper vouching.

The Court also relied on the trial judge’s instructions that the jurors alone decided credibility and that an expert’s qualifications did not make the expert’s opinions necessarily correct.

The Takeaway

Defense counsel should file a written rape-shield motion and a specific offer of proof before trial when seeking to admit evidence the statute may cover, even if counsel disputes that the statute applies. Counsel should explain how the particular evidence shows bias or a motive to fabricate and why a more general description would impair the defense. When challenging a sexual abuse expert, counsel should identify the specific testimony that exceeds Section 5920’s limits. The Court’s decision permits general educational testimony under that statute. Prosecutors still cannot use an expert to tell the jury that a particular complainant is credible.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder.

We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

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Appeals, Theft Crimes Zak Goldstein Appeals, Theft Crimes Zak Goldstein

PA Superior Court: Home Improvement Fraud Does Not Require a Signed Contract

The Superior Court affirmed a home improvement fraud conviction based on an oral agreement. Prosecutors still must prove fraudulent intent or knowledge and the other statutory elements.

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that a contractor can be convicted of home improvement fraud even when the contractor and homeowner never signed a written contract. In Commonwealth v. Sims, decided November 3, 2026, the Court ruled that an oral agreement can satisfy the contract requirement under Pennsylvania’s Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act. The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, seven years of probation with electronic monitoring for the first year, and $13,000 in restitution.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Sims

In the fall of 2022, the defendant met with two Berks County homeowners about improvements to their pool area, hot tub, gazebo, and retaining wall. Sims visited the property approximately a dozen times and provided a written proposal estimating the project at $25,000. The proposal did not contain original signatures, and the parties did not sign another contract.

The parties expected the initial work to take about two weeks. They planned to finish the pool work in the spring while the homeowners investigated whether the original pool installer would contribute to the repairs. In November 2022, the homeowners paid the defendant $13,000 toward the project.

The defendant and an employee installed a cement slab for the pool filter and started the retaining wall. The defendant did not finish the wall or complete the other promised improvements. The defendant repeatedly scheduled work and then offered explanations for failing to perform it. He blamed problems with his employee and agreed to return at least some of the money, but he never made a refund. He also failed to provide receipts accounting for the advance payment.

By July 2023, the homeowners were still seeking repayment. They eventually contacted the police. After a bench trial, the trial court convicted the defendant of home improvement fraud. the defendant appealed, arguing that the Commonwealth could not prove the offense without a written contract meeting the Act’s requirements.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court rejected that argument. The defendant was convicted under 73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(2), which addresses contractors who accept advance payments and then fail to provide the agreed services or materials when required and fail to return payment for what they did not provide. The statute accounts for circumstances extending the deadline, including certain events beyond the parties’ control, unforeseen labor strikes, and extensions agreed to by the homeowner.

The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant acted with intent to defraud or injure someone, or knew that he was facilitating fraud or injury. A homeowner’s dissatisfaction with a project does not eliminate that requirement.

The defendant relied on a separate provision, Section 517.7(a), which requires a written, signed contract containing specified information before a contractor can enforce a home improvement contract against a homeowner. He argued that the Commonwealth likewise needed a written contract to obtain a criminal conviction.

The Court explained that the legislature included the writing requirement in the provision governing enforcement against homeowners. The legislature did not include the same requirement in the criminal provision. Other parts of the home improvement fraud statute expressly address both written and oral agreements. Reading those provisions together, the Court concluded that the Commonwealth could establish the necessary agreement without a signed document.

The Court also rejected the argument that the rule requiring courts to resolve serious uncertainty in a criminal statute in the defendant’s favor required a different result. Although the term contract could initially refer to either an agreement or a written document, the Court found that the surrounding statutory provisions resolved that ambiguity.

The Commonwealth proved an agreement in this case through the proposal, the payment, the text messages, and the defendant’s decision to begin the work. Those facts supported the trial court’s finding that the parties agreed on the work, price, and timing. The Superior Court also relied on the substantially unfinished project, repeated missed commitments, missing receipts, and unfulfilled refund promise. The defendant’s limited performance did not require an acquittal.

The Takeaway

The defendant makes it harder for a contractor to defeat a home improvement fraud charge solely because the parties never signed a contract. The Commonwealth still must prove the actual agreement, the failure to perform and refund payment as the statute requires, and the defendant’s fraudulent intent or knowledge. Defense counsel should examine the promised work and deadlines, any agreed extensions, the work actually performed, material purchases, payments, and communications about delays or refunds. A contractor may have defenses based on those facts even when the absence of a signature will not resolve the case. Prosecutors must prove the required mental state beyond a reasonable doubt; they cannot obtain a conviction simply by showing that a customer paid for an unfinished job.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder.

We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

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Appeals, Gun Charges, Criminal Procedure Zak Goldstein Appeals, Gun Charges, Criminal Procedure Zak Goldstein

PA Superior Court Upholds Suppression of Gun After Police Blocked Juvenile’s Path

The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld suppression of a gun after police blocked a juvenile’s path without reasonable suspicion. His later flight could not justify the earlier detention.

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has affirmed an order suppressing a gun that a juvenile discarded while running from Philadelphia police. In its October 29, 2026 decision in In the Interest of K.C., the Court held that an officer detained K.C. when he blocked his path, aimed a flashlight at him, and questioned him about his waistband while another officer stood nearby. The officer lacked reasonable suspicion when the detention began. Because K.C. ran away only after the officer had already illegally detained him, the Commonwealth could not use his flight to justify the initial stop.

The Facts of K.C.

On October 18, 2025, Philadelphia Police received a radio report of a gunpoint robbery at 10th and Cherry Streets. The report described three juvenile males wearing black clothing. The responding officer did not know when the robbery had occurred, and the report did not provide physical descriptions or say which direction the suspects had fled.

At about 7:30 p.m., the officer saw K.C. and another male walking north near 9th and Poplar Streets, approximately one mile from the reported robbery. K.C. wore a black sweatshirt, gray sweatpants, and a black mask on his face. His companion also wore black clothing. The two were coming from the direction of the reported robbery, but they only partly matched the description, and the description was vague.

The officer pulled his marked cruiser alongside them without activating its lights or siren. He got out, aimed a flashlight at K.C., walked ahead of him, and stopped in his path. With his partner nearby, the officer pointed toward K.C.’s waistband and asked what was there.

K.C. ran and discarded a gun during the pursuit. The officer caught him, tackled him, and arrested him. Approximately eleven seconds passed between the officer leaving the cruiser and K.C. running.

The Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition charging firearm violations and related offenses. K.C. moved to suppress the gun. After reviewing the officer’s body-camera footage, the suppression judge rejected his description of K.C. making furtive movements and shielding his body from the officer. The judge granted suppression, and the Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that the officer initially approached K.C. for a consensual encounter. Police may approach a person and ask questions without reasonable suspicion if the person remains free to ignore them and continue walking. Once officers restrain that freedom and begin an investigative detention, however, they need specific facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The Superior Court held that the officer’s conduct amounted to an investigative detention before K.C. fled. The officer blocked K.C.’s path, kept his flashlight aimed at him, and questioned him about his waistband while a second officer stood nearby. A reasonable person in those circumstances would not have felt free to leave.

The Commonwealth argued that K.C. could have walked away in other directions. The Court rejected that argument. Police do not have to block every possible route before they detain someone. The officer had obstructed the direction in which K.C. was walking.

The Court also considered how the officer used his flashlight. The street was already well lit. The officer kept the light trained on K.C. while approaching him, blocking his path, and questioning him. The Court assessed those circumstances together; it did not hold that every use of a flashlight or question about a gun creates a detention.

The officer needed reasonable suspicion when the detention began. He knew that police were looking for three juveniles in black clothing. He encountered two juveniles wearing some black clothing about a mile away. K.C.’s gray sweatpants and gray backpack did not match the description. The Commonwealth also failed to establish that the stop occurred in a high-crime area, and the suppression judge rejected the officer’s description of suspicious movements after watching the video.

The Court held that the incomplete clothing match, without more, did not justify the detention. It declined to count K.C.’s later flight as a reason for initiating a stop that had already occurred. The Superior Court therefore affirmed suppression of the firearm.

The Takeaway

Defense lawyers should identify exactly when police first detained the client and what the officers knew at that moment. Here, the officer detained K.C. before he ran, and the Commonwealth could not rely on the later flight to justify the earlier detention. Counsel should review the body-camera footage against each claimed movement and the officer’s account of where everyone stood. The suppression judge did that here and rejected the officer’s description of suspicious behavior. A person’s partial match to a general clothing description does not automatically justify a stop, even when police are investigating a serious crime. It is also important to note that this analysis only works in Pennsylvania state court because Pennsylvania requires the doctrine of forced abandonment. The federal courts have rejected that doctrine as a matter of federal constitutional law.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder.

We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

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Appeals, Drug Charges, Homicide Zak Goldstein Appeals, Drug Charges, Homicide Zak Goldstein

PA Supreme Court Rejects Joint Acquisition and Use Defense to Drug Delivery Resulting in Death

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided Commonwealth v. Cassell and Commonwealth v. Scott, Nos. 22 and 23 MAP 2025 (Pa. Oct. 13, 2026), holding that two people who buy drugs together and use them together have no defense to the delivery element of possession with intent to deliver or drug delivery resulting in death. The Commonwealth does not have to disprove joint acquisition and use, and the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on it. Under the Court’s reading of the Drug Act, a drug user who chips in money or drives a friend to the dealer has delivered the drugs. If the friend dies, the drug user faces up to 40 years in prison.

The Facts of Cassell and Scott

A. Smith left a drug rehabilitation facility in Lancaster with no money and no phone. She texted Cassell, her boyfriend, and asked for a ride to York. Cassell paid for an Uber to bring her to York, texted a dealer that he had $40, and drove to the dealer’s house. He and Smith used together twice, and Cassell told police that he let her take as much as she wanted. Smith overdosed, and Cassell did not call 911 until about an hour after she stopped breathing. A York County jury convicted him of third-degree murder, drug delivery resulting in death, PWID, and related charges, and the court sentenced him to 23.5 to 47 years in prison.

In the second case, M. Wandell and her friend Z. Savage planned to buy heroin from Wandell’s dealer, and Savage put up the money. When Wandell could not reach the dealer, the dealer’s son, defendant Scott, answered and said he could help if they picked him up. Savage drove the three of them to Harrisburg, where Scott took the money from Wandell, handed it to a dealer, and came back with fentanyl. The three went to a park and used. Savage passed out and died the next morning in the back seat of his car. The jury acquitted Scott of third-degree murder but convicted him of drug delivery resulting in death and PWID. He received 9 to 18 years.

Both defendants asked for a jury instruction that people who jointly acquire drugs for their shared personal use do not deliver drugs to each other, relying on United States v. Semler, 858 F. App’x 533 (3d Cir. 2021), and United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1977). Both trial judges refused, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and accepted the case for review.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the proposed defenses that they could not be guilty of drug delivery resulting in death (homicide) because they had purchased and consumed drugs together. The Drug Act defines delivery as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance … whether or not there is an agency relationship.” 35 P.S. § 780-102. Because the definition covers constructive transfers, the Court read it to reach anyone who helps the deal happen:

However, the Court also suggested in a broad opinion that individual also may constructively deliver drugs to another when they intentionally facilitate the sale — in other words, as the Swiderski Court stated, they serve “as a link in the chain of distribution.” This “link” may be providing the funds for the drugs, or the transportation to the dealer. Without these actions, the transaction cannot occur. That language is largely dicta, however, and may not be binding on future cases. There could also be causation issues with that type of analysis which were not addressed in this opinion.

The Court also relied on Section 780-113(a)(31), which makes the distribution of a small amount of marijuana not for sale a misdemeanor with a 30-day maximum. In the Court’s view, the General Assembly knew how to protect co-users and chose to protect only marijuana users:

The fact the General Assembly limited this exception to possession of a small amount of marijuana speaks volumes. It could have crafted a lesser penalty for those who share (or co-use) other controlled substances, such as heroin or fentanyl, but it did not.

The Court admitted that the defense “makes sense” and that some believe dealers deserve harsher punishment than users. It then held that “this type of policy determination is for the General Assembly, not the courts.”

The Court found the evidence sufficient in both cases. Cassell paid for Smith’s ride, contacted the dealer, paid for the drugs, and controlled how much she took. Scott was never part of the plan between Wandell and Savage; he was a go-between who got the drugs from his dealer and handed them to Wandell, who was acting as Savage’s agent.

The Takeaway

This is a terrible decision for anyone charged after a friend’s overdose. Prosecutors rarely find the dealer in these cases. They charge the person who was in the room, usually another addict who drove, made the call, or put in a few dollars. The Court has now held that each of those acts is a delivery. The Second and Third Circuits drew a line between traffickers and users under a federal definition of delivery nearly identical to Pennsylvania’s. The Superior Court had leaned towards accepting that potential defense, as well, in a prior unpublished case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to draw it and told defendants to ask the legislature, which is unlikely to make any changes.

The facts still matter. The Court rested its sufficiency analysis on Cassell’s control of the drugs and Scott’s role as the go-between, and it quoted the California rule that the partner who takes the more active role in financing and arranging the buy may be guilty of furnishing to the less active one. A case where two people put in the same money and bought the drugs together remains open as a sufficiency argument, even without a jury instruction, and defense counsel should build that record. Cassell’s murder conviction also carries a lesson. The trial court told the jury it could infer malice from his failure to seek medical care, not from the delivery itself. Calling 911 is the one choice that can still change the outcome, both in terms of avoiding a murder charge and getting crushed at sentencing should a defendant be convicted.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

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