PA Superior Court: Summary Traffic Offenses May Be Charged Separately From Serious Offenses in Philadelphia

For many years, it was the routine practice of the Philadelphia Police Department to charge summary traffic offenses and more serious charges like DUI or possessory offenses separately. For example, if police pulled a car over for speeding and ultimately found a gun in the car or ended up charging the driver with DUI, then the Commonwealth would bring the summary speeding charge in Philadelphia Traffic Court and the more serious gun charge or DUI charge in either the Municipal Court or the Court of Common Pleas. Thus, a defendant who wished to challenge the traffic citation would be required to attend twice as many court dates and hire a defense attorney twice.

This practice arguably violates Pennsylvania's compulsory joinder statute. Pennsylvania has a compulsory joinder statute which is codified at 18 Pa C.S. § 110. At its most basic level, a compulsory joinder statute requires the prosecution to bring charges which arise out of the same incident together in a single prosecution. This spares the defendant the additional time, expense, and stress of defending against two separate cases, and in this sense, compulsory joinder is very similar and related to the idea of Double Jeopardy – that a defendant may not be prosecuted for the same crime twice. Pennsylvania appellate courts had repeatedly ruled that under a prior version of Section 110 (the joinder statute), summary offenses were just different and did not count because the Court of Common Pleas held jurisdiction over misdemeanors and felonies and the Magisterial District Courts had jurisdiction over summaries. Therefore, the prosecution and police could bring summary traffic prosecutions in traffic court and misdemeanor and felony prosecutions in the Municipal Court and Court of Common Pleas.

In 2002, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the statute to change language requiring compulsory joinder where the offenses occurred within courts of the same jurisdiction to offenses which occurred within the same judicial district. This language arguably has a dramatic impact. Instead of summaries being different due to the differing jurisdictions of the courts, the question became whether the offense occurred in the same judicial district. This issue became even more important approximately ten years later when the Philadelphia Traffic Court became enmeshed in scandal and was abolished. After the court was abolished, its functions were merged into the Philadelphia Municipal Court – Traffic Division. Thus, any argument that summary offenses were not within the same judicial district or that the Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction became extremely weak, and defense lawyers began to successfully move for cases to be dismissed due to the fact that summary traffic cases arising out of the same stop had already been resolved.

In the vast majority of cases, the traffic ticket would be resolved much faster than the criminal case. The traffic court hearings were scheduled more quickly, and if a defendant failed to appear for court, the defendant would be found guilty in absentia. Further, many defendants pay their traffic tickets online, by phone, or through the mail rather than going to court to fight them. This meant that a traffic court case could be disposed of within a month or two, and the defense could then move to dismiss the criminal case as violating the compulsory joinder rule. Once prosecutions realized they had a potential problem, Philadelphia Police quickly changed their procedures and stopped issuing traffic tickets in cases where they also intended to charge the defendant with a more serious crime. However, many existing cases were successfully dismissed because the traffic tickets had already been resolved.

Although this issue is not as prevalent today because a large number of the cases in which this happened have already been resolved, the Superior Court has just held that the unique rules establishing the Philadelphia Municipal Court – Traffic Division trump the compulsory joinder rule and allow the traffic citations to be issued separately from the criminal charges.   

On August 30, 2017, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto. The Superior Court overturned the trial court’s decision granting Mr. Perfetto’s Motion to Dismiss. Although this decision is limited to Philadelphia, it could potentially affect a large number of defendants who are charged with Driving Under The Influence (“DUI.”)

Commonwealth v. Perfetto

In July 2014, Mr. Perfetto was arrested in Philadelphia and charged with three counts of “DUI.” Mr. Perfetto was also charged with the summary offense of driving without lights as required, a traffic citation. Although traffic citations are not considered very serious, they are still summary offenses, and all summary offenses are crimes under Pennsylvania law. In September 2014, Mr. Perfetto was found guilty of the traffic citation by the Philadelphia Municipal Court – Traffic Division. In June 2015, Mr. Perfetto filed a motion to dismiss in his DUI case, arguing that § 110 barred the prosecution. The trial court agreed with Mr. Perfetto and dismissed the DUI case. The court granted the motion because Mr. Perfetto’s case satisfied the four requirements of § 110. Shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth filed an appeal, arguing that Mr. Perfetto’s subsequent DUI prosecution was not barred by § 110. 

What is Double Jeopardy and § 110?

Double Jeopardy is mentioned in both the United States Constitution (5th Amendment) and the Pennsylvania Constitution (Article 1, Section 10). Double Jeopardy is the rule that the same government cannot put you on trial for the same charges twice. For example, let’s say a defendant is accused of punching a complainant in the face and is charged with Simple Assault and Recklessly Endangering Another Person (REAP). If the defendant was acquitted of these charges, the same government could not put that defendant on trial again for those charges because Double Jeopardy would forbid it. This rule does not always apply against other levels of government. For example, a federal prosecution will prevent the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from bringing a subsequent prosecution, but a Pennsylvania prosecution will not prevent the United States from bringing a federal prosecution.     

The idea of compulsory joinder is similar and arises out of many of the same concerns of Double Jeopardy. As previously explained, Section 110 provides Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder rule. § 110 is similar to the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, but more nuanced. § 110 is the codification of the rule announced in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 Pa. 1973). In Campana, the Court held that ‘the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode.” Id. at 374. This is known as compulsory joinder. Using the same example above, let’s say that in addition to punching the complaining witness, the defendant also told said this person that he was going to kill him (arguably a Terroristic Threat), however the government only charged him with Simple Assault and REAP. Assuming this defendant is acquitted again, the defendant could not subsequently be tried for the crime of Terroristic Threats. The reason is because the “terroristic threat” came from the same criminal episode as the assault. Again, this would only prevent Pennsylvania from bringing a second prosecution; the federal government may still be able to bring federal charges.  

In order to be successful when bringing a § 110 motion to dismiss, the defense must show four things: 1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction; 2) the current prosecution was based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode; 3) the prosecutor in the subsequent trial was aware of the charges before the first trial; and 4) all the charges are within the same judicial district as the former prosecution. The key issue in Mr. Perfetto’s case was the fourth prong of this analysis because it was the fourth prong that changed in the 2002 amendment to the compulsory joinder rule.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court Holds that Philadelphia’s Traffic Division of Municipal Court is a Separate Judicial District

In overturning the trial court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court made a very technical finding. First, the Court looked to 42 Pa C.S.A. § 1302, a statute which addresses traffic courts. In analyzing the statute, the Court held that when a traffic offense is resolved in a jurisdiction with a traffic court, there is no violation of § 110 if the more serious criminal charges are filed separately. In other words, if a jurisdiction does not have a traffic court, then § 110 would apply if a defendant resolved the traffic offense prior to their criminal offense, but the same is not true when the jurisdiction has a traffic court.

Unfortunately, Philadelphia is different than other jurisdictions in Pennsylvania because its traffic court is specifically mentioned in § 1302. In 2013, Philadelphia’s traffic court merged with Philadelphia’s Municipal Court. This created two divisions: the General Division and the Traffic Division. Therefore, the Municipal Court has jurisdiction over both traffic and criminal offenses. Thus, prior to Perfetto, defense attorneys would argue that because Philadelphia does not have a separate traffic court, §110 applied for traffic offenses.

The Superior Court has now rejected this argument at least as it applies to Philadelphia courts. The Superior Court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the power to create rules for the general practice and procedure of the Courts. With this in mind, the Superior Court focused on a May 2014 comment to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1001(D) which addresses Philadelphia Municipal Court.  The comment stated:

This rule, which defines “Municipal Court case,” is intended to ensure that the Municipal Court will take dispositive action, including trial and verdict when appropriate, in any criminal case that does not involve a felony, excluding summary cases under the Vehicle Code. The latter are under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court Traffic Division, the successor of the Philadelphia Traffic Court.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1001(D), cmt.

As such, the Superior Court held that the Supreme Court’s intent was for the traffic division of the Municipal Court to exclusively hear the traffic offenses. Thus, the Superior Court held that, in essence, Philadelphia’s Municipal Court traffic division is analogous to a jurisdiction with its own separate traffic court. Consequently, the Superior Court held that § 110 does not bar subsequent prosecution of a criminal offense when there has been a prior disposition of a traffic offense in Philadelphia. The Superior Court reversed the ruling of the trial court, and Mr. Perfetto’s case was remanded back to the Philadelphia Municipal Court for trial.

DUI Cases     

At this point, the impact of Perfetto is relatively limited. For a number of years, unpublished opinions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court reached the opposite conclusion, so a large number of cases have already been dismissed and cannot be reinstated. For those cases which were on appeal and awaiting the decision in Perfetto, the defendants will now face prosecution once again. However, the Philadelphia Police Department stopped issuing separate traffic citations a number of years ago due to this rule, so the decision is not likely to substantially affect newly charged defendants. Certainly, Perfetto will likely be appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the issue may not be resolved. 

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

As always, DUI cases can be very technical and there are a number of ways to beat them.  If you are charged with DUI, you need an attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to fight your case. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.  

DUI Update: PA's New Ignition Interlock Law Takes Effect

Pennsylvania’s new Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) Ignition Interlock Law took effect on Friday, August 25, 2017. We have written about the pros and cons of the new law previously, but prior to taking effect, the Pennsylvania Legislature modified the law so that it would bring many of the same advantages and disadvantages to recipients of the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) Program. Unfortunately, the changes to make ARD defendants eligible for the Ignition Interlock License will not go into effect until October 2018. Additionally, most defense lawyers believed that the law would be applied retroactively to motorists who were already serving their suspensions when the law took effect. Based on recent guidance from PennDOT, it now seems clear that the DUI Ignition Interlock Statute will apply retroactively. This means that many motorists who are already serving DUI-related suspensions will be immediately eligible to obtain an Ignition Interlock device and have their driver’s licenses reinstated.

Pros and Cons of the New DUI Ignition Interlock Law

There are some significant pros and cons to the new law. In general, the law makes Driving Under the Influence Convictions more expensive by requiring even some first-time offenders to install ignition interlock devices on their vehicles. These devices can be costly, but the law does allow for subsidized interlock installations upon a showing of financial hardship. At the same time, the law provides many motorists with a way to keep their licenses or serve shorter driver’s license suspensions than those statutorily required in the absence of the law.

One of the biggest problems with Pennsylvania’s DUI statute is that it requires a one year driver’s license suspension for many first-time offenders, and Pennsylvania does not really offer the kinds of work licenses offered in other states. This means that a DUI would ordinarily cause many people to lose their jobs if they drive for a living or need to drive to and from work. This is a problem even for criminal defendants who are accepted into the ARD program as even ARD requires a sixty day driver’s license suspension for a motorist who blew above a .16 or had drugs in their system. The law solves some of these problems by allowing many drivers to keep their licenses while at these are time protecting the public from drunk drivers by requiring them to obtain ignition interlock devices. 

Changes to the DUI Statute

Now, even first-time offenders in the highest tier (meaning they had a BAC above .16 or drugs in their system while driving) can obtain a special Ignition Interlock license which will permit them to keep driving during the period of suspension. This will result in many DUI defendants being able to keep their jobs. At the same time, it makes the roads safer by requiring those convicted of DUI to obtain these ignition interlock devices. The devices prevent a car from starting if the device detects the presence of alcohol in the driver’s breath. Notably, the devices have no way of detecting the presence of any kind of drugs. Additionally, the legislature recently amended the statute so that defendants who are diverted into the ARD program will be eligible for ignition interlock licenses. This portion of the statute will not go into effect until October 2018, so ARD currently still requires the license suspension. The law also does not help criminal defendants who have had their driver's licenses suspended due to convictions for drug possession or possession with the intent to deliver.  

We Can Help With DUI Cases and Ignition Interlock Licenses

Goldstein Mehta LLC - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

You can learn more about the law and its benefits on PennDOT’s website. If you have questions about your eligibility for an ignition interlock license or the procedure for applying for this type of license, call one of our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers at 267-225-2545 for a free consultation. We can also help with DUI and driving with a suspended license charges in Philadelphia and the surrounding counties. 

PA Superior Court Finds Suspicionless Boat Searches Unconstitutional

On August 21, 2017, the Pennsylvania Superior decided the case of Commonwealth v. Karash, holding that the government cannot stop a boat without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. This was a case of first impression in Pennsylvania that will affect the thousands of people who utilize Pennsylvania’s waterways each year.

Commonwealth v. Karash

In Karash, the defendant was charged with not having the required safety equipment on his boat. On May 23, 2016, Mr. Karash was fishing on his boat when he was stopped by a waterways conservation officer. The officer did not see Mr. Karash do anything illegal prior to boarding his boat. Regardless, the officer boarded Mr. Karash’s boat to conduct a license check of those who were fishing. After this check was completed, and the occupants were cleared, the officer then performed a safety inspection. During this inspection, the officer determined that Mr. Karash did not have sufficient flotation devices and issued him a citation.

Mr. Karash contested his citation at a hearing. Mr. Karash litigated a Motion to Suppress where he argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to board his vessel in violation of his rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The magisterial district court denied his motion because 30 PA C.S. § 901 (a)(10) allows a waterways conservation officer to board a boat to make sure it is in compliance with the administrative aspects of the Fish and Boat Code (i.e. licensing requirements). It is important to note that this particular provision does not require an officer to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a government official to board one’s boat. After the hearing, Mr. Karash was found guilty of not having the required number of life vests and fined $75.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION?

Typically, a motion to suppress is a motion that asks a court to exclude evidence against a defendant because it was obtained when police acted without “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion.” Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are similar, but distinct legal concepts.  Probable cause is mentioned in both the United States Constitution (the Fourth Amendment) and the Pennsylvania Constitution (Article I, Section 8). In order for the government to arrest you, there must be probable cause that you committed a crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined “probable cause” as “the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 203 (Pa. 2009).

“Reasonable suspicion” is different. Unlike “Probable cause,” reasonable suspicion is not mentioned in either the U.S. or Pennsylvania constitutions. Despite this, courts have allowed police officers and other government officials to stop people on “reasonable suspicion” after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. To be clear, “reasonable suspicion” is not as rigorous a standard as “probable cause.” Additionally, a person cannot be arrested or have their home searched based on “reasonable suspicion.” However, an individual can be detained for an “investigatory detention” based on “reasonable suspicion.”  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court defines “reasonable suspicion” as “a less stringent standard than probable cause…and depends on the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances…a police officer must be able to point to ‘specific and articulable facts’ leading him to suspect that criminality is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2010).   

Typically, the government needs either “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” to detain someone. There are exceptions when the government can make a suspicionless stop of you (i.e. point-of-entry searches at public schools for weapons and DUI checkpoints). In determining whether a suspicionless check will be upheld, Pennsylvania courts employ a “balancing test…wherein the intrusion on the individual of a particular law enforcement practice is balanced against the government’s promotion of legitimate interests.” Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d  1177, 1167 (Pa. 1992). Thus, the issue for the Karash Court was whether suspicionless checks for boats are constitutional.

As stated above, this was a case of first impression. Thus, the Karash Court looked for guidance from other jurisdictions to see how they ruled on this issue. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez. In its decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal government could conduct suspicionless "Customs checks" on vessels with close proximity to the open sea because of the complexity of the documentation required by federal law and the governmental interest in preventing smuggling. Thus, in Villamonte-Marquez, the United States Supreme Court upheld the warrantless and suspicionless search of a ship that resulted in finding thousands of pounds of marijuana.  

Can the Police Search a Boat Without Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause? 

Despite the ruling in Villamonte-Marquez, the Pennsylvania Superior Court declined to follow its holding. In Karash, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held, understandably, that ensuring recreational boater safety on Pennsylvania’s waters is a legitimate government interest. Nonetheless, the Karash Court also held that government had not demonstrated that it was unable to achieve its goal of recreational boater safety by a means other than suspicionless searches. 

The Karash Court analogized the Commonwealth’s waterways to its roads. Specifically, the Court focused on DUI Checkpoints. Pennsylvania allows DUI Checkpoints, but there are extremely strict limitations that the appellate have imposed on police departments in setting up these highly intrusive checkpoints. Police do not have “unfettered discretion” and along with other guidelines (i.e. prior notice, momentary stoppage of drivers, checkpoints placed on roads where DUI’s are more likely, etc.), courts have imposed rules to reduce the intrusiveness of the checkpoints so that they may comply with the Pennsylvania Constitution.  Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1037 (PA 1987).

The Karash Court held that the Commonwealth has not employed these same safeguards on its waterways. As such, the Karash Court held that Mr. Karash’s constitutional rights were violated when the waterways conservation officer boarded his boat without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Thus, Mr. Karash’s conviction was overturned. 

Motions to Suppress

Goldstein Mehta LLC Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

Trials can be won and lost with a motion to suppress. If you are facing criminal charges, you need an attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to litigate these motions even when the law has yet to be conclusively established. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court Permits Appeal of Motion to Suppress Despite Guilty Plea

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Singleton, permitting the defendant to appeal the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress despite the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty. Singleton could have a dramatic impact on plea negotiations throughout the Commonwealth as it suggests that a defendant may be able to litigate a motion to suppress and reserve the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress as part of a negotiated plea. Before Singleton, it was not totally clear whether the Superior Court would reach the merits of an appeal in a case in which the defendant attempted to plead guilty as part of a “conditional guilty plea.”

Types of Guilty Pleas

In general, there are two types of guilty pleas – negotiated guilty pleas and “open” or non-negotiated guilty pleas. In the case of a negotiated guilty plea, the defense and the prosecution reach an agreement as to what charges the defendant will plead guilty and what sentence the judge should impose. For example, if the defendant is charged with felony Robbery but the Commonwealth has a shaky case, the prosecutor may offer a misdemeanor Simple Assault charge and probation in exchange for the guilty plea. The defendant avoids the risk of a felony conviction and jail time, and the prosecution obtains a conviction and restitution for the complainant. Thus, both sides may be happy with the result. When the defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, the judge may not reject the sentence and impose his or her preferred sentence. Instead, if the judge finds that the negotiated plea is either too harsh or too lenient, the judge must permit the defendant to withdraw the plea and go to trial if the defendant wishes to do so. Alternatively, the defendant may proceed to sentencing and allow the judge to decide on the sentence, which is often going to be worse than what was negotiated.

In the case of an open guilty plea, the defendant pleads guilty to the charges without any kind of negotiations. In many cases, the Commonwealth’s plea offer is simply unreasonable and should be rejected. At the same time, the defendant may not have a viable defense to the charges. The judge, who is tasked with resolving the backload of cases in the criminal justice system, may be willing to sentence the defendant to something significantly less than the sentence requested by the prosecution. Unfortunately, losing a trial is far more likely to result in a jail sentence than pleading guilty. Therefore, the defendant who is unlikely to win his or her case may be better served by pleading guilty and focusing on convincing the judge to impose a lighter sentence than the sentence sought by the Commonwealth. In an open guilty plea, both sides may make recommendations, present witnesses and evidence, and argue to the judge for the recommended sentence. The judge will then decide on the sentence. Open pleas are increasingly common due to the elimination of most of Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentence laws.

Conditional Guilty Pleas in Pennsylvania

Following Singleton, there may be a third type of guilty plea called a conditional guilty plea. Conditional pleas are extremely common in New Jersey, but it has not been totally settled whether they are allowed in Pennsylvania. In a conditional guilty plea, a defendant who has lost a pre-trial motion such as a motion to suppress evidence may plead guilty pursuant to negotiations for an agreed upon sentence. As part of the negotiations, the Commonwealth may agree that the defendant can appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. In the case of a normal negotiated or open guilty plea, the defendant retains very few rights on appeal and cannot appeal the denial of a pre-trial motion. A conditional guilty plea allows the defendant to retain the right to appeal specified issues and still enjoy the certainty of the negotiations. Thus, the defendant does not have to risk receiving a greater sentence as a punishment for going to trial solely to preserve appellate rights.

Commonwealth v. Singleton

In Singleton, the defendant was arrested and charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver. The defendant filed a motion to suppress. At the motions hearing, Philadelphia police officers testified that they were on patrol near a major train terminal which was a known location for drug sales. There had also recently been a number of robberies in the area. Officers testified that they saw the defendant wearing a hoodie which appeared to have a heavy object in the pocket. The officers were concerned that the object could be a weapon, so they approached the defendant, who had sat down on a ledge. As the officers approached, the defendant looked at them, took a black bag out of his sweatshirt, and placed it behind him. The officers continued to believe that the bag could contain a weapon.

Police asked the defendant about the bag, and the defendant did not answer. One of the officers testified that he was able to see through the side of bag and that it contained jars of red syrup, which the officer recognized as codeine syrup. The officers arrested the defendant for PWID and found both heroin and marijuana during a search incident to arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the initial encounter with the defendant was only a mere encounter. The trial court further found that the officers observed drugs in plain view, which gave them the necessary probable cause to arrest the defendant and search him. Because police never officially stopped or searched the defendant prior to viewing the drugs, the court denied the motion. After the trial court denied the motion, the defendant entered into a conditional guilty plea with the prosecution. The plea provided for a sentence of 11.5 to 23 months of incarceration to be followed by five years of probation, and the plea agreement specifically provided that the defendant could appeal the denial of the Motion to Suppress.

On appeal, the Superior Court upheld the trial court’s order denying the Motion to Suppress. However, the case is notable for the fact that the Superior Court agreed to reach the merits of the issue despite the fact that the defendant had pleaded guilty. Normally, the guilty plea makes it impossible to challenge the denial of the Motion to Suppress on appeal. Here, the Superior Court ruled that because the plea agreement reserved the right to appeal and the Commonwealth did not object in its brief, the Court could reach the merits of the appeal.  

If this trend is upheld, Singleton creates less risk and more certainty for both sides as the defendant can accept a pre-trial offer for reduced charges or less jail time while still retaining the ability to challenge a wrongfully denied motion to suppress in the Superior Court. The Commonwealth, meanwhile, saves the time and expense of going to trial in a case in which the real defense was a pre-trial motion and not whether or not the defendant committed the crime. In many drug and gun cases, the real issue will be whether the police conducted a legal search and not whether the defendant possessed the contraband in question. Without the ability to enter into a conditional guilty plea, the defendant who has lost a strong motion to suppress has to choose between going to trial and potentially receiving a worse sentence and pleading guilty and waiving the right to appeal. Now, the defendant may not have to make that unfair choice.

Call For A Free Strategy Session With An Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney 

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

As always, if you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have won countless pre-trial motions, bench trials, and jury trials, and we have also successfully resolved many cases through negotiations which resulted in excellent outcomes for our clients. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client, so call 267-225-2545 to speak with one of our experienced and understanding defense attorneys today.