PA Superior Court: If you lie about having a gun while visibly carrying a gun, the police can search you.

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just issued a significant published opinion in Commonwealth v. Toliver, 2026 PA Super 63 (Pa. Super. March 27, 2026), in which it reversed a Philadelphia trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress a firearm and the defendant’s statements. The Superior Court held that when a passenger in a vehicle lies to a police officer about the presence of a firearm during a lawful traffic stop, and the officer subsequently sees the firearm in plain view, the combination of the lie and the plain-view observation provides reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention and frisk. This decision has significant implications for gun cases in Philadelphia and throughout Pennsylvania, and it continues to chip away at the protections that the defense bar had hoped to rely on under Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), and Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142 (Pa. Super. 2021).

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Toliver

On June 19, 2023, a Philadelphia Police Officer and his partner conducted a vehicle stop on the 700 block of West Erie Avenue for an expired registration. The defendant was the front seat passenger in the vehicle, and the defendant’s father was the driver.

When the officer initially approached the vehicle, he spoke to the father and asked for his license and registration. He also asked whether anyone in the vehicle had a license to carry a firearm. The father denied having a license to carry while the defendant stared straight ahead and did not respond. The officer then asked whether there was a firearm in the vehicle, and both the defendant and his father shook their heads no.

The officer testified that he returned to his police vehicle to run the identification cards, and from where he was sitting inside the police vehicle, he could see movement on the passenger side of the car. He described the movement as “bending in an abnormal position,” reaching down between the seats, and quicker than normal reaching movements on both sides of the seats.

The officer then exited his police vehicle and approached the defendant on the passenger side. He testified that as he approached, he saw the defendant reach down to the right side between the arm and the door, clenching something against his body, which made the officer suspicious. The officer asked the driver to turn off the vehicle, took possession of the keys, and then ordered both the defendant and his father to exit. Once the defendant was out of the vehicle, the officer placed his hands on the roof of the car. At that point, the officer noticed the butt end of a pistol sticking out of the rear pocket of the defendant’s athletic shorts and immediately put him in handcuffs. While handcuffing the defendant, the officer asked whether he had a license to carry a firearm, and the defendant responded that he did not. The defendant was then arrested and charged with Carrying a Firearm Without a License (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1)) and Carrying a Firearm on Public Streets in Philadelphia (18 Pa.C.S. § 6108).

The Suppression Court’s Ruling

The defendant moved to suppress the firearm, and the suppression court granted his motion to suppress. The court based its ruling primarily on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), and the Superior Court’s prior decision in Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142 (Pa. Super. 2021). The suppression court found that the police did not have independent reasonable suspicion to investigate whether the defendant had a valid firearms license. The court did not credit the officer’s testimony about furtive movements, finding his description of what he claimed to observe was “extremely vague and equivocal.” The court also found that there was no evidence that the defendant displayed any nervousness during the traffic stop. Although the suppression court acknowledged that the defendant had been untruthful about whether there was a gun in the car, it dismissed this factor, reasoning that lying to the police while not under oath is not a crime.

The suppression court also concluded that the officer should have checked the police databases for the defendant’s licensure status before questioning him about whether he had a license to carry, and it therefore suppressed both the gun and the defendant’s statement admitting he did not have a license to carry. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court reversed the suppression order in a published opinion.

First, the Superior Court accepted the suppression court’s factual findings, including its finding that the movements described by the officer were not furtive and its assessment of the officer’s credibility on that point. However, the Superior Court found that the suppression court committed a legal error by completely disregarding the defendant’s lie about the presence of a firearm in its reasonable suspicion analysis.

The court’s analysis turned on the distinction between this case and Hicks. In Hicks, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the mere possession of a firearm is not alone suggestive of criminal activity and cannot independently support a finding of reasonable suspicion. The Superior Court in Toliver agreed that Hicks controlled the question of whether mere possession alone is sufficient, but it found that the case presented more than mere possession. Specifically, when asked by the officer whether there was a firearm in the car, the defendant affirmatively denied having a gun. The officer later determined that this denial was a lie when he saw the butt of the gun protruding from the defendant’s pocket.

The Superior Court also distinguished Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142 (Pa. Super. 2021), which the defendant and the suppression court had relied upon. In Malloy, the court suppressed evidence because the investigative detention was initiated based solely on the defendant’s mere possession of a firearm, which under Hicks could not support reasonable suspicion. Critically, in Malloy, the lie about the firearm license came after the detention had already begun, and the court found that information developed after the start of the detention could not be used retroactively to justify it. In Toliver, by contrast, the lie about the gun occurred before the officer saw the gun and initiated the investigative detention. Therefore, by the time the officer ordered the defendant out of the car and saw the gun protruding from his pocket, the officer had already detected the lie, and the combination of the lie and the plain-view observation of the gun provided reasonable suspicion.

The Superior Court held that lying to the police about the presence of a firearm, combined with the officer’s subsequent plain-view observation of that firearm, constitutes reasonable suspicion permitting an investigative detention. The court reasoned that the combination of possessing a concealed firearm and lying about that possession leads to natural inferences that the person lied either because they wish to hide the fact that they pose a lethal threat to the officer or to hide that their possession of the firearm is illegal. The court cited Commonwealth v. Metz, 332 A.3d 92, 100 (Pa. Super. 2025), Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 616 (Pa. Super. 2013), and Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997), in support of the well-established principle that providing false information to the police is a factor supporting reasonable suspicion.

The court also held that the frisk was justified because once reasonable suspicion existed for the investigative detention, the officer could reasonably suspect that a passenger who lied about having a gun and was in fact armed was dangerous. It further ruled that the officer’s question about licensure status during the lawful investigative detention was permissible and did not require suppression of the defendant’s admission that he lacked a license.

Finally, the Superior Court rejected the suppression court’s reasoning that the officers should have checked their databases for the defendant’s licensure status before asking about it. The court noted that accepting this reasoning would effectively mandate that all police officers in the Commonwealth run firearms licensing checks as a routine part of every traffic stop, which would inevitably prolong all stops. The court also pointed out that this reasoning directly contradicts the holding of Malloy, which forbids the delay of a car stop to research a passenger’s firearm licensing status in the absence of reasonable suspicion.

The Takeaway

This is a significant and difficult decision for the defense. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Hicks in 2019, defendants have been able to argue that the mere possession of a concealed firearm does not give the police reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate. Toliver narrows that protection considerably by establishing that when a person also lies about having a gun, the lie transforms the encounter into one that supports reasonable suspicion.

The practical impact is considerable. During most traffic stops, officers routinely ask occupants whether there are any weapons in the car. Under Toliver, if an occupant denies having a gun and the police subsequently discover one, the denial itself now provides the additional factor beyond mere possession that the Commonwealth needs to establish reasonable suspicion. This creates a difficult situation for defendants: remaining silent in response to the officer’s question may itself raise suspicion, yet answering untruthfully will now be used against them. Meanwhile, truthfully admitting to having a firearm obviously leads to further investigation as well.

The decision also effectively limits the reach of Malloy by making clear that a detected lie that precedes the investigative detention is distinguishable from information learned during an already-unlawful detention. Defense attorneys handling gun cases will need to pay close attention to the precise timeline of events: when the lie occurred, when the officer observed the gun, and when the detention actually began.

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